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**ANNUAL HISTORICAL SUMMARY
HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE AND SEVENTH ARMY
1 JANUARY TO 31 DECEMBER 1966**



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1 January to 31 December 1966
[RCS CSHIS-6(R2)]

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FOREWORD

(U) The Annual Historical Summary, Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe and Seventh Army, covering the period 1 January - 31 December 1966, complies with AR 870-5, Section VIII [Reports Control Symbol CSHIS-6(R2)].

(U) In addition to describing and analyzing developments of major historical significance in all principal areas of responsibility, the 1966 summary features organizational and functional changes, readiness, planning for the fast relocation of the line of communications (FRELOC), special weapons, and Berlin events.

(U) The staff of the Military History Branch of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, at Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe and Seventh Army, and the 9th, 10th, and 12th Military History Detachments prepared the historical summary from source material available within the headquarters and from interviews with key action officers.



GEORGE E. BLAU
Chief, Military History Branch

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Chapter 1

Organizational and Functional Changes

1. (S) The Merger and Realignment of Headquarters

a. Background. The consolidation of United States Army, Europe (USAREUR), and Seventh Army headquarters had been the subject of numerous staff studies and recommendations since August 1957.¹

As a corollary of President de Gaulle's demand that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military headquarters leave France by 31 March 1967, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) requested the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) to study various possibilities of merging U.S. headquarters in Europe. USEUCOM, in turn, asked USAREUR on 4 May to consider first the merger of USAREUR and Seventh Army headquarters and then that of U.S. Army Area Command (USAACOM) and the U.S. Army Communications Zone, Europe (USACOMZEUR), headquarters within one year after the latter headquarters had completed its relocation from France to Germany. The possibility of consolidating Seventh Army Support Command with USACOMZEUR headquarters was also under consideration.²

¹Memo, GEN H. I. Hodes, CINCUSAREUR to USAREUR G-3 and G-4, 29 Aug 57. In AEAGC-XH files. CONF. Gp-3.

²Cable ECJC-P-07173, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR et al., 4 May 66. SECRET. Gp-3.

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In forwarding the requested plans, USAREUR recommended strongly against the merger with Seventh Army, mainly because it would make the U.S. forces more vulnerable to surprise and would compel Seventh Army headquarters to reassemble and reconstitute during the initial phase of hostilities.³

In late June USEUCOM submitted a consolidated relocation study--including USAREUR's submission--to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They, in turn, informed the Secretary of Defense that they preferred the U.S. Commander in Chief, Europe (USCINCEUR), proposal to colocate USEUCOM with Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE), headquarters in the Brussels area and to retain separate USAREUR and Seventh Army headquarters. However, political considerations made this solution impractical. The Joint Chiefs of Staff considered the relocation of USEUCOM headquarters to Stuttgart--with a small staff element at SHAPE--and the merger of USAREUR and Seventh Army headquarters at Heidelberg as an acceptable alternative.⁴

On 20 July the Secretary of Defense instructed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to implement the merger. As a first step, the Commander in Chief, USAREUR (CINCUSAREUR), was to assume the functions and missions of the Commanding General, Seventh Army, and the two headquarters were to merge at Heidelberg by 1 December. The consolidated headquarters was to assume most of the functions previously performed by the two separate headquarters. The two corps, Seventh Army Support Command, and other headquarters were to assume certain specific functions. The merged headquarters was to maintain a capability to augment NATO's Central Army Group (CENTAG) headquarters in the event of war, to reconstitute and split off Seventh Army headquarters, and to provide the nucleus for the wartime USAREUR (theater army) headquarters.⁵

³ Cable SX-3501, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 24 May 66.
SECRET. Gp-4.

⁴ Cable JCS-5845, JCS to USCINCEUR, 1 Jul 66. SECRET.
Gp-3.

⁵ (1) Rept, USEUCOM Ad Hoc Committee on Relocation Alternatives to D/USCINCEUR, 25 Jun 66. AEAGC. NOFORN. (2) Cable JCS-7185, JCS to USCINCEUR, 20 Jul 66. (3) Cable 11123, Secy State to AMEMB Bonn, 20 Jul 66. (4) Cable ECJC-P-10802, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 23 Jul 66. NOFORN. All SECRET. Gp-3.

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The Secretary of Defense announced the merger on 23 July in Washington and granted authority for simultaneous announcements in Bonn, Heidelberg, and Paris.⁶

b. The Merger of USAREUR and Seventh Army Headquarters.
CINCUSAREUR immediately formed a special task group and initiated planning for the headquarters consolidation (HEADCON). The implementation plan included a schedule that covered each step of the merger until its completion by 1 December.⁷

According to this plan, as modified in November, CINCUSAREUR continued to command CENTAG and assumed command of Seventh Army in peacetime. He had two deputies, both lieutenant generals. As the Commanding General, Seventh Army Designate, the Deputy CINCUSAREUR for Seventh Army was responsible for the readiness of Seventh Army units to perform their peacetime and wartime missions. In time of war, or as directed, he would use the reconstituted Seventh Army headquarters to assume operational control or command of Seventh Army. The other deputy--the Deputy CINCUSAREUR and Chief of Staff--continued to function as chief of staff in peacetime. In time of war, or when directed, he would become the deputy theater army commander. The organization of the remainder of USAREUR headquarters underwent relatively minor changes (Charts 1 and 2).

In instructions to USAREUR, the Department of the Army stressed the importance of keeping the historic identity of Seventh Army conspicuously in public view. The primary objective was to preserve the continued identity of Seventh Army as a major field force in Europe.

There was to be no consolidation, as defined in AR 220-5, of the designations U.S. Army, Europe, and Seventh Army. Each headquarters was to retain its separate identity. Seventh Army headquarters was to be at zero strength and remain on the rolls of the Army as active, but unfilled. Thus, effective 1 December 1966, the headquarters staffs of USAREUR and Seventh Army operated as one headquarters under the designation Headquarters, United States Army, Europe, and Seventh Army (hereafter referred


⁶ Cable 7428, SECDEF to USCINCEUR et al., 22 Jul 66. UNCLAS.

⁷ Intvw, Mr. G. E. Blau, C/USAREUR Ops Div Mil Hist Sec, with COL R. G. Marriott, Chairman, HEADCON Task Gp, 30 Aug 66. UNCLAS.

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HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE

1 January 1966



* Logistics Division included the Engineer and Installations Directorate, Materiel Readiness Directorate, Supply and Services Directorate, and Transportation Directorate.


---General Staff supervision.

SOURCE: USAREUR Dir of Key Pers, Dec 65. UNCLAS.

CHART 1 (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE and SEVENTH ARMY

31 December 1966



* Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics, included the Materiel Readiness Directorate, Supply and Services Directorate, Transportation Directorate, and Plans and Programs Directorate.

--- General Staff supervision.

SOURCE: USAREUR Dir of Key Pers, Dec 66. UNCLAS.

CHART 2 (U)

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to as USAREUR).⁸ The designation "Headquarters, Seventh Army" continued to appear in correspondence and communications pertaining to NATO exercises and war plans. All directives and messages issued to NATO subordinate commands remained in effect.⁹

Most of the major commands reporting directly to Seventh Army also reported to the merged headquarters. Until 30 November USAREUR had five major commands: Seventh Army, USACOMZEUR, U.S. Army Southern European Task Force (USASETAF), U.S. Army, Berlin (USAB), and USAACOM (Chart 3). After the merger Seventh Army disappeared from the chain of command; however, V Corps, VII Corps, Seventh Army Support Command, and the 32d Army Air Defense Command (AADC) became additional major commands directly subordinate to USAREUR headquarters (Chart 4).¹⁰

Other significant changes in command relationships included the attachment of the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment--responsible for rear area security--to V Corps, the assignment of the Seventh Army Training Center to USAREUR, and the placement of the Seventh Army Noncommissioned Officers' Academy under U.S. Army School, Europe (USASCHEUR). All three had been directly subordinate to Seventh Army.¹¹

c. Housing, Spaces, and Funding. In August the HEADCON Task Group secured housing for all the families scheduled to move from Stuttgart and to arrive from the United States. The 600 housing units vacant in the Heidelberg and Mannheim areas satisfied these requirements. To find office space at Campbell

⁸(1) Cable DA-796059, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 6 Jan 67. (2) Cable SC-10844, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 10 Jan 67. (3) Cable DA-797276, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 16 Jan 67. (4) USAREUR GO 31, 3 Feb 67. All UNCLAS.

⁹Cable SX-6327, CINCUSAREUR to COMCENTAG et al., 21 Nov 66. SECRET. Gp-3.

¹⁰(1) USAREUR Briefing for SA, 12 Oct 66. AEAGC. UNCLAS. (2) App 1 to Anx A to USAREUR Curr Op Order 2-66. AEAGC-CO. CONF (info used UNCLAS). (3) Cables SC-50958 and 53305, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 21 Nov and 8 Dec 66. Both UNCLAS.

¹¹USAREUR Briefing for SA, cited above. UNCLAS.


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
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ORGANIZATION OF UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
1 January 1966



SOURCE: (1) USAREUR Reg 10-5, 1 Dec 65, subj: Designation of Commands, Units, and Activities of the United States Army, Europe. (2) USAREUR GO 411, 2 Dec 65. Both UNCLAS.

ORGANIZATION OF UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
31 December 1966



SOURCE: USAREUR Reg 10-5, 16 Dec 66, subj: Designation of Commands, Units, and Activities of the United States Army, Europe. UNCLAS.

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Barracks--the location of the consolidated headquarters--USAREUR had to transfer a number of agencies to other facilities.¹²

On 18 August the Deputy Secretary of Defense decided to relocate USEUCOM Headquarters to Stuttgart when the Seventh Army facilities became available. He did not authorize any new family housing construction and directed the use of lease and rental procedures. The Department of the Army was to fund both moves by reprogramming FY 1967 resources. He limited the military strength ceiling of the merged Army headquarters to 3,780, including 2,697 USAREUR and 1,083 Seventh Army headquarters and direct support personnel.¹³ These figures represented a reduction of 534 from the 4,314 military spaces that USAREUR had recommended in the HEADCON plan, and a 32 percent cut from the March 1966 combined military strength of USAREUR and Seventh Army headquarters. The Department of Defense cut the funds authorized for the movement of Seventh Army personnel, facility modifications, and communications proportionately and reduced USAREUR's request for additional classrooms for the dependents' schools in Heidelberg from 17 to 5.¹⁴

d. Other Actions. The implementation of the HEADCON stationing plan affected approximately 14,000 troops. USAREUR alerted units and staffs for movement, diverted incoming personnel to Heidelberg, gradually consolidated functions, and transferred the individuals assigned to the merged headquarters as soon as possible. It also completed and forwarded 17 tables of distribution and allowances (TDA's) for the consolidated headquarters and affected units and published the operations order governing the merger of headquarters on 29 October.¹⁵

¹²DF, USAREUR DCSOPS to CoFS, 11 Aug 66, subj: HEADCON Implementation - Information for Ministerial Director Weise, FMF, Bonn. AEAGA-M. CONF. Gp-4.

¹³Cable JCS-1053, JCS to USCINCEUR, 25 Aug 66. SECRET. Gp-3.

¹⁴Cable JCS 1056, JCS to USCINCEUR, 25 Aug 66. SECRET. Gp-3.

¹⁵(1) Cables SX-4992, 5485, and 5932, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 31 Aug, 29 Sep, and 27 Oct 66. All SECRET. (2) Ltr, same to distr, 29 Oct 66, subj: United States Army, Europe, Current Operations Order 2-66. AEAGC-CO. CONF. Both Gp-4. (3) Cables SC-51407 and 52408, same to DA, 22 and 30 Nov 66. Both UNCLAS.

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The operations order called for establishing the main communication facility of Seventh Army Command Post at Schwetzingen on 14 November and for moving the headquarters personnel to Heidelberg after 1 December, when Seventh Army headquarters would cease to be operational.¹⁶ To find space for the expanding staff divisions, USAREUR moved a number of agencies out of Campbell Barracks. For instance, the Special Ammunition Support Command (SASCOM) moved to Frankfurt,¹⁷ the Engineering Agency of the U.S. Army Strategic Communications Command-Europe (USASTRATCOM-EUR) to the Autobahn Kaserne near Mannheim, and the vehicle registry and the 42d MP Detachment (Customs) to the Heidelberg Shopping Center. To carry out these moves, USAREUR had to relocate several other units and activities.¹⁸

On 3 October CINCUSAREUR approved the internal space utilization plan for movements within Campbell Barracks; during the following weeks USAREUR started minor construction projects and moved Labor Service personnel to Heidelberg to assist in the construction.¹⁹

e. Completion of the Merger. By 1 December all but a few units and personnel moves had taken place as scheduled. The Seventh Army functions and personnel had been completely integrated into USAREUR headquarters.

The merged headquarters assumed most of the functions for which USAREUR and Seventh Army had previously been responsible, except that V Corps became the action headquarters for airborne

¹⁶(1) USAREUR Curr Op Order 2-66. AEAGC-CO. (2) Cable SX-6283, CINCUSAREUR to distr, 18 Nov 66. Both CONF. Gp-4.

¹⁷Cable SC-47247, CINCUSAREUR to Seventh Army et al., 19 Oct 66. UNCLAS.

¹⁸(1) Cable SC-42222, CINCUSAREUR to Cmdr EES, 14 Sep 66. (2) DF's, USAREUR HTG to Ops Br, 23 and 30 Sep 66, subj: HEADCON Implementation. AEAGC. (3) Cable SC-44809, CINCUSAREUR to USASAE. (4) Cable SC-44822, same to USAACOM. Both 1 Oct 66. All UNCLAS.

¹⁹(1) DF, USAREUR DCSOPS to distr, 10 Oct 66, subj: HEADCON Implementation. AEAGC. UNCLAS. (2) Cable SX-5932, 27 Oct 66, cited above. SECRET. Gp-4.

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training. Seventh Army's two command management maintenance inspection (CMMI) teams went--together with the function--to the 32d AADC and to USAREUR and Seventh Army Troops, respectively. The USAREUR Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics (DCSLOG), exercised staff supervision over both teams.

Three new organizations became operational. The first--the Seventh Army Communications Command, created by eliminating the 12th Signal Group--was subordinate to USAREUR and Seventh Army Troops and functioned under the technical supervision of the USAREUR Deputy Chief of Staff, Communications-Electronics (DCSC-E). It operated the tactical army command and area communications, automatic data processing, air and motor messenger service, and cryptologic systems. In wartime it would provide command and control for Seventh Army signal troops, and its commander would become the Seventh Army Signal Officer.

The second new organization--the Aviation Group--was under the operational and technical control of the USAREUR Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations (DCSOPS), and under the command of the Commanding General, USAREUR and Seventh Army Troops. In peacetime it provided command and control and administrative supervision for assigned or attached aviation units and activities and was the aviation operational agency for the merged headquarters. It controlled Army aviation, executed the Mohawk side-looking airborne radar (SLAR) border program, established aviation and safety standards, and conducted aviation training as directed. In wartime the group--augmented with personnel from the merged headquarters staff--would provide the nucleus of Seventh Army's Aviation Section.

The third of the new commands--the USAREUR Engineer Command (Provisional)--became a USAREUR Assigned Unit. The headquarters of the command, organized at Frankfurt on 1 November, consisted of personnel formerly assigned to the 7th Engineer Brigade Headquarters and Headquarters Company and to the USAREUR Engineer Element. By combining the two, USAREUR unified the engineer construction effort, since the provisional command supervised both troop and contract construction. The principal missions of the new command were to exercise command and control over assigned units--specifically the 24th, 32d, and 39th Engineer Groups--to execute U.S. Army and Air Force construction projects in Germany and other specified areas, and to perform real estate functions in the Federal Republic.²⁰

²⁰(1) App 1 to Anx A to USAREUR Curr Op Order 2-66. AEAGC-CO. CONF (info used UNCLAS). (2) USAREUR GO 256, 1 Oct 66. UNCLAS.

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On 1 December USAREUR discontinued, inactivated, redesignated, and reorganized the engineer elements involved in the activation of Headquarters and Headquarters Company, USAREUR Engineer Command. The authorized strength of the new command totaled 66 officer, 7 warrant officer, 210 enlisted, 93 Department of the Army civilian, 279 local national, and 1,094 Labor Service spaces.²¹

f. Minimum Personnel Requirements. The authorized military strength of USAREUR headquarters had been 923 spaces and that of Seventh Army headquarters 903 spaces. The approved HEADCON plan showed a total of 1,413 military spaces for the merged headquarters without support units, a saving of 413 military spaces from the authorized strength of the separate headquarters. In implementation of the JCS cut from 4,314 to 3,780 military personnel for the merged headquarters and direct support units, USAREUR further reduced the total number of military spaces for the merged headquarters from 1,413 to 1,203.

At the time of readiness tests, alerts, or during NATO exercises, the merged headquarters would have to assign first priority to augmenting CENTAG headquarters with 141 military personnel and reestablishing Seventh Army headquarters, which--at 82 percent of TOE strength--would require 547 military personnel. The establishment of theater army headquarters would have second priority. At full strength, the merged headquarters would be able to provide 515 military personnel as the nucleus of theater army headquarters. However, until the officer manning level of USAREUR and Seventh Army headquarters increased to 100 percent, there would be a shortfall in the number of officers remaining for the theater army headquarters.²²

2. (S) Realignment of Intelligence Missions and Resources

a. Background. In 1965 CINCUSAREUR had approved a concept for the realignment of intelligence missions and the redistribution of the personnel resources of subordinate intelligence elements. The concept had called for withdrawing counterintelligence and security missions, together with the personnel performing them, from USASETAF and USACOMZEUR, with the reorganized 513th

²¹Cable SC-49959, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 10 Nov 66. UNCLAS.

²²(1) DF, USAREUR HEADCON Merger Task Gp to CofS, 6 Oct 66, subj: HEADCON Implementation. AEAGC. (2) Memo, TIG to CofSA, 8 Oct 66, subj: Annual General Inspection, FY 1967, Hq USAREUR. IG ID. (3) Intvw, Mr. Blau with LTC L. P. Bayard, USAREUR ODCSPER Plans Div, 30 Jan 67. All SECRET. Gp-4.

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Intelligence Corps (INTC) Group--directly subordinate to USAREUR headquarters--absorbing both functions and personnel. Similarly, the Seventh Army would transfer part of its counterintelligence mission and personnel to the 513th INTC Group, retaining responsibility primarily for installations and personnel security. Unlike USASETAF and USACOMZEUR, Seventh Army would retain both military intelligence and counterintelligence units in its structure; however, in peacetime the collection company would be under the operational control of the 513th INTC Group, whereas it would revert to Seventh Army control in wartime.²³

b. Developments During 1966. Since Seventh Army had objected to the transfer of part of its counterintelligence mission, USAREUR decided to implement only the realignment of the counterintelligence missions of USASETAF and USACOMZEUR, and to transfer 167 military spaces from these two commands to the 513th INTC Group during 1966.²⁴

At the same time, however, USAREUR requested Seventh Army to review its counterintelligence requirements and structure. Specifically, Seventh Army was to consider the resources it would need for counterintelligence missions both in peacetime and in war; to consider adopting a standard TOE military intelligence (MI) battalion in lieu of the current MI group and MI company structure; to examine the organization and stationing of the 2d MI Aerial Reconnaissance Surveillance Battalion; and to consider the desirability of organizing Seventh Army intelligence units in keeping with the 80-, 90-, or 100-percent of TOE authorization concept.²⁵

Early in May the 513th INTC Group proposed an interim reorganization to permit a smooth transition to the USAREUR concept later in the year. Under this plan the Group would have four new deputy commanders: The Deputy for Support would

²³USAREUR Anl Hist Sum, 1965, pp. 158 - 60. TS (info used SECRET. Gp-3).

²⁴(1) DF, DCSI to CofS, 6 Apr 66, subj: Realignment of Intelligence Activities (U). AEAGB-P(O&T). (2) Cable SX-2856, CINCUSAREUR to Seventh Army et al., 14 Apr 66. Both SECRET. Gp-3.

²⁵(1) Ltr, USAREUR CofS to Seventh Army CofS, 14 Apr 66. GB 46-0279. (2) Intvw, Mr. B. H. Siemon, USAREUR Ops Div Mil Hist Sec with LTC J. H. Martin, USAREUR Intel Div, 14 Jun 66. Both SECRET. Gp-3.

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supervise the Group's Headquarters and Service Company, Personnel and Administration and Logistics Branches, Signal Detachment, the Intelligence Support Battalion that supported the USAREUR Intelligence Division, and the U.S. Army Development Laboratory. The Deputy for Counterintelligence would supervise the Group's Counterintelligence Branch with subordinate stations and field offices in major cities in the Federal Republic of Germany (F.R.G.), the USAREUR Central Registry, the Operations and Research Detachment, the Interservice Refugee Coordination Detachment, and the Defense Scientist Immigration Program. The Deputy for Special Collections would supervise the Group's Operations Branch, a tactical radio support element, the 531st MI Company, and five operations offices located in major F.R.G. cities and in Vicenza, Italy. The Deputy for General Collections would supervise the overt collection mission performed by the assigned C&I Battalion, including the Army Interrogation Unit of the Defector Reception Center (AIU/DRC) and the Army element of the Joint Refugee Operations Center (JROC), Berlin.²⁶

The 513th INTC Group proposal was not entirely in keeping with USAREUR's concepts, which envisaged a group headquarters with two INTC detachments for counterintelligence and collection, and two MI battalions responsible for support and for interrogation and translation. The responsibilities of these four elements would be the same as those of the four deputies, but the alignment of subordinate elements would differ.²⁷

The 513th INTC Group replied that its realignment proposal was merely an interim step and that it would submit a draft TOE for its organization reflecting the USAREUR concept. The TOE would provide for a group headquarters with the 766th and 430th INTC Detachments--responsible for counterintelligence activities in France and Italy and special collection activities in USAREUR--and two as yet unnumbered interrogation and translation and intelligence support battalions.²⁸ The 513th INTC Group then

²⁶Ltr, CO 513th INTC Gp to distr, 2 May 66, subj: 513th INTC Group Realignment of 1 June 1966 (C), w/annexes. AEUM-DO. SECRET. Gp-3.

²⁷Ltr, USAREUR DCSI to CO 513th INTC Gp, 4 May 66, subj: Realignment of 513th Intelligence Corps Group (U). AEAGB-P(O&T). SECRET. Gp-3.

²⁸Ltrs, 513th INTC Gp to USAREUR DCSI, 6 and 10 May 66, subj: 513th INTC Group Realignment of 1 June 1966 (C). AEUM-DO. SECRET. Gp-3.

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proceeded with its interim reorganization as outlined above, which became effective 1 June.²⁹

USAREUR meanwhile considered the question of personnel spaces. A joint Army/Air Force activity, the European Special Activities Facility (ESAF), had an immediate requirement for 24 spaces that USAREUR would have to furnish through the 513th INTC Group. The intelligence data handling system (IDHS), approved by both the Department of the Army and the Defense Intelligence Agency, would require 35 additional personnel spaces. Finally, as part of the intelligence realignment, USAREUR expected that the Department of the Army would publish during the first quarter of FY 1967 a TOE for a technical intelligence company. USAREUR planned to activate the company at 80 percent of authorized strength and to obtain the necessary personnel resources by discontinuing its technical intelligence detachments and by adding approximately 30 spaces. USAREUR would thus need a total of 89 additional military personnel spaces. Since the consolidation of the 766th and 430th INTC Detachments into the 513th INTC Group would result in a saving of 32 military spaces, USAREUR requested the Department of the Army to furnish 57 additional military personnel spaces. In order to meet the established need, even if the Department of the Army did not furnish the requested spaces, USAREUR intended to transfer 12 officer and 45 enlisted spaces from Seventh Army to the 513th INTC Group.³⁰

USAREUR transferred the 57 spaces on 21 December. However, since the Department of the Army did not provide a TOE for a technical intelligence company, the USAREUR Technical Intelligence Center (UTIC) remained unchanged at the end of 1966.³¹

In the meantime, USAREUR had proceeded with steps to implement the other aspects of the reorganization. Thus, effective 1 August

²⁹ 513th INTC Gp GO 40, 16 May 66. CONF. Gp-3.

³⁰ (1) DF, DCSI to CofS, 10 May 66, subj: Manpower Resources for the 513th Intelligence Corps (INTC) Group (U). AEAGB-P(O&T). (2) Cable SX-3564, CINCUSAREUR to DA. (3) Cable SX-3565, same to Seventh Army and 513th INTC Gp. Both 27 May 66. All SECRET. Gp-3.

³¹ (1) Intvws, Mr. Siemon with LTC Martin, 9 Dec 66 and 16 Feb 67. CONF. Gp-3. (2) MV 66 ML-1-67, 21 Dec 66. UNCLAS.

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USAREUR transferred operational control of the 766th INTC Detachment, together with responsibility for counterintelligence support of all U.S. Army forces in France, to the 513th INTC Group; however, the detachment remained temporarily assigned to USACOMZEUR.³² On 1 October USAREUR assigned both the 766th and 430th INTC Detachments to the 513th INTC Group but left them at Orleans and Vicenza, respectively.³³

Although the initial phase of the reorganization was thus complete by 1 October, the 513th INTC Group was still organized under the interim four-deputy system. The Group had assumed all counterintelligence functions within USAREUR's area of jurisdiction, except for the five southernmost Laender (states) of the Federal Republic of Germany. There, Seventh Army exercised the counterintelligence functions primarily through the 66th INTC Group, with the assistance of the corps and division MI detachments.³⁴

Responding to departmental directives, in October and November USAREUR changed the designations of its major intelligence units from INTC to MI groups and detachments. Missions, responsibilities, and assignments remained unchanged.³⁵

Finally, upon implementation of the USAREUR and Seventh Army headquarters merger on 1 December, the 66th MI Group became-- like the 513th MI Group--a USAREUR Assigned Unit directly subordinate to the merged headquarters.³⁶

3. (S) Redesignation of the 32d Artillery Brigade. In late December 1965 the redesignation of the 32d Artillery Brigade had been under consideration. Noting that the brigade's strength

³²Cable SX-4500, CINCUSAREUR to USACOMZEUR and 513th INTC Gp, 1 Aug 66. CONF. Gp-3.

³³(1) USAREUR GO 255, 29 Sep 66. (2) 513th INTC Gp GO 92, 8 Oct 66. Both CONF. Gp-3.

³⁴Intyws, Mr. Siemon with LTC Martin, 9 Dec 66 and 27 Feb 67. CONF. Gp-3.

³⁵USAREUR GO's 268 and 302, 14 Oct and 23 Nov 66. UNCLAS.

³⁶See Chart 4. UNCLAS.

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approximated that of a ROAD division--14,000--USAREUR recommended its redesignation as an army air defense division to illustrate the magnitude of the United States' contribution to NATO air defense. In addition to the political advantage of tabulating the United States' contribution to the defense of NATO as equivalent to seven divisions instead of six, the organization of USAREUR's air defense forces along lines comparable to USAFE's 86th Air Division (Air Defense) would enhance the coordination of the air defense effort.³⁷

In January 1966 the Department of the Army concurred in the rationale for the USAREUR proposal, but disapproved the designation of air defense division on the grounds that NATO nations might interpret such a move as a prelude to the withdrawal of a division size force.³⁸ Eventually, the Department of the Army chose the designation 32d Army Air Defense Command (AADC); the redesignation ceremonies took place on 11 May at Kaiserslautern, Germany.³⁹

³⁷(1) DF, DCSOPS to CofS, 23 Dec 65, subj: Redesignation of Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 32d Artillery Brigade (Air Defense) (U). (2) Cable SX-8120, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 27 Dec 65. Both SECRET. Gp-4.

³⁸Cable DA-748131, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 21 Jan 66. SECRET. Gp-4.

³⁹(1) Cable DA-760239, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 14 Apr 66. (2) USAREUR GO 84, 25 Apr 66. (3) The Stars and Stripes (Eur. ed.), 12 May 66, p. 2. All UNCLAS.

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Chapter 2

Readiness

4. (S) Measures To Improve Readiness

Throughout 1966 the Department of the Army readiness program, based on AR 220-1 (Unit Readiness) published on 28 July 1965, was one of USAREUR's principal tools for the management of manpower and materiel.

a. Revision of AR 220-1. In May 1966 the Department of the Army indicated that it intended to revise the regulation in order to improve the readiness program and called for comments and recommendations on the proposed changes. The tentative publication date for the revised regulation was 1 October, and it was to become effective on 31 December. In reply USAREUR recommended a minimum delay of 120 days between publication and effectiveness dates to allow for dissemination and orientation at the lowest troop level. The text of the regulation should not require amplifying instructions by intermediate commanders, and units commanders should not be held responsible for readiness conditions beyond their control. Finally, USAREUR recommended that the revised regulations include a 10-day extension of readiness reporting suspense dates for all levels of commands.

Based on these and other comments, the Department of the Army decided to publish the revised AR early in 1967 with an effectiveness date of 1 April.¹

¹(1) Cable SC-33168, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 30 Jun 66. (2) Cable SC-15536, same to V Corps et al., 16 Feb 67. Both UNCLAS.

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b. Changes in REDCAPE Criteria. In March the Department of the Army revised its readiness capabilities (REDCAPE) criteria because the support of Vietnam operations, revisions in the program and budget guidance, and the need for using all available resources invalidated in large measure the existing standards. To balance resources on a worldwide basis, the Department needed each major command's full TOE and table of distribution (TD) requirements and the actual general order strength authorizations. REDCAPE's were not tools for expressing desired requirements; they expressed actual allocations of programmed spaces and materiel.

Until March allocations of manpower spaces had been the sole basis for REDCAPE's; the Department of the Army desired to expand this basis by including logistic considerations. Accordingly, in addition to manpower space authorizations, assets of reportable items versus TOE authorizations, the amount of limited standard and overage equipment issued in lieu of current models, and the availability of TOE maintenance equipment would determine the assignment of a REDCAPE.²

USAREUR fully subscribed to establishing valid REDCAPE's for the entire Army by 31 December 1966. For this purpose it wanted to take advantage of the new G-series TOE's to increase the flexibility of the organizational structure at division level. USAREUR also requested an extension of the suspense date for submitting REDCAPE's and modified TOE's (MTOE's) for the 2d quarter of FY 1967 from 30 June to 30 September 1966 so that it could balance all TOE and TD units at one time. In granting this request, the Department of the Army stated that, according to a recently completed study, the combinations of the readiness system, current organizational policies, and the New Army Authorization Document System (NAADS) constituted a sound management system.³

c. The New Army Authorization Document System. Toward the end of 1966 the Department of the Army directed the acceleration

(2) Cables DA-754870 and 755426, DA to CINCUSAREUR et al., 15 and 17 Mar 66. Both CONF. Gp-4.

(3) (1) Cable SX-2436, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 24 Mar 66. SECRET.
(2) Cable DA-757803, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 30 Mar 66. CONF. Both Gp-4.

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of NAADS and the completion of the conversion by 1 July 1967.⁴ All major commands were to update previously submitted tables of distribution and allowance (TDA's) or submit TDA's for units not previously converted to NAADS; they were to complete these actions before 15 May 1967, reflecting authorization and requirements data as of 31 December 1966. Since the acceleration of NAADS imposed a heavy workload, the Department of the Army granted a moratorium on most MTOE, TDA, and modified TDA (MTDA) submissions and postponed indefinitely the submission of mobilization TD's. As a contribution to the systems documentation effort in Europe, the U.S. Continental Army Command (USCONARC) was to provide the initial NAADS package to USAREUR.⁵

By 31 October USAREUR had submitted modified TOE's conforming to NAADS for all its units. During the last two months of 1966, the Department of the Army approved some of these MTOE's, but the majority awaited approval. The Department of the Army had processed 60 of the 225 TDA's USAREUR had submitted, and the remainder had a suspense date of 15 May 1967. Upon completion, the conversion to NAADS would contribute to readiness by standardizing the authorization document system throughout the Army.⁶

d. New Training Directive. In August USAREUR published a new training directive that aimed toward improving combat effectiveness in small units--the units that win battles. The directive was also keyed to the training of leaders and the integration of new doctrine, weapons, equipment, organizations, and techniques.

USAREUR's training doctrine was based on the concept that the squad, section, and platoon leaders were responsible for

⁴The original schedule called for completion of the worldwide conversion to NAADS within two years following 1 October 1965. (See USAREUR Anl Hist Sum, 1965, p. 21. TS [info used UNCLAS].)

⁵(1) Cable DA-796258, DA to USCONARC, 6 Jan 67. (2) Cable DA-796292, DA to CINCUSAREUR et al., 9 Jan 67. Both UNCLAS.

⁶(1) Briefing Paper, DCSOPS Force Dev Br, subj: New Army Authorization Document System (NAADS). (2) Intvw, CPT E. J. Lee, USAREUR ODCSOPS Mil Hist Br, with LTC J. G. Brunt, C/ODCSOPS Org & Equip Br, 8 Mar 67. Both UNCLAS.

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training their units. Training was to raise the standards of individual skills, to perfect teamwork in crews, squads, sections, platoons, and companies, and to develop the unit leaders' initiative, resourcefulness, and capability for independent action. Another major training objective was to maintain unit integrity at the squad, section, and platoon level continuously throughout the year.⁷

e. Restationing. In 1966 USAREUR continued to emphasize its policy of keeping unprogramed unit moves to a minimum. The following table shows the restationing actions taken during the year:

<u>Month</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>4th Armd Div Restationing</u>	<u>FRELOC/ HEADCON</u>	<u>Other Moves</u>
TOTAL	<u>155</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>44</u>	<u>93</u>
January	<u>24</u>	--	--	24
February	<u>3</u>	--	--	3
March	<u>11</u>	--	--	11
April	<u>5</u>	--	--	5
May	<u>9</u>	--	--	9
June	<u>18</u>	5	--	13
July	<u>16</u>	5	--	11
August	<u>4</u>	--	--	4
September	<u>4</u>	--	--	4
October	<u>10</u>	--	5	5
November	<u>28</u>	6	21	1
December	<u>23</u>	2	18	3

USAREUR initiated or authorized 93 of these moves to consolidate activities or improve the performance of peacetime missions. The 18 moves directed in connection with the 4th Armored Division restationing improved USAREUR's readiness and wartime posture. Finally, the implementation of the merger of USAREUR and Seventh Army headquarters and the withdrawal of U.S. forces from France required 44 moves during the last two months of 1966.⁸

⁷USAREUR Reg 350-5, USAREUR Training Directive, 12 Aug 66.
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⁸Extracted from AEAGC-OR files. CONF. Gp-4.

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f. The USAREUR Supply Review Team. In November the Chief of Staff, Department of the Army, directed CINCUSAREUR to review his supply system to determine the factors contributing to supply turbulence and delays, to analyze command controls and reports to ascertain their conformance to established logistic system policies and procedures, and to recommend--if appropriate--changes to current Department supply directives.⁹

To accomplish these objectives, USAREUR established a special team to conduct an initial review of all previous reports and identify the most repetitive problem areas. On completion of this review, the team would visit selected USAREUR units and organizations to obtain additional information on current supply operations.¹⁰

5. (S) Effects of the Personnel Drawdown on Readiness

a. The Personnel Levies. Early in February the Department of the Army decided to build up the training establishment in the United States to support military operations in Vietnam. For this purpose it withdrew personnel from all commands, both by diverting and by curtailing individuals.¹¹ The procedures used for officers and enlisted man differed.

(1) Officers. The Department of the Army issued orders for individual officers and informed USAREUR periodically of projected withdrawals, simultaneously establishing new manning levels. It intended not to withdraw more than 50 percent of USAREUR's authorized strength in any given branch, although it could not maintain 50 percent of strength by grade within the branches.¹²

⁹Cable DA-791061, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 21 Nov 66. CONF. NOTORN. Gp-4.

¹⁰Cable SC-10510, CINCUSAREUR to distr, 4 Jan 67. UNCLAS.

¹¹(1) Cable DA-750670, DA from DCSPER to CINCUSAREUR et al., 11 Feb 66. (2) Cable DA-751563, DA from OPXR to CINCUSAREUR, 18 Feb 66. UNCLAS. (3) Cable SX-2816, CINCUSAREUR to Seventh Army et al., 12 Apr 66. Both (1) and (3) SECRET. Gp-4.

¹²(1) Cable DA-751563, 18 Feb 66, cited above. (2) Cable SX-1998, CINCUSAREUR to Seventh Army et al., 28 Feb 66. (3) Intvw, Mr. B. H. Siemon, USAREUR Ops Div Mil Hist Sec, with LTC H. J. Bowman, USAREUR Pers Div, 21 Jun 66. (4) Cable SX-2535, CINCUSAREUR to Seventh Army et al., 29 Mar 66. All SECRET. Gp-4.

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A series of withdrawals and manning level revisions in the ensuing months brought the cumulative loss of officers through direct curtailments to 4,527--221 lieutenant colonels, 764 majors, 3,284 company grade officers, and 258 warrant officers. Most affected were the combat arms, with 1,196 artillery, 710 infantry, and 574 armor officers accounting for approximately 55 percent of the losses.¹³

By late September the shortage of officers at the battalion and company level was so acute that a number of battalions had as few as seven officers. In one artillery battalion two of the batteries had no officers so that noncommissioned officers were in command; another battalion had only two officers in its headquarters, and one of these--a captain--occupied five TOE positions, including that of battalion executive officer.

While this situation gave younger officers an opportunity to assume positions of responsibility, the advantages of the challenge were more than offset by the frustrations attendant upon even the most capable officers being unable to perform a large number of functions well.¹⁴

The downward trend in officer strength reversed itself in October, and thereafter improved steadily.

(2) Enlisted Men. The Department of the Army used three methods for withdrawing enlisted personnel. In February it curtailed by name certain personnel scheduled to return to the United States in April and May, directing them to report not later than 31 March; it also diverted to units in the United States the majority of advanced individual training (AIT) graduates earmarked for USAREUR; and finally, it imposed a number of personnel levies, specifying military occupation specialties (MOS's) and grades, but leaving the actual selection of individuals to USAREUR.¹⁵ The Department promised, however, not to reduce USAREUR below 20 percent of its authorized strength in any single MOS.¹⁶

¹³USAREUR Readiness Briefing, 7 Mar 67, pp. 24 - 25. AEAGC-OR SECRET (info used CONF). NOFORN. Gp-4.

¹⁴Memo, MG J. A. Richardson, III, TIG to CofSA, 18 Oct 66, subj: Annual General Inspection, FY 1967, Headquarters, United States Army, Europe (U). IG ID. SECRET. Gp-4.

¹⁵(1) Cable SX-1998, 28 Feb 66, cited above. (2) DF, AG to CofS, 4 Apr 66, subj: Drawdown of Enlisted Personnel (U). AEAAG. Both SECRET. Gp-4.

¹⁶Cable SX-2535, 29 Mar 66, cited above. SECRET. Gp-4.

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USAREUR received its first levy late in February; subsequent levies and Department of the Army adjustments raised the total of enlisted personnel withdrawn by levy to 28,199, for a total loss of 29,789, including 1,590 personnel curtailed. The heaviest losses were in grades E-5 (10,076) and E-6 (7,131), followed by E-4 (3,868) and E-7 (2,750). The situation was aggravated by the fact that normal rotation continued to remove personnel from the command, while the Department of the Army sent virtually no replacements until May. The number of enlisted man present for duty dropped from 205,828 on 1 January to 180,319 on 31 July and then rose steadily to 207,378 on 31 December.¹⁷

b. Impact on the Readiness Posture. The significance of the reductions lay not so much in the numbers withdrawn as in the effects upon combat readiness.

(1) Understrength Battalions. Beginning in the last week of April, USAREUR prepared weekly reports comparing the TOE authorizations with the actual present-for-duty strength of USAREUR's 172 combat and combat support battalions.¹⁸ The first incomplete compilation revealed that, as of 27 April, 31 of the 148 battalions considered had actual strengths below 75 percent of their TOE authorizations.¹⁹

By mid-June the figure had climbed to 80 out of 172 battalions that were below 75 percent of authorization, and 10 of these were below 60 percent. By branch, 13 out of 24 armored, 20 out of 68 artillery, and 25 of USAREUR's 31 infantry battalions were in the

¹⁷(1) Cable SX-1086, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 6 Jan 67. CONF.
(2) USAREUR Readiness Briefing, cited above, pp. 10, 23. SECRET (info used CONF). NOFORN. Both Gp-4.

¹⁸This comparison differed from the REDCAPE-REDCON analysis and from other traditional authorized-assigned comparisons. It compared personnel actually available for duty, rather than those assigned, with total TOE authorizations rather than with the reduced General Order authorizations under the 80-90-100 percent organization plan. UNCLAS.

¹⁹Memo, COL R. J. Allen, C/Ops Br, to DCSOPS, 2 May 66, subj: Special Report on Unit Strengths, w/1 incl. AEAGC-OR. CONF. Gp-4.

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under-75-percent category. The following week the first complete analysis revealed 83 of the 172 battalions below 75 percent of strength--11 of them below 60 percent.²⁰

Thereafter the number of battalions significantly below their TOE authorized strength began to decline, until on 22 July USAREUR discontinued the special report. On that date 76 battalions remained below 75 percent of authorized strength, and 14 were under 60 percent--4 armored, 1 artillery, 2 aviation, 1 engineer, and 6 infantry battalions.²¹

(2) Deletion of Units. In order to maintain at least some units at a relatively high state of readiness during the period of personnel reductions, USAREUR deleted understrength units and distributed their personnel to others. Taking an infantry company as an example, USAREUR directed that whenever a rifle platoon fell below 32 men, its parent unit was to delete one squad and increase the others in strength. Should a rifle platoon fall below 24 men, USAREUR directed deletion of the entire platoon and distribution of its personnel to other platoons to improve their effectiveness. If a company suffered further strength reductions, commanders were to delete the mortar sections of the weapons platoon next, then a second rifle platoon, and finally the weapons platoon. If still further reductions occurred thereafter, USAREUR would authorize the deletion of the entire company. Similar procedures, keyed to the organizations involved, applied to other types of combat, combat support, and service support units. Only USAREUR headquarters had the authority to approve the deletion of entire companies, troops, or batteries.²²

(3) Unit Personnel Readiness. USAREUR had hardly begun to feel the effects of the drawdown when it prepared the quarterly summary of command readiness as of 31 March. Nevertheless,

²⁰ Machine records runs, Rept 6167, 17 and 22 Jun 66, subj: Combat and Combat Support. CONF. Gp-4.

²¹(1) Ibid., 29 Jun and 6 Jul 66. (2) Memos, COL R. J. Allen to USAREUR DCSOPS, 15 and 22 Jul 66, subj: Special Report on Unit Strength, w/1 incl ea. AEAGC-OR. All CONF. Gp-4.

²² Cable SX-2165, CINCUSAREUR to distr, 9 Mar 66. SECRET. Gp-4.

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of the 507 USAREUR units reporting, only 77 percent had a personnel readiness condition (REDCON) equalling or exceeding their assigned REDCAPE--a drop of 11 percent from the preceding quarter. However, even these figures were misleading, for on 31 March many personnel who had actually left were still carried as assigned. The three infantry divisions--with personnel REDCAPE's of 2--had already dropped from REDCON 2 to 3, while the two armored divisions had maintained their REDCON's of 2. The two armored cavalry regiments assigned to border duty had met their assigned REDCAPE's of 1, but the third armored cavalry regiment had dropped to REDCON 3.²³

As expected, the personnel readiness level declined drastically during the following quarter, so that by 30 June only 44 percent of USAREUR's units met or exceeded their assigned personnel REDCAPE's. All the divisions and the three armored cavalry regiments failed to meet their REDCAPE's.²⁴

By 30 September the personnel situation--in terms of pure numbers--had improved somewhat. On that date 277, or 55 percent, of USAREUR's units met or exceeded their personnel REDCAPE's. All five divisions met their REDCAPE 2, and all Pershing and air defense units met their assigned REDCAPE's. The three armored cavalry regiments, however, failed to meet their personnel REDCAPE's.

USAREUR again pointed out that, although the criteria of the REDCAPE/REDCON system justified the reported readiness conditions, the figures were misleading. Thus, Seventh Army had only 46 percent of its authorized combat arms officers. Among the artillery battalions--authorized from 24 to 35 officers--most had only 7, providing 1 officer in each battery, a battalion commander, and one staff officer. While this situation would permit a reported REDCON of 2, the Seventh Army commander emphasized that the presence of only one officer in an artillery battery would not permit adequate supervision of nuclear weapons

²³(1) DF, DCSOPS to Cofs, 27 Apr 66, subj: Unit Readiness Report, RCS CSGPO-266 (R1)(U) AEAGC-OR. CONF. (2) Cable SX-3321, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 12 May 66. SECRET. NOFORN. Both Gp-4.

²⁴(1) Cable AETGC-R-21395, Seventh Army to CINCUSAREUR, 25 Jul 66. CONF. (2) Cable SX-4770, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 17 Aug 66. SECRET (info used CONF). NOFORN. Both Gp-4.

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assembly training. The officer shortage in armored and infantry battalions was not as acute, but was nevertheless significant. The numerical shortage, together with the lack of higher ranked officers and the influx of second lieutenants, combined to produce a serious shortage of experienced officers, which in turn adversely affected training.

The heavy influx of AIT graduates lowered experience levels among the enlisted personnel but the high caliber of the incoming personnel contributed to raising the level of small unit training.²⁵

c. Replenishment of Personnel.

(1) Plans and Procedures. When the Department of the Army first announced the drawdown, it advised USAREUR that the first replacements for withdrawn personnel--AIT graduates--would not arrive until early May.²⁶

In April the Department of the Army indicated that it would assign AIT graduates to fill regular USAREUR requisitions and also as "bulk fill."²⁷ The bulk fill replacements were of particular interest to USAREUR since it could use them to meet its most immediate needs, whereas the Department of the Army assigned requisitioned personnel directly to specific units.²⁸ USAREUR decided to assign bulk fill personnel by units and to leave them in the same unit for their entire term of service. Seventh Army was to fill first one maneuver battalion in one division and then one maneuver battalion in another division, until all battalions of all divisions would be up to strength. Non-Seventh Army commands were to fill at first their companies and then, as possible, their battalions.

²⁵ Cable SX-6193, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 12 Nov 66. SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-4.

²⁶ Cable SX-2816, CINCUSAREUR to Seventh Army et al., 12 Apr 66. SECRET. Gp-4.

²⁷ (1) Cable SX-2888, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 15 Apr 66, SECRET.
(2) Cable DA-761299, OPO to CINCUSAREUR, 20 Apr 66. CONF. Both Gp-4.

²⁸ DF's, AG Div to DCSPER et al., 5 and 19 May 66, subj: Advanced Individual Training (AIT) Bulk Fill Replacements. Both AEAAG-PM. UNCLAS. FOUO.

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This policy was more desirable than one that would distribute personnel evenly to all units, because an even distribution would keep the entire command at a substandard operational level for a longer period. The USAREUR plan, conversely, would bring at least some units up to strength quickly and, by stabilizing assignments, would reduce repetitive training requirements.²⁹

One potential drawback to the plan lay in the nature of the AIT graduates, however. The majority were inducted personnel with a 2-year service commitment who arrived in USAREUR with some 18 to 20 months to serve. The rapid filling of battalions with AIT graduates would therefore produce equally rapid depletion when one battalion after another would lose its fillers.

(2) The Nature of Enlisted Replenishments. The total number of AIT graduates assigned to USAREUR from May to December was 81,316, or slightly more than 37 percent of USAREUR's total assigned enlisted strength of 219,189 as of 31 December. The enlisted replenishments specifically identified as offsetting drawdown losses totaled 33,165 in grades E-2 and E-3, 2,193 in grade E-4, 2,773 E-5's, and 1,212 in grade E-6; there were no replacements for the enlisted withdrawals in grades E-7 through E-9.

Thus, not only was the ratio of AIT graduates abnormally high, but there had been no replenishment of the large numbers of senior NCO's withdrawn, nor even adequate enlisted replacements in grades E-4 through E-6. In grade E-3 assigned strength was almost double the authorizations, whereas in all grades from E-4 through E-9 assigned strength was below authorizations--the most serious imbalance being in grade E-7, in which USAREUR had only approximately 75 percent of its authorized strength. Moreover, the statistical analysis was itself misleading because of increased promotion allocations, through which USAREUR had been able to advance personnel to higher enlisted grades. While the extent of the problem was not statistically measurable, USAREUR considered that the numerical shortage of intermediate-level noncommissioned officers (NCO's) was further aggravated by the large number of inexperienced personnel in those grades.³⁰

²⁹ Cable SX-2862, CINCUSAREUR to Seventh Army et al., 14 Apr 66.
CONF. Gp-4.

³⁰ USAREUR Readiness Briefing, cited above, pp. 6 - 7, 29 - 31.
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d. Year-End Personnel Readiness Status. On 31 December USAREUR was short 6,673 of its 16,959 authorized commissioned officers. The influx of enlisted AIT replacements further complicated the officer shortage problem because the new personnel had a greater need for supervision. Most company-size units had no more than one officer, and the shortage was critical in the nuclear-capable units.

Warrant officer shortages were mostly in the maintenance skills, except for aviators. USAREUR had 713 aviators--against an authorization of 1,563--and 173 of these were on orders for reassignment.

USAREUR also experienced a significant shortage of hard-skill MOS's and enlisted personnel in grades E-4 through E-8. To alleviate some of these deficiencies, USAREUR had intensified its on-the-job training and reclassification program. Personnel in need of special qualifications--such as the airborne personnel of the 8th Infantry Division--attended local training courses. In general, USAREUR made maximum use of low grade personnel to fill higher skill requisition shortfalls.

On the basis of the personnel drawdown and replenishment experience, USAREUR concluded that the existing personnel readiness reporting criteria were inadequate and misrepresented the actual condition of units. Battalions with less than 25 percent of their authorized officers--all of them lieutenants except for the battalion commander--reported a REDCON of 2 in accordance with the regulation. Neither the current nor the revised AR 220-1 provided REDCON criteria to reflect a disabling shortage of critical personnel or the qualitative deficiencies of the inexperienced personnel who substituted for them.³¹

6. (S) Training Readiness

a. Changes in Training Readiness Reporting. In August 1965 the Department of the Army had requested USAREUR to conduct a 6-month test of proposed changes in the training readiness section of the unit readiness report.³² In January and April 1966 USAREUR

³¹(1) Cable SX-1731, CINCUSAREUR to DA et al., 13 Feb 67. SECRET. (2) USAREUR Readiness Briefing, cited above, pp. 3 and 42 - 43. SECRET (info used CONF). Both NOFORN. Gp-4.

³²Seventh Army Semiannual Hist Sum, 1966, pp. 4-5 to 4-7. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

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submitted the first two quarterly reports, and at the end of June it evaluated the proposed changes.

USAREUR considered the proposed training indicators to be a significant improvement over existing criteria for reporting readiness. It commented on the indicators for the three types of reporting units--combat and combat support, combat service support, and air defense--and made recommendations for minor changes in revising AR 350-1, Army Training, and AR 220-55, Field and Command Post Exercises.³³

b. Training REDCON's. As of 31 March the personnel drawdown had had virtually no effect on USAREUR's training readiness; 97 percent of the reporting units met or exceeded their training REDCAPE's, as compared with 98 percent at the beginning of 1966.³⁴ Even at 30 June the measurable effects remained insignificant. The number of units meeting or exceeding their training REDCAPE's had dropped by only 1 percent. The reported REDCON's were by no means an accurate reflection of the true training state, however. For example, successful participation in Army Training Tests (ATT), Technical Proficiency Inspections (TPI), and major training exercises were factors that contributed to the establishment of unit REDCON's. Many units had completed their tests or participated in exercises earlier in the year but had since lost their key personnel and had replaced significant numbers of experienced lower ranking personnel with AIT graduates. Accordingly, Seventh Army indicated the REDCON's would more accurately reflect the actual training condition if the two armored cavalry regiments on the border reported REDCON 3 instead of 1; the third armored cavalry regiment, REDCON 4 instead of 2; and the five divisions, REDCON 4 instead of 1. Only the REDCON's 1 reported by the Pershing units and the 32d Army Air Defense Command were accurate. USAREUR commented that realistic training ratings would be REDCON 4 for its combat units and 3 for its combat support units.³⁵

³³Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to DA(ACSFOR), 1 Jul 66. AEAGC-TT.
UNCLAS.

³⁴DF, DCSOPS to CofS, 27 Apr 66. CONF.; and Cable SX-3321, 12 May 66. SECRET. NOFORN. Both Gp-4. Both cited above.

³⁵Cables AETGC-R-21395, 25 Jul 66. CONF; and SX-4770, 17 Aug 66. SECRET (info used CONF). NOFORN. Both Gp-4. Both cited above.

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Training readiness deteriorated further in the following quarter, so that by 30 September only 85 percent of USAREUR's units met or exceeded their assigned REDCAPE's. The two border armored cavalry regiments and the 3d Armored Division rated REDCON's 3, and the remaining divisions and the third armored cavalry regiment had REDCON's 4. Only USAREUR's Pershing units and the 32d Army Air Defense Command were able to maintain a training REDCON of 1.³⁶

Training at the end of 1966 concentrated on the lowest level. Experienced officers and NCO's who had participated in training the year before had departed, and most of the officer replacements were young and inexperienced. Seventy-nine percent of the reporting units achieved their training REDCAPE on 31 December. The Pershing units and the 32d Army Air Defense Command maintained a REDCON 1, while the 3d Armored Division achieved a REDCON 2. The 3d and 8th Infantry Divisions, along with the 2d and 14th Armored Cavalry Regiments, attained a REDCON of 3. The 24th Infantry Division, 4th Armored Division, and the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment received a REDCON 4 rating.

Training above section and squad level was to begin as soon as more experienced supervisors arrived. USAREUR expected to reach the low point in training readiness during early 1967.³⁷

7. (S) Logistics Readiness

a. Supply Funding. Seventh Army unfinanced requirements for FY 1967 totaled \$38,670,000; of this amount, \$35,443,000 was in the supply area. Seventh Army needed these funds to correct such deficiencies as low inventory levels, an unusually high rate of zero balances of line items, and the inability to repair and maintain equipment because of low repair parts stocks. These supply problems had existed for several years, but they had become more serious in the last two fiscal years. A high rate of carryover demands and over-obligation of funds had compounded the problem.

³⁶ Cable SX-1693, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 12 Nov 66. SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-4.

³⁷ Cable SX-1731, 13 Feb 67, cited above. SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-4.

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Beginning in January 1966, Seventh Army tried to reduce the obligation of funds by curtailing several activities. However, combat readiness in the logistic area had already been so impaired that only one of the major combat units was able to achieve its REDCAPF in logistics. During the course of the year Seventh Army continued to streamline its supply system in order to improve its readiness posture.³⁸

b. Storage of Excess Unit Equipment. In 1965 the Department of the Army had authorized USAREUR to place in depot storage those items of TOE equipment not required by units organized at less than 100 percent of authorized personnel strengths. This measure reduced the units' care and maintenance workload to levels more consistent with their actual capability. A corresponding modification of the respective REDCAPE's was to provide more realistic factors for the equation determining the logistical readiness status.³⁹

USACOMZEUR could not develop a detailed storage plan, since the list of items recommended for storage--about 5,000 tons--was not complete. The turbulence caused by the accelerated movement of supplies from France, where some of the items were supposed to have been stored, and the resulting scarcity of storage space in Germany also delayed planning.

At the end of the year USAREUR decided to retain the excess equipment at the unit level pending the Department of the Army's approval of the MTOE's proposed by each unit officially organized at less than 100 percent of its authorized TOE strength or operating at reduced personnel strength because of operational requirements imposed by specific missions, the character of the operational area, or other conditions, such as the personnel drawdown.

Under NAADS, TOE units would have equipment authorizations consistent with their particular operational requirements and capabilities. Their excess equipment, representing the items

³⁸ Commander's Narrative Analysis, Seventh Army Command Operating Budget, FY 67. Cy in AEAGC-B files. SECRET. Gp-4.

³⁹ For details, see USAREUR Anl Hist Sum, 1965, pp. 18 - 19 and 187 - 189. TS (info used SECRET. Gp-4).

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that would bring them to 100 percent of their traditional TOE equipment strengths, would be in theater storage, available for issue when required.⁴⁰

c. Transfer of Supply and Maintenance Functions. To relieve combat units of certain noncombat-related supply functions and to increase their effectiveness correspondingly, USAREUR directed USAACOM to assume the responsibility for seven Seventh Army supply accounts by 31 December 1966. For this purpose, Seventh Army was to transfer to USAACOM the associated funds, stocks, facilities, equipment, and personnel spaces.⁴¹

USAREUR subsequently decided to transfer from Seventh Army to USAACOM certain maintenance functions⁴² that Seventh Army had assumed in 1956 under the Project MASS concept. Since that time, further mingling of maintenance functions had resulted in Seventh Army supporting such non-Seventh Army TOE materiel as generator elements, communications and electronic items, heaters, and refrigerators.

By the end of the year USAACOM had assumed the functions but had not yet received the necessary personnel spaces and funds.⁴³

⁴⁰(1) Cable SX-4853, CINCUSAREUR to Seventh Army, 24 Aug 66. (2) Ltr, same to USACOMZEUR, 26 Sep 66, subj: Decrementation and Storage of Equipment (U). AEAGD-S-P-P. (3) Cable C-0981, USACOMZEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 29 Sep 66. (4) DF, S&S Dir to DCSOPS, 28 Oct 66, subj: Storage of Decrementated Equipment. AEAGD-S-P-P; and Cmt 2, DCSOPS to DCSLOG, 29 Nov 66. AEAGC-PFD. (5) Intvws, Mr. J. E. Carlisle, USAREUR ODCSOPS Mil Hist Br, with LTC C. S. Sparks, USAREUR ODCSLOG S&S Dir, and LTC R. C. Lehman, ODCSOPS Pl & For Dev Div, 11 and 13 Jan 67. All CONF. Gp-4.

⁴¹(1) Cable SC-19781, CINCUSAREUR to Seventh Army et al., 18 Mar 66. (2) Ltr, same to same, 12 Apr 66, subj: Draft Plan for Transfer of Post, Camp, and Station Supply Functions from Seventh Army to USAACOM. (3) Ltr, same to same, 31 May 66, subj: Transfer of Post, Camp, and Station Supply Functions from Seventh Army to USAACOM. Both AEAGD-S-P-P. All UNCLAS.

⁴²Support of Materials handling equipment (MHE); special purpose vehicles (SPV); special purpose equipment (SPE); office machinery; clothing and equipage (C&E), excluding shoe repair; tentage; and TOE metal and wood furniture repair. UNCLAS.

⁴³(1) Cable SC-33051, CINCUSAREUR to Seventh Army, 30 Jun 66. (2) Cable 5374, USAACOM to CINCUSAREUR, 19 Dec 66. (3) Intvw, Mr. Carlisle with Mr. E. F. Minch, USAREUR ODCSLOG Mat Readiness Dir, 16 Jan 67. All UNCLAS.

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d. Logistics REDCON's. Despite major efforts to improve its logistic readiness posture, USAREUR was unable to make any real progress, mainly because of the drawdown of experienced supply and maintenance personnel.

At the end of 1965 only 25 percent of 507 reporting units had been able to match their REDCAPE's for overall logistics. This percentage figure rose to 29 and 30 during the first two quarters of 1966, but dropped to 25 by the end of September. At the end of 1966, 28 percent of 517 reporting units were able to match their logistics REDCAPE's.

A comparison of individual logistics indicators showed that the equipment-on-hand indicator rose from 54 percent at the end of 1965 to 72 percent by 31 December 1966 and that the prescribed-load-lists indicator improved from 46 to 49 percent for the same period. The significant improvement in equipment on hand resulted from the arrival of new or replacement items from the United States, the redistribution of assets, the issue of serviceable assets from in-theater overhaul programs, and the modernization of equipment.

On the other hand, the equipment-serviceability indicator dropped from 74 to 66 percent during 1966. The percentage of deadlined equipment rose because of the continued shortage of repair parts and assemblies. During the second half of 1966 the increased training efforts to qualify new AIT personnel resulted in misuse of equipment and a higher consumption rate of parts. The number of deadlined M60 tanks represented the tank strength of two divisions--one armored and one mechanized. The major causes were lack of fire control instruments, infrared equipment, and power packs.

On 31 December 1966 only 43 percent of USAREUR's units--against 51 percent a year earlier--matched their REDCAPE's for equipment deployability. The divisional REDCON deployability ratings had deteriorated correspondingly. At the end of 1965 three divisions had been able to match their assigned REDCAPE 2 and one each had REDCON 3 and 4 ratings. One year later four divisions rated REDCON 3 and one division REDCON 4. Thus, by 31 December 1966 not a single USAREUR division was able to match its assigned REDCAPE 2 for the crucial equipment-deployability indicator.⁴⁴

⁴⁴(1) Cable SX-1731, 13 Feb 67, cited above. SECRET. (2) USAREUR Readiness Briefing, 24 Feb 67. SECRET (info used CONF). Both NOFORN. Gp-4.

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Chapter 3

Plans and Preparations

8. (TS) Changes in the NATO Posture in Central Europe

The relocation of U.S. forces out of France--code named FRELOC--and the new French relationship with NATO caused profound changes in the American military posture in Europe during 1966. At the end of the year the unsolved problems ranged from the establishment of a highly vulnerable line of communications across Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg (BENELUX), to the uncertainty of the role and intent of the French Forces stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany.

While USAREUR did not recommend that the United States replace the French forces on a one-for-one basis, it held that the defense of Europe was so closely integrated that a reduction in effort by any one nation invariably affected the posture and requirements of the others. The Central Army Group (CENTAG) had to adjust to these circumstances, with the result that Seventh Army lost a German reserve division and suffered a reduction in its rear area security capability.¹ In effect, since the French forces would probably not be available to CENTAG at the outbreak of hostilities, the German II Corps would have to take their place in the southern sector. Depending on the tactical situation, the German 10th Panzer Grenadier (Armored Infantry) Division, initially held in CENTAG reserve, would be prepared for commitment in either the U.S. Seventh Army or the German II Corps sector. The German 12th Panzer (Armored) Division, which had previously

¹Cable SX-5621, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 8 Oct 66. TS.
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been a part of Seventh Army reserve, became directly subordinate to Seventh Army, effective 1 July.²

The significance of the U.S. and German defense forces in Central Europe and their relative strength were brought out on 15 December, when LTG J. H. Polk, Deputy CINCUSAREUR for Seventh Army, visited the President of the Federal Republic of Germany (F.R.G.), H. Luebke. When General Polk pointed out that USAREUR was roughly up to strength, except for an overall shortage of approximately 2,000 officers, the Chief of the German Army Staff, who was accompanying him, commented that the Bundeswehr's personnel problem was far worse, since it was currently short of about 6,000 officers and 34,000 noncommissioned officers.

President Luebke stated that in his opinion there would be very little warning of a Communist attack against Germany. The enemy could mass his tanks relatively quickly. The Western Allies would have to find ways of dealing with this danger effectively and without the use of nuclear weapons. Luebke doubted that Communist forces would use nuclear weapons initially and stated that the employment of such weapons by NATO forces would result in an intolerable danger to Germany and would inevitably lead to the use of nuclear weapons by the Soviets. Germany as a country would be wiped off the map. It was essential that such a catastrophe should not occur.³

9. (S) Force Structure

During 1966 USAREUR's manpower authorization dropped from 225,602 to 222,809. The following actions were of particular significance:

a. Major Completed Actions.

(1) Civilianization Program. In 1966 the civilianization program involved the conversion of 2,546 military to civilian spaces. The military spaces were withdrawn from administrative and logistical support table of distribution (TD) authorizations.⁴

²Ltr, Hq CENTAG to distr, 23 May 66, subj: Alternate Plan ALPHA (in the event French Forces are not available to COMCENTAG on the outbreak of hostilities). CENG3. TS.

³Cable 7261, AMEMB Bonn to Secy State, 17 Dec 66. CONF. Gp-3.

⁴Intvw, Mr. G. E. Blau, C/USAREUR ODCSOPS Mil Hist Br with MAJ J. S. Kramer, USAREUR ODCSOPS For Dev Div, 14 Feb 67. CONF. Gp-4.

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(2) Conversion of Battalions. In January Seventh Army submitted its plan for converting three mechanized battalions to three tank battalions. USAREUR revised this plan and reduced to two the number of tank battalions scheduled for activation. The 5th Battalion, 32d Armor--the last Roundout unit remaining in Europe--took the place of the third tank battalion. The Department of the Army withdrew a total of 1,439 spaces: 918 as a result of the conversion and 521 because of the discontinuance of the Berlin augmentation.

Upon completion of the conversion on 1 May, USAREUR's three infantry divisions each had four tank and six mechanized battalions and each of the two armor divisions had six tank and five mechanized battalions.⁵

(3) Improvement of Hawk and Nike Hercules Capabilities. In 1965 the reorganization of the 32d Artillery Brigade⁶ had provided for a substantial personnel increase in the Hawk and Nike Hercules firing batteries. Among the principal changes introduced at that time had been an increase in the maintenance personnel of the batteries; the provision of radio relay personnel and equipment in the battery and battalion headquarters; the addition of a security section in the nuclear-capable Nike Hercules batteries; the incorporation of an organic direct support platoon; and the creation of a transportation section in the Nike Hercules battalion headquarters. In January 1966 USAREUR asked the Department of the Army for 3,100 additional spaces for these high priority unprogramed requirements for air defense.⁷

The Department of the Army responded partially, allocating 2,021 additional spaces for air defense. Of this total, 1,373 spaces--111 officers and 1,262 enlisted men--were for Hawk, and 648 enlisted spaces for Nike Hercules units.⁸

⁵(1) USAREUR Anl Hist Sum, 1965, pp. 47 - 48. TS (info used SECRET. Gp-4.). (2) Cable SX-1172, CINCUSAREUR to Seventh Army et al., 12 Jan 66. SECRET. Gp-4. (3) USAREUR GO 55, 25 Mar 66. UNCLAS. (4) Cable SX-3158, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 1 May 66. CONF. Gp-4.

⁶(1) USAREUR GO 250, 20 Aug 65. (2) The 32d Artillery Brigade was redesignated 32d Army Air Defense Command effective 11 May 66, by USAREUR GO 84, 25 Apr 66. Both UNCLAS.

⁷Cable SX-1171, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 12 Jan 66. SECRET. Gp-4.

⁸Cable DA-748180, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 24 Jan 66. SECRET. Gp-4.

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USAREUR kept four officer spaces--one each for air defense system design, for the preparation of systems specifications, for the continuing operation of the ADP support of its command and control system, and for a NATO Missile Firing Installation (NAMFI) adviser and liaison officer in Greece. It increased Seventh Army's military authorization voucher by 2,017 spaces (107 officers and 1,910 enlisted men), effective the last quarter of FY 1966. Since all air defense firing batteries were at REDCAPE 1, 100 percent level, USAREUR did not specify to Seventh Army that the additional spaces were for Hawk and Nike Hercules units.⁹

(4) Communications. Effective 25 August, USAREUR transferred the 4th Signal Group, supporting the U.S. Army Area Command, to U.S. Army Strategic Communications Command, Europe. This transfer involved 544 spaces.¹⁰

b. Major Incompleted Actions.

(1) The Administrative Support, Theater Army-1970 (TASTA-70). USAREUR considered the TASTA-70 concept to be another crucial step in the functionalization process that had begun with ROAD and continued with COSTAR II. In January USAREUR submitted its comments to the TASTA-70 draft of the U.S. Army Combat Developments Command (CDC), and in June the Department of the Army revised and approved the final CDC draft. The implementation of TASTA-70 was to be gradual as TOE's oriented toward the new concept and new doctrinal publications became available. USAREUR planned to accomplish the necessary changes to the troop basis caused by activations, inactivations, and reorganizations of TASTA-70 units as routine actions.¹¹

(2) Redeye Teams. USAREUR was to receive 428 trained 2-man teams and 114 three-man headquarters sections to support the Redeye teams. Against a total requirement of 1,198 spaces, the

⁹(1) DF's, DCSOPS to CofS, 29 Jan and 2 Feb 66, subj: Spaces for High Priority Unprogramed Requirements. AEAGC-PFD. Both SECRET. (2) Cable SX-1471, CINCUSAREUR to Seventh Army, 31 Jan 66. CONF. All Gp-4.

¹⁰Intvw, Mr. Blau with MAJ Kramer, 14 Feb 67. CONF. Gp-4.

¹¹Ibid. CONF. Gp-4.

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Department of the Army provided 143 enlisted spaces in the first quarter of FY 1967, pointing out that the remaining spaces would probably have to come from existing resources. The Redeye personnel were to arrive in Europe over a 9-month period extending from April to December 1967.¹²

(3) FRELOC. The effect of FRELOC upon the USAREUR force structure was difficult to gauge. As of 31 March 1966, the adjusted FRELOC data base was 23,876--10,942 military, 1,139 U.S. civilian, and 11,795 local national (LN)--spaces. The Secretary of Defense authorized the permanent relocation of 9,683--4,637 military, 871 U.S. civilian, and 4,175 LN--spaces.¹³

(4) Other Pending Actions. At the end of 1966 the Department of the Army had not withdrawn the balance of 518 military spaces saved as a result of the merger of USAREUR and Seventh Army headquarters. Of the total HEADCON saving of 1,172 military spaces, USAREUR had applied 654 for the support of the Pershing in Phase II of the quick reaction alert (QRA), since the Department of the Army had not allocated the spaces promised for this mission.¹⁴

10. (S) Planning for a Force Reduction in Europe

a. Political Background. In late August Senator Mike Mansfield, Democrat from Montana, introduced a resolution by which the entire membership of the Senate Majority Policy Committee requested the President of the United States to make a substantial reduction in the U.S. forces in Europe. Senator Henry M. Jackson, a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee and Preparedness Subcommittee, replied on the floor of the Senate that any unilateral cut in combat capability would be folly for the United States. After consultations, Senator Mansfield did not insist on obtaining an immediate vote, but the issue remained open.¹⁵

¹² Cable SX-4184, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 12 Jul 66. SECRET. (2)
Cable DA-778808, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 19 Aug 66. CONF. Both Gp-4.

¹³ Intvws, Mr. Blau with MAJ Kramer, 14 Feb and 3 Apr 67.
SECRET. Gp-4.

¹⁴ (1) Cable DA-748180, 24 Jan 66, cited above. (2) Intvw, Mr. Blau with MAJ Kramer, 14 Feb 67. Both SECRET. Gp-4.

¹⁵ TAB A to Memo, JCS, 7 Sep 66, subj: Mansfield Resolution Calling for a Substantial Reduction in the U.S. Forces Stationed in Western Europe. UNCLAS.

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b. Requirements Studies. During the following months the Joint Chiefs of Staff, USEUCOM, and USAREUR headquarters considered a number of alternatives for achieving a force reduction in Europe while maintaining a balanced force. In December USAREUR was preparing a new force requirements study that was to reach USEUCOM in early January 1967.¹⁶

11. (TS) Augmentation Planning

a. The Post Mobilization-Day Deployment List (PMDL). In late 1965 USAREUR had pointed out that the Army Transportation Plan (ATP) was incompatible with its newly developed reception plan. To eliminate this deficiency, the Department of the Army had proposed a 4-step plan: First, USAREUR was to list the air and sea priorities for the units on the current PMDL based on aircraft capabilities as reflected in the Strategic Movement Capabilities Plan (MOVECAP) covering the period from 1966 to 1970. In addition, USAREUR was to provide information on its air and sea port receiving capability. As second and third steps, the Department of the Army would amend the PMDL in accordance with the new priorities and revise its transportation plan on the basis of the USAREUR priorities and capability to receive units, taking into account the air and surface lift allocated to the Army. Based on this information, USAREUR would finally prepare the reception and movement tables for the theater reception plan.¹⁷

In response, USAREUR resequenced the PMDL and provided the Department of the Army with a single priority listing. To decide on the application of air or sea mode of movement to this listing, USAREUR needed information on the time, frequency, and size of surface convoys, and movement data for COSTAR (combat support to the Army) units.¹⁸

The Department of the Army agreed to take up the convoy question with the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (CINCLANT), who

¹⁶(1) Cable ECJC-J-18972, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR et al., 16 Dec 66. (2) Intvw, Mr. Blau, with LTC D. Snell, USAREUR ODCSOPS War Pl Br, 3 Jan 67. Both SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-3.

¹⁷(1) USAREUR Anl Hist Sum, 1965, pp. 65 - 66. TS (info used SECRET). (2) Intvw, Mr. Blau with LTC G. A. Custer, USAREUR Ops Div Pl Br, 28 Oct 66. SECRET. Both Gp-4.

¹⁸Cable SX-3328, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 12 May 66. SECRET. Gp-3.

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convened a conference for 7 and 8 July to resolve this problem. USAREUR and USNAVEUR representatives attended, but since no representatives of the Department of the Army or USEUCOM headquarters were present, the results of the conference were inconclusive.¹⁹

The Department of the Army agreed that as the next step it would have to complete the application of rate and mode of movement to the resequenced PMDL. In the meantime, USAREUR submitted an estimate of the D plus 30 air priority listing, based upon the FY 1967 airlift allocation, as well as additional planning data. It had thus completed as much of the first of the four steps as was possible until information on the convoy lift became available.²⁰

In November USAREUR recommended the prestocking of equipment, primarily for those high-priority units that would have to move by sea because of the weight or bulk of their equipment. USAREUR also suggested an extension of the PMDL from a 90-day to a 180-day force list to bring it into line with such other planning documents as the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP), the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), the European Requirements List (ERL), and MOVECAP. The Department of the Army and USAREUR should jointly determine the optimum prestocks for selective prepositioning and revise the PMDL and the ATP accordingly.²¹

The Department of the Army intended to republish the PMDL as of 1 January 1967. It did not wish to extend it to 180 days because its current configuration served its intended purposes of developing Army transportation plans and calculating Theater Reserves No. 1 and 3. To permit the determination of total materiel requirements, USAREUR was to revise the list of PMDL units for which equipment was to be prepositioned in Europe. The list was to indicate the execution priority desired. In addition, USAREUR was to propose an operational project to replace Part II, Section 30, of Project AEG 102-50--the stocks for units to be airlifted from the United States. For each TOE item listed, USAREUR was to indicate whether it was to be prepositioned, not required for prepositioning, airlifted with troops, or issued from command assets.²²

¹⁹(1) Cable DA-763262, DA to CINCLANTFLT, 4 May 66. (2) Intvw, Mr. Blau with LTC Custer, 28 Oct 66. Both SECRET. Gp-4.

²⁰Cable SX-4578, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 5 Aug 66. SECRET. Gp-3.

²¹Cable SX-6374, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 23 Nov 66. SECRET. Gp-4.

²²Cable DA-793120, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 7 Dec 66. SECRET. Gp-4.

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b. Changes in the Army Augmentation Forces. Annex A of JSCP-66 scheduled two airborne divisions for M plus 1 deployment and moved the armored division and the infantry division, for which USAREUR had prepositioned equipment, from the M plus 1 to the M plus 4 increment. Another change in the forces earmarked for augmenting USAREUR was the substitution of the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) for the 4th Infantry Division, which would require a modification of the prepositioned equipment. USAREUR concurred in this substitution as well as in the emergency use of prepositioned equipment from the 2d Armored Division to equip four tank battalions needed to support the airborne division. It added, however, that the decision on the use of the 2d Armored Division equipment and the employment of the nondivisional units should depend upon the conditions prevailing at the time. USAREUR also recommended that, before deploying by air from the United States, the airborne divisions should receive equipment compatible with theater stocks.²³

The Commander in Chief, United States Strike Command (CINCSTRIKE) revised his Operations Plan (OPLAN) 202E to incorporate the substitution of divisions and the modification of the support force package. He also added the alternative 2-division force package, consisting of two airborne divisions plus support forces, and included in his plan the use of the prepositioned divisional equipment for the four nondivisional tank battalions to give the airborne divisions a sustained combat capability.²⁴

In April the new troop list of the U.S. Continental Army Command (USCONARC)/CINCARSTRIKE OPLAN 202E tasked the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) to replace the 4th Infantry Division. This action made the 2-division package included in OPLAN 202E compatible with mission assignments in the PMDL and the reception plan (Annex C) to USAREUR OPLAN 102.²⁵ The Department of the Army had meanwhile promised to take emergency measures to bring the 5th Infantry Division to a C-1 readiness condition if rapid reinforcement to Europe became necessary.²⁶

²³ Cable SX-1558, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 3 Feb 66. TS. NOFORN. Gp-3.

²⁴ Cable STRJ 5-166-66, CINCSTRIKE to USCINCEUR, 26 Mar 66. TS. NOFORN. Gp-4.

²⁵ Cable 56256, USCONARC/CINCARSTRIKE to CINCSTRIKE, 6 Apr 66. SECRET. Gp-3.

²⁶ (1) Cable DA-747662, DA to CINCUSAREUR et al., 19 Jan 66.
(2) DF, DCSOPS to Cofs, 15 Apr 66, subj: Army Augmentation Forces for USEUCOM. AEAGC-P. Both TS. Gp-3.

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In July representatives of the 5th Infantry Division visited USAREUR and inspected the equipment prepositioned for its use in an emergency. During the following months USAREUR took the necessary steps to correct some of the deficiencies observed during this inspection.²⁷

In October USEUCOM asked its component commands to prepare lists of all augmentation units (combat, combat support, and logistic or administrative) down to separate companies or squadrons, or even lower if further identification was critical to the execution of the plan. USAREUR was to submit three time-phased force lists reflecting the units included in Annex B to USCINCEUR OPLAN EC 101. The listings would show ports of entry, when known, but were to exclude French ports.²⁸ On 20 December, however, USEUCOM suspended this requirement until further notice, because the force deployment lists were to be in accordance with the force tabs contained in JSCP-68, which would not be available until January 1967. Upon receipt of JSCP-68, USEUCOM would issue new instructions concerning the submission of time-phased force listings.²⁹

c. The MOVECAP 67-71 Study. In May the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to hold in abeyance the operational test designed to improve the deployment planning (DEPPLAN) procedures determining movement requirements through the use of automatic data processing (ADP).³⁰ The procedures prescribed for the test, however, were to serve for the identification of movement requirements associated with the operations plans for MOVECAP 67-71. USCINCEUR, for instance, was to submit time-phased force requirements lists for OPLAN EC 102 and for CINCSTRIKE OPLAN 581 wherever possible.³¹

²⁷ DF, USAREUR DCSOPS to DCSLOG, 23 Nov 66, subj: 5th MECH Division - Trip Report. AEAGC-PW. CONF. Gp-4.

²⁸ Cable ECJC-J-16414, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 28 Oct 66. SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-3.

²⁹ Cable ECJC-J-19129, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR et al., 20 Dec 66. CONF. Gp-4.

³⁰ For background information see USAREUR Anl Hist Sum, 1965, pp. 64 - 67. TS. NOFORN. Gp-1.

³¹ Cable JCS-2610, JCS to USCINCEUR et al., 20 May 66. UNCLAS.
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USCINCEUR realized that the updating of MOVECAP was vitally important but warned that the FRELOC decisions and actions would influence the component commands' reception capability and force requirements. Preparation of the MOVECAP data base without accurate knowledge of the geographical locations and capabilities of airbase and seaport facilities and in-theater employments might result in an inaccurate and misleading product. USCINCEUR therefore suggested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff accomplish the updating of MOVECAP 66-70 without USEUCOM's participation or that they defer its participation until relocation planning had progressed to the point where the geographical location of facilities and the disposition of U.S. forces were fairly certain.³²

The Joint Chiefs of Staff shared USCINCEUR's concern, but the necessity for updating and improving the 66-70 MOVECAP effort outweighed the cogent reasons for a deferment or for using the old data base. The Joint Chiefs of Staff hoped that they would be able to relate the FRELOC effort to MOVECAP and that relocation planning would have advanced far enough to permit realistic assumptions. They intended to evaluate the impact of other actions on MOVECAP as the new study progressed.³³

USCINCEUR instructed his component commanders to provide him with detailed, time-phased force requirements for the support of USCINCEUR OPLAN EC 102, and for a European Reinforcement Plan (ERP) that provided for a peacetime 3-division augmentation including tactical and transport air support. For MOVECAP 67-71, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would examine the ERP concurrently with the reinforcement of Northeast Asia and the Middle East, but--in contrast to MOVECAP 66-70--would omit Southeast Asia. Other major differences were that the USAREUR planners were to assume the implementation of FRELOC as an accomplished fact and consider reentry into France to support wartime operations in the NATO area. They were to provide time-phased force lists according to DEPPLAN procedures, use only forces that were to be available at the end of FY 1968, and show on a separate list the forces that were not available as constituting a shortfall.³⁴

³²Cable ECJD-PW-07391, USCINCEUR to JCS, 9 May 66. SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-4.

³³Cable JCS-2211, JCS to USCINCEUR, 17 May 66. SECRET. Gp-4.

³⁴(1) Cables ECJD-PW-08421 and 08677, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR et al., 27 May and 3 Jun 66. (2) Intvw, Mr. Blau with LTC Custer, 20 Jun 66. All SECRET. Gp-3.

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After reviewing the MOVECAP draft procedures, CINCSTRIKE recommended the use of the CINCSTRIKE OPLAN 581 forces whenever possible. As a minimum, the planners should specify the battalion mix in requesting forces and indicate the detailed composition of brigades in requesting brigade forces when OPLAN 581 forces were not in use. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred in this recommendation.³⁵ However, the U.S. planners in Europe interjected that the packages conceived in CINCSTRIKE OPLAN 581 had little or no applicability for force listings of the magnitude of those of USCINCEUR OPLAN EC 102 and the ERP. For instance, theater augmentation requirements for OPLAN EC 102 involved 12 Army divisions as well as Navy, Marine, and Air Force contingents totaling almost one million men, plus reinforcements. The ERP involved about 250,000 men.

USCINCEUR concluded that the OPLAN 581 force packages would need extensive adjustments. Whereas OPLAN 581 had value in planning force requirements for operations for which the development of detailed force requirements was impractical, the packaging method used in this plan appeared to have little or no applicability for such force listings as those of OPLAN EC 102 or the ERP.³⁶

In forwarding the detailed time-phased force requirements for USCINCEUR OPLAN EC 102, using card deck DEPPLAN Card 1, USAREUR reemphasized that the piecemeal arrival of the electronic accounting machine (EAM) card deck had complicated the correlation of the ERP with the Department of the Army Force Basis Annex listing of available forces. The possibility of misuse or misinterpretation of the results of MOVECAP 67-71 was real. Since CINCUSAREUR firmly believed that reentry into France and reconstitution of the French line of communications would be necessary for the successful defense of central Europe, USAREUR based its force requirements study of the assumption that these two actions would be taken.³⁷

³⁵(1) Cable STRJ4-T-5013, CINCSTRIKE to JCS, 2 Jun 66.
(2) Cable JCS-3621, JCS to CINCSTRIKE/USCINCEAFSA, 3 Jun 66.
Both UNCLAS.

³⁶Cable ECJC-J-08796, USCINCEUR to JCS, 7 Jun 66. SECRET.
NOFORN. Gp-4.

³⁷Cables SX-3790 and 4048, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 14 Jun and 1 Jul 66. Both SECRET. Gp-4.

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As required by USCINCEUR, USAREUR programed and phased the force requirement, Card 1, on the basis of airfield and surface reception capabilities. The primary purpose of Card 1 was to present a statement of forces required to support OPLAN EC 102 in a single priority listing. The format did not provide for a pure statement of priority that could serve as the key to all subsequent actions and trade-offs.

To use only the air reception capability as the basis for the study might cause the designation of more units than necessary for movement by air. The preparation of an initial convoy schedule for augmenting the Army forces in Europe--including data on size, frequency, and arrival times--was therefore essential.³⁸

USCINCEUR included USAREUR's comments in his recommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In addition, he suggested a simplification of the current DEPPLAN procedures--they would generate an estimated minimum of 79,000 cards for EC 102--and of the current card format--22.5 percent of which was redundant. In general, however, USCINCEUR subscribed wholeheartedly to the overall concept and hoped that his proposals would be instrumental in simplifying procedures and making the DEPPLAN successful.³⁹

d. Force Objectives for JSOP 1969 - 1976. USAREUR's force objectives increased from 19 to 22 divisions; they were the minimum required to respond to the threat and execute the concept of operations proposed in Volume I of JSOP 69-76. USAREUR assumed that the declaration of M-day would follow a period of tension that would further increase before D-day, thus permitting the implementation of a portion of the reinforcement plans. Another assumption was that there would be adequate combat service support. In this connection, USAREUR pointed out that no units capable of receiving incoming forces, individual fillers and replacements, or supplies were in Europe, and that there were not many such units in the active Army. The M-day requirement for certain combat service support units thus remained unresolved.

The European Theater reinforcement rate would depend upon the readiness of U.S.-based units and their capability to move to ports of embarkation, the availability of strategic inter-theater

³⁸Cable SX-6255, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 16 Nov 66. SECRET. Gp-4.

³⁹Cable ECJD-TP-17574, USCINCEUR to JCS, 19 Nov 66. CONF. Gp-4.

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lift, and the theater reception capability. MOVECAP 66-70, which considered these three factors, revealed that a 12-division force would need 207 days to close in Europe provided the entire strategic airlift capability was used for this purpose. By FY 1972 an increase in airlift capability--because of the availability of C5A aircraft--would reduce this figure to 130 days.⁴⁰

e. Review of Operations Plans. In late October the Joint Chiefs of Staff tentatively selected USCINCEUR OPLAN EC 102--including the early reinforcement requirement--as one of three plans for the 1967 package review of operations plans. A preliminary conference for the review of CINCSTRIKE OPLAN 202E took place in Paris in late November. In early December a 3-man team from U.S. Strike Command (USSTRICOM) briefed the USAREUR staff on OPLAN 581, which both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and USEUCOM considered to be an example of the proper application of automatic data processing to operations planning. USAREUR intended to apply procedures similar to those used in OPLAN 581--the planning document for force package selection--in structuring its operations plans to ADP application.⁴¹

In mid-December a USAREUR representative attended a JCS planning conference in Washington. The purposes of the conference were to refine procedures and to guarantee realistic objectives for the 1967 package review in terms of the theater commander's capabilities for plan preparation, revision, and appraisal.⁴²

12. (TS) Revision of Operations and Contingency Plans

Toward the end of 1966 USAREUR reviewed and commenced to revise its operations and contingency plans as required by the merger of headquarters and the relocation from France.⁴³

⁴⁰Cable SX-5621, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 8 Oct 66. TS. Gp-3.

⁴¹(1) Cable JCS-6377, JCS to USCINCEUR et al., 25 Oct 66. (2) Cable SX-6303, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 19 Nov 66. Both CONF. Gp-4. (3) DF, USAREUR ODCSOPS to distr, 2 Dec 66, subj: USCINCSTRIKE OPLAN 581 Briefing. AEAGC-PN. UNCLAS.

⁴²DF, USAREUR ODCSOPS to CofS, 6 Dec 66, subj: CONUS Travel. AEAGC-P. SECRET. Gp-3.

⁴³Cable SX-6722, CINCUSAREUR to USACOMZEUR, 15 Dec 66. SECRET. Gp-3.

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a. USAREUR OPLAN AE 102. After having published separate Annexes C and E in 1965, USAREUR revised the remaining parts of its OPLAN AE 102 and distributed them in January. In August USAREUR again revised and distributed Annex E as Change 2 to OPLAN AE 102.⁴⁴

During the following months USAREUR changed this general war plan in accordance with the developments in FRELOC implementation. For instance, on 15 November USAREUR closed its main wartime headquarters at Maison Fort and its emergency headquarters at Verdun. Concurrently, the emergency headquarters opened in the vicinity of Karlsruhe on an interim basis, serving also as the main headquarters. By 15 December USAREUR (Main) headquarters was ready to open in a selected field location on order of CINCUSAREUR or at the appropriate state or stage of alert.⁴⁵

At the end of 1966 USAREUR drafted a change to its OPLAN AE 102, which was based on an internal review of the plan and on Change No. 7 of USCINCEUR OPLAN EC 102. The revised USAREUR plan, including appendices and annexes, was to be ready for staffing in early 1967.⁴⁶

b. USAREUR OPLAN AE 4214. In September USAREUR distributed this contingency plan; it replaced USAREUR OPLAN AE 214 and supported USCINCEUR OPLAN EC 4214. The plan provided for alerting and deploying to Libya an airborne brigade, an armored cavalry regiment, and supporting units as Army elements of a U.S. joint task force (USJTF). USAREUR would also provide a staff augmentation to the USJTF headquarters and logistic support and personnel. The U.S. Army Task Force Commander would be designated as the land force commander (COMLANFOR).⁴⁷ During the following weeks USAREUR

⁴⁴(1) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to distr. 24 Jan 66, subj: USAREUR OPLAN AE 102. CONF. Gp-3. (2) Ltr, same to same, 24 Aug 66, subj: Change 2, USAREUR OPLAN AE 102. UNCLAS. Both AEAGC-P.

⁴⁵Cable SX-6192, CINCUSAREUR to distr, 12 Nov 66. SECRET. Gp-3.

⁴⁶DF, USAREUR ODCSOPS to distr, 17 Dec 66, subj: Proposed Change 2, USAREUR OPLAN AE 102. AEAGC-P. SECRET. Gp-3.

⁴⁷Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to distr, 19 Sep 66, subj: USAREUR OPLAN AE 4214 (U). AEAGC-P. TS. Gp-3.

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made several changes in the previously prepared time-phased force deployment lists, which were to permit eventual use of ADP procedures.⁴⁸

c. USAREUR OPLAN AE 218. After a planning conference at USAFE headquarters on 13 March USAREUR issued instructions for the expanded concept of operation. USEUCOM had directed the use of USAREUR OPLAN AE 218 as a vehicle to test ADP or EAM procedures for deployment planning. USAREUR issued instructions on the preparation of DEPPLAN cards based on a complete printout of all Army units supporting OPLAN AE 218.

Seventh Army proposed to substitute a 105-mm artillery battalion for a battery of the same caliber, and USAREUR decided to retain in the troop list a 155-mm howitzer battalion to provide sufficient heavy caliber firepower to meet any contingency that might develop in the objective area.⁴⁹

In June USAREUR asked for the resupply requirements of the CINCSRIKE forces so that it could prepare the deployment cards for all Army forces.⁵⁰

In September USAREUR submitted transportation planning data for USCINCEUR OPLAN EC 4218, which included information on the number of personnel and the cargo tonnages required for the Army elements that would participate in the execution of this plan. A joint task force planning conference hosted by USAFE subsequently examined the status of various contingency plans, including the logistic assumptions of EC 4218.⁵¹

⁴⁸ Cable SX-2870, CINCUSAREUR to Seventh Army, 14 Apr 66. CONF. Gp-3.

⁴⁹ Cables SX-2370, 2837, and 3108, CINCUSAREUR to Seventh Army et al., 21 Mar, 12 and 28 Apr 66. All CONF. Gp-3.

⁵⁰ Cable SX-3715, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 9 Jun 66. CONF. Gp-4.

⁵¹ (1) Cable SX-5154, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 10 Sep 66. SECRET. Gp-4. (2) Cable SC-46979, same to CINCUSAFE, 17 Oct 66. UNCLAS.

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In December USAREUR drafted a new OPLAN AE 4218 for publication on 1 February 1967. The new plan, supporting USCINCEUR OPLAN EC 4218 dated 17 October 1966, was to be a consolidated revision of USAREUR OPLAN AE 218 and Seventh Army OPLAN 215.⁵²

d. USAREUR OPLAN AE 215. This plan provided for alerting and deploying an Army task force to execute contingency operations within the USEUCOM area or to augment USSTRICOM/USMEAFSA. It also provided for logistic support to USAREUR and USARSTRIKE elements in accordance with Department of the Army policy. The newly added Annex J included information on possible staging bases and areas of employment. USAREUR published the plan on 22 March.⁵³

During the third quarter of 1966 USAREUR, assisted by Seventh Army, prepared force structures for the various force packages listed for deployment in USCINCEUR's draft OPLAN EC 4225. Upon completion of component force packages and other data, USEUCOM intended to publish OPLAN EC 4225, and USAREUR was to respond by publishing its own OPLAN AE 4225 to replace AE 215.

USAREUR's force packages submitted to USEUCOM were similar to those listed in the current AE 215 and USCINCEUR's OPLAN EC 4214. The use of ADP procedures facilitated the selection and tailoring of force packages. Although the details of logistic support packages, weights and cubes of combat support elements, and the force structure itself were not complete, USAREUR forwarded the Army force packages and ADP cards to USEUCOM to permit the early publication of EC 4225. At the same time, USAREUR asked Seventh Army to review each force package for completeness, proper listing of priorities, and accuracy of logistic data. In addition, Seventh Army was to develop a more meaningful format for force package data. USAREUR expected that an exercise testing the OPLAN EC 4225 concept would take place in the spring of 1967.⁵⁴

⁵²DF, USAREUR ODCSOPS to distr, 19 Dec 66, subj: Revision of USAREUR OPLAN AE 218. AEAGC-P. UNCLAS.

⁵³(1) DF, DCSOPS to distr, 21 Mar 66, subj: USAREUR OPLAN AE 215. (2) USAREUR OPLAN AE 215. Both AEAGC-PW. SECRET. Gp-3.

⁵⁴(1) Ltr. CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 14 Oct 66, subj: Force Tabs for USCINCEUR OPLAN 4225. (2) Ltr, same to Seventh Army, 17 Oct 66, subj: USCINCEUR OPLAN 4225. Both AEAGC-P. SECRET. Gp-4.

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e. USCINCEUR and USJTF OPLAN 4226. In revising its EC 4226, USEUCOM introduced a new concept of operations that required USAREUR to extend administrative and logistic support rather than to deploy units providing such support. The execution of this plan would result in increased tension in Europe and would require significant augmentation of USEUCOM. The forces and phasing developed in the ERP and used in MOVECAP 67-71 appeared appropriate for such an augmentation, which might be stopped at any point if there was a relaxation in tension. USAREUR concurred in these planning concepts.⁵⁵

On 1 November USCINCEUR published his OPLAN 4226 with only limited time available for preparation. After its publication, the commander of the U.S. joint task force reviewed the plan and the proposed--yet unpublished--annexes, and made recommendations for changes. USAREUR headquarters, in turn, reviewed the joint task force plan--USJTF OPLAN 4226, dated 18 April 1966--and relettered the annexes required to support it. These actions were under way at the end of 1966.⁵⁶

f. USAREUR OPLAN AE 300. USAREUR alerted its standby support forces for possible recovery operations during Projects GEMINI 8, 9A, 10, 11, and 12 in March, May, July, September, and November. After successful completion of these five flights, USAREUR released the alert forces.⁵⁷

On 1 December, upon the merger of USAREUR and Seventh Army headquarters, USAREUR OPLAN 300 became obsolete, and USAREUR Operations Order 4-66 replaced it.⁵⁸ The new USAREUR operations

⁵⁵(1) Cable ECJC-L-14128, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR and CINCUSAFE, 24 Sep 66. TS. Gp-3. (2) Cable SC-44825, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 1 Oct 66. UNCLAS.

⁵⁶DF, USAREUR ODCSOPS to distr, 19 Dec 66, subj: Revision of USJTF OPLAN 4226. AEAGC-P. UNCLAS.

⁵⁷Cables SX-2302, 2307; 3568, 3683; 4280, 4338; 5178, 5234; 6064, and 6243, CINCUSAREUR to distr, 16, 17 Mar; 28 May and 6 Jun; 19, 21 Jul; 12, 13 Sep; 4 and 15 Nov 66. All CONF. NOFORN. Gp-4.

⁵⁸Intvw, Mrs. C. Stevenson, USAREUR ODCSOPS Mil Hist Br, with LTC U. Uchima, USAREUR ODCSOPS P1 Div, 5 Dec 66. CONF. Gp-4.

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order was based on USEUCOM Operations Order 4-66, dated 28 September 1966, which tasked USAREUR to perform normal and forceful recovery operations in support of future Apollo and Manned Orbital Laboratory recovery missions.⁵⁹

g. Evacuation of Noncombatants. In early 1966 USEUCOM clarified its concept for the nonemergency evacuation of noncombatants. By accelerating their respective peacetime administrative procedures, component commanders would be able to move a much greater number of personnel to the United States. There were several reasons for this assumption: No dependents would be arriving, no sponsors would be leaving, additional intertheater transportation would be available, and there would be more funds for contracting indigenous assistance. If the evacuation requirements exceeded the capabilities of the accelerated uniservice systems, USEUCOM would implement its OPLAN EC 310.⁶⁰

USAREUR continued to differentiate between the emergency evacuation of noncombatants (OPLAN AE 310 [NEO]) and the regulation for the peacetime nonemergency evacuation of noncombatants (USAREUR Regulation 600-801). In April USAREUR revised and published the regulation; it used Annex J to OPLAN AE 310 as the basic document for briefing and orienting noncombatants.⁶¹

In September the Joint Chiefs of Staff requested USEUCOM to restudy the noncombatant evacuation in the light of the withdrawal of U.S. forces from France. In submitting its comments, USAREUR stated that it envisioned no change in the noncombatant evacuation philosophy, but that the planners would have to consider the following factors in modifying the concept of operations: The French holding areas would no longer be available; the use of holding areas in the BENELUX countries would be undesirable because of their vulnerability; the use of land routes across France to safehavens on the Iberian Peninsula would no longer be possible;

⁵⁹ DF, C/P1 Div to USAREUR DCSOPS, 19 Dec 66, subj: Proposed USAREUR OPORD 4-66. AEAGC-P. SECRET. Gp-4.

⁶⁰ Cable ECJC-J-04107, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR et al., 1 Mar 66. CONF. Gp-4.

⁶¹ DF's, DCSOPS to DCSPER, 7 Mar, subj: Nonemergency Evacuation of Noncombatants; 8 Mar, subj: Plan AE 310 (NEO); and 20 Apr 66, subj: ACROTUS. All AEAGC-PW. SECRET. Gp-4.

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and the use of France as a safehaven would depend on that country's willingness and capability to receive and maintain U.S. noncombatant evacuees.

USAREUR therefore recommended a revision of the current concept of operations to reflect maximum use of all available airlift for evacuation to the United States, available safehavens, and holding areas in the United Kingdom, in that priority.⁶²

13. (S) Civil Affairs

a. Overall Planning. In April Allied Land Forces, Central Europe (LANDCENT) distributed copies of the so-called new concept of population movement prepared by F.R.G. authorities. In the amplifying directive accompanying the basic document LANDCENT stated that the concept would form the basis for population movement planning at the army group level. During the following month CENTAG disseminated these instructions, asking its subordinate commands to furnish information on restricted areas and civilian evacuation routes. When Seventh Army requested its U.S. and F.R.G. corps and the Support Command to comply with the CENTAG request, they warned that the detailed planning would be time consuming.⁶³

b. Seventh Army Planning. In April the Joint Military-Civilian Central Coordinating Committee of the Wehrbereichskommando (WBK) V (the Bundeswehr area command for Baden-Wuerttemberg) held its first meeting. The participants included representatives of the F.R.G. Ministry of Defense, WBK V, Seventh Army, V Corps, and Seventh Army Support Command. The conferees decided to form working groups to prepare plans for population control and correlate these plans with existing civil defense measures.⁶⁴ At the next meeting on 9 May the committee formed seven working groups and specified that they were to deal with such problem

⁶²(1) Cable ECJC-J-13325, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR et al., 12 Sep 66. (2) Cable SX-5316, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 20 Sep 66. Both SECRET. Gp-3.

⁶³(1) Cable CX-1114, CENTAG to Seventh Army, 6 Jul 66. (2) Ltr, Seventh Army to V Corps et al., 16 Jul 66, subj: Population Movements Under the New Concept. AETGC-PL. Both CONF.

⁶⁴Minutes of First Meeting - Joint Military Civilian Planning Committee, WBK V, 1 Apr 66. Cy in AEAGC-P files. SECRET. Gp-4.

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areas as the control and movement of the civilian population; rear area security; the release of U.S. facilities after the outbreak of hostilities; wartime stationing; local manpower and materiel resources; traffic regulation; treatment and evacuation of casualties; barrier and infrastructure planning; and signal communications. The working groups held their first meetings during the following months.⁶⁵

Toward the end of 1966 Working Group I prepared a draft plan for the movement of civilian population elements from potential combat areas into the WBK V area in the event of hostilities. Civil affairs and transportation officers from Seventh Army headquarters participated in the preparation of movement schedules and selection of evacuation routes. At the end of 1966 the draft plan was ready for further staffing.⁶⁶

14. (S) Psychological Warfare

The personnel drawdown greatly affected USAREUR's psychological warfare resources. By mid-September the 5th Psychological Operations Battalion (Tactical) had only 2 of the 39 officers it was authorized in wartime. However, if the need arose, the battalion could draw on a pool of Ready Reserve personnel composed of 42 officers and 106 enlisted men programed for assignment to psychological warfare duties in the event of an emergency. With a peacetime authorized strength of 64, the battalion was the only U.S. military psychological warfare unit available in the U.S. European Command. USAREUR planned to activate a number of psychological warfare staff sections in wartime; the PMDL included additional units for arrival during the first 90 days of hostilities.⁶⁷

⁶⁵(1) MFR, Seventh Army, 9 May 66, subj: Second Meeting of the Joint Military-Civilian Control Coordinating Committee of WBK V Area. (2) DF, German Ln Staff with Seventh Army to Seventh Army Civil Affairs Officer, 16 Jun 66, subj: Minutes on the First Meeting of Working Group V. (3) Ltr, WBK V to Seventh Army, 2 Nov 66, subj: 3d Working Conference of Civil-Military Cooperation at WBK V on 12 Sep 66. All AETGC-CA. UNCLAS.

⁶⁶Ltr, WBK V to Seventh Army et al., 3 Jan 67, subj: Civil/Military Cooperation - Working Group - Population Movement, WBK V. CONF.

⁶⁷Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to COMCENTAG, 15 Sep 66, subj: Psychological Warfare. AEAGC-PW. SECRET. Gp-3.

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15. (TS) Chemical and Biological (C-B) Munitions

In 1965 USAREUR had computed its specific C-B agent-munition war reserve requirements for sustained operations and submitted them to higher headquarters. By the end of 1965 no feasible plan had existed for prestocking C-B munitions in Europe or for their timely shipment to the theater.⁶⁸

In February USAREUR learned that stocks in the United States were available to meet a major percentage of its war reserve C-B requirements, but that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had disapproved the proposal for augmenting chemical weapons stocks in Europe. In an effort to modernize the chemical munitions stored in Germany, USAREUR was to draft a requirements list for a balanced munitions mix containing about 480 agent-tons.⁶⁹

USAREUR forwarded the requirements list in March 1966. Subsequently, due to criticality of storage space caused by materiel relocations from France, USAREUR revised the modernization mix. The revised list stayed within the limitation of 480 agent-tons and reduced storage igloos from 27 to 15; the Department of the Army validated it in October.⁷⁰

Based on a report that current ammunition safety studies might preclude the shipment of M-55, 115-mm, C-B nerve agent rockets and their storage in Europe, USAREUR again revised the requirements list by changing the ammunition mix within the 480 agent-ton ceiling. This revision was less desirable than the first, and USAREUR considered it as only an alternate solution.⁷¹

⁶⁸USAREUR Anl Hist Sum, 1965, pp. 75 - 76. TS. Gp-1.

⁶⁹(1) Cable DA-749189, DA to USCINCEUR, 1 Feb 66. (2) Cable ECJD-WP-03035, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 8 Feb 66. NOFORN. Both TS. Gp-1.

⁷⁰(1) Ltr, USAREUR to USEUCOM, 15 Mar 66, subj: Modernization of CW Stocks (U). AEAGC-B. (2) Cable ECJD-WP-05471, USCINCEUR to DA, 30 Mar 66. Both TS. NOFORN. Gp-1. (3) Cable DA-785941, DA to CINCUSAREUR and USCINCEUR, 11 Oct 66. (4) Cable ECJCO-16079, USCINCEUR to DA, 25 Oct 66. Both CONF. Gp-4.

⁷¹Intvw, Mr. Blau with COL E. M. Them, C/USAREUR Ops Div CBR Br, 30 Nov 66. TS. NOFORN. Gp-1.

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Chapter 4

Training and Operations

16. (S) Major Exercises

Because of the effects of the troop drawdown on unit training activities, there were no brigade- or division-level field training exercises (FTX's) in the second half of 1966 and only corps-level command post exercises (CPX's).¹ The following significant exercises held during 1966 involved USAREUR participation:

a. FTX WINTER EXPRESS. Exercise WINTER EXPRESS, held near Bardufoss, Norway, from 17 February to 26 March, tested the capability of the ACE (Allied Command Europe) Mobile Force (AMF) to deploy rapidly to an outlying area of the NATO Alliance and support national forces in deterring or resisting an act of aggression. The AMF Land Component (AMF-L) consisted of a Canadian infantry battalion, an Italian airborne Alpine battalion and field hospital, an infantry battalion and artillery battery from the United Kingdom (U.K.), and one infantry battalion and one engineer company from USAREUR.

In addition to the AMF-L forces, a Norwegian brigade and rifle company, 4 Norwegian air force squadrons, a company of U.S. Marines, and an aviation company from USAREUR took part, bringing total participation in the exercise to approximately 10,000 men and making it the largest NATO winter exercise ever held in the Arctic area of Norway.²

¹For a listing of exercises, see Chronology. UNCLAS.

²USAREUR Mil Hist Br, Ops Div, Exercise WINTER EXPRESS (February - March 1966), pp. 1 - 17: UNCLAS.

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USAFE aircraft deployed the participating USAREUR units to Norway, except for the aviation company, which deployed in its own helicopters. USAFE provided some transportation for the Italian elements, but the other countries moved their own troops; the deployment was complete by 8 March. From their arrival until the beginning of the tactical phase of the exercise, units conducted training and participated in international sport competitions.³

The tactical phase lasted from 10 to 19 March and included cross-country movement by vehicle and on foot, utilizing both snowshoes and skis; helicopter movement of troops and supplies; use of helicopters in a reconnaissance role; tactical air operations that emphasized close air support of ground forces; and aerial resupply.

Redeployment began on 20 March.

The exercise revealed no significant problems in joint and combined operations and clearly indicated the feasibility of employing the AMF in its intended role.⁴ It also revealed, however, that there were serious weaknesses in the preparation, training, and equipment of some of the participating elements. Disregarding the Norwegians, who were operating on native territory with which they were thoroughly familiar, only the Canadian and Italian infantry elements were able to move and fight effectively over the deep snow encountered in the exercise area. In the future, the U.S. and British elements would have to improve their winter camouflage capabilities and would have to devote more attention to health and care of troops in order to prevent cold injuries.⁵ USAREUR found that the ski boots used by its participants were inadequate. Medical experts stated unequivocally that the primary cause of cold injuries was improper footwear; insufficient supervision and inadequate training of troops were contributory causes.⁶

³Ibid., pp. 18 - 44. UNCLAS.

⁴Ibid., pp. 45 - 60. UNCLAS.

⁵Ltr, AMF(L) to distr, 12 May 66, subj: Exercise Report on Exercise "WINTER EXPRESS," w/1 incl. AMF(L) G3 1710/10/7. (USAREUR AG 66-32). NATO SECRET.

⁶MFR, LTC H. F. Wehrle, III, USAREUR Log Div, subj: After Exercise Logistics Problem Discussion, Exercise WINTER EXPRESS, 4 April 1966. AEAGD-P. CONF. Gp-4.

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b. FTX SOUTHERN ARROW. Exercise SOUTHERN ARROW began on 29 April, when USAREUR announced an alert and initiated preexercise play by issuing the warning order to marshal the airborne task force at Rhein-Main Air Base, the departure airfield. The exercise tested joint operations, with three USAFE squadrons--two C-130 and one C-124--providing the airlift for the deployment, assault, resupply, and redeployment stages of the exercise. It also verified augmentation capabilities, for 22 C-130 aircraft from the United States flew to Europe to augment the USAFE squadrons. Finally, on the ground the exercise tested the capability of the 8th Infantry Division's airborne task force to perform a contingency mission, and the Air Force flew tactical reconnaissance and close air support sorties during the tactical phase.⁷

SOUTHERN ARROW also simulated a nuclear detonation and attendant casualties, which permitted USAREUR to test processing of casualties and USAFE to test staging and evacuation procedures.

For the first time in Europe, the exercise tested the parachute low-altitude delivery system (PLADS) for aerial resupply; of 4 bundles dropped, 2 landed on the marker, and the others 40 and 60 feet from it. The 8th Infantry Division considered that the test had conclusively demonstrated the effectiveness of the PLADS and recommended its use in future exercises.

The exercise revealed no significant problem areas.⁸

c. FTX SUMMER/MARMARA EXPRESS. Exercise SUMMER/MARMARA EXPRESS was a 28-day, 2-part exercise played in Greek and Turkish Thrace by ACE Mobile Forces. U.S., U.K., German,

⁷(1) Cable SX-3196, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 3 May 66.
(2) Ltr, 8th Inf Div to Seventh Army, 7 Jun 66, subj: After Action Report, Exercise SOUTHERN ARROW (U), w/incls. AETHGC. Both CONF. Gp-3.

⁸(1) Cable SX-3371, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 14 May 66. CONF. Gp-4. (2) Cable SC-28406, same to Seventh Army, 21 May 66. UNCLAS. (3) 8th Inf Div After Action Rept, 7 Jun 66, cited above. CONF. Gp-3.

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Belgian, and host nation contingents participated. After the initial deployment by aircraft to Thessaloniki, Greece, from 30 August to 5 September, the field exercise took place from 6 to 11 September. The administrative move to Turkey took two days, whereupon the second part of the field exercise was played from 15 to 19 September. Redeployment to home bases from Yesilkoy Airfield was from 21 to 28 September.

Exercise objectives included the testing of rapid deployment of AMF-L elements to a contingency area, coordinating exercise-related activities of national authorities and subordinate commands, familiarizing AMF-L personnel with likely deployment areas, and reviewing the requirements for host nation support.

Coordination between AMF components and host nation forces was adequate.⁹

d. FTX ABSALON 66. During the period 24 September to 12 October a reinforced battalion of the U.S. 3d Infantry Division took part in the Danish FTX ABSALON 66. The Danish Army committed two brigades plus supporting elements.

The exercise play provided training for Danish units in repelling the seaborne invasion of a would-be aggressor, played by the U.S. battalion and the Danish Guard Hussar Brigade. The U.S. forces gained experience in small-scale deployment, coordination with allied ground forces, and field operations on unfamiliar terrain.

The U.S. elements deployed from home station on 24 September and were in position when the exercise formally began on 2 October. On the day following its termination on 6 October, a joint Danish-U.S. parade and retreat ceremony took place. Five days later all U.S. elements had redeployed and closed at home station.¹⁰

⁹AMF(L) Post Ex Rept, 10 Nov 66, subj: Exercise SUMMER/MARMARA EXPRESS. Cy in AEUTMH-C. NATO CONF.

¹⁰(1) Cable ECJCO-11608, USCINCEUR to JCS, 10 Aug 66.
(2) Cable SX-5402, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 24 Sep 66.
(3) Cable SX-5522, same to same, 2 Oct 66. (4) Cable AETBGC-OP-K-110, 3d Inf Div to CINCUSAREUR, 6 Oct 66. (5) Cable SX-5709, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 13 Oct 66. All CONF. Gp-4.

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e. CPX FALLEX 66/HIGH HEELS V. Exercise FALLEX 66 was a NATO-wide CPX held from 17 to 28 October in conjunction with a U.S. worldwide CPX (HIGH HEELS V). HIGH HEELS V was a unilateral test of the general war plans of U.S. unified and specified commands, while FALLEX tested NATO war plans. FALLEX 66 consisted of three phases: TOP GEAR, from 17 to 21 October, practiced the coordinated alert system, procedures for the relocation of nontactical units (RONTU), the execution of emergency defense plans (EDP), and procedures for the dispersal of nuclear weapons. The second phase, JOLLY ROGER, held from 21 to 23 October and based on the assumption of a worldwide nuclear exchange, tested emergency plans and nuclear programs and examined problems arising from chemical-biological-radiological warfare, fallout effects, civil defense, and communications disruptions. The final phase, FULL MOON, was a study group examination of logistical problems held at CENTAG headquarters from 24 to 28 October.

USAREUR participated in its NATO role by augmenting the CENTAG headquarters staff and providing players for the USAREUR (War) headquarters staff. In addition, Seventh Army, USACOMZEUR, USASETAF, USAACOM, USAREUR Special Troops, USASTRATCOM-EUR, SASCOM, the 9th Hospital Center, the 513th INTC Group, and the U.S. Traffic Management Agency, Central Europe (USTMACE), participated in exercise play, as did all major national and NATO headquarters in Europe.¹¹

The exercise revealed a number of problem areas. For example, higher headquarters requested information that USAREUR's war headquarters did not have and was incapable of producing. The problem appeared to be one of inadequate understanding of theater army headquarters wartime capabilities and functions. There also seemed to be confusion concerning the alert measures that would authorize deployment of nuclear weapons from their storage sites. USAREUR recommended improvements in the alert directives to clarify the relationship between U.S. support units and non-U.S. delivery units, U.S. and NATO communications channels, and deployment times.

The U.S. atomic demolition teams in the Allied Forces Northern Europe (AFNORTH), Northern Army Group (NORTHAG), and CENTAG areas were unable to implement a USCINCEUR-directed

¹¹ USAREUR Ex Dir, 18 Aug 66, subj: FALLEX 66/HIGH HEELS V (U), pp. 1 - 3, Anx A. GC 76-9. SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-1.

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unilateral deployment because they depended upon host-nation communications, transportation, and security to carry out their missions. Since it would not be possible to conduct theaterwide atomic demolitions on a U.S. unilateral basis under existing plans and directives, USAREUR recommended the formulation of plans to overcome this deficiency.¹²

The differing times at which various forces passed to NATO operational control complicated the conduct of covering and screening operations during early stages of alert. There were also communications problems between Seventh Army and its flanking forces--German II Corps to the south and NORTHAG in the north. The problem was particularly significant because Seventh Army was to support these two elements with Pershing nuclear fire, and the procedures for executing the fire missions were unclear. The communications problem also delayed Seventh Army's acquisition of tactical information from elements on the north flank; similarly, slow communication with the Joint Combat Operations Center (JCOC) delayed receipt of nuclear strike analysis reports, and inadequate air-ground communications impaired the value of aerial reconnaissance support.¹³

The major difficulties that USASETAF encountered arose from the lack of coordination between the alert stages and measures of Italian and U.S. elements and the NATO command. Alert messages passed through three different channels at different times, and there were problems in passing national elements to NATO command. While the nuclear weapons employment and resupply seemed satisfactory, both SETAF and the III Missile Brigade failed to receive LANDSOUTH's nuclear release message. During the exercise USASETAF executed nuclear fire missions on the basis of receiving and authenticating SACEUR's R-hour message without awaiting LANDSOUTH's message.¹⁴

¹²Incl 1, 2, and 3 to DF, C/Op & Tng Br to DCSOPS, subj: HIGH HEELS V Final Exercise Report (U). AEAGC-TX. SECRET. Gp-1.

¹³Cable 26441, Seventh Army to COMCENTAG et al., 18 Nov 66. SECRET. Gp-1.

¹⁴Incl 1 to ltr, USASETAF to CINCUSAREUR, 13 Dec 66, subj: Transmittal of After Action Report (U). AESE-GCT. SECRET. Gp-3.

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USACOMZEUR pointed out that the current logistical reporting methods were inadequate to meet the wartime needs of the nuclear weapons supply system and that it had not received SACEUR's allocations of reserve nuclear weapons in time to permit adequate resupply action. AWSCOM was unable to activate its communications with NORTHAG because the equipment used by the two headquarters was incompatible.¹⁵

17. (C) The NATO Missile Firing Installation (NAMFI)

a. Hawk Equipment. In November 1965 USAREUR had recommended procuring additional equipment to improve Hawk annual service practice (ASP) at the NAMFI range in Crete. At the January 1966 User Nations' meeting the SHAPE representatives informed the User Nations of the difficulties experienced in declaring the additional Hawk equipment a minimum military requirement. Thus, infrastructure funding for the equipment was virtually impossible.¹⁶ The member nations urged SHAPE to reconsider, because an adequate ASP would require Hawk batteries to fire in their normal double firing section configuration, which would be impossible without the additional equipment. At the end of February SHAPE agreed to support the NATO funding request, subject to the following conditions: The siting of the additional high power illuminator radars (HIPIR's) without infringing electronic separation distance criteria, the siting of the additional launchers without infringing explosive safety criteria, and the full compatibility of the extra U.S.-manufactured equipment with the current European-produced NAMFI Hawk

¹⁵Incl 1 to ltr, USACOMZEUR to distr, 14 Nov 66, subj: FALLEX 66 After Action Report (U). AEZOT-WP. SECRET. NOFORN.

¹⁶(1) Cable FMN-5329/11-KT-841-A/6, MOD Denmark to SACEUR, 5 Jan 66. NATO UNCLAS. (2) Cable JSRL/6/19, Gen Hq Brussels to SACEUR, 7 Jan 66. NATO RESTRICTED. (3) Cable 19 EXA/PROG 2, Min Armees Paris to SHAPE, 17 Jan 66. NATO UNCLAS. (4) Cable SX-1501, CINCUSAREUR to MOD Athens, 1 Feb 66. (5) Rept, USAREUR Ops Div, 24 Feb 66, subj: NATO Missile Firing Installation (NAMFI) Users Meeting in Paris, 17 - 21 Jan 66 (Hereafter cited as Users Mtg Rept). AEAGC-TT. NOFORN. Both CONF. Gp-1.

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equipment.¹⁷ USAREUR was able to satisfy SHAPE on the first two points, and the Greek NAMFI officials certified that the U.S.-manufactured ground equipment was compatible with the European. In June a radar survey revealed the southeast Hawk launch site to be completely suitable. In July USAREUR technicians assisted Italian personnel in successfully firing two U.S. Hawk missiles from launchers manufactured by SETEL, thus demonstrating the compatibility of U.S. missiles and European launchers.¹⁸

At the April User Nations' meeting the Belgian representative formally offered to sell equipment to NATO to meet some of the additions that USAREUR recommended. Included were one HIPIR, one launcher, and two junction boxes, all of which were immediately available. However, the NATO Payments and Progress Committee would have to decide whether to purchase the equipment from Belgium or the United States, and SHAPE had not yet stated a minimum military requirement for the Hawk equipment.¹⁹

¹⁷(1) Cable MBHC-853, MOD Germany to SACEUR, 28 Jan 66. NATO CONF. (2) Cmt 3, DCSOPS to Cofs, 2 Feb 66, subj: Additional HAWK Equipment for NAMFI (U), w/incls. AEAGC-TT (28 Jan 66). (3) Cable SX-1572, CINCUSAREUR to SACEUR, 4 Feb 66. Both CONF. Gp-4. (4) Cable SH-21718, SACEUR to MOD Belgium et al., 24 Feb 66. NATO RESTRICTED. (5) Users Mtg Rept, 17 - 21 Jan 66, cited above. CONF. NOFORN. Gp-1.

¹⁸(1) Rept, USAREUR Ops Div, 11 Apr 66, subj: NATO Missile Firing Installation (NAMFI) Users Meeting in Paris, 14 - 18 March 1966. AEAGC-TT. NOFORN. (2) Cable SH-23227, SACEUR to RHAF GAS Athens, 11 May 66. NATO RESTRICTED. (3) Cable SX-3950, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 24 Jun 66. (4) Cables SX-4331 and 4332, same to 32d AADC, 21 Jul 66. (5) Ltr, 32d AADC to CINCUSAREUR, 9 Sep 66, subj: Test of HAWK Missiles for NAMFI. AETL-CC-TE. All CONF except (2). Gp-4.

¹⁹Rept, USAREUR Ops Div, 9 May 66, subj: Report of NATO Missile Firing Installation (NAMFI) Users Meeting in Paris, 26 - 30 April 1966. AEAGC-TT. CONF. Gp-4.

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At the July meeting the representatives learned that SHAPE was willing to declare as a minimum military requirement 7 launchers, 4 crew chief junction boxes, and 4 HIPIR's in addition to the originally procured equipment. Belgium could provide the equipment it had offered, and NATO would purchase the remainder from the United States.²⁰

In December USAREUR learned that in mid-January 1967 the U.S. Army Missile Command (USAMICOM) would submit to Greek representatives a letter of offer for additional Hawk equipment.²¹

b. Sergeant Equipment. At the end of 1965 the question of which Sergeant equipment to use during ASP firings in Crete had remained open. NATO had procured a set of Sergeant equipment for the NAMFI range, but the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany (F.R.G.)--the only User Nations with a Sergeant capability--wanted to use their own equipment in Crete, as in the Hebrides.²²

On 24 March the Department of the Army proposed that USAREUR inform SHAPE and the other User Nations that U.S. Sergeant units would use their own equipment, and USCINCEUR concurred in the proposal on 19 April. Two days later CINCUSAREUR formally announced the decision.²³ The NATO-owned Sergeant equipment thus became surplus, and at the December meeting the United States announced that it would refund to NATO the \$5.2 million purchase price.²⁴

²⁰Repts, USAREUR Ops Div, subjs: NATO Missile Firing Installation (NAMFI) Users Meeting, 11 - 15 July 1966 (U); and NATO Missile Firing Installation (NAMFI) Users Meeting 20 - 23 September 1966 (U). Both AEAGC-TT. CONF. Gp-4.

²¹Rept, USAREUR ODCSOPS, subj: NATO Missile Firing Installation (NAMFI) Users Meeting 6 - 9 December 1966 (U), p. 6. AEAGC-TT. CONF. NOFORN. Gp-3.

²²USAREUR Anl Hist Sum, 1965, pp. 83 - 84. TS (info used CONF. Gp-4).

²³(1) Cable DA-756664, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 24 Mar 66.
(2) Cable ECJD-PC-06381, USCINCEUR to same, 19 Apr 66. (3) Cable SX-2979, CINCUSAREUR to SACEUR et al., 21 Apr 66. All CONF. Gp-4.

²⁴Users Mtg Rept, 6 - 9 Dec 66, cited above, p. 6. CONF. NOFORN. Gp-3.

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In the meantime, USAREUR learned that the User Nation-approved NAMFI range instrumentation would not be capable of recording Sergeant impact data with the desired accuracy of plus or minus 30 meters. SHAPE, however, refused to support international funding of any modification, because in 1963 the United States had approved the original range design that had not provided for means to obtain accuracy data.²⁵

Instead of a new radar that would cost approximately \$1 million, USAREUR considered installing radar beacons in the Sergeant missiles. The beacons would cost less than \$44,000, and the available range equipment would then give impact data accurate to plus or minus 30 meters over a small sector of the impact area and plus or minus 60 meters over about half of the impact area. A remaining requirement was to provide a means to record precise radar data at the instant of the missile impact.²⁶

c. Nike Spare Parts. The multilateral agreement establishing NAMFI called for stocking 120 days' supply of Nike spare parts, with NATO furnishing infrastructure funds for the first 60-day supply and the User Nations paying for the second increment. The infrastructure portion amounted to \$2.254 million, and the other totaled \$979,000. Throughout 1966 the NATO-funded stocks remained a matter of controversy, with the United Kingdom and Canada objecting to the high cost. On 1 December, however, the NATO Payments and Progress Committee suggested a compromise under which NATO and the User Nations would share all costs equally. However, a U.S. study established that a 120-day stock of spare parts would not be significantly larger than a 60-day supply because of the necessity of storing complete items even though only a fractional item of supply might be called for. Accordingly, the User Nations proposed that NATO

²⁵(1) Cable SX-3832, CINCUSAREUR to RHAF/GAS Athens, 16 Jun 66. CONFMOD. Gp-4. (2) Cable SH-24388, SACEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 19 Jul 66. NATO CONF.

²⁶(1) Cable SX-5061, CINCUSAREUR to Seventh Army, 6 Sep 66. (2) Cables SX-5251 and 5434, same to RHAF/GAS Athens, 16 and 27 Sep 66. (3) Ltr, same to USAMICOM, 11 Oct 66, subj: NAMFI - Instrumentation Required for SERGEANT Annual Service Practice (ASP) (U). AEAGC-TT. (4) Cable SX-6137, same to same, 9 Nov 66. All CONF. Gp-4.

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and the User Nations share equally the costs of the initial 60-day stock of spare parts. USAMICOM would subtract from a 120-day stockage list the items included in the first 60-day supply, and NATO and the User Nations would then share equally the cost of the reduced second stock increment. The Payments and Progress Committee made a counter-proposal that the User Nations accepted: NATO would provide \$1.3 million toward the first 60-day stock, with the Users paying the rest of those costs and all of the costs for the second stock increment. This decision freed the necessary funds; the United States would deliver the first 60-day supply of spare parts by 30 April 1967, well ahead of the scheduled opening of the range.²⁷

Subsequently, in mid-December the Payments and Progress Committee agreed to pay ancillary charges in addition to the cost of spare parts, bringing the total NATO payment to almost \$1.5 million and reducing the User Nations' portion.²⁸

d. Status of Range Construction. Early in November USAREUR representatives visited the NAMFI site to determine the progress in construction. The cantonment area and the headquarters and operations buildings were nearing completion, as were the facilities in the missile assembly area. The launch area was complete but required some minor changes in cable conduits and modifications to the Sergeant launch pad. Certain commercial power outlets were incompatible with the power cables of tactical Hawk and Nike equipment and would require replacement.

The USAREUR representatives found that the line of sight from the Klapes radar site to the launch area would require tracking Sergeant missiles visually from the launch until they had attained sufficient altitude to permit the radar to obtain a track on the missile. The solution was to equip the missiles themselves with radar beacons.

²⁷Users Mtg Rept, 6 - 9 Dec 66, cited above, pp. 1 - 3.
CONF. NOFORN. Gp-3.

²⁸Cable 9319, AMEMB Paris to Secy State, 16 Dec 66.
CONF. Gp-4.

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A more serious problem was that two vital facilities--the range control installation and the tracking radars at Vassilikon--would not be ready before October 1967, at least three months past the scheduled 1 July opening date. At the December meeting the Greek representatives estimated that all range facilities and equipment would be operational by 15 August. The subsequent NATO acceptance test for range instrumentation would require at least 6 and perhaps as much as 15 weeks, thus placing the prospective opening date at 15 November or later.²⁹

Since the delay would probably force the User Nations to conduct a portion of their Hawk annual service practice in the United States, USAREUR recommended that the Department of the Army plan tentatively for 15 non-U.S. NATO Hawk batteries to fire in the United States during FY 1968.³⁰

In December SHAPE asked whether the McGregor Range might be made available to User Nations for both Hawk and Nike annual service practice in FY's 1967 and 1968. USAREUR requested the FY 1967 data for discussion at the User Nations meeting in January 1967.³¹

e. Addition of a NAMFI Adviser. Late in 1965 USAREUR had proposed adding a field grade officer with extensive air defense experience to the staff of the Joint U.S. Military Aid Group, Greece (JUSMAGG).³² Assigned to USAREUR Special Troops, the officer would be directly responsible to CINCUSAREUR, stationed in Athens, and attached to JUSMAGG for administrative support. His principal missions would be to advise and assist the Greek

²⁹(1) Rept, USAREUR ODCSOPS, 15 Dec 66, subj: NATO Missile Firing Installation (NAMFI) Users Meeting in Greece, 1 - 4 Nov 66 (U), pp. 1 - 5. NOFORN. (2) Users Mtg Rept, 6 - 9 Dec 66, cited above, pp. 3 - 4. NOFORN. (3) DF, USAREUR DCSOPS to CofS, 15 Nov 66, subj: Status of NATO Missile Firing Installation (NAMFI) (U). AEAGC-TT. All CONF. Gp-3.

³⁰Cable SX-6157, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 10 Nov 66. CONF. NOFORN. Gp-3.

³¹(1) Cable C-186, MAAG Belgium to USARADCOM, 15 Dec 66. (2) Cable SX-6913, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 29 Dec 66. Both CONF. Gp-4.

³²USAREUR Anl Hist Sum, 1965, pp. 82 - 83. TS (info used CONF. Gp-4).

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NAMFI staff, to monitor the range's status and progress, to report thereon to USAREUR, and to act as the informal point of contact between the Greek NAMFI staff and U.S. agencies furnishing them technical information on range operations.

The liaison officer arrived in April. With the concurrence of both USCINCEUR and JUSMAGG, at the end of June USAREUR prepared a letter of instruction that reflected his missions.³³

f. Training Greek Personnel. Late in 1965 the Greek Government had requested USAREUR to train Greek Hawk operational and maintenance personnel. The NAMFI User Nations agreed to pay the estimated \$50,000 costs for travel and temporary duty, and the 32d AADC began on-the-job training for the 50 Greek Hawk personnel on 9 March.³⁴

At the September User Nations' meeting the delegates also agreed to send a multinational team to NAMFI in October to train Greek personnel during the assembly and testing of the Hawk equipment. The team found that the equipment was not ready for checkout, and the U.S. team members questioned the proficiency of the Greek technicians.³⁵ User Nations'

³³(1) Cable SX-1965, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 25 Feb 66. CONF. Gp-4. (2) Cable ECJD-E-04269, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 4 Mar 66. (3) Ltr, USAREUR DCSOPS to C/JUSMAGG, 21 May 66, subj: Letter of Instruction - USAREUR NAMFI Liaison Officer to JUSMAG, Greece. AEAGC-TT. Both UNCLAS. (4) Ltr, JUSMAGG to CINCUSAREUR, 7 Jun 66, same subj, w/1 incl. JUSOPB. CONF. Gp-4. (5) Intvw, Mr. B. H. Siemon, USAREUR Ops Div Mil Hist Sec, with LTC J. E. McCleary, USAREUR Ops Div Org and Tng Br, 23 Jun 66. UNCLAS.

³⁴(1) DF, DCSOPS to CofS, 4 Jan 66, subj: NAMFI Users Meeting in Paris, 8 - 12 Nov 65. AEAGC-TT. CONF. Gp-4. (2) Users Mtg Rept, 17 - 21 Jan 66, cited above. CONF. NOFORN. Gp-1. (3) Cable SC-14339, CINCUSAREUR to CHJUSMAG Athens, 7 Feb 66. UNCLAS. (4) Intvw, Mr. Siemon with LTC McCleary, 22 Jun 66. CONF. Gp-4.

³⁵(1) Cable SX-5442, CINCUSAREUR to CG Seventh Army, 27 Sep 66. CONF. Gp-4. (2) Ltr, 32d AADC to CINCUSAREUR, 25 Nov 66, subj: NAMFI HAWK Technical Assistance Report. AETL-GC-TE. UNCLAS.

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representatives visiting NAMFI in early November confirmed the need for further training. Accordingly, the Danish representative recommended that the Users send teams of technicians to Greece during the first quarter of 1967 to assist and train the host nation technicians. The Users agreed, and USAREUR directed the 32d AADC to prepare two training programs--one for Hawk and one for Nike--and plan for their implementation in early 1967.³⁶

18. (S) Ranges for Rocket-Firing Helicopters

In 1965 USAREUR explored the possibility of Army helicopters firing familiarization and qualification courses with the M-3 rocket system at Spanish gunnery facilities. In December USAREUR helicopters had used the British-controlled Bergen-Hohne range in Germany, where adverse weather had hampered the successful conduct of the firing.³⁷

Because the British could make Bergen-Hohne available only in late December, USAREUR continued its attempts to secure facilities in Spain.³⁸ The Zaragoza gunnery range was too small to meet safety requirements for rocket-firing helicopters. The Spanish Army thereupon suggested using a tank and artillery range at Hoyo de Manzanares, 30 kilometers north of Madrid, but this range also proved to be too small.³⁹

³⁶(1) Users Mtg Rept, 1 - 4 Nov 66, cited above. NOFORN. (2) Cable SX-6263, CINCUSAREUR to CG 32d AADC, 17 Nov 66. Both CONF. Gp-3.

³⁷USAREUR Anl Hist Sum, 1965, pp. 85 - 86. TS (info used SECRET. Gp-3.

³⁸(1) Cable AETGC-TT-11541, Seventh Army to CINCUSAREUR, 29 Jan 66. (2) DF, USAREUR DCSOPS to CofS, 3 Feb 66, subj: SMC IN 12149 Jan 66 (Proposed Use of Zaragoza Air Base) (U). AEAGC-TT. Both SECRET. Gp-4.

³⁹Cable 15467, Seventh Army to CINCUSAREUR, 13 Apr 66. SECRET. Gp-4.

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In May Seventh Army representatives visited the Putlos firing range operated by the Bundeswehr on the Baltic Sea coast. The range had adequate overland approach routes and the firing area--partially on the beach and partially in the sea--had an acceptable safety fan over the sea.⁴⁰

Late in May Seventh Army representatives met with F.R.G. officials to determine the possibilities of sharing training areas during FY 1968. When the Seventh Army conferees raised the question of using the Putlos range in early 1967, the Germans offered the period from 11 to 23 March. On 6 September USAREUR secured official German approval for the use of the range in March 1967.⁴¹

However, since USAREUR was not entirely satisfied with this solution--largely because of the likelihood of adverse weather in Germany--it continued to search for better facilities. On 3 October two USAREUR officers visited an Italian artillery range at Nettuno, near Anzio, and found that it was too narrow to establish an adequate firing lane. The Italian artillery officers who were their hosts advised them that the Salto di Quirra range on the island of Sardinia offered the best possibility for rocket firing. Since the USAREUR liaison officer to NAMFI had earlier expressed the same opinion, USAREUR decided to investigate the facility at Salto di Quirra in early 1967.⁴²

⁴⁰ Cable 18407, Seventh Army to CINCUSAREUR, 26 May 66.
UNCLAS.

⁴¹ (1) Cable 19416, Seventh Army to CINCUSAREUR, 14 Jun 66. (2) DF, DCSOPS to Ger Rep Cen Area, 18 Aug 66, subj: Use of Putlos Range by US Forces. AEAGC-TT. (3) DF, Ger Rep Cen Area to Hq USAREUR--Org & Tng Br [Ops Div], 6 Sep 66, subj: Use of Firing Range PUTLOS by US Forces. G3/3-Az 45-10-20. Cy in AEAGC-TT. All UNCLAS.

⁴² (1) Memo, LTC D. E. Mulligan to C/USAREUR Ops Div Tng Br, 4 Oct 66, subj: Visit to Italian Artillery Range Located At Nettuno. AEAGC-TT. (2) Intvw, Mr. Siemon with LTC McCleary, 14 Dec 66. Both UNCLAS.

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19. (S) Special Warfare

a. Relocation. Among the units that would have to relocate from France before the 1 April 1967 deadline were two elements associated with unconventional warfare--the Support Operations Task Force, Europe (SOTFE), and the 557th Quartermaster (QM) Company. SOTFE was USEUCOM's unconventional warfare planning staff in peacetime, which would assume wartime operational control over USAREUR's 10th Special Forces Group (SFG) in implementation of USCINCEUR unconventional warfare plans. The 557th, a USACOMZEUR unit that was capable of rigging equipment for airdrop, had the dual mission of supporting USAREUR's airborne and aerial resupply operations and USEUCOM's wartime unconventional warfare operations by rigging for airdrop the guerrilla supplies required for SOTFE's unconventional warfare plans.⁴³

USAREUR considered transferring one company of the 10th SFG from the Federal Republic to Camp Passalacqua, in Italy, and stationing with it one platoon of the 557th to support its airdrop operations. When the Italian Government refused, for political reasons, to authorize the stationing of a Special Forces unit in that country, USAREUR decided to move the entire 557th QM Company to Mainz.⁴⁴ There, the company would be in a central location close to the Wiesbaden and Rhein-Main Air Bases to support airborne operations, and also fairly close to Sembach, the home station of the 7th Air Commando Squadron, the primary air-delivery unit supporting SOTFE.⁴⁵

USAREUR had first recommended relocating SOTFE at McGraw Kaserne in Munich, near the 10th SFG. In August a SOTFE survey revealed that Panzer Kaserne in Boeblingen, near USEUCOM headquarters at Stuttgart, would be more

⁴³ Intvw, Mr. Siemon with LTC U. Uchima, USAREUR ODCSOPS Plans Div, 5 Dec 66. CONF. NOFORN. Gp-3.

⁴⁴ Cable SX-5715, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 14 Oct 66. CONF. Gp-4. (For details, see pp. 179 - 181.)

⁴⁵ Cable ECJD-PW-17864, USCINCEUR to JCS, 25 Nov 66. SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-4.

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suitable because SOTFE's working relations with the USEUCOM planning, operations, and intelligence staffs required daily contacts. Accordingly, in mid-October USCINCEUR directed the SOTFE headquarters to move to Panzer Kaserne between 2 and 15 January 1967.⁴⁶

b. Readiness. Like all other USAREUR elements, the 10th Special Forces Group was affected significantly by the personnel drawdown. Thus, by the first week of June the Group had reduced all 9 of its authorized "B" detachments to zero strength, and had eliminated 5 of its 36 authorized "A" detachments.⁴⁷

Since Special Forces personnel require a high degree of proficiency in a variety of unique skills, the 10th SFG was unable to overcome the effects of personnel reductions as rapidly as other units. By 31 December--by that time USAREUR's assigned enlisted strength was higher than it had been before the drawdown--the 10th SFG had made little progress. Two "A" detachments remained at zero strength, and three were in caretaker status with strengths of two to five enlisted men. All "B" detachments were in caretaker status, commanded by E-8 and E-9 noncommissioned officers; their total strengths varied between 6 and 10 enlisted men. (Normally "A" detachments, commanded by captains, had 12 personnel, and "B" detachments, commanded by majors, had 23.) All "C" detachments had officers commanding them and were considered operational, although none was at full strength.

In terms of readiness, 3 "A" detachments had a REDCON of 2; 7 "A" and 3 "C" detachments had REDCON 3, and the remaining detachments had REDCON 4. There was no prospect of significant improvement in the foreseeable future.⁴⁸

⁴⁶(1) Cable 192, COMSOTFE to CINCUSAREUR, 10 Aug 66. CONF. NOFORN. Gp-4. (2) Ltr, GEN D. A. Burchinal, Dep USCINCEUR, to GEN A. P. O'Meara, CINCUSAREUR, 21 Sep 66; USAREUR GS 96-8. SECRET. (3) DF, USAREUR DCSOPS to Cofs, 30 Sep 66, subj: SOTFE Relocation. AEAGC-OR. SECRET. Gp-4. (4) Cable ECJC-S-15390, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR and SOTFE, 15 Oct 66. UNCLAS.

⁴⁷(1) Cables AEUSF-CC-237 and 292, 10th SFG to CINCUSAREUR, 23 May and 22 Jun 66. (2) Intvw, Mr. Siemon with CPT W. A. Hitchcock, Jr., USAREUR Ops Div, 20 Jun 66. All SECRET. Gp-4.

⁴⁸(1) Intvw, Mr. Siemon with CPT Hitchcock, 6 Dec 66. (2) Ltr, 10th SFG to CINCUSAREUR, 7 Jan 67, subj: Detachment Status Report, w/1 incl. AEUSF-CC. Both CONF. Gp-4.

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c. Training and Exercises.

(1) Special Training. In addition to routine training and operations, the 10th Special Forces Group trained its own personnel in such specialized skills as mountain climbing, parachuting, SCUBA diving, and foreign languages. It also furnished teams under the military assistance program to teach unconventional warfare skills to members of foreign armed forces. Two such teams went to Austria, and one team spent six weeks in Greece.

At its home station the group trained 71 members of the British Army in mountain climbing, survival, demolition, and escape and evasion techniques. It also exchanged unconventional warfare training with the Royal Danish Army and sent personnel to a 10-day training course given by the German Army Mountain School.

Other unusual training activities included two 12-week sessions of medical on-the-job training at the Munich U.S. Army Hospital attended by nine medical specialists of the 10th SFG. Finally, in June, 44 Special Forces personnel participated in amphibious infiltration and exfiltration training along the Italian coast near Leghorn together with the crew of a U.S. Navy submarine.⁴⁹

(2) Unconventional Warfare Exercises. Elements of the 10th Special Forces Group participated in three joint and combined unconventional warfare exercises in 1966. The first of these, DARK CLOAK, was a SOTFE-directed joint unconventional warfare CPX that took place from 1 to 21 February. USEUCOM, USAREUR, the 10th SFG, USACOMZEUR, USAFE, the 7th Air Commando Squadron, USNAVEUR, and the Sixth Fleet participated from home stations.

The exercise play practiced coordination between SOTFE, USEUCOM, and the Joint Task Force (JTF) and its component commands.⁵⁰

⁴⁹(1) Ltrs, 10th SFG to USAREUR DCSOPS, 6 Jul and 4 Oct 66, subj: Quarterly Training and Operations Report, 2nd and 3d Quarter Calendar Year 1966 (U), w/incl. Both AEUSF-CC. (2) Ltr, same to same, 26 Sep 66. GC 106-15. All SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-1.

⁵⁰(1) Cables SX-1038 and 1475, CINCUSAREUR to USACOMZEUR and Seventh Army, 4 and 31 Jan 66. (2) DF, USAREUR DCSOPS to CofS, 3 Feb 66, subj: Exercise DARK CLOAK (U). AEAGC-TT. All CONF. Gp-4.

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Exercise GREEN HEATHER was an Anglo-American unconventional warfare exercise conducted from 29 April to 17 May in the vicinity of Brecon, Wales. Company B of the 10th Special Forces Group and a detachment from the 275th Signal Company participated with elements of the British Army.

The exercise tested joint operations, communications, and coordination of unconventional warfare techniques.⁵¹

From 6 to 22 September elements of the 10th SFG, supported by the 7th Air Commando Squadron, participated with F.R.G. units in Exercise HAY MOUNT. The U.S. elements furnished unconventional warfare elements, and German units provided both guerrilla and territorial defense forces for the exercise, which tested infiltration techniques, communications between infiltrators and their operational base, aerial resupply, and guerrilla and counter guerrilla operations.⁵²

20. (S) Aviation

a. Aviators. In 1965 the Department of the Army had levied USAREUR for 472 helicopter pilots and had established a manning level of 999 against the command's authorization of 1,553 aviators. Late in March 1966 the Department announced a further worldwide redistribution of Army aviation assets to meet the needs of the conflict in Vietnam, reducing USAREUR's manning level to 478 for the following six months. USAREUR estimated that normal rotation and projected withdrawals might reduce assigned aviator strength to 250 in August and September.⁵³

⁵¹(1) Cable SX-3142, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 15 Apr 66. CONF. Gp-4. (2) Ltr, 10th SFG to DCSOPS, 6 Jul 66, cited above. SECRET. Gp-1.

⁵²(1) Ltr, Hq SOTFE to distr, 18 Jul 66, subj: Joint/ Combined Field Training Exercise (FTX) HAY MOUNT, w/1 incl. (2) Intvw, Mr. Siemon with MAJ J. E. Rehbock, USAREUR ODCSOPS Tng Div, 29 Dec 66. Both CONF. Gp-4.

⁵³Cables DA-755998, 756891, and 765509, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 21 and 24 Mar and 17 May 66. SECRET. Gp-4.

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Actually, however, USAREUR's aviator strength dropped from 914 at the end of May to 543 on 31 August, reached a low point of 497 on 30 September, and then rose to 713 on 31 December, against the year-end manning level of 833.⁵⁴

b. Aircraft. Aviator losses led USAREUR to store a major portion of its aircraft, which in turn created a significant maintenance problem. In so doing, USAREUR had to consider the Department of the Army Aircraft Distribution Plan, FY's 1967 - 1971, reflecting the findings of the Aviation Requirements for the Combat Structure of the Army (ARCSA) study, which would reduce its quota of aircraft. In addition, the modernization program required the turn-in of a number of OV-1 aircraft between November 1966 and June 1967. To reduce the storage requirement, USAREUR recommended turning in some of the aircraft that would become excess under the ARCSA study or were scheduled for modernization. The Department of the Army issued preliminary instructions for the shipment of CH-34 helicopters and OV-1 aircraft.⁵⁵

At the same time, USAREUR proceeded with its storage plans. Subordinate commands were to place approximately 80 percent of their assigned aircraft into extended storage by 31 July, selecting older models for storage and retaining the maximum number of UH-1B, U-8, and other aircraft that were essential for operational and contingency missions.⁵⁶ Since aviator strengths did not decline as rapidly as

⁵⁴(1) Info extracted from files of USAREUR Pers Div Mil Pers Br. CONF. (2) USAREUR Readiness Briefing, 27 Feb 67, p. 39. GC 27-42. SECRET (info used CONF). NOFORN. Both Gp-4.

⁵⁵(1) Cable SX-1756, CINCUSAREUR to distr, 14 Feb 66. (2) Cable SX-1915, same to same, 23 Feb 66. CONF. (3) DF, USAREUR DCSOPS to CofS, 23 Mar 66, subj: Early Turn-In of Excess USAREUR Aircraft (U). AEAGC-A. (4) Cable SX-2419, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 23 Mar 66. NOFORN. (5) Cables DA-757548 and 757641, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 29 Mar 66. All except (2) SECRET. All Gp-4.

⁵⁶Cable SX-2480, CINCUSAREUR to Seventh Army et al., 25 Mar 66. SECRET. Gp-4.

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anticipated, USAREUR decided in May to maintain a balance between available personnel and aircraft and between aircraft in flyable and extended storage.⁵⁷

As of 31 July, only 36 percent--rather than the anticipated 80 percent--of USAREUR's aircraft were in flyable and extended storage. This figure dropped to 23.7 percent by 31 December.⁵⁸

USAREUR also shipped considerably fewer aircraft than anticipated. It sent 12 CH-34's to the United States to meet a Military Assistance Program (MAP) requirement and returned approximately 20 OV-1's for modernization during the year.⁵⁹

c. Flying Hours. Anticipating aviator losses, USAREUR reduced the flying hours program from 202,451 flying hours in FY 1966 to 110,568 in FY 1967, and scheduled 14,000 hours for the quarter ending on 30 September. However, when aviator losses were smaller than anticipated, aircraft flew 32,000 hours during that quarter. Accordingly, USAREUR increased its FY 1967 flying hours program to 148,000 hours and scheduled 21,000 hours for the second quarter, 38,000 for the third, and 57,000 hours for the fourth.⁶⁰

d. Training Programs. In 1965 USAREUR had provided helicopter transition training for 386 aviators. The 1966

⁵⁷(1) DF, USAREUR DCSLOG to CofS, 25 May 66, subj: Aircraft Storage (U). AEAGD-M-ASE. SECRET. (2) Cable SX-3562, CINCUSAREUR to Seventh Army, 27 May 66. CONF. Both Gp-4.

⁵⁸Intvw, Mr. Siemon with LTC E. L. Landry and Mr. H. C. Gayler, USAREUR ODCSLOG Mat Readiness Dir, 6 Dec 66 and 31 Jan 67. SECRET. Gp-4.

⁵⁹Intvw, Mr. Siemon with LTC W. E. Dasch, USAREUR ODCSLOG Sup & Svc Dir, 8 Dec 66. CONF. Gp-4.

⁶⁰(1) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 30 Jun 66, subj: USAREUR Aviation (U). AEAGC-A. SECRET (info used UNCLAS). (2) Ltr, same to ACSFOR, 14 Nov 66, subj: Revision of Fiscal Year 1967 Flying Hour Program. AEAGC-A. UNCLAS.

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program called for helicopter flight training for as least 250 pilots who were qualified only on fixed-wing aircraft. The course began on 14 March at the aviation training center at Schleissheim Army Airfield, near Munich; it included 124 hours of ground-school instruction, 60 hours of flight in the OH-13, and 25 flying hours in the UH-1B.⁶¹

At the end of April three classes were in session, and a fourth was to start on 2 June, but the diversion of personnel to the transition school began to have an adverse effect upon other USAREUR aviation operations.⁶² By mid-June USAREUR had but 107 aviators qualified to fly only fixed-wing aircraft. Helicopter pilots assigned from Vietnam to CH-34 units in Europe needed transition or requalification training, and all aviators returning from Vietnam had to renew their instrument-flight qualifications within six months of arrival in Europe.

Because of the shortage of potential students and the multiple requirements for instructor pilots, USAREUR reduced student input to the helicopter qualification courses from 30 to 12 per class for the classes held from June to December. Plans for 1967 called for continuation of the training program so that all fixed-wing pilots would qualify to fly rotary-wing aircraft.⁶³

e. Reorganizations. The ARCSA study had recommended concentrating OV-1 aircraft in corps surveillance companies

⁶¹(1) Cables 10521 and 10840, Seventh Army to CINCUSAREUR, 12 and 18 Jan 66. Both CONF. Gp-4. (2) Cable 183, USAACOM to same, 13 Jan 66. UNCLAS. (3) Cable 11801, Seventh Army to V Corps et al., 2 Feb 66. CONF. Gp-4. (4) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to ACSFOR, 5 Apr 66, subj: Rotary Wing Training. AEAGC-A. UNCLAS.

⁶²Cable SX-3329, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 12 May 66. SECRET. Gp-4.

⁶³(1) Cable SX-3842, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 17 Jun 66. SECRET. (2) Cable SX-6417, same to Seventh Army et al., 26 Nov 66. (3) Intvws, Mr. Siemon with LTC E. K. Ball and LTC E. F. Crooks, 8 Dec 66, and LTC L. F. Wilhelm, 13 Dec 66, all USAREUR ODCSOPS Avn Div. (2) and (3) CONF. All Gp-4.

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to provide intelligence collection support for the brigades, divisions, and corps. It had also emphasized that there was no requirement for an extensive air line of communications in Europe and that the mechanized infantry and armored divisions did not need organic light airmobile companies.⁶⁴

Accordingly, the study recommended eliminating the organic airmobile companies, consisting of 25 UH-1D helicopters, and establishing one airmobile company at the corps level. Similarly, the divisional aviation general support companies--authorized 10 OH-6, 6 UH-1B, and 4 OV-1 aircraft--would disappear, with part of their assets going to the division headquarters and headquarters company, part to the division support command supply and transportation battalion, and part to the corps. The divisional air cavalry troop would remain unchanged, with 9 OH-6 and 17 UH-1B aircraft, but the headquarters battery of the division artillery would lose 1 of its current 10 OH-6 and gain 2 UH-1B for a new total of 11 aircraft. The division headquarters and headquarters company--currently authorized no aircraft--would receive 4 OH-6's and 2 UH-1D's, while each of the infantry division brigade headquarters and headquarters companies would have 4 instead of 6 OH-6's.⁶⁵

In August the Department of the Army authorized USAREUR to reorganize its aviation elements under the new G-series TOE's with its currently available aircraft.

USAREUR then had 5 each of divisional aviation battalions, light airmobile companies, air cavalry troops, and general support companies. The 16th Aviation Battalion, assigned to Seventh Army, included the 14th Air Traffic Control Company, the 60th Aviation Company, Army, and the 122d Aviation Company, Aerial Surveillance. The 18th Aviation Battalion, assigned to Seventh Army Support Command, was composed of two medium helicopter companies; the 4th and 90th Aviation Companies. Finally, there were two corps aviation companies

⁶⁴Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 30 Jun 66, subj: USAREUR Aviation (U). AEAGC-A. GC-66-142. SECRET. Gp-4.

⁶⁵Army Commander's Conf Sum, DA Study Gp, Aviation Requirements for the Combat Structure of the Army (ARCSA) (U), 12 Nov 65, pp. 1, 8 - 9, 11, and Chart II. AEAGC-A. SECRET.

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and one aviation company in each of the three armored cavalry regiments.

In the FY 1967 - 68 force structure each USAREUR division would retain one aviation support detachment and one air cavalry troop. In addition, USAREUR would have 1 aviation group, 2 aviation battalions, 2 army and 2 corps aviation companies, 3 light airmobile companies (not assigned to divisions), 1 heavy and 2 medium helicopter companies, 2 aerial surveillance companies, 1 air ambulance medical company and 2 helicopter ambulance medical detachments, 3 air cavalry troops for the armored cavalry regiments, and 3 aviation detachments for USASETAF, Berlin Brigade, and AWSCOM headquarters.⁶⁶

Under the HEADCON implementation plan USAREUR activated the Aviation Group (Provisional) and transferred to it the units formerly subordinate to the 16th Aviation Battalion plus Seventh Army's helicopter training facility, the 3725th Flight Detachment, the 3737th Flight Operations Facility, and the 3740th Flight Information Detachment. Simultaneously USAREUR reassigned the 4th Aviation Company from the 18th to the 16th Aviation Battalion, reassigned the 16th Battalion to VII Corps, and assigned the corps' 67th Aviation Company to the battalion. On the same date USAREUR assigned the 18th Aviation Battalion, including the 90th Aviation Company, to V Corps, and reassigned the corps' 66th Aviation Company to the 18th Aviation Battalion.

The subsequent phases of the reorganization program called for the implementation of the force structure prescribed by the Department of the Army, except for the disposition of aerial surveillance assets. Instead of assigning one aerial surveillance company to each corps, USAREUR doubled the aircraft strength of the 122d Aviation Company and assigned it to the Aviation Group (Provisional) with the mission of supporting both corps.⁶⁷

⁶⁶Intvw, Mr. Siemon with LTC Wilhelm, 9 Dec 66. CONF.
(2) Cable DA-779829, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 26 Aug 66. SECRET. Both Gp-4.

⁶⁷(1) Cable SX-6335, CINCUSAREUR to 3d Armd Div et al., 21 Nov 66. (2) Cables SX-6417, same to Seventh Army et al., and SX-6418, same to DA, both 26 Nov 66. (3) Intvw, Mr. Siemon with LTC Wilhelm, 12 Dec 66. All CONF. Gp-4.

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f. Support of USEUCOM Headquarters at Stuttgart. During 1966 the Army's 1st Aviation Detachment provided 2 UH-1B helicopters to support USEUCOM headquarters and the U.S. element of SHAPE. USEUCOM stated that it would need 3 additional UH-1B's and 2 U-8 aircraft after its departure from France. Three helicopters would be at Stuttgart and two with SHAPE in Belgium. The U-8 fixed-wing aircraft would permit flights to airfields that could not accommodate larger Air Force aircraft.⁶⁸

The Department of the Army wanted to establish a USAREUR aircraft pool to provide aviation support for elements not specifically included in the ARCSA study. Since the aircraft pool would not exist by the time USEUCOM headquarters would move out of France, and USAREUR's aviation assets would not permit the permanent stationing of additional helicopters and aircraft, USAREUR recommended moving the two UH-1B helicopters of the 1st Aviation Detachment from France to Belgium. It would furnish the other helicopter and U-8 support on a mission basis pending Department of the Army authorization of additional aircraft.⁶⁹

USCINCEUR found the proposal acceptable, except that his headquarters would require three permanently assigned UH-1B helicopters because of the road congestion in the Stuttgart area. He therefore requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide him with adequate Army air support at Stuttgart by 1 March 1967.⁷⁰ The Joint Chiefs approved the assignment of five UH-1B's--two in Belgium and three at Stuttgart--on a full-time basis; USAREUR was to provide the aircraft from its current assets.⁷¹

⁶⁸ Cable ECJC-P-13272, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 12 Sep 66. CONF. Gp-4.

⁶⁹ (1) DF, USAREUR DCSOPS to CofS, 15 Sep 66, subj: Aircraft and Helicopter Support (U). AEAGC-A. (2) Cable SX-5256, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 16 Sep 66. Both CONF. Gp-4.

⁷⁰ Cable ECJC-P-14039, USCINCEUR to JCS, 23 Sep 66. CONF. Gp-4.

⁷¹ Cable JCS-7345, JCS to USCINCEUR, 7 Nov 66. CONF. Gp-3.

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21. (S) New Equipment

a. The M551 Sheridan. In 1965 the U.S. Army Weapons Command had advised USAREUR that it would receive some 600 Sheridans beginning in the fall of 1967. Because of the questionable night-fighting capabilities of the Sheridan--the flare from the rocket motor of the Shillelagh guided missile mounted on the new vehicle blinded the gunner--CINCUSAREUR had withheld his decision until completion of further testing.⁷²

Early in February the Department of the Army advised USAREUR of a revision of the overall Army tank program. The new proposal concerned primarily the M60A1E1 tank, a retrofitted M60A1 also equipped with Shillelagh, and did not include any provision for furnishing the M60A1E1 to USAREUR's armored cavalry regiments. Because of the night-fighting question, the Department suggested retaining the current M60 tank with the 105-mm gun in the tank units of the armored cavalry regiments to provide a better balance with the Sheridans issued to the remaining elements of the regiments.⁷³

Because the armored cavalry regiments on the border would make initial contact with the enemy, and most probably at night, CINCUSAREUR wished to retain one M60 tank with the 105-mm gun in each armored cavalry platoon of the border cavalry regiments. Accordingly, USAREUR requested authority to equip the armored cavalry platoons with a mix of two Sheridans and one M60 pending conclusive demonstration that the Sheridan had an adequate night-fighting capability.⁷⁴

Late in May the Department of the Army proposed eliminating USAREUR from the Sheridan distribution plan. The Sheridan,

⁷²USAREUR Anl Hist Sum, 1965, pp. 112 - 14. TS (info used SECRET. Gp-4).

⁷³Cable DA-749764, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 7 Feb 66. SECRET. Gp-1.

⁷⁴(1) MFR, LTC G. C. Hoffmaster, USAREUR Ops Div, 24 Feb 66, subj: Discussion of Army Tank Program (U). AEAGC-TO. (2) Cable SX-2032, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 1 Mar 66. Both SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-4.

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a light, thin-skinned vehicle with limited night-fighting capability, would not be suitable for USAREUR's purposes-- which required vehicles to confront and delay enemy armor in all conditions of weather and visibility. Its lack of protection seemed a serious weakness if the Sheridan were to engage in close combat with enemy armor, and the Department thought that a mix of Shillelagh- and gun-equipped M60 tanks might better meet USAREUR's needs.⁷⁵

In response to USAREUR's request for comments, Seventh Army stated that the original plan to mix two Sheridans and one M60 105-mm gun tank in the armored cavalry platoon still seemed the best solution. While it was true that the Sheridan would be no match for heavy enemy tanks in direct engagement, it might survive because of its superior mobility and speed. Superior maneuverability such as that possessed by the Sheridan would--according to the OREGON TRAIL study-- reduce vulnerability on the nuclear battlefield that would probably prevail in Europe. Seventh Army recommended expeditious efforts to improve the Sheridan's night-fighting capability.⁷⁶

CINCUSAREUR's position differed from the Department of the Army and Seventh Army proposals. He agreed that the armored cavalry regiments on the border could better perform their probable combat mission if each platoon had a mix of two M60 tanks with the conventional 105-mm gun and one M60A1EL mounting the Shillelagh. However, he believed that the greater speed and mobility of the Sheridan suited it admirably to the tasks of the armored cavalry reconnaissance squadrons of the division. USAREUR would require 135 Sheridans for its 5 divisional armored cavalry squadrons; additional needs for the maintenance float, the theater reserve, the prepositioned equipment, and training purposes would bring

⁷⁵ (1) Cable SX-3525, CINCUSAREUR to Seventh Army, 25 May 66. (2) DF, DCSOPS to DCSLOG, 26 May 66, subj: Distribution of XM551, Sheridan (U). AEAGC-TO. Both SECRET. Gp-4.

⁷⁶ Cable 19380, Seventh Army to CINCUSAREUR, 13 Jun 66. SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-1.

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the total to 262. If accepted, this proposal would make available 338 of the 600 Sheridans previously earmarked for USAREUR.⁷⁷

b. The M60A1E1 and E2 Tank. At the end of 1965 the Department of the Army had been awaiting approval of its request to increase procurement of the M60A1E1 tank, so that it could furnish USAREUR 854 new turrets mounting the Shillelagh system for retrofit in Europe. USAREUR would distribute 630 M60A1E1 tanks to tactical units, use 8 for training purposes, and keep 57 for maintenance float and 159 for theater reserve. The distribution to tactical units was predicated upon a mix of two Shillelagh-equipped M60A1E1 and three 105-mm gun M60 tanks in each tank platoon.⁷⁸

In February, however, the Department of the Army advised that USAREUR would receive only 597 tanks under the latest distribution plan; these would be new M60A1E2 tanks, however, obviating the need for an in-theater retrofit program. Based on a mix of 2 Shillelagh and 3 gun tanks in each tank platoon, the Department of the Army envisioned a distribution of 432 M60A1E2's to 24 tank battalions; USAREUR would use 8 for training, hold 39 for a maintenance float, store 108 as prepositioned equipment for 6 tank battalions, and keep 10 as a maintenance float for the prepositioned equipment. The plan made no provision for distributing M60A1E2 tanks to USAREUR's armored cavalry regiments or for placing any in theater reserve.⁷⁹

Seventh Army considered the departmental proposal acceptable, but USAREUR pointed out that current supply directives did not authorize a maintenance float for prepositioned stocks. USAREUR therefore proposed

⁷⁷Ltr, GEN A. P. O'Meara, CINCUSAREUR, to LTG J. H. Polk, ACSFOR, 18 Jun 66, w/1 incl. SECRET. Gp-4.

⁷⁸USAREUR Anl Hist Sum, 1965, pp. 111 - 12. TS (info used SECRET. Gp-4).

⁷⁹Cable DA-749764, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 7 Feb 66. SECRET. Gp-1.

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transferring the 10 M60A1E2 projected for prepositioned maintenance float into the theater reserve and retaining sufficient 105-mm gun M60 tanks to provide a full theater reserve for both the gun and Shillelagh versions of the M60. With these exceptions, USAREUR concurred in the proposed distribution plan.⁸⁰

In June, however, CINCUSAREUR increased the total requirement by 112 M60A1E2 tanks to compensate for the proposed reduction in Sheridans under his revised distribution plan.⁸¹

c. The Revised Tank Program: USAREUR heard nothing further on the subject until October, when the Department of the Army reconfirmed its February proposal to distribute the M60A1E2 to USAREUR on the basis of a mix of 2 Shillelagh and 3 gun tanks in each tank platoon--including those of the cavalry regiments--and announced a new worldwide distribution priority for the M551 that would provide USAREUR with 604 Sheridans between 1 July 1967 and 30 June 1970. The Sheridans would arrive in increments of 241 in FY 1968, 288 in FY 1969, and 75 in FY 1970. The Department of the Army wanted to distribute them first to the armored cavalry regiments and training base, then to the divisional cavalry squadrons and maintenance float, and finally to the theater reserve.⁸²

⁸⁰(1) Cable SC-14327, CINCUSAREUR to Seventh Army, 14 Feb 66. UNCLAS. (2) Cable 13035, Seventh Army to CINCUSAREUR, 23 Feb 66. (3) DF, DCSOPS to Cofs, 28 Feb 66, subj: The Army Tank Program (U). AEAGC-TO. (4) Cable SX-2032, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 1 Mar 66. All but (1) SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-1.

⁸¹Ltr, GEN O'Meara to LTG Polk, 18 Jun 66, cited above. SECRET. Gp-4.

⁸²(1) Cable DA-787145, DA to CINCUSAREUR et al., 19 Oct 66. (2) Cable DA-788695, DA to USACDC, 31 Oct 66. NOFORN. (3) Memo, COL F. X. Leary, Ops Div, to USAREUR DCSOPS, 2 Nov 66, subj: XM 551 Sheridan (U). AEAGC-TO. (4) DF, USAREUR DCSOPS to Cofs, 8 Nov 66, subj: The Army Tank Program (U). AEAGC-TO. NOFORN. All SECRET. Gp-1.

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Since CINCUSAREUR had the authority to revise the Sheridan distribution schedule within his command without reference to the Department of the Army, he directed that the border armored cavalry regiments receive the Sheridans last, rather than first, as proposed by the Department of the Army. Accordingly, the FY 1968 increment of the M551 would go to the training base, to the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, which had a reserve role; to the maintenance float, and to the divisional reconnaissance squadrons. The FY 1969 supply of Sheridans would go to the maintenance float, the theater reserve, and finally to the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment; and the 14th Armored Cavalry Regiment would receive its Sheridans in FY 1970.⁸³

As for the M60A1E2, the Department of the Army did not establish issue priorities because production schedules were not firm. However, USAREUR anticipated that it would receive its allocation of 597 tanks of this model from August 1967 to May 1969.⁸⁴

22. (S) Project OREGON TRAIL/Troop Test FRONTIER SHIELD

In 1965 the Department of the Army had completed the OREGON TAIL study of the future nuclear battlefield and had directed USAREUR, with USCINCEUR's concurrence, to conduct a troop test--FRONTIER SHIELD--of the study's findings.⁸⁵

In April USAREUR designated the Commanding General of the 3d Armored Division as the FRONTIER SHIELD test director. To permit effective testing, USAREUR also directed Seventh Army not to take from the 3d Armored Division any enlisted personnel required to meet drawdown

⁸³Cable SX-6291, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 18 Nov 66. SECRET. Gp-4.

⁸⁴(1) Cable DA-788659, 31 Oct 66. (2) Incl to DF, DCSOPS to CofS, 8 Nov 66. Both cited above. SECRET. Gp-1.

⁸⁵USAREUR Anl Hist Sum, 1965, pp. 55 - 59. TS (info used SECRET. Gp-1).

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levies until it had exhausted other sources, and to leave the test units intact until after the test. At USAREUR's request, the Department of the Army stabilized 162 specified officers who were key participants in the test program and promised to leave them in Europe until 1 December 1966.⁸⁶

After preliminary training sessions at Hohenfels in May and at Wildflecken in July, the troop units conducted the test from 28 August to 2 October.⁸⁷ The total program consisted of two 5-day company-level tests and two battalion-level tests of 7 and 8 days' duration. These four operations tested a CDC doctrinal proposal for defensive operations in the nuclear environment, which was based on four essential elements:

To assure survival in a nuclear battle, dispersion both within and between units was essential, with emphasis upon concealment, use of alternate positions, and mobility.

In contrast to current doctrine, which held the battalion to be the lowest echelon unit capable of separate employment in battle, the proposal would establish the company as the basic maneuver element and would disperse companies sufficiently to reduce vulnerability to nuclear attack while permitting the use of the companies' own low-yield nuclear weapons in the sectors between them.

The doctrine also called for a defense by "attrition in depth." Under this concept, the maneuver companies, separated by gaps, would maintain control of their areas by surveillance and patrolling, rather than occupation. If hostile elements penetrated the area, friendly forces would maneuver so as to maintain surveillance of the

⁸⁶ (1) Cable SX-2831, CINCUSAREUR to Seventh Army, 12 Apr 66. (2) Cable 16084, Seventh Army to CINCUSAREUR, 15 Apr 66. Both CONF. Gp-4. (3) Cable SC-24135, CINCUSAREUR to 3d Armd Div, 20 Apr 66. (4) Cable SC-24505, same to USACDC, 24 Apr 66. (5) Cable SC-25127, same to Seventh Army, 28 Apr 66. (3) to (5) UNCLAS.

⁸⁷ (1) Cable 2509, 3d Armd Div to CINCUSAREUR et al., 1 Jun 66. CONF. (2) Intvw, Mr. Siemon with LTC V. A. Quarstein, USAREUR Ops Div, 24 Jun 66, and LTC H. A. Davis, ODCSOPS, 29 Dec 66. Both CONF. Gp-4.

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enemy and would call for supporting nuclear or nonnuclear fire to destroy them. They would complete the destruction of the enemy with their own firepower after the strike.

Finally, the doctrine proposed a "scramble" concept of organization under which the combat assets of a battalion would be redistributed to provide balanced platoons. Each platoon would thus have a direct-fire capability--either a tank section or a recoilless rifle section--two rifle squads, and a mortar squad.⁸⁸

The test revealed a paradox: The gaps between company-size units were too small to permit effective use of friendly nuclear fire to accomplish the desired attrition in depth. At the same time, the sectors of the company-size units were too large for the units to maintain adequate surveillance of the area. FRONTIER SHIELD also demonstrated that, while surveillance means were adequate for larger targets, they could not detect small dismounted patrols. Small groups of aggressors easily infiltrated the dispersed forces and reassembled into potent fighting forces in the rear area. The "scramble" concept proved unsatisfactory because it was too complicated, decentralized the firepower of crew-served weapons, and did not permit the tailoring of forces for specific missions. Further testing to compare the "scramble" process with normal cross-reinforced armor and infantry units of company size would be necessary.⁸⁹

Both USAREUR and Seventh Army emphasized that the concepts and doctrine tested in FRONTIER SHIELD were sound in principle and that the test was a valuable contribution toward the development of proper training techniques and tactics for the nuclear battlefield. They recommended correction of the weaknesses they were criticizing and improvements of the basic concept. The cross-reinforcement concept was sound, but its implementation by the "scramble" method was too complicated to be effective in nuclear conflict. One should not limit oneself to more and better equipment. There was a real need for improving the reliability of current

⁸⁸ 3d Armd Div, Final Report to Troop Test FRONTIER SHIELD (U), 4 Dec 66, Sec I-3. AETFFS. CONF. NOFORN. Gp-3.

⁸⁹ Ibid., Sec I-6. CONF. Gp-3.

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equipment and developing new techniques and concepts for battlefield surveillance.

CINCUSAREUR pointed out that perhaps the most significant finding of the test was that a surprisingly large number of nuclear rounds did not even damage, much less destroy, their targets. Previous studies had overlooked that nuclear exchanges would not necessarily be totally devastating, a fact worth stressing to those who might have to fight in a nuclear environment. CINCUSAREUR was highly impressed by the efficacy of the Davy Crockett, which was a relatively primitive first-generation weapon. He urged the development of an improved nuclear weapon of the Davy Crockett type that would be highly mobile, reliable, and accurate and would have a very low yield of less than .02 kilotons. The weapon should be of a blast type, leaving little residual radioactive contamination. It would give the battalion great flexibility and fire-power and would also contribute to solving the conflict between dispersion and surveillance.

In summary, CINCUSAREUR considered the FRONTIER SHIELD test a valuable step toward the development of the doctrines and techniques that would be essential in future nuclear warfare.⁹⁰

23. (S) School Training

a. The U.S. Army School, Europe (USASCHEUR). As early as March USAREUR recognized that the drawdown of experienced specialists would soon create serious shortages of MOS-qualified personnel. At USASCHEUR 16 of the courses then offered provided training in over 20 of the MOS's in which USAREUR anticipated significant losses. Accordingly, USAREUR decided to expand certain of the available courses and to add some new courses that would help to relieve shortages in eight other MOS's.⁹¹

⁹⁰ Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to CG USACDC, 23 Dec 66, subj: Report of Troop Test Frontier Shield (U), w/incl 2. AEACC. SECRET. Gp-1.

⁹¹ DF's, USAREUR DCSOPS to CofS, 26 and 31 Mar 66, subj: Expansion of Output from MOS Training in USAREUR (U). Both AEAGC-T. SECRET. Gp-4.

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To accomplish the expansion, USASCHEUR requested issuance of 120 items of equipment, approval of three minor construction projects totaling \$46,000, the filling of 36 vacant enlisted instructor positions, and a temporary one-year TD augmentation.

USAREUR authorized the release of 73 of the desired items of equipment from theater reserve stocks to help meet the USASCHEUR requirements, and USACOMZEUR requisitioned the other items from the United States. USAACOM approved two of the construction projects, and USAREUR approved the third. Construction began in May.⁹²

USAREUR further authorized a TD augmentation of 1 officer, 2 warrant officers, 35 enlisted personnel, and 5 LN employees, but rejected a USASCHEUR request for 6 other local nationals for the comptroller's office.⁹³

USASCHEUR expanded 7 of its current courses--1 intelligence, 2 logistics, 2 engineer, and 2 ordnance--and established 6 new courses, 4 in the signal field, and 1 each in intelligence and ordnance.⁹⁴

These actions enabled USAREUR to issue 705 additional student quotas for attendance at USASCHEUR during the second quarter of 1966, thereby bringing the total student input for FY 1966 to 16,873. More significantly, the expansion of the USASCHEUR program would permit the school to accept a total student input of over 23,000 for FY 1967, an increase of approximately 38 percent.⁹⁵ In the second half of 1966 USASCHEUR graduated 10,047 students from its various courses.⁹⁶

⁹²(1) DF, DCSOPS to CofS, 15 Apr 66, subj: Expansion of US Army School, Europe. AEAGC-TO. (2) Cmt 2, DCSOPS to DCSPER, 2 May 66, subj: Requirement for Spaces in USASCHEUR. AEAGC-TO(25 Apr 66). (3) Intvw, Mr. Siemon with LTC S. H. Cook, USAREUR Ops Div, 24 May 66. All UNCLAS.

⁹³Intvw, Mr. Siemon with LTC J. H. Ramsburg, USAREUR Pers Div Mpr Con Br, 24 May 66. UNCLAS.

⁹⁴Data extracted from files of USAREUR ODCSOPS Tng Div. UNCLAS.

⁹⁵Incl 1 to ltr, USASCHEUR S3 to USAREUR Ops Div Mil Hist Sec, 10 Nov 66. AEUOC. UNCLAS.

⁹⁶Fonecon, Mr. Siemon with SGM Woolverton, USASCHEUR S-3, 16 Mar 67. UNCLAS.

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b. Training of Foreign Personnel. USAREUR furnished training to foreign military personnel of NATO countries through the NATO Weapons Systems Department of USASCEUR, a SHAPE-sponsored activity that USAREUR operated. USAREUR also trained foreign personnel of NATO and non-NATO countries through the Military Assistance Program.

(1) NATO Training. A total of 741 non-U.S. NATO personnel attended courses at the NATO Weapons Systems Department of USASCEUR in 1966.

(2) MAP Training. During 1966, 70 foreign military personnel from 9 nations attended courses at USASCEUR or at one of the Seventh Army schools. In addition, 957 personnel from 22 countries took observer training with various units, and 23 mobile training teams, comprising 89 USAREUR personnel, traveled to 15 foreign countries to present instruction.⁹⁷

24. (C) Marksmanship

a. USAREUR Participation in Armywide Competitions. In January the Department of the Army announced its intention to reduce Army participation in the civilian National Trophy Team Matches held each summer in the United States. The Department proposed to compete with three rather than six teams by discontinuing participation of the U.S. Army, Europe, Pacific, and Air Defense Command teams as entities. Instead, upon completion of the Army Championship Matches, the Department would select the best shooters from all teams to man the Army First Team, an Army Eastern Region Team, and an Army Western Region Team. USAREUR shooters not selected for these teams would return to their home stations after the Army championships.

The proposed change would guarantee an effective marksmanship program while saving personnel and funds. Although the shooters would lose their unit identity when

⁹⁷ All data extracted from files of ODCSOPS Indiv Tng Br. CONF. Gp-4.

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they joined Army teams, USAREUR recognized the advantages of the proposal and concurred in the change, which the Department then announced on 8 February.⁹⁸

In addition, USAREUR reduced the size of its contingent sent to the All-Army Matches by approximately one-third, to a total of 64--including 32 competitors in 2 categories of rifle shooting, 12 pistol shooters, coaches, armorers, and administrative staff. It granted the 64 personnel a maximum of 180 days of temporary duty in the United States to participate in All-Army Matches and--if selected for the Army teams--in the civilian National Matches.⁹⁹

b. USAREUR Competitive Marksmanship Program. Late in December 1965 USCONARC had announced curtailments in competitive marksmanship programs in the United States. After examining the applicability of similar curtailments in Europe, USAREUR reduced minimum mandatory participation in its small arms matches from 24 to 16 rifle shooters and from 12 to 8 pistol shooters, thus providing for 2 rifle and 2 pistol teams per division. It also reduced participation in automatic-rifle matches to five teams per division.

These changes reduced participation in the USAREUR matches by approximately 90 personnel, which in turn permitted a reduction in the overall budget for the marksmanship program from about \$146,000 to approximately \$95,000 for FY 1966.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁸(1) Cable DA-747088, DA to CINCUSAREUR et al., 14 Jan 66. (2) Cable 11470, Seventh Army to same, 28 Jan 66. (3) DF, DCSOPS to CofS, 2 Feb 66, subj: Reduction of Active Army Teams at the National Matches. AEAGC-TT. (4) Cable SC-41424, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 3 Feb 66. (5) Cable 88, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 8 Feb 66. All UNCLAS.

⁹⁹(1) Cable 11536, Seventh Army to CINCUSAREUR, 29 Jan 66. CONF (info used UNCLAS). (2) Cable SC-19682, CINCUSAREUR to USAREUR AMU, 17 Mar 66. UNCLAS.

¹⁰⁰(1) Cable SC-70944, CINCUSAREUR to Seventh Army, 29 Dec 65. UNCLAS. (2) Cable 11536, 29 Jan 66, cited above. CONF. Gp-4. (3) Cable SC-18654, CINCUSAREUR to Seventh Army, 10 Mar 66. UNCLAS.

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c. Participation in International Competition. In 1966 USAREUR participated in two international marksmanship competitions, the NATO Prix Leclerc matches, held in Germany in July, and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) Small Arms Competition, held in England during August. The USAREUR team, from the 1st Battalion of the 21st Infantry, 24th Infantry Division, placed third in the Prix Leclerc matches and won the CENTO competition, finishing almost 200 points ahead of the second place Iranian team.¹⁰¹

25. (C) Disaster Relief

a. Medical Supplies to Sudan. To arrest the proliferation of cholera USAREUR shipped about 33,000 pounds of medical supplies to Khartoum, Sudan, in early April.¹⁰²

b. Floods in Italy. In early November violent storms lashed Western Europe; tempest-swollen rivers spilled over in central and northern Italy, and more than a third of the peninsula was under water and mud. The rise of the Po River crushed seawalls and brought disaster conditions to the cities of Florence and Venice.¹⁰³ USAREUR immediately furnished disaster relief and continued to do so for more than one month. By 16 December--the date on which U.S. relief operations officially terminated--USAREUR had furnished helicopter and engineer services, personnel, and supplies, including 52 prefabricated buildings, estimated at \$137,000.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰¹(1) DF, DCSOPS to CofS, 18 May 66, subj: 1966 NATO Prix Leclerc Competition. AEAGC-TX. (2) Cable 181620Z, USAF COMCEN SO Ruislip to CINCUSAREUR, 18 Aug 66. (3) Cable SC-39136, CINCUSAREUR to CG 24th Inf Div, 20 Aug 66. (4) Data from files of ODCSOPS Tng Dir. All UNCLAS.

¹⁰²(1) Cable SX-2696, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 5 Apr 66. CONF. Gp-4. (2) Cable SC-22508, same to USACOMZEUR, 7 Apr 66. (3) Intvw, Mr. J. E. Carlisle, USAREUR Ops Div Mil Hist Sec, with LTC B. E. Blair, USAREUR Log Div, 7 Jun 66. Both UNCLAS.

¹⁰³The New York Herald Tribune (Eur. ed.), 5 through 13 Nov 66. UNCLAS.

¹⁰⁴(1) Cable ECJD-OS-18922, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 16 Dec 66. (2) Cable SC-54623, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 20 Dec 66. Both UNCLAS.

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Chapter 5

Personnel

26. (C) Numerical Trends

In 1966 assigned military strength increased despite a decrease in authorizations (Charts 5 and 6), mainly because of a Department of the Army decision to assure that the present for duty strengths--that is, assigned strength less the personnel in transit both into and out of the command--would approximate authorizations. The troop drawdown of the spring¹ caused a significant increase in the number of in-transit personnel. During the first quarter of the year transient personnel never exceeded 5,000, but in May the figure jumped to almost 9,000 and from July on remained above 10,000. Since 12,255 personnel were in transit as of 31 December, USAREUR's present for duty strength was about 2,800 below authorized strength.²

A major drop in military personnel authorizations occurred when the 4th Signal Group and its subordinate units transferred from USAACOM to USASTRATCOM-EUR on 25 August; other significant losses in authorized strengths resulted primarily from the implementation of the McNamara Study Group recommendations concerning USACOMZEUR and USASETAF.³ A shift in authorized strengths from Seventh Army to USAREUR headquarters resulted

¹See paragraph 5. UNCLAS.

²(1) See Charts 5 and 6. CONF. Gp-4. (2) USAREUR Comd Readiness Briefing, 7 Mar 67, pp. 5, 26. SECRET (info used CONF). NOFORN. Gp-4.

³For details of the McNamara Study Group, see USAREUR Anl Hist Sum, 1965, pp. 38 - 44. UNCLAS.

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CHART 5 (C)

USAREUR COMMAND PERSONNEL (U)

	31 Dec 1965	31 December 1966				
	<u>Totals</u>	<u>Totals</u>	<u>Germany</u>	<u>France</u>	<u>Italy</u>	<u>Other</u>
<u>Totals</u>	<u>517,121</u>	<u>449,936</u>	<u>397,736</u>	<u>32,879</u>	<u>9,618</u>	<u>9,703</u>
<u>Military Personnel*</u>						
Officer	227,910	231,314	212,351	10,620	3,404	4,939
Enlisted	18,500	12,125	10,647	1,060	312	106
	209,410	219,189	201,704	9,560	3,092	4,833
<u>Dependents</u>						
Of Military	175,137	106,354	96,023	1,278	2,711	342
Of Civilian	169,974	99,799	91,114	5,983	2,360	342
	5,163	6,555	4,909	1,295	351	---
<u>Total Civilian Employees</u>	<u>114,074</u>	<u>112,268</u>	<u>89,362</u>	<u>14,981</u>	<u>3,503</u>	<u>4,422</u>
<u>U.S. Civilians</u>						
Appropriated Fund	12,915	12,483	10,139	1,435	309	600
Nonappropriated Fund	6,364	6,845	5,277	1,230	278	60
	6,551	5,638	4,862	205	31	540
<u>Continental Wage Scale</u>						
Appropriated Fund	131	20	38	23	--	29
Nonappropriated Fund	33	30	12	18	--	--
	98	60	26	5	--	29
<u>Local Nationals</u>						
Appropriated Fund	93,620	91,783	72,473	12,323	3,194	3,793
Nonappropriated Fund	62,476	62,844	49,903	10,364	2,464	113
	31,144	28,939	22,570	1,959	730	3,680
<u>Labor Service</u>	<u>7,408</u>	<u>7,912</u>	<u>6,712</u>	<u>1,200</u>	<u>---</u>	<u>---</u>

* Assigned strength, including transient military personnel.

SOURCES: (1) USEUCOM Pers Rept - Component Comds (USAREUR), 31 Dec 66. RCS: ECJS-11.
(2) Files of ODCSPER Mpr Con Div. Both CONF. Gp-4.

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CHART 6 (c)

USAREUR MILITARY PERSONNEL BY MAJOR ELEMENTS (U)

	31 December 1965		31 December 1966				
	Authorized	Unit Actual	Authorized	Unit Actual	Officers	Warrant Officers	Enlisted Personnel
<u>Total</u>	<u>227,503</u>	<u>227,910</u>	<u>221,912</u>	<u>231,314</u>	<u>10,283</u>	<u>1,842</u>	<u>219,189</u>
USAREUR Headquarters* and Assigned Units	1,285	1,298	2,516	2,382	647	31	1,704
Seventh Army	168,237	167,186	167,027	171,882	5,015	1,244	165,623
USACOMZEUR	24,817	25,534	23,399	23,844	1,455	237	22,152
USASETAF	3,612	3,839	3,298	3,367	256	49	3,062
Berlin	4,110	4,441	4,113	4,084	219	19	3,846
USAAACOM	7,045	6,818	3,188	3,683	486	22	3,175
Other Commands**	18,397	18,794	18,371	22,072	2,205	240	19,627

* Includes Seventh Army headquarters in 31 December 1966 figures.

** Includes SASCOM, 7th Engr Bde, 10th SFG, 5th PSYOP Bn, 513th MI Gp, and 9th Hosp Cen,
plus USAREUR Sp Trps (USAREUR and Seventh Army Troops at the end of 1966).

SOURCE: AG DPU Rept 403210, Actual Authorized Strength Report, 31 Dec 66. CONF. Gp-4.

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from the implementation of the USAREUR and Seventh Army headquarters merger on 1 December.⁴

The significant drop in the number of dependents of military sponsors was attributable to two factors: The termination of dependent travel to France on 1 August and the change in the composition of military personnel subsequent to the troop drawdown.

27. (S) Personnel Implications of FRELOC

a. Tour Lengths for Military Personnel in France. The Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed the phase-out of dependents from France in April, when the need to withdraw the U.S. military forces from France became manifest. It was not until mid-June, however, that the Department of Defense formally announced the suspension of dependent travel to France, effective 1 August. The Department of the Army thereupon offered personnel assigned to France before 1 August the option of leaving their dependents in the United States, which would entitle them to a 24-month unaccompanied tour instead of the usual 36-month tour in Europe. Personnel assigned to France after 1 August would serve a 24-month unaccompanied tour.⁵

On 15 August the Department of the Army shortened the tour lengths of personnel assigned to France after 1 August from 24 to 12 months. It also announced that personnel scheduled for relocation out of France who had completed 5/6ths of their tours would either receive credit for completion of their tours and return to the United States, or they might have to serve out the remaining percentage of a normal oversea tour at a new location; the decision would depend upon the need for their services at the new station.

The situation would be different for personnel who had not completed 5/6ths of their normal tours, however. Upon transfer to a long-tour area in Europe, they would receive credit only for the actual number of months--rather than the percentage of their tour--served in France. They would then serve the remaining months of a normal long

⁴Intvws, Mr. B. H. Siemon, USAREUR ODCSOPS Mil Hist Br, with Mr. R. E. Ranck, ODCSPER Mpr Con Div, 8 and 9 Mar 67. CONF. Gp-4.

⁵For a detailed discussion, see pp. 203 - 207. UNCLAS.

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tour--36 or 24 months, depending upon whether accompanied or not.⁶

USACOMZEUR objected to the new tour policy because virtually no one would benefit from the 5/6ths of tour provision before the scheduled 31 March 1967 close-out in France. Personnel who before 1 August had elected to serve an unaccompanied tour, or who after 1 August had anticipated serving a short tour or one adjusted under the provisions of AR 614-30, would face an unexpected extension of their tours. Clearly, this situation could lead to serious morale problems, quite apart from the administrative workload that the tour adjustment policy would create.⁷

USAREUR solved the administrative problem through the simple expedient of considering France a long-tour area for the purposes of assigning, requisitioning, and reassigning personnel.⁸ However, since there seemed to be no solution for the potential inequities of the 5/6ths of tour length provision, USAREUR recommended an adjustment of tours under AR 614-30. The Department of the Army replied that it had included the 5/6ths of tour length provision as a "contingency measure" and that this provision would remain in effect because it might yet become applicable to personnel serving a 12-month tour in France.⁹

b. Legislative Relief From the Payment of Foreign Taxes, Fees, and Charges. In October USEUCOM called attention to one means of relieving a part of the financial hardship that U.S. personnel prematurely relocated from France would have to bear, and asked the Joint Chiefs to support an early congressional approval of House Resolution (H.R.) 8123--introduced in May

⁶(1) Cable DA-778046, DA to CINCUSAREUR et al., 15 Aug 66. (2) Cable DA-778842, same to same, 19 Aug 66. Both UNCLAS. FOUO.

⁷Cables 36792 and 37735, USACOMZEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 10 and 20 Sep 66. UNCLAS. FOUO.

⁸(1) DF, USAREUR AG Div to DCSPER, 27 Sep 66, subj: Tour Policy for Personnel Assigned to France. AEAAG-PM. FOUO.
(2) MFR, LTC H. J. Bowman, USAREUR Pers Div, 17 Nov 66, subj: Tour Lengths - France. AEAGA-OE. Both UNCLAS.

⁹(1) Cable SX-5566, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 5 Oct 66. CONF.
Gp-4. (2) Cable DA-786245, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 13 Oct 66. FOUO.
(3) Intvws, Mr. Siemon with LTC G. C. Wilhide, USAREUR Pers Div, 30 Nov 66 and 20 Jan 67. Both UNCLAS.

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1965--that called for reimbursing U.S. personnel for their payments of foreign taxes, fees, and charges, such as the French-imposed contribution mobilière, a government charge for occupying a dwelling in France.

French law made a tenant living in a French dwelling on 1 January liable for a full-year advance assessment. However, the 1967 bills would not be available until after 30 June, when almost all U.S. forces personnel would have left France. Passage of H.R. 8123 would avoid the adverse impact on U.S. morale and the friction caused by French insistence on the payment of what they considered a legal obligation based on existing U.S.-French agreements.

The 89th Congress adjourned without taking any action on H.R. 8123. However, the Department of Defense approached the problem from several directions, such as supporting a substitute bill allowing income tax credits for any foreign taxes, fees, or charges legally imposed, and negotiating with the French Government for a one-time exemption. Regardless of the merits of general and permanent relief from the payment of host-nation-imposed charges, the situation in France had a special significance because it applied to payments for periods subsequent to the departure of U.S. personnel.

Pending resolution, the Joint Chiefs recommended that USEUCOM consider including such charges in the computations determining the housing and cost-of-living allowances applicable to other host nations.¹⁰

The French resolved the problem, as it applied to their country, in late December, when they agreed to relieve U.S. personnel from the obligation to pay the contribution. Remaining, however, was the task of resolving the general foreign tax problem for U.S. Forces personnel stationed in other European countries.¹¹

c. U.S. Civilian Space Authorizations. On 31 March 1966 the base date of FRELOC computations, USAREUR had a total of

- ¹⁰
(1) Cable ECLA-15600, USCINCEUR to JCS, 18 Oct 66.
(2) Cable JCS-7593, JCS to USCINCEUR, 9 Nov 66. Both UNCLAS.

¹¹
Cable ECLA-19818, USCINCEUR to JCS and OSD, 6 Jan 67.
UNCLAS.

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1,139 U.S. personnel authorized in France. USAREUR was unable to complete its plans for relocating U.S. civilian personnel from France, because it did not receive final decisions from the Department of Defense until late in the year or, indeed, in some cases not until 1967.¹²

Those FRELOC actions approved by the Office of the Secretary of Defense by 31 December provided for a total of 807 U.S. civilian personnel spaces. Other actions awaiting approval would add to that total, but nevertheless USAREUR anticipated a reduction of approximately 250 U.S. civilian spaces upon completion of the withdrawal from France.

Accordingly, in December USACOMZEUR cancelled some of its unfilled requisitions for personnel from the United States and temporarily suspended others. USAREUR anticipated that these actions--coupled with normal personnel losses through reassignments, resignations, and retirements--would reduce reduction-in-force actions to a minimum and enable the command to meet its space authorization ceilings by the end of the first quarter of FY 1968.¹³

d. French Local National (LN) Employees. One serious problem facing USAREUR in connection with FRELOC was how to retain needed skills during the relocation period. Current U.S. practice was to pay separation bonuses only to French LN employees separated through no fault of their own. These bonuses, consisting of one week's pay for each year of service for the U.S. forces beyond five years, were not payable to employees who voluntarily resigned. The French Government had proposed changes in procedures as early as 1963 and intensified these demands in the spring of 1966. In June the United States, which had steadfastly refused to change its procedures because they complied with French industrial practice, reiterated its intention to continue existing practices. Accordingly, in November the French Government issued a decree under the terms of which it would pay an extra separation bonus to French employees of the Allied forces. The French bonus would consist of one week's wages for every year served with the Allied forces beyond one year

¹²For details, see Chapter 7, FRELOC. UNCLAS.

¹³(1) Cable AEZCU-46396, USACOMZEUR to DA, 23 Dec 66. UNCLAS. (2) Fact Sheet, 18 Jan 67. Cy in AEAGA-C-CD. (3) Intvws, Mr. Siemon with Mr. F. Newman, ODCSPER Prog Admin & Eval Br, and LTC D. J. Norton, ODCSPER Mpr Con Br, 18 Apr 67. (2) and (3) CONF. Gp-4.

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and up to five years. Employees who resigned would receive from the French Government the bonuses that the U.S. Forces would have paid them had they not resigned.¹⁴

Anticipating increasing difficulty in both retaining and recruiting personnel in France during the withdrawal period, USAREUR proposed in June the establishment of a retention or loyalty bonus. The U.S. Army would pay such a bonus, computed as a percentage of basic pay and allowances and credited to an employee's account, only to those employees who remained on the job until released without cause. Bonus credits would vary between 5 and 50 percent of tariff pay, depending upon the type of personnel involved and the location, since some areas experienced greater labor shortages than others.

At a conference in early September French Government representatives suggested that, instead of seeking blanket approval, the U.S. Forces request authority to pay bonuses in specific installations on a case-by-case basis. The U.S. conferees rejected this proposal, and additional discussions in the following months led to no agreement. However, since the anticipated problems failed to materialize, the U.S. negotiators dropped the issue.¹⁵

There was no significant increase in the resignation rate of LN personnel in France during the first half of 1966 (See Chart 7). Even after the French announcement of the new bonus provisions, the increase in resignations was relatively minor, and the personnel gains exceeded losses in all quarters and were more than twice as high as the losses in the second and third quarters.

A number of factors contributed to this relatively favorable situation. During the first quarter of 1966, for example, there was a degree of uneasiness and uncertainty among

¹⁴(1) Min, 52d Meeting of Civ Pers Coord Com, 14 Jun 66.
(2) Ltr, L'Intendant Général de 1ère Classe COLIN, to Directors of the Intendance, 16 Nov 66, subj: Personnel Recruited for the Allied Forces - Separation, w/incl. 75-1/ISAAA. (Translated copy.) Both in AEAGA-C-CM files. UNCLAS.

¹⁵(1) USAFE Fr Ln Off Memo, 7 Sep 66, subj: Memorandum-- Special Bonus System. CPL. (2) Intvw, Mr. Siemon with Mr. W. M. Frailey, USAREUR ODCSPER Civ Pers Div, 8 Mar 67. Both UNCLAS.

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Chart 7 (U)

Resignations and Gains of LN Employees in France, 1964 - 1966

Quarter Ending	Resignations		Gains	
	Number	Percent of Workforce	Number	Percent of Workforce
March 1964	628	4.0	217	1.4
June 1964	466	3.3	468	3.3
September 1964	358	2.75	609	4.7
December 1964	209	1.66	379	3.0
March 1965	312	2.71	329	2.9
June 1965	256	2.26	705	6.2
September 1965	396	3.46	810	7.1
December 1965	182	1.6	682	5.9
March 1966	356	3.2	416	3.7
June 1966	433	4.0	1,049	9.7
September 1966	520	4.9	1,117	10.5
December 1966	586	5.7	791	7.8

SOURCE: Civilian Strength Journal, USAREUR ODCSPER Civ Per Div Prog Admin & Eval Br.
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the French employees, but they did not blame the United States for the instability.¹⁶ The surplus of gains over resignations in the second quarter of 1966 reflected the hiring of large numbers of unskilled and semi-skilled workers on a temporary basis in connection with FRELOC requirements.¹⁷

Surprisingly, in the second half of 1966 the recruiting rate improved. With the agreement of French authorities, USACOMZEUR undertook an unusual recruiting program to obtain 400 temporary workers at five locations in eastern France, for example. Advertising promised candidates immediate start of work, repayment of transportation costs, up to 20 hours of overtime weekly, a minimum of 750 francs (approximately \$150) monthly take-home pay, and work for three to six months. Within one month USACOMZEUR hired 378 unskilled workers--mostly young men facing their compulsory military service--who would suffice to meet the requirements of the FRELOC program, especially since resignation rates remained low. Another surprise experienced during the same period was that sick leave usage, or indeed abuse, had not increased, suggesting a general sympathy and loyalty on the part of French employees.¹⁸

Because of the shortage of labor in the Federal Republic of Germany,¹⁹ USAREUR anticipated difficulty in filling LN personnel vacancies after the relocation from France. Accordingly, the command negotiated an agreement with the F.R.G. Ministry of Finance that authorized the U.S. Forces to bring LN employees from France to Germany. USAREUR thereupon established the following policy: It would offer incumbents of LN positions clearly identified with a unit or function transferred to Germany, and whom the receiving commander considered essential, a guarantee of pay protection, to include all allowances and bonuses, as an incentive to move with their functions. It would encourage French LN

¹⁶USACOMZEUR LWR Rept, 31 Mar 66. RCS CSGPA-663. UNCLAS.

¹⁷USACOMZEUR LWR Rept, 30 Jun 66. RCS CSGPA-663. UNCLAS.

¹⁸USACOMZEUR LN Repts (sic), 30 Sep and 31 Dec 66. RCS CSGPA-663. UNCLAS.

¹⁹At that time there were over 1 million foreign workers in private industry in the F.R.G. UNCLAS.

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employees not in the above category to apply for vacant LN positions in Germany. They would not receive pay protection and would have to accept positions at the appropriate F.R.G. pay scale, but they would receive credit for their service in France for such purposes as leave accrual rates, step-in-grade entitlement, and longevity allowances and bonuses. The U.S. Government would pay moving and transportation expenses for both categories of employees, their dependents, and their household goods from France to Germany and would pay return transportation to any employee released through a reduction in force within two years.²⁰

By early December the German economy was in the throes of a mild recession that led the F.R.G. Government to impose restrictions on the employment of foreign labor. USAREUR revised its policy accordingly, directing subordinate commands to give first consideration to qualified German LN applicants already employed and consult the German labor office to determine the availability of qualified personnel in the local labor market. Only after these two steps had failed to fill the vacancy in question might a U.S. commander consider hiring a French LN employee.²¹

In the meantime, however, USACOMZEUR had distributed questionnaires in June to determine the desire and willingness of French LN employees to relocate to other countries when FRELOC actions would move their functions out of France. Of those responding, 64.3 percent indicated willingness to relocate, 20.6 percent were undecided, and the remaining 15.1 percent did not desire to relocate. Approximately half of those responding positively indicated conditions that would affect their decision to relocate. USACOMZEUR's analysis of those conditional responses, coupled with analysis of the training, knowledge, and skills of the employees concerned and the demand

²⁰Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to CINCUSAFE et al., 6 Sep 66, subj: U.S. Forces Local National Personnel Policy - Germany. AEAGA-CS. UNCLAS. FOUO.

²¹Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to distr, 22 Dec 66, subj: Recruitment To Meet Local National Requirements in Germany. AEAGA-C-CL. UNCLAS. FOUO.

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for those assets in the French labor market, led to the conclusion that only approximately 9 percent of the French LN workforce would actually be available for relocation.²²

By the end of 1966 USACOMZEUER had identified 295 positions (247 in the Supply and Maintenance Agency (SAMA) and 48 in USACOMZEUER headquarters) for transfer with their functions and had offered the incumbents a transfer under the conditions outlined above. Only 172--150 of them in the Supply and Maintenance Agency-- had accepted the offer.

In addition to these personnel, slightly over 1,900 had indicated in a November survey their willingness to relocate to Germany. USACOMZEUER matched the qualifications of these personnel against 1,014 vacancies existing in Germany in the hope of arranging nonfunctional transfers for at least some of the French employees. The comparison showed only a maximum of 573 possible matchings--and these only in the event that no employee changed his mind, that the vacancies remained open until the employees became available upon termination of their positions in France, and that the interested French employees were able to obtain German work permits. As of 31 December only 4 French LN employees had actually received nonfunctional transfers, and an additional 21 such transfers were in the process of negotiation between the respective civilian personnel offices in France and Germany.²³

e. Labor Service (LS) Personnel in France. Under the terms of the Bruce-Parodi agreement of 1950 that permitted the U.S. forces to employ third-country nationals in Labor Service units in France, the United States had to remove the Polish LS personnel upon termination of their employment. Although the Secretary of Defense's decision on the transfer of these LS personnel to Germany was still pending at the end of 1966, USAREUR studied certain morale and welfare aspect of the problem. For example, while the move of the LS personnel to Germany would be at U.S. Government expense, there was no provision for moving their dependents and household goods--a privilege granted to LN personnel transferring from France to Germany. USACOMZEUER reported that 529 of the almost 1,300 LS personnel in France were

²²USACOMZEUER LN Rept, 30 Sep 66. RCS CSGPA-663. UNCLAS.

²³USACOMZEUER LN Rept, 31 Dec 66. RCS CSGPA-663. UNCLAS.

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married and that they had a total of 857 children. To move these dependent households would cost an estimated \$780,000. In October USAREUR decided to extend to the LS personnel the same privileges granted to LN employees and directed USACOMZEUR to charge the costs of the move to the FRELOC action.²⁴

Another problem concerned the payment of separation longevity bonuses to LS personnel. If the United States paid the bonuses upon separation in France, they would not be taxable. If, however, it transferred the accrued bonus with the employee to his new duty station in Germany, the entire amount would be subject to German taxes upon payment at a later date. USACOMZEUR therefore recommended offering LS employees the option of immediate payment in France, and USAREUR approved this course of action-- provided USACOMZEUR gave the employees a choice and thoroughly briefed them as to the advantages and disadvantages of the two bonus payment alternatives.²⁵

f. Cancellation and Reinstatement of the USASETAF LN Personnel Reductions. Plans developed during 1965 in implementation of the General McNamara Study Group recommendations called for significant LN personnel reductions as a result of the elimination and consolidation of USASETAF facilities. The target completion date for the release of the employees was 30 June 1966.²⁶

In the spring of 1966 it became clear that USAREUR would have to relocate U.S. troops and large quantities of supplies

²⁴(1) DF, USAREUR DCSPER to Cofs, 28 Oct 66, subj: Payment of Transportation Costs for French Labor Service Dependents, w/4 incl. AEAGA-CL. (2) Cmt 2, Cofs to DCSPER, 31 Oct 66, to DF, DCSPER to Cofs, 28 Oct 66, cited above. AEAGS. (3) Ltr, C/Cen Ln Msn to CG USACOMZEUR, 2 Feb 67, subj: Polish Members of the American Labor Service. DN/MCLAA/ATEC/STA. All UNCLAS.

²⁵(1) Ltr, USACOMZEUR to C/USAREUR LS Agency, 8 Aug 66, subj: Longevity Bonus Payment for Labor Service Personnel, France. AEZPA-LS. (2) 1st Ind, USAREUR LS Agency to CINCUSAREUR, 26 Aug 66, same subj. AEULS. (3) 2d Ind, CINCUSAREUR to C/USAREUR LS Agency, 7 Oct 66, same subj. AEAGA-CS. All UNCLAS.

²⁶USAREUR Anl Hist Sum, 1965, pp. 42 - 44. TS (info used SECRET. Gp-3).

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as a result of FRELOC. Because of the obvious need for facilities outside France, the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized the retention of Caserma Passalacqua in Verona, Italy, and the Department of the Army authorized USAREUR to retain 110 LN employees scheduled for release on 30 June; these personnel would be in excess to USAREUR's established personnel space ceilings.²⁷

When the Italian Government disapproved the restationing proposal for internal political reasons,²⁸ USAREUR decided to return to the original McNamara Group recommendation and to release by 30 June 1967 that part of Camp Passalacqua not required by the U.S. forces.²⁹

As of 30 September USASETAF exceeded its space authorization by 141 appropriated-fund LN employees. By the end of 1966 it had released 33 of these employees under reduction-in-force procedures, and reassigned 16 to vacant positions at Vicenza. USASETAF planned to reassign or release the remaining 92 LN personnel by 30 June 1967.³⁰

g. Family Housing in Germany. In April USAREUR warned that there might be some difficulty in providing adequate housing for dependents who would have to relocate from France. In Germany government quarters were already in short supply, and there were no Army-controlled quarters at all in the United Kingdom and the BENELUX countries. To complicate matters, the Department of the Army had advised that it would soon begin to transfer personnel from Vietnam to USAREUR. Since the priority

²⁷(1) Cable DA-768269, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 4 Jun 66. NOFORN.
(2) Cable SX-3754, CINCUSAREUR to USASETAF, 11 Jun 66. Both SECRET. Gp-4.

²⁸For details, see pp. 279 - 31. UNCLAS.

²⁹(1) Cable SX-5990, CINCUSAREUR to DA et al., 31 Oct 66. NOFORN. (2) Cable AESE-GDL-P-O-439, USASETAF to CINCUSAREUR, 2 Nov 66. Both CONF. (3) Cable JCS-8962, JCS to USCINCEUR, 23 Nov 66. SECRET. All Gp-4. (4) Cables SC-53354 and 53380, CINCUSAREUR to USASETAF, 8 and 9 Dec 66. UNCLAS.

³⁰(1) USASETAF Civ Pers Prog Rept, DA Form 1346-1, 31 Dec 66.
(2) USASETAF Civ Pers Narrative Rept (RCS CSGPA-663), Local Nationals Overseas, 31 Dec 66. Both UNCLAS.

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for assignment of government quarters in Germany depended on the date a sponsor departed the United States for his original oversea station, personnel coming from Vietnam would have high-priority claims on the available housing in Germany, which would further complicate the housing problem.³¹

To insure fullest possible use of available housing, particularly in light of the temporary troop drawdown, USAREUR required in June that eligible personnel occupy available government quarters or forfeit their entitlements to quarters allowances. USAREUR also authorized ineligible military and civilian personnel to occupy government housing on a voluntary basis, but subject to their written agreement to vacate quarters within 45 days, if required. At the end of July, however, USAREUR extended the notification period for ineligible personnel from 45 days to 6 months.³²

In anticipation of the forthcoming unit relocations, in mid-November USAREUR revoked the privileges extended to ineligible personnel and directed that all those occupying government housing at Mannheim, Worms, Karlsruhe, Zweibruecken, Kaiserslautern, Landstuhl, Kassel, and in the Pirmasens-Muenchweiler area vacate their quarters under the terms of their signed agreements. At Mainz, USAREUR limited the revocation of privileges to 104 family housing units needed for eligible personnel transferred to this area. The policy of permitting ineligible personnel to occupy government quarters remained otherwise unchanged.³³

To guarantee the availability of quarters to incoming FRELOC personnel, at the end of November USAREUR directed a temporary suspension of assignments of government quarters to all other personnel in the Mannheim, Worms, Zweibruecken, Landstuhl, Kaiserslautern, and Pirmasens-Muenchweiler areas. USAREUR then

³¹Cable SX-2943, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 19 Apr 66. SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-3.

³²(1) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to distr, 30 Jun 66, subj: Assignment of Family Housing to Eligible Personnel. AEAEN-FA. (2) Cable SC-35715, same to USACOMZEUR et al., 23 Jul 66. Both UNCLAS.

³³Cable SC-50398, CINCUSAREUR to USAACOM, 16 Nov 66. UNCLAS.

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instructed USACOMZEUR and SAMA to prepare consolidated rosters of all personnel who would relocate to the North Baden and Palatinate Districts and to forward these rosters to the district commanders concerned. The latter would then consolidate the USACOMZEUR and SAMA requirements with other known requirements, would establish housing lists on the basis of sponsors' base dates of departure from the United States, and would furnish lists of personnel certified for quarters occupancy and waiting lists according to base date priority.³⁴

In December, after adding Baumholder to the list of areas in which ineligible personnel had to vacate government housing, USAREUR established so-called consolidated housing areas to control and use more effectively the housing available in areas where critical shortages would develop upon the relocation of units. Thus, USAREUR created the Mannheim-Worms area as a single consolidated housing area and directed USAACOM to establish a liaison detachment of the North Baden District housing office at Worms. The housing assets at Zweibruecken, Pirmasens, Muenchweiler, Landstuhl, Kaiserslautern, and Baumholder formed the second consolidated housing area.

With the exception of the Baumholder housing--used only for sponsors with duty stations at Kaiserslautern or North Point-Vierhof--sponsors at duty stations within a consolidated housing area could be assigned quarters anywhere within it, but as close as possible to their duty stations. Those not housed at their duty stations could remain on waiting lists and would have the option of moving when quarters subsequently became available.

Finally, to conserve the available housing in the consolidated areas, USAREUR discontinued assignment of CENTAG personnel to housing in the Mannheim area and included them in the Heidelberg area. Non-U.S. personnel assigned to the Allied Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Force would no longer receive U.S. government quarters at all.

With these arrangements made, on 23 December USAREUR lifted the temporary suspension on assignment of quarters.³⁵

³⁴ (1) Cable SC-51868, CINCUSAREUR to USAACOM, 28 Nov 66. FOUO. (2) Cable SC-52753, same to USACOMZEUR, 2 Dec 66. Both UNCLAS.

³⁵ Cables SC-54596, 55161, and 55183, CINCUSAREUR to USAACOM et al., 19, 23, and 24 Dec 66. UNCLAS. FOUO.

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h. Housing for Local Nationals in Germany. In certain limited circumstances USAREUR provided living quarters for bachelor LN employees of both sexes. It furnished barracks-type quarters--both in permanent and in temporary buildings--to laborers, used the maids' rooms in the basements and attics of U.S. dependent housing facilities in some areas, assigned bachelor officers' quarters (BOQ) to certain medical doctors and nurses, and in military hotels--primarily in the recreation area--it authorized some hotel employees to live in available facilities within the buildings.³⁶

In connection with the buildup of activities in Germany that would result from FRELOC moves, USAREUR anticipated that it would require 2,300 additional LN employees in the Federal Republic. Since Germany suffered both a labor and a housing shortage, the ability to offer quarters to LN personnel would be a useful recruiting inducement. Moreover, German law required that a prospective employer guarantee that he would provide housing facilities before a German labor office would recruit third-country nationals for him. Since local labor shortages would probably force USAREUR to employ third-country nationals, it would have to offer living quarters for such personnel.

A complicating factor was the NATO Status of Forces Agreement, however. Under the terms of the agreement the German government provided to the forces facilities for the exclusive use of the forces and members of the forces. Since LN personnel did not qualify as members of the forces, USAREUR had to seek German agreement to quartering local nationals in U.S. Army facilities. Accordingly, in May USAREUR requested the F.R.G. Ministry of Finance to guarantee to the U.S. forces continued user rights for any Army-controlled facilities remodeled to provide LN housing.³⁷

³⁶This discussion includes only local national employees and does not consider the labor service personnel, most of whom lived in barracks. At the end of November 1966 USAREUR was providing housing to approximately 2,300 LN employees. (Intvw, Mr. Siemon with Mr. H. R. Streiss, ODCSPER Civ Pers Div, 7 Mar 67. UNCLAS.)

³⁷(1) ODCSPER Rept, subj: Civilian Personnel Management Actions of Headquarters U.S. Army Europe, 2d Qtr, FY 1967 (hereafter cited as Civ Pers Mgt Rept), pp. 8 - 9. Cy in AEAGC-XH files.
(2) Intvw, Mr. Siemon with Mr. Streiss, cited above. Both UNCLAS.

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In September the Ministry of Finance agreed to the USAREUR proposal in principle, but only as an exception to existing agreements, which were to remain in effect. Thus, under the Status of Forces Agreement, the German Government could at a later date claim the right to recall facilities used for LN housing on the ground that such use was not for the forces or for members of the forces. USAREUR refused to accept such a conditional agreement and continued negotiations with German authorities at the end of the year; it expected to receive a modified German proposal in early 1967.³⁸

28. (S) The Substitution of Civilian for Military Personnel

In 1965 the Secretary of Defense had announced a program to substitute civilian personnel for certain categories of military personnel in TD units. In response to instructions from the Department of the Army, USAREUR had nominated 613 officer and 8,297 enlisted TD positions as suitable for conversion. Late in the year the Department of the Army had reduced these figures to 30 officer and 3,380 enlisted positions.³⁹

On 19 January 1966 the Department of the Army formally directed implementation of the conversion program. USAREUR was to begin immediately and complete by 31 December the conversion of 2,576 military positions to civilian occupancy.⁴⁰ A machine records print-out identified the specific positions that USAREUR was to convert in accordance with the following schedule:

<u>Spaces</u>		<u>FY 1966</u>		<u>FY 1967</u>
		<u>3d Qtr</u>	<u>4th Qtr</u>	<u>1st Half</u>
Total	<u>2,576</u>	<u>1,089</u>	<u>952</u>	<u>535*</u>
Direct-Hire	683	304	322	57
Indirect-Hire	1,893	785	630	478

*Of these 535 spaces, USAREUR was to convert 405 in the first quarter and 130 in the second quarter; USAREUR could select its own mix of direct- and indirect-hire spaces in each quarter so long as it did not exceed the total for each category.

³⁸ Intvw, Mr. Siemon with Mr. Streiss, cited above. UNCLAS.

³⁹ USAREUR Anl Hist Sum, 1965, pp. 123 - 25. TS (info used SECRET. Gp-4).

⁴⁰ Five were USASETAF officer positions, and the remainder were enlisted positions. (Intvw, Mr. Siemon with LTC J. H. Ramsburg, USAREUR Pers Div, 7 Jun 66.) UNCLAS.

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The Department of the Army indicated that it would not consider a position as converted until the civilian replacement was on the job and performing the duties in question. USAREUR was not to interchange direct- and indirect-hire spaces, and the Department of the Army limited the flexibility in substituting at will to grades E-2 and E-3 positions listed in the machine records print-out, except for scientific and engineering assistants. In all other officer and enlisted grades USAREUR might also substitute other positions for those the Department had selected, but only if the grade and MOS of the positions matched.⁴¹

Upon comparing the list of positions selected for conversion with the schedule of space authorizations, USAREUR discovered three inconsistencies. The Department had selected 733 positions for conversion to U.S. citizen direct-hire, whereas the total authorization of direct-hire spaces for the entire program was only 683. It had also selected 271 USASLTAF positions for conversion to local-national civilian occupancy, apparently under the misconception that local-national employees in Italy were in the indirect-hire category. In contrast to USAREUR's other local national employees, those in Italy were direct-hire. Finally, the Department of the Army had changed 11 positions in USACOMZEUR and USAACOM that USAREUR had recommended for occupancy by U.S. citizen direct-hire Wage Board employees to occupancy by indirect-hire local nationals. To implement this decision would place local-national employees in supervisory positions over U.S. nationals who earned higher pay, which might lead to morale problems. To eliminate these three inconsistencies, USAREUR requested the Department of the Army to revise the conversion schedule by exchanging 332 indirect-hire for direct-hire spaces, as follows:⁴²

		<u>2d Half FY 1966</u>	<u>1st Half FY 1967</u>
Total	<u>2,576</u>	<u>2,042</u>	<u>534</u>
Direct Hire	<u>1,015</u>	833	182
Indirect Hire	<u>1,561</u>	1,209	352

⁴¹Ltr, DA to distr, 19 Jan 66, subj: Civilianization Program, w/2 incl. AGAM-P (M) (17 Jan 66) FOR TA. UNCLAS.

⁴²(1) DF, DCSPER to CofS, subj: Civilianization Program. AEAGA-M. (2) Cable SC-13753, CINCUSAREUR to DA. Both 1 Feb 66. Both UNCLAS.

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The Department of the Army agreed to the USAREUR proposal in principle but was unable to afford complete relief immediately. It deleted the two direct-hire spaces intended for the Courier Transfer Service--a former USAREUR activity transferred to departmental control--and thereby reduced the total conversion requirement to 2,574 positions. It also directed USAREUR to proceed at once with the conversion of 624 direct-hire and 1,415 indirect-hire positions originally authorized for FY 1966. To facilitate matching space authorizations with positions selected for conversion, USAREUR could reprogram positions in each hiring category from one fiscal year to the other. The Department of the Army would then ask the Department of Defense for an adjustment of FY 1967 space authorizations to cover USAREUR's shortage of direct-hire spaces.⁴³

Within this framework USAREUR prepared an implementation plan. The reorganization and reduction of USASSETAF that had begun in 1965 included the release of over 300 Italian LN employees by 30 June 1966.⁴⁴ Since the conversion of military positions provided for hiring 271 Italian local nationals, USAREUR wanted to retain most of the skilled personnel earmarked for release under the reduction program.⁴⁵

Between the time in late 1965 when USAREUR had submitted lists of positions recommended for conversion and the beginning of implementation late in February 1966, various reorganizations, manpower surveys, and similar actions had eliminated or changed certain positions specified for conversion. In some cases there were no substitute positions with identical grade and MOS requirements. To complicate matters, the Department of the Army had directed USAREUR to substitute 75 indirect-hire spaces for direct-hire spaces in FY 1967 and had advised that it would request only 257 additional direct-hire spaces from the Department of Defense instead of the 332 USAREUR desired. To alleviate

⁴³ Cable DA-749696, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 4 Feb 66. UNCLAS.

⁴⁴ USAREUR Anl Hist Sum, 1965, pp. 124 - 25. TS (info used SECRET. Gp-4).

⁴⁵ (1) DF, DCSPER to CofS, 10 Feb 66, subj: Civilianization Program. AEAGA-M. (2) Cmt 2, CofS to DCSPER, 12 Feb 66, to DF, DCSPER to CofS, 10 Feb 66, cited above. AEAGS. (3) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to distr, 25 Feb 66, same subj. AEAGA-M. All UNCLAS.

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the situation, USAREUR requested authority to substitute positions without regard to MOS and grade and requested restitution of the 75 direct-hire spaces deleted from the FY 1967 request.⁴⁶

The Department of the Army authorized USAREUR to substitute enlisted positions without regard to MOS and grade but could not make restitution of the 75 direct-hire spaces because it had used them to meet the needs of another major command.⁴⁷ USAREUR thereupon advised its subordinate commands that they could substitute at will, provided they were able to justify the need for substitutions and that they made them only within the same budget program that provided the funds for the position originally selected for conversion.⁴⁸

With the new flexibility, a noteworthy improvement in implementation of the program was immediately evident. Whereas in March USAREUR elements converted only a total of 72 enlisted positions to civilian occupancy, in April conversions amounted to 176, and in May to 240.⁴⁹

During the summer and early fall the Department of the Army made a series of adjustments in the conversion figures which resulted in USAREUR being authorized 944 direct-hire and 1,630 indirect-hire spaces. However, the transfer of the 4th Signal Group from USAACOM to USASTRATCOM-EUR involved 11 direct-hire and 17 indirect-hire spaces, thus reducing USAREUR's conversion total to 2,546--933 direct- and 1,613 indirect-hire spaces.

⁴⁶(1) Cable SC-18830, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 11 Mar 66. (2) DF, Mpr Con Br to DCSPER, 22 Mar 66, subj: Civilianization, w/1 incl. AEAGA-M. Both UNCLAS.

⁴⁷Cable DA-755507, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 18 Mar 66. UNCLAS.

⁴⁸(1) Cable SC-19778, CINCUSAREUR to Seventh Army et al., 18 Mar 66. (2) DF, Mpr Con Br to DCSPER, 22 Mar 66, cited above. (3) Intvw, Mr. Siemon with LTC Ramsburg, 7 Jun 66. All UNCLAS.

⁴⁹(1) Cables SC-22721 and 26681, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 8 Apr and 10 May 66. (2) Intvw, Mr. Siemon with LTC Ramsburg, 15 Jun 66. Both UNCLAS.

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As of 31 December USAREUR had converted 792 direct-hire and 1,328 indirect-hire positions, for a total of 2,120--426 less than the authorization. USASETAF was experiencing little difficulty and had filled 219 of the 230 LN spaces and 31 of the 39 U.S. national spaces that it had received in a revised USAREUR allocation. USACOMZEUR--despite the difficulties attendant upon the relocation of installations from France--had been able to fill 679 of its 724 indirect-hire and 95 of the 128 direct-hire spaces. The remaining commands, located in Germany, filled 447 of their 536 direct-hire and 649 of their 889 indirect-hire spaces, a shortfall of 329.⁵⁰

The indirect-hire shortfall was largely attributable to the tight labor market in Germany. However, the economic decline during the last months of 1966 and an increasing rate of unemployment in Germany led USAREUR to conclude that there would be little difficulty in recruiting the desired local national personnel during 1967. The same was not true for U.S. personnel, however, mainly because of limitations on overseas residence for civilian employees.⁵¹

29. (U) U.S. Civilian Employees

a. Limitation of Oversea Employment. Based on a Department of Defense memorandum distributed in April, the Department of the Army advised USAREUR in August of a new policy that would restrict the length of overseas service by U.S. civilian employees to a total of five consecutive years--including any time spent in overseas areas in any other capacity as well as U.S. Government employment.⁵² The program had three related basic purposes: To assist employees serving overseas to return to positions in the United States; to reduce the number of personnel serving extended

⁵⁰(1) Cable SC-26681, 10 May 66, cited above. (2) All figures extracted from files of USAREUR Pers Div Mpr Con Br (later ODCSPER Mpr Con Div). (3) USAREUR GO 237, 7 Sep 66. (4) Intvws, Mr. Siemon with LTC D. J. Norton, ODCSPER Mpr Con Div, 18 Nov 66 and 20 Feb 67. All UNCLAS.

⁵¹Civ Pers Mgt Rept, cited above, p. 11. UNCLAS.

⁵²Two years' residence in the United States would be required before an employee could again be considered for overseas assignment. UNCLAS.

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oversea tours; and to free positions in the United States blocked for extended periods of time because prior incumbents currently serving overseas had statutory reemployment rights to those positions. Specifically, the Department of the Army instructions required current career or career-conditional employees to execute their reemployment rights and established a requirement that newly hired employees sign a statement agreeing to apply for reassignment to the United States upon completion of five years' residence abroad; failure to apply for placement would be ground for separation.⁵³

The limitation did not apply to persons who had firm job commitments before commands received the new Department of the Army instructions, nor to dependents of either military or civilian personnel of the U.S. forces overseas. Similarly, it was not applicable to nonappropriated-fund activities.⁵⁴ The restrictions would also not apply to reassignments within USAREUR and would thus not preclude personnel with five years or more of oversea service from accepting positions under the Merit Promotion Program. Any new accessions, however--whether by initial hire, by reinstatement, or by transfer from another U.S. Government agency, such as the Air Force--would be subject to the 5-year limitation. Moreover, the Department of the Army specifically required that any prospective career or career-conditional employee be able to serve the minimum oversea tour of duty within his 5-year limitation and reserved to itself the authority to grant exceptions to the new policy. The initial oversea tour of duty for a civilian employee was three years. Thus, the regulation generally meant that USAREUR could hire locally U.S. personnel who had been overseas for more than two years only on the basis of an oversea limited term appointment not to exceed a total of five years overseas or a temporary appointment not to exceed one year. Since these types of appointment carried no privileges of transportation to the United States upon completion of the contract term, their attraction was limited.⁵⁵

⁵³(1) Memo, LTG J. B. Lampert, OASD, to Asst SECDEF (Admin) et al., 1 Apr 66, subj: Return Placement of Employees from Foreign Areas and the Canal Zone. (2) Cable DA-777507, DA to CINCUSAREUR et al., 10 Aug 66. Both UNCLAS.

⁵⁴(1) Cable DA-778752, DA to CINCUSAREUR et al., 18 Aug 66. (2) Intvw, Mr. Siemon with Mr. K. Bennett, USAREUR ODCSPER Civ Pers Div, 20 Feb 67. Both UNCLAS.

⁵⁵(1) Ltr, USAREUR to distr, 16 Sep 66, subj: Limitation of Appointments of DA Civilian Employees Overseas. AEAGA-CD. (2) Cable DA-782526, DA to CINCUSAREUR et al., 16 Sep 66. (3) Intvws, Mr. Siemon with Mr. Bennett, 20 Feb and 1 Mar 67. All UNCLAS.

The regulation prohibited entirely, of course, the hire of personnel who had been overseas for more than five years. USAREUR considered, however, that certain specific local circumstances--the FRELOC program for example--might create unique requirements for the prompt hiring of qualified U.S. personnel present in the overseas area. The complete ban on personnel with more than five years' residence overseas, coupled with the reservation of exception-granting authority to the Department of the Army, would unduly restrict USAREUR's freedom to recruit qualified and available personnel to meet specific urgent needs--even on a temporary basis. Accordingly, USAREUR recommended a relaxation of the requirement that career and career-conditional personnel be able to serve the complete minimum overseas tour within a 5-year limitation and urged the exclusion from the 5-year residence limitation of all part-time positions and those temporary appointments that did not exceed one year.⁵⁶ The Department refused to make any change in the regulation but agreed to obtain appropriate relief in individual cases if USAREUR submitted detailed information on the special circumstances and mission need.⁵⁷

b. Restrictions on Grade Structure. In 1965 the Department of the Army had imposed upon USAREUR a GS-8.95 average of all Classification Act employees, as of 30 June 1966. In a related action, the Department had also imposed a limit on the number of employees in higher grades, authorizing USAREUR a total of 78 GS-14 and GS-15 positions combined, with not more than 12 of them at grade GS-15.⁵⁸

At the end of 1965 the USAREUR average grade had been GS-9.15, actually a slight increase from the previous quarter, when the average had been GS-9.13. By 31 March the USAREUR average grade had dropped to GS-9.08 for actual employees, and to GS-9.06 including unfilled but authorized positions.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ Cable SC-46012, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 10 Oct 66. UNCLAS.

⁵⁷ Cable DA-786513, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 14 Oct 66. UNCLAS.

⁵⁸ USAREUR Anl Hist Sum, 1965, pp. 131 - 34. TS (info used UNCLAS).

⁵⁹ (1) DF, DCSPER to CofS, 8 Mar 66, subj: Reduction of U.S. Civilian Average Grade, w/3 incl. AEAGA-CS. (2) Cmt 2, CofS to DCSPER, 10 Mar 66, to DF, DCSPER to CofS, 8 Mar 66, cited above. AEAGS. All UNCLAS. (3) USAREUR Pos Con Rept (RCS CSGPA 839 [R1]), 31 Mar 66.

As a result of the civilianization program, however, the Department of the Army lowered USAREUR's average grade ceiling⁶⁰ to GS-8.47 as of 30 June 1966, and to GS-8.17 as of 30 June 1967.⁶¹

Based on their current grade structures, USAREUR in turn imposed new average grade limitations upon its commands. These ranged from a high of GS-10.60 assigned to the USAREUR Engineer Element--reflecting the large number of professional personnel--to a low of GS-5.02 for the 9th Hospital Center, which employed primarily clerical personnel.⁶²

USAREUR met the desired goals, since by 30 June its average grade was GS-8.40, and by 30 September it was already below its 30 June 1967 goal of GS-8.17, having reached an actual average of GS-8.12. In the following quarter the grade average increased slightly to GS-8.13, largely because it converted several higher ranked officer positions--primarily in the field of comptrollership--to civilian positions to help counteract the effects of the military personnel drawdown. However, since these changes were not a part of the official civilianization program, they had not been considered in establishing USAREUR's revised grade average.⁶³

In June USAREUR also requested an increase in its authorized total of GS-15 positions. The Department of the Army replied that, with the exception of a few positions earmarked for support of operations in Southeast Asia, it had allocated the full quotas of high-graded positions to major commands. Since there was some limited flexibility in exchanging GS-15 and GS-14 positions, however, the Department would allow USAREUR one additional GS-15 space within the combined ceiling of 78 GS-14 and GS-15 positions.⁶⁴

⁶⁰Most of the U.S. civilian positions established under the civilianization program were in low grades, and the new ceiling took that factor into consideration. UNCLAS.

⁶¹Ltrs, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 2 and 31 May 66, subj: Control of Average Grade Levels. AGSC-C DCSPER. UNCLAS.

⁶²Cables SC-28554 thru 28563, CINCUSAREUR to Seventh Army, et al., 23 May 66. UNCLAS.

⁶³(1) Intvws, Mr. Siemon with Mr. J. N. Bage, USAREUR ODCSPER, 14 Nov 66 and 21 Feb 67. (2) Civ Pers Mgt Rept, cited above. Both UNCLAS.

⁶⁴(1) Ltr, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 3 Jun 66, subj: Control of High Grade Positions. AGSC-C DCSPER. (2) Intvw, Mr. Siemon with Mr. Bage, 10 Jun 66. Both UNCLAS.

c. Career Programs.

(1) The Interchange Program. At the beginning of 1966 48 USAREUR applicants were awaiting placement in the United States under the interchange program, and an additional 80 personnel applied during the year. Of these 128 applicants, 52 accepted placement and 17 withdrew from or dropped out of the program--usually for such reasons as taking reemployment leave in the United States, which obligated them to remain overseas for two years, or accepting a new position under the merit promotion program, which required them to remain for one year.⁶⁵

(2) New Career Programs. During 1966 USAREUR completed the implementation of the career program for civilian intelligence employees that it had begun in 1965. Approximately 85 USAREUR employees were in the program.⁶⁶

In May 1965 USAREUR had received a draft copy of a proposed Department of the Army civilian personnel regulation (CPR) that would establish a civilian career program for Special Service librarians. For several years USAREUR had on its own initiative been operating a similar program that featured a centralized inventory of librarians and included appraisal, referral, counseling, training, and developmental provisions that applied to both appropriated-fund and nonappropriated-fund personnel and positions.

Accordingly, USAREUR had recommended nonappropriated-fund employees for CPR inclusion. The Department of the Army did not accept this proposal, however, and in 1966 USAREUR enrolled 24 appropriated-fund librarians in the new career program.⁶⁷

(3) Automation of Career Program Records. During the last quarter of 1966 USAREUR developed and began implementation of an electronic data processing program for civilian career

⁶⁵ Extracted from USAREUR ODCSPER Civ Pers Div Tng and Career Mgt Br files. UNCLAS.

⁶⁶ The number of enrollees actually present varied because of reassignments. (Intvw, Mr. Siemon with Mr. L. K. Johnson, USAREUR ODCSPER Civ Pers Div, 1 Mar 67.) UNCLAS.

⁶⁷ (1) Ltr, DA to distr, 5 May 65, subj: Review of Draft Regulation, Librarian Career Program, w/incl. AGPN-GL (M) (28 Apr 65). (2) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to TAG, 17 Jun 65, same subj, w/incl. AEAGA-CT. (3) Intvw, Mr. Siemon with Mr. Johnson, cited above. All UNCLAS.

program records. Under this program it reproduced the essential career data of each applicant on cards that could then be machine-sorted, producing an automatic print-out. The print-out, in turn, would not only reduce the time needed for preliminary screening of personnel for referrals to existing vacancies, but would also produce detailed statistical data for analysis of the workforce. USAREUR began to apply the new program to personnel records in the comptroller and civilian personnel administration career programs and expected to mechanize all the remaining career programs by June 1967.⁶⁸

(4) Participation in the Comptroller Career Program Test. In March 1965 the Under Secretary of the Army had decided to test the findings of a study of civilian career management in the comptroller career program.⁶⁹ The test program was to emphasize several points, including the following:

The intake of quality personnel through accurate forecasting of requirements, increased and coordinated recruiting of college students, established training programs for all new employees, and quality selection of employees;

The centralized administration of personnel resources;

The careful selection of personnel for placement, promotion, and training based on the last three performance appraisals, a complete analytic appraisal of employee performance and potential, and the maintenance and periodic revision at 6-month intervals of promotion lists;

The identification of employees of high competence and with high potential for intensive career management;

Career counseling;

The development of precise career progression patterns and core training programs to match them;

And the encouragement and support of planned self-development programs on the part of individual employees.⁷⁰

⁶⁸ Civ Pers Mgt Rept, cited above. UNCLAS.

⁶⁹ The comptroller field had been selected primarily because of its size. UNCLAS.

⁷⁰ Briefing, CPSA OCA, May 66, subj: Comptroller Career Program--A Prototype. Cy in AEAGA-C-CT files. UNCLAS.

In March 1966 the Department of the Army established a Comptroller Civilian Career Planning Board (CCCPB), comprised of members from major commands, including USAREUR, to develop policy for the test program.⁷¹ The first CCCPB meeting at the end of March recommended establishing centralized screening panels to select candidates for referral, the development of input requirements for personnel in the grade range GS-5 to GS-7 for FY's 1967 and 1968, and the development of model career progression patterns and training programs in five comptroller occupational areas.⁷²

USAREUR established a local screening committee in June to provide lists of superior personnel to the Department of the Army centralized screening committee. Lacking established criteria and guidelines, the committee first determined its own bases for selection, screened all USAREUR personnel in the comptroller program in grades GS-12 and above, and submitted its lists to the Department of the Army in July.

USAREUR submitted its anticipated input requirements in August and, in a series of meetings held during the summer and fall, the Comptroller Screening Committee developed a number of recommendations concerning career patterns and training programs; it submitted these proposals at the end of October, but received no further information on these subjects during the remainder of 1966.⁷³

In December the CCCPB reviewed the developments to date and decided to concentrate on college recruiting, employee evaluation

⁷¹Ltr, DA to distr, 3 Mar 66, subj: Army Civilian Career Program for the Comptroller Functional Area, w/incl. AGAM-P (M) (25 Feb 66) COMP CPSA. UNCLAS.

⁷²(1) Incl 2 to ltr, Mr. C. F. Mullaly, Dir of Civ Pers, ODCSPER, DA, to Mr. B. Beeson, USAREUR Asst DCSPER, 19 May 66. (2) Ltr, DA to distr, 7 Jun 66, subj: Army Civilian Career Program for the Comptroller Functional Area--Forecasts of Intake Requirements, w/3 incl. AGAM-P (M) (2 Jun 66) COMPT CFSA. (3) Ltr, DA to distr, 21 Jun 66, subj: Army Civilian Career Program for the Comptroller Functional Area. AGAM-P (M) (16 Jun 66) COMPT CPSA. All UNCLAS.

⁷³(1) MFR, Mr. Johnson, USAREUR DCSPER Tng & Career Mgt Sec, 28 Jun 66, subj: Meeting of USAREUR Comptroller Screening Committee. AEAGA-CT. (2) Intvw, Mr. Siemon with Mr. Johnson, 2 Mar 67. Both UNCLAS.

programs, and means of increasing personnel mobility and of moving superior personnel ahead more rapidly. The Under Secretary of the Army approved the continuation of the test program in the comptroller field and recommended the extension of the already tested aspects of the program to other career fields.⁷⁴

d. Labor Union Activities. In 1964 and 1965 activities by three U.S. civilian employees' labor unions had increased significantly.⁷⁵ In addition to the two employee units it had previously represented, in 1966 the AFL-CIO affiliated American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE) secured from USAREUR exclusive recognition to represent four employee units, and formal recognition for four others. Including the two units previously organized, AFGE thus represented 223 employees of 9 USAREUR activities, plus 325 employees of the European Exchange System (EES).⁷⁶

Two organizations competed for the right to represent the teaching personnel of the U.S. Dependents' Schools, European Area (USDESEA) school system: The Overseas Federation of Teachers (OFT), affiliated with the AFL-CIO, and the Overseas Education Association (OEA), affiliated with the National Education Association (NEA). In 1965 USAREUR had rejected the OEA request to have exclusive recognition for the entire USDESEA system.⁷⁷ In 1966 the OEA renewed its request for exclusive recognition, this time, however, only for the Army-operated schools of the USDESEA system--which also included schools operated by the Navy and Air Force. Since USAREUR had already granted the OFT exclusive recognition as the bargaining agent for the Kaiserslautern High School in 1965, inclusion of that school in the system-wide recognition sought by the OEA was impossible. In addition, the OFT claimed to have strong support in the Heidelberg and Mannheim High Schools. Thus, for the first time it was necessary to hold employee elections to determine which of the two unions should represent the members of a bargaining unit. The OFT won

⁷⁴Ltr, Compt of the Army to USAREUR Compt, 6 Jan 67. COMPT-CPSA. UNCLAS.

⁷⁵For details, see USAREUR Anl Hist Sum, 1965, pp. 137 - 39. UNCLAS.

⁷⁶Extracted from USAREUR ODCSPER Civ Pers Div files. UNCLAS.

⁷⁷USAREUR Anl Hist Sum, 1965, p. 136. TS (info used UNCLAS).

the election in Mannheim, and USAREUR granted it exclusive recognition on 12 April to represent the 39 professional employees in the school, bringing its total to 110 employees represented.

The OEA won the other election, received exclusive recognition to represent the 47 personnel in the Heidelberg High School on 20 April, and subsequently--on 17 June--received exclusive recognition to represent teachers in all the Army schools of the USDESEA system, except for the two schools represented by the OFT. OEA was thus by far the strongest union, representing some 2,200 personnel.⁷⁸

30. (U) Revised Local National Pay Scales and Contracts

a. Germany. In Germany USAREUR was the USCINCEUR-designated coordinator of LN civilian personnel matters for all U.S. forces.⁷⁹ In this capacity, USAREUR negotiated a total of 14 new wage and salary tariff agreements with German unions representing the LN workforce. These agreements, affecting over 54,700 employees of both appropriated- and nonappropriated-fund Army activities, called for pay increases ranging from a low of 4 percent for harbor workers to a high of 19.5 percent for personnel engaged in motion-picture theater operations. USAREUR estimated that the increases for appropriated-fund employees alone would increase its LN personnel labor costs by over \$10 million annually.

Similar negotiations with two German unions failed to produce a new tariff for Labor Service personnel during 1966. When the first round of negotiations was broken off in August, USAREUR unilaterally granted a 6 percent increase to LS personnel, retroactive to 1 July. A second negotiating session ended in October without result, so that at the end of the year LS personnel received the new pay rates without formal tariff agreement. USAREUR estimated the annual cost of the 6 percent increase at \$853,000.⁸⁰

In December USAREUR, F.R.G., and union representatives completed collective tariff agreement negotiations that had

⁷⁸ Extracted from ODCSPER Civ Pers Div files. UNCLAS.

⁷⁹ USAFE held this responsibility for France, Holland, and Spain, while USNAVEUR was coordinator for the United Kingdom and Italy. For further details, see USAREUR Anl Hist Sum, 1965, pp. 142 - 43. UNCLAS.

⁸⁰ Extracted from USAREUR ODCSPER Civ Pers Div Compen and Labor Rel Br files. UNCLAS.

begun in 1961. The new agreement was to replace the one of 28 January 1955 that--although changed and modified--had remained in effect. Like its predecessor, Collective Tariff Agreement (CTA) II--signed on 16 December with an effective date of 1 January 1967--established the common general terms of employment for LN personnel serving with the armed forces of the Sending States under the terms of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement and the Supplementary Agreement thereto. Twenty-two appendices spelled out specific agreements pertaining to the various categories of personnel or to such matters as bonuses, allowances, and separation pay.⁸¹

The major changes in the new agreement included longer probationary periods for certain categories of personnel; credit for employment by forces of other Sending States or the Federal Republic in computing seniority rights; higher premium pay for overtime, shift work, and work performed on Sundays, German holidays, and at night; extra leave for employees required to take their entire annual leave during the winter months; payment of employees by direct transfer to a bank account once per month; introduction of improved job and pay-protection systems; and mandatory retirement at age 65. CTA II also formalized certain fringe benefits that USAREUR formerly had granted voluntarily, including higher Christmas bonuses, group life insurance, and vacation bonuses and severance pay that replaced the previous longevity bonus.⁸²

b. Other Countries. In France LN employees received a 4-percent across-the-board increase effective 1 July. On the same date Italian EES employees received a pay raise of 3.3 percent, while other employees received 3.2 percent. Negotiations in Spain led to wage increases of 6.5 percent for EES employees together with separation-pay benefits that added an additional 7.5 percent to LN employee costs; both changes became effective on 1 July. Finally, in the United Kingdom the small number

⁸¹The tariff agreements that USAREUR negotiated with individual trade unions for specific categories of personnel over the years had modified the appendices to the original 1955 CTA. UNCLAS.

⁸²(1) USAREUR Manual 600-480, 25 Jan 60, subj: Collective Tariff Agreement of 28 January 1955, w/changes. (2) USAREUR Pam 690-60, 15 Feb 67, subj: Collective Tariff Agreement of 16 December 1966 (CTA II). (3) Cable SC-54521, CINCUSAREUR to distr, 17 Dec 66. All UNCLAS.

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of Army LN employees received increases that averaged 4.5 percent for graded and 6.9 percent for ungraded personnel. LN employees in Belgium and Holland received no pay increases during 1966.⁸³

31. (S) Dependents' Education

a. The Impact of the Personnel Drawdown. During the first half of the school year 1965 - 66 USDESEA had experienced a small decrease in enrollments, dropping from 74,015 students in grades 1 through 12 at the end of September 1965 to 72,424 at the end of December. Because of the military personnel drawdown that began in February 1966, enrollments decreased sharply to 56,396 at the end of the school year.⁸⁴

In early September, at the opening of the 1966 - 67 school year, there was a further decrease of almost 2,000 from the June enrollment despite an increase of 9,500 in military personnel strength in the same period.⁸⁵ The probable cause of this discrepancy was the difference in the departing and arriving personnel. The heaviest losses were of first lieutenants, captains, majors, and enlisted grades E-5 and E-6, that is to say, personnel who were more likely to have families that included school-age dependents. The replacements, conversely, were almost entirely second lieutenants and AIT graduates who had been in the Army for approximately four months. Both the officer and the enlisted replacements were generally younger than those who had left, and their children, if any, tended to be below school age. During the remainder of the year there were only minor fluctuations in school enrollment, which stood at 53,358 on 31 December.⁸⁶

⁸³ Extracted from USAREUR ODCSPER Civ Pers Div Compen and Labor Rel Br. UNCLAS.

⁸⁴ (1) USAREUR Depn Sch Stat Repts, 26 Nov and 28 Dec 65, 19 Jan, 15 Feb, 21 Mar, 20 Apr, 16 May, and 21 Jul 66. AEUEH-BA. (2) Intvw, Mr. Siemon with Mr. C. Dahm, USDESEA, and LTC R. M. Isham, USAREUR Pers Div, 17 Nov 66. All UNCLAS.

⁸⁵ (1) USAREUR Depn Sch Stat Repts, 21 Jul and 19 Oct 66. AEUEH-BA. UNCLAS. (2) Military personnel strengths as of 30 Jun and 31 Aug extracted from files of USAREUR Pers Div Mpr Con Br. CONF. Gp-4.

⁸⁶ USAREUR Depn Sch Stat Repts, 23 Sep, 19 Oct, 21 Nov 66, and 10 Jan 67. AEUEH-BA. UNCLAS.

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b. Phasedown in France. In preparation for the complete inactivation of the dependents' schools in France scheduled for 1967, USDESEA curtailed its operations in that country during 1966. In September it did not reopen the Braconne, Etain, La Chapelle, and Vassincourt elementary schools, and the Poitiers school, which included both an elementary and a high school. Similarly, USDESEA did not reopen the Toul high school, although it did retain the elementary school there, and converted the Fontainebleau school from a 6-grade elementary and 3-grade junior high school into an 8-grade elementary school.⁸⁷

When it became clear that not all personnel and dependents would leave France by 1 April 1967, USEUCOM requested permission to keep a number of dependents' schools in operation until the end of the school year in June. The French Government approved this request, and USDESEA prepared plans to close schools as the progressive reduction in students would permit.⁸⁸

c. Revised Defense Department Directives. Effective 15 September the Department of Defense revised its directive governing the operation of oversea dependents' schools so as to provide for operations under the "single manager" concept. The revision assigned to the Department of the Army responsibility for operating an educational system in the European area--defined as all of Europe, Africa, and Asia up to 90 degrees east longitude, a line running approximately through the center of East Pakistan. In effect, the Department of the Army thereupon became totally responsible for all aspects of the administration and operation of dependents' schools for all three services in that geographic area, except for the logistic support of schools located on Navy and Air Force installations.⁸⁹

⁸⁷ Extracted from USAREUR Pers Div Educ Sec files. UNCLAS.

⁸⁸ (1) Cable 2056, AMEMB Paris to Secy State et al., 12 Aug 66. (2) Cable ECDS-11784, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR et al., 13 Aug 66. Both SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-3. (3) Intvw, Mr. Siemon with LTC Isham, 23 Nov 66. UNCLAS.

⁸⁹ Logistic support included the provision of both school and dormitory facilities; all equipment and supplies other than school-unique items; and such services as maintenance and repair, custodial, transportation, utilities, and housing. UNCLAS.

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In addition to administering the educational program, USAREUR, as the Department of the Army agent in Europe, was to program, budget, and finance for all personnel, school-unique supplies and equipment, and Department of Defense dependents attending tuition-free schools in the European area. Further, it was to provide logistic support for all dependents' schools on Army installations and to monitor the logistic support provided by the other services in the European area.

The Department of Defense was responsible for the recruitment, selection, and assignment of professional educator personnel and for the procurement and distribution of school-unique supplies. However, it gave USAREUR the responsibility for developing a personnel management program, to include in-service training of professional educators.⁹⁰

The new directive required the transfer of personnel, personnel spaces, funds, and material resources among the military departments throughout the world. Since the Department of Defense wanted to begin the transfers in 1967, USAREUR appointed USDESEA to act as its agent in the negotiations that were to take place in Europe.⁹¹

The negotiations began in October, with USAREUR submitting a USDESEA-prepared draft agreement to USAFE for consideration. Subsequent meetings between USAREUR, USAFE, and USDESEA representatives ultimately led to an agreement signed on 31 December, to become effective 1 January. It called for USAFE to turn over to USDESEA full administrative control of all Air Force-operated dependents' schools in the USAFE area, together with all available and programed material and personnel resources. Contracts and agreements that USAFE had negotiated would remain in effect unless specifically cancelled by USAREUR. USAFE would transfer to USAREUR the civilian

⁹⁰(1) DoD Dir 1342.6, 15 Aug 66, subj: Overseas Dependents Schools, Department of Defense. ASD(M). (2) Ltr, DA to CINCUSAREUR et al., 25 Oct 66, subj: Reorganization of Dependents' Schools in Oversea Areas. AGMG-D. Both UNCLAS.

⁹¹(1) Ltr, DA to CINCUSAREUR et al., 4 Nov 66, subj: Reorganization of Dependents' Schools in Oversea Areas. AGMG-D. (2) Intvws, Mr. Siemon with LTC Isham, 17 and 28 Nov, 16 Dec 66. All UNCLAS.

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personnel assigned to its schools but would continue to provide civilian personnel servicing and financial administration, to administer contractual education for Air Force dependents, and to collect tuition payments until 30 June 1967.

On the other hand, all agreements between USAFE schools and Air Force base commanders concerning support would terminate upon the transfer, and USAREUR would negotiate new cross servicing agreements for these. In the area of school-unique supplies, USDESEA would procure instructional materials from 1 January to 30 June 1967 up to the limit of already-approved USAFE funding for that purpose. Thereafter all programing, budgeting, and funding for that purpose would be solely a USAREUR responsibility. The Army would assume control of the USAFE warehouse for school equipment in England, and the USAFE warehouse at Wiesbaden would cease operations and transfer its stocks to USAREUR warehouses.

In addition to a number of other detailed provisions of lesser significance, the agreement also called for further negotiations to cover the questions of funding and personnel administration during the second half of FY 1967.⁹²

d. Pay Increases for Teachers. On 14 April the Congress finally enacted the long-awaited teacher pay bill, Public Law 89-391. The revised pay schedules for the remainder of the 1965 - 66 school year provided for salaries ranging from \$4,845 to \$11,455.⁹³ One month later the Wage Board announced further increases for the school year 1966 - 67, according to which salaries would range from \$5,075 to \$11,995.⁹⁴

⁹² Civ Pers Mgt Rept, cited above, pp. 9 - 10. (2) Memo, 30 Dec 66, subj: Dependent Schools Transfer Agreement and Memorandum of Understanding Between Headquarters, United States Air Forces in Europe and Headquarters, United States Army, Europe. Cy in AEAGC-XH files. (3) Intvw, Mr. Siemon with LTC Isham, 10 Mar 67. All UNCLAS.

⁹³ Ltr, Army-Air Force Wage Bd to Dir Civ Pers, DA, and Dir Civ Pers, USAF, 22 Apr 66, subj: Revision of Overseas Teachers School Year Salary Schedules to Implement Public Law 89-391, w/6 incl. DCSPER-AAFWB. UNCLAS.

⁹⁴ Ltr, Army-Air Force Wage Bd to Dir Civ Pers, DA, and Dir Civ Pers, USAF, 27 May 66, subj: Revision of Overseas Teachers School Year Salary Schedule - School Year 1966 - 67, w/4 incl. DCSPER-AAFWB. UNCLAS.

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The Congressional debate of the military appropriations bill continued beyond the opening of the USDESEA schools in the fall, and teachers started the new school year at the previous salary rates rather than at the new ones they had expected. The situation soon led to unrest among the teachers, and late in September a group of approximately 30 picketed and demonstrated at an Overseas Education Association meeting. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Education, Dr. L. M. Bartlett, who addressed the meeting, advised the teachers that the Department of Defense fully expected the Congress to enact an appropriations bill that would include sufficient funds to raise teacher salaries to the levels foreseen in the spring and that pay raises, retroactive to the start of the school year, would go into effect as soon as funds were available.⁹⁵

Despite these assurances, teacher unrest continued, and the faculty of one USDESEA school voted to cease all extracurricular activities⁹⁶ until the Department of Defense would "honor the salary provisions of Public Law 89-391."⁹⁷

The tempest subsided two weeks later when, on 11 October, the Congress enacted a military appropriations bill that increased the per-pupil fund limitation from \$455 to \$490, thus permitting the promised pay increase to go into effect.⁹⁸ This legislation not only mollified the USDESEA teachers, it also caused the NEA to rescind a 3-year-old "advisory" in which the million-member organization cautioned teachers against working in the Defense Department schools because of alleged substandard conditions and low salaries.⁹⁹

⁹⁵(1) The Stars and Stripes (Eur. ed.), 25 Sep 66, pp. 1 and 24. (2) Cable SC-43862, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 25 Sep 66. Both UNCLAS.

⁹⁶Such as sponsoring athletic teams, school newspaper, band, chorus, student council, and attending PTA meetings. UNCLAS.

⁹⁷The Stars and Stripes (Eur. ed.), 27 Sep 66, pp. 1 and 23. UNCLAS.

⁹⁸The New York Herald Tribune (Eur. ed.), 13 Oct 66. UNCLAS.

⁹⁹Ibid., 17 Oct 66. UNCLAS.

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32. (C) Support of SHAPE and AFCENT Headquarters After Relocation

Various Department of Defense agencies had to prepare plans for the impending relocation of SHAPE and Allied Forces, Central Europe (AFCENT) headquarters to Belgium and the Netherlands, respectively. Thus, for example, in October the Secretary of Defense assigned to the Department of the Army responsibility for American Forces radio and television support in both countries. Similarly, USCINCEUR designated CINCUSAREUR as the coordinator for local national employees in Belgium and directed him to work in conjunction with the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) and Embassy in negotiating labor agreements with the Belgian Government. Finally, through USDESEA, USAREUR would assist in the negotiations with both Belgium and Holland concerning U.S. military dependents' education facilities. However, SHAPE and AFCENT headquarters remained the primary negotiating partners with the two host governments for the overall Status of Forces agreements and supplements thereto.¹⁰⁰

a. Armed Forces Radio and Television Service. On the basis of the Secretary of Defense's directive, in October the American Forces Network, Europe (AFNE), a USAREUR assigned activity, began preliminary studies of the problems involved.

Basing its calculations on the assumption that all U.S. personnel would reside within a 25-mile radius of SHAPE headquarters, AFNE estimated that it would need a 4,000-watt transmitter with an antenna at least 110 feet high. Such a transmitter would permit Class A radio service to a radius of 15 miles from the transmitter and so-called fringe-area service (receivers would require an outdoor antenna) up to approximately 30 miles.

Assuming that U.S. personnel assigned to AFCENT would live either on post or within 20 miles of the headquarters, AFNE considered using two 75-watt transmitters, each furnishing Class A service to a radius of 4 miles and fringe-area service up to 10 miles. AFNE could not reach a decision as to whether it would need one or two 75-watt transmitters until more definite information as to the housing of U.S. personnel became available.

At the end of October USAREUR requested USEUCOM to open negotiations with the host governments to secure their authorizations

¹⁰⁰(1) Cable DEF-5978, SECDEF to USCINCEUR, 20 Oct 66.
(2) Cable ECLA-19224, USCINCEUR to JCS, 22 Dec 66. NOFORN. Both CONF. Gp-4.

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to install and operate transmitters and their assignment of frequencies for those transmitters.¹⁰¹ AFNE representatives meanwhile undertook an on-the-scene survey at both sites to determine technical requirements on the basis of terrain features and the probable distribution of housing facilities.¹⁰²

In December, USCINCEUR directed USAREUR to conduct the negotiations with the host governments through the MAAG Chief after 1 January 1967.¹⁰³

b. Local National Labor and Dependents' Education. USAREUR did not have time to begin discussions on local national matters in Belgium before 31 December. The negotiations concerning the dependents' education facilities in Belgium and Holland were inconclusive. SHAPE reported early in December that preliminary talks with officials of the host governments had indicated several areas of broad general agreement on the question of support facilities for the two NATO headquarters. However, SHAPE would have to negotiate special agreements for the operation of schools after the beginning of 1967. During the following weeks USAREUR and USDESEA advised SHAPE on such general matters as space requirements and types of facilities needed.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰¹(1) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 27 Oct 66, subj: Negotiations with Belgium Government for Expansion of American Forces Network, Europe. (2) Ltr, same to same, 27 Oct 66, subj: Negotiations with Netherlands Government for Expansion of American Forces Network, Europe. Both AEAPA-CI. UNCLAS.

¹⁰²Intvw, Mr. Siemon with Mr. J. R. Harris, USAREUR PAD, 14 Nov 66. UNCLAS.

¹⁰³Cable ECAP-T-19109, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR et al., 20 Dec 66. UNCLAS. FOUO.

¹⁰⁴(1) Cable ECLA-19224, 22 Dec 66, cited above. (2) Intvws, Mr. Siemon with LTC Isham and Mr. Frailey, 3 and 10 Mar 67. Both CONF. Gp-4.

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Chapter 6

Intelligence

33. (S) Intelligence Estimates

During 1966 refinements of intelligence holdings caused USAREUR to make slight revisions in its estimates of Soviet and Soviet Bloc strengths and capabilities.¹

a. Military Strengths. As of December 1966 USAREUR held that the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (GSFG), had 308,000 men stationed in East Germany. The GSFG was organized into 5 field armies, composed of 10 tank and 10 motorized rifle divisions, plus supporting elements that included a separate artillery division and a tactical air army. The end of 1966 estimate represented an increase of 3,000 men in the GSFG strength as compared to last year's figure.

USAREUR estimated that the strength of the Soviet Northern Group of Forces (NGF) stationed in Poland had dropped from 30,000 to 25,000 men. As before, these were organized into two combat-ready tank divisions, plus supporting elements. USAREUR did not anticipate that the Soviets would commit their Southern Group of Forces (SGF) stationed in Hungary against NATO in wartime. It had 50,000 men--a reduction of 4,000 from previous estimates--organized in 2 tank and 2 motorized rifle divisions, all combat ready. No Soviet troop units were in Czechoslovakia.

¹For details of last year's intelligence estimates, see USAREUR Anl Hist Sum, 1965, pp. 155 - 58. UNCLAS.

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The Satellite forces included 150,500 men in East German military organizations: 84,100 in the 6 combat-ready East German Army divisions, 52,400 in the Border Command and the Berlin Border Brigade, and 14,000 in the paramilitary emergency and security police agencies. The Polish Army consisted of 225,000 men organized into 15 divisions, 12 of them--including 1 airborne and 1 amphibious assault landing division--combat ready; the Czechoslovak Army had 175,000 men in 14 divisions, 8 of them combat ready; and the Hungarian Army's 6 divisions--4 of them combat ready--totaled 95,000 men.²

b. Probable Land Battle. USAREUR's holdings on the probable course of a Soviet/Satellite attack on Western Europe remained basically unchanged: A 4-front attack including a secondary effort by 8 divisions in the north on the Maritime Front, a 32-division main attack on the North Central Front, a 16-division secondary effort on the Central Front, and 8 divisions attacking on the South Central Front in a secondary containing role. USAREUR held that 64 divisions--instead of 65 as stated previously--would launch the initial attack: The 44 combat-ready Soviet and Satellite divisions already present in the forward area as described above, plus 2 Soviet airborne divisions stationed in the Soviet Union that could be committed immediately by air and 18 reinforcing divisions from the Western Soviet Union that could arrive in the forward area at the rate of 3 per day after the initial closing. Initial closing time, including loading, travel, and unloading, would amount to 1.6 days by rail or 13.1 days by highway.³

There were no other significant changes from the previous estimate.

c. Revised Publication Procedures. In the past USAREUR had published its intelligence estimates on an annual basis.

²(1) USAREUR Intelligence Estimate, 1966, 14 Jun 66, Annexes 9 and 11. GB 66-0103. (2) Intvw, Mr. B. H. Siemon, USAREUR Ops Div Mil Hist Sec with Mr. M. M. Lewkowicz, USAREUR Intel Div, 7 Jun 66. (3) Incl to DF, ODCSI to ODCSOPS, 25 Jan 67, subj: Draft Annual Historical Report (U). AEAGB-P. All SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-1.

³USAREUR Intelligence Estimate, 1966, cited above, Annex 24. SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-1.

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Since many sections of the estimate--for example, those concerning climate, weather, and terrain--remained essentially unchanged from year to year, republishing the entire estimate caused unnecessary duplications of effort. Accordingly, to reduce the workload, cut costs, and speed dissemination, USAREUR decided in August to discontinue republication of the complete estimate. Instead, it would publish page changes updating the existing estimate as refinements in intelligence holdings made such action possible and desirable. Since the estimate was bound in a loose-leaf ring binder, the substitution of revised pages for outdated ones would present no problem.⁴

34. (S) Effects of the Personnel Drawdown

a. Curtailment of Intelligence Production. In May the losses of intelligence personnel caused by the drawdown program forced USAREUR to announce temporary reductions in its production and dissemination of finished intelligence. Since USAREUR could no longer maintain basic Order of Battle information on the armed forces of Albania, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Yugoslavia, it would rely upon the holdings and output of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).

USAREUR also ceased publication of its Monthly Intelligence Summary (MISUM) and Order of Battle handbooks and changed the publication schedule of the Quarterly Current Intelligence Report (QCIR) from regular appearance to publication on a "when appropriate" basis. No additional QCIR appeared during the year.

To compensate at least partially for this curtailment, USAREUR began publication of the Monthly Intelligence Appraisal (MIA), which included, as appropriate, some of the special topics that had formerly appeared in the discontinued publication. The MIA was published in both cable and printed versions--the former including all available information, and the latter including only items releasable to NATO allies.⁵

⁴Intvws, Mr. Siemon with LTC W. E. McClain, USAREUR Intel Div, 7 Nov and 14 Dec 66. UNCLAS. FOUO.

⁵(1) Cable SX-3273, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 9 May 66.
(2) Intvws, Mr. Siemon with LTC L. H. Landre, 25 Oct 66, and LTC McClain, 7 Nov 66, both USAREUR Intel Div. All SECRET. Gp-3.

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In place of the technical intelligence items no longer disseminated in MISUM's, the USAREUR Technical Intelligence Center (UTIC) initiated a new publication, the USAREUR Technical Intelligence Bulletin (UTIB). Planned for publication on an irregular basis whenever sufficient information was available, the first issue of the bulletin appeared on 30 August 1966 as a SECRET, NATO-releasable document. In addition to the NATO-releasable version, UTIC also planned to issue UTIB supplements that would contain any information not releasable to foreign nationals. Neither of the two UTIB's published in 1966 required a supplement, however.⁶

b. Temporary Reduction in the RAINDROP Program. In May USAREUR curtailed the RAINDROP aerial surveillance program; it dropped the aerial observer portion because of personnel shortages but retained the photographic missions.⁷ In August USAREUR resumed the aerial observer portion of the program with four observers and put into effect a training program for additional observers.⁸

c. Shortage of Intelligence Officers. By the end of October the shortage of intelligence officers caused by the personnel drawdown became critical. USAREUR's General Order authorizations--not full TOE and TD strengths--called for 564 AIS officers. Against the Department of the Army manning level of 414, however, actual assigned strength dropped to 332 AIS officers as of 31 October and then rose slightly to 361 at the end of December.⁹

⁶ Intvw, Mr. Siemon with MAJ A. Tittel, CO, UTIC, 3 Nov 66. UNCLAS.

⁷ Cable SX-3273, 9 May 66, cited above. SECRET. Gp-3.

⁸ (1) Cable SX-5697, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 13 Oct 66.
(2) Intvw, Mr. Siemon with CPT J. C. Johnson, USAREUR Intel Div, 8 Nov 66. Both SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-3.

⁹ (1) Cable SX-5992, CINCUSAREUR to CofSA, 31 Oct 66. SECRET.
(2) USAREUR AG DPU Rept 403202, 31 Dec 66. CONF. Both Gp-4.

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35. (U) Technical Intelligence

In addition to introducing the new bulletin, the USAREUR Technical Intelligence Center continued its program of publishing technical intelligence handbooks and training aids. UTIC revised and updated its missile and ordnance identification handbooks--the latter increasing from one to two volumes--and issued a new identification handbook concerning Soviet box-bodied vehicles. It also prepared a helicopter identification handbook that included all types of helicopters--U.S., West European, and Soviet Bloc--that were in use in the Federal Republic of Germany and bordering countries. In addition to the normal uses of an identification handbook, this volume would serve to reduce the number of erroneous reports of helicopter border violations by familiarizing personnel with the characteristics and appearance of all helicopters in service in the area. For that reason USAREUR planned to distribute the unclassified publication to F.R.G. agencies--both civilian and military--as well as to U.S. military units.

Late in 1965 UTIC had begun a program to revise and update training posters. These posters, distributed by the thousands for use on unit bulletin boards, showed full-color illustrations of Soviet Bloc uniforms and insignia and photographs of weapons and equipment. By the end of 1966 UTIC had prepared 86 such posters, of which the USAREUR Training Aids Center had published approximately 65.¹⁰

36. (C) Automatic Data Processing (ADP)

In April 1965 USAREUR had submitted a study on the application of ADP methods to intelligence operations. USAREUR had subsequently requested authority to prepare intelligence data handling facilities at Heidelberg, but had not received any final decisions or authorizations in 1965.¹¹

a. Equipment. On 5 August 1966 the Department of the Army approved the equipment requirements that USAREUR had listed in its systems specifications submitted the previous year. After a joint USAREUR/DIA review in mid-August, USAREUR released the specifications on 27 October for commercial

¹⁰Intvw, Mr. Siemon with MAJ Tittel, 3 Nov 66. UNCLAS.

¹¹USAREUR Anl Hist Sum, 1965, p. 163. TS (info used CONF. Gp-3).

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bidding. Although it had not received all bids by the end of the year, USAREUR anticipated that it could complete the selection of equipment by 1 March 1967 and secure its delivery by 1 July.

b. Program Development. In June USAREUR requested the Department of the Army to authorize commercial contractual assistance in developing the input and retrieval systems for computer programing. The Department approved 6 man-years of contractual assistance for FY 1967 and 5 man-years for FY 1968, and awarded the contract to the Planning Research Corporation.

c. Computer Site. Computers, like any other electric or electronic equipment, produce emissions that are susceptible to detection and monitoring, thereby making any classified information processed by that equipment subject to possible compromise. To provide a specially shielded installation for its intelligence ADP equipment, USAREUR had selected a building in the headquarters compound. At the end of 1966 work was in progress to prepare the building for the computer installation, and USAREUR anticipated that the administrative portion of the building, which could serve as a temporary computer location, would be ready for occupancy by 15 June 1967, and the permanent shielded computer installation by 1 November.¹²

37. (S) Revision of the Rules of Engagement for Border Operations

a. The July Incident. On 14 July an unarmed CH-34 helicopter of the 14th Armored Cavalry Regiment made a routine surveillance flight along the zonal border. At one point a Soviet "Hound" helicopter flew parallel to the U.S. helicopter, remaining, however, on the East German side of the border. The Soviet pilot then crossed the border, made two buzzing passes at the U.S. helicopter--one of them close enough to cause severe turbulence and endanger the U.S. craft--and

¹²(1) Summary sheet, subj: Current Status USAREUR IDHS Project. (2) Intvw, Mr. Siemon with COL C. F. Brewster, USAREUR ODCSI, IDHS Div, 14 Nov 66 and 15 Feb 67. Both CONF. Gp-3.

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forced the U.S. helicopter to land near the F.R.G. village of Heringen. The Soviet helicopter, which bore a gun pod mounting twin coaxial machine guns, followed the U.S. helicopter down and hovered between the U.S. helicopter and the border, remaining about 10 feet above the ground and at approximately 40 yards' distance. When a F.R.G. customs police patrol arrived on the scene after 15 to 20 minutes, the Soviet helicopter withdrew but remained in sight of the landed U.S. helicopter. The U.S. crew then remounted and started the engine, whereupon the Soviet helicopter returned. The F.R.G. customs personnel fired several flares in the direction of the Soviet aircraft, which then withdrew. The U.S. helicopter flew to a 14th Armored Cavalry Regiment border observation post and reported the incident by radio. The time elapsed from the initial sighting of the Soviet helicopter to the filing of the report was 30 to 35 minutes.¹³

On the following day USAREUR started an investigation to determine the causes of the apparent lack of aggressiveness of the U.S. personnel involved and the reason for the delay in notifying higher headquarters.¹⁴

b. Findings of the Investigation.

(1) Aggressiveness. The investigating officer found that there had been no lack of aggressiveness but that, on the contrary, the U.S. helicopter crew members had handled themselves well and had adhered to instructions. Current regulations governing border operations instructed U.S. personnel to avoid arrest or capture by Soviet Bloc personnel on F.R.G. territory and authorized the use of firepower in self-defense or to avoid detention. However, personnel of the 14th Armored Cavalry Regiment had standing instructions to avoid border incidents. Further, pilots of the 14th Armored Cavalry Regiment had orders to turn away from the border and to avoid contact or overflight of the border in any situation where a Soviet Bloc aircraft approached their aircraft.

¹³Ltr, V Corps Arty to V Corps, 18 Jul 66, subj: Transmittal of Report of Investigation (U), with 11 incl. AETVAT-CG. SECRET (info used CONF).

¹⁴Cable SX-4243, CINCUSAREUR to Seventh Army, 15 Jul 66. CONF. Gp-4.

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The investigator added that the restrictions of these regulations and the inadequate equipment of the border surveillance aircraft made an effective response impossible. He recommended, therefore, the use of armed helicopters by border surveillance forces and a modification of the rules of engagement to provide for an adequate response to Soviet Bloc aircraft incursions.¹⁵

While USAREUR concurred in these findings and recommendations, it held that Seventh Army units--in particular the 14th Armored Cavalry Regiment--had overemphasized the desirability of avoiding incidents. Current guidance had been intended to prevent border violations by U.S. personnel, but certainly not to establish a policy of retreat in the face of unlawful and hostile Soviet Bloc acts in F.R.G. territory. Accordingly, USAREUR instructed border regiments to comply with the provisions of Operations Order 1-66, which did authorize the use of firearms.¹⁶

(2) Communications. Two distinct types of communications failure had taken place during the incident: Within Army channels, a delay occurred in notifying higher headquarters; and communications between Army and Air Force elements were unsatisfactory because of bad connections and because there was no immediate response to the available information. The U.S. pilot sent his initial report of harassment to the 3d Squadron of the 14th Armored Cavalry Regiment while the helicopter was still airborne. The squadron passed the initial report to regimental headquarters within three or four minutes, but after the aircraft landed in a depressed area the terrain features rendered radio communications difficult and only fragmentary information became available to the 3d Squadron. Personnel at the regimental headquarters were

¹⁵Incl to "Report of Investigation - Helicopter Incident 14 July 1966," 18 Jul 66, to V Corps Arty ltr cited above.
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¹⁶(1) 1st Ind, V Corps to Seventh Army, 18 Jul 66. AETVCG (18 Jul 66). (2) 2d Ind, Seventh Army to CINCUSAREUR, 19 Jul 66. AETGB-CI (18 Jul 66). (3) 3d Ind, USAREUR to USCINCEUR, 22 Jul 66. AEAGC-O (18 Jul 66). All to V Corps Arty ltr, cited above.
All SECRET. Gp-3.

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reluctant to pass on fragmentary information, and by the time the helicopter was airborne and communications improved the incident was no longer critical. The regimental commander therefore decided to wait until a full report was available before advising higher headquarters.¹⁷

As required by regimental operating procedures, the 3d Squadron also attempted to notify USAFE's 616th Air Control and Warning Station (ACWS) of the Soviet incursion, but was unable to get a useable connection. The Fulda Flight Control Center (FCC), which had heard the radio messages from the aircraft, was able to contact and notify the ACWS, however, approximately 10 minutes after the 3d Squadron's attempt had failed.

Seventh Army corrected some of these deficiencies by installing a "hot line" connection from the 14th Armored Cavalry Regiment to the FCC and by instructing subordinate units that they were to report future border incidents as they were developing instead of waiting until more detailed information became available.¹⁸

c. USAREUR/USAFE Memorandum of Understanding. On 20 and 21 July representatives of USAREUR and USAFE headquarters met to discuss the helicopter incident and measures to preclude any recurrence of the reporting delays. The conferees found that, in addition to the communications delay between Army and Air Force elements, personal failures by some Air Force personnel had resulted in no fighter aircraft being directed to the scene of the incident even after the incursion was known. However, both parties agreed that Air Force directives and procedures on the subject were adequate, and that the problem lay in improper implementation of instructions, rather than in an inherent weakness of the system. They also agreed

¹⁷Report of Investigation, 18 Jul 66, cited above. SECRET. Gp-3.

¹⁸(1) Ibid., w/incls. (2) 1st Ind, V Corps to Seventh Army, 18 Jul 66. (3) 2d Ind, Seventh Army to CINCUSAREUR, 19 Jul 66. Both cited above. All SECRET. Gp-3.

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to review the current rules of engagement and other instructions affecting U.S. elements engaged in border operations to determine their applicability to Army aircraft; improve reporting methods; examine the possibility of equipping border units with armed helicopters; establish a common terminology, essential items of information required, and a format for passing information between Army elements and the Air Force air defense system; study the communications systems in use and improve communications between USAREUR's border operations centers and USAFE's ACWS stations; and to improve Air Force reaction time by establishing procedures for automatic scrambling of fighters when advised of U.S. Army aircraft in trouble and by conducting at least some aircraft interceptor operations near the buffer zone to have them in the area of potential incidents.¹⁹

USCINCEUR approved implementation of the terms of the memorandum on 11 August and requested USAREUR to pursue the matter as one of priority.²⁰

d. Changes in Border Procedures. Meanwhile, USAREUR had already changed certain border operations procedures. In addition to the already required ground patrols, Seventh Army was to conduct two armed helicopter patrols of the border daily--weather and equipment permitting. Seventh Army was to use UH-1B helicopters armed with M-6 7.62-mm machineguns loaded with live tracer ammunition. Aircrews were to keep safety and system activation switches in the safe or off position at all times until they actually used the weapon. The rules of engagement, as outlined in Annex B of Operations Order 1-66, remained in effect.²¹ Seventh Army added that,

¹⁹Incl, MFR, 25 Jul 66, subj: Memorandum of Understanding Between USAREUR and USAFE Concerning Soviet Aircraft Harassment (U), with incl, same subject, 21 Jul 66, to DF, DCSOPS to CofS, 8 Oct 66, subj: Implementation of the USAREUR/USAFE Memorandum of Understanding Proposals (U). AEAGC-CO. SECRET. Gp-3.

²⁰4th Ind, USEUCOM to CINCUSAREUR, 11 Aug 66, subj: Transmittal of Report of Investigation (U), to V Corps Arty ltr cited above. AETVAT-CG (18 Jul 66). SECRET. Gp-4.

²¹Cable SX-4568, CINCUSAREUR to Seventh Army, 4 Aug 66. SECRET. Gp-3.

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except for aircraft engaged in medical evacuation or similar emergency operations, no unarmed helicopters would fly in the 5-kilometer border zone unless accompanied by an armed UH-1B.

If a Communist Bloc helicopter violated the border, the pilot of any armed UH-1B in the vicinity was to attract the violator's attention and signal him to land. If the intruder refused to land, the U.S. pilot was to maintain surveillance of the Communist aircraft and report the situation to the nearest armored cavalry unit and flight control center. The use of weapons was permissible only in self-defense.²²

To improve reporting procedures, Seventh Army units were to use the Tactical Alert Net for reporting immediately all border violations, civilian or military, to USAREUR headquarters. Commanders at the scene of a violation were to make their first report in clear text by the most direct possible means to the nearest entry point of the Tactical Alert Net--i.e., to an armored cavalry regiment or corps headquarters. The commander would then supplement his initial report with additional reports as the situation developed. USAREUR emphasized that no element was to delay border violation reports for verification, evaluation, or to await additional information, lending further weight to this injunction by designating the reports as "Fragmentary Reports" (FRAGREP's). Finally, USAREUR directed the armored cavalry regiments to relay immediately all FRAGREP's to the nearest USAF ACW station as received.²³

e. USAREUR's Proposal for Modifying the Rules of Engagement. In addition to issuing the above instructions to eliminate communications delays, USAREUR proposed a far-reaching modification of the rules of engagement, which would define the ground environment as "that portion of the terrain in the vicinity of the F.R.G. border and the air space above it in which the ground commander conducts his operation." The local Army commander would be responsible for the airspace used by Army aircraft in patrolling and surveillance, and thus also for meeting any violation of that airspace by a Soviet Bloc aircraft.²⁴

²²Cable 22213, Seventh Army to V Corps et al., 9 Aug 66.
SECRET. Gp-1.

²³Cable SX-4568, CINCUSAREUR to Seventh Army, 4 Aug 66.
SECRET. Gp-3.

²⁴Cable SX-4569, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 4 Aug 66.
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USAFE promptly objected, pointing out that SHAPE had assigned both responsibility and authority for air defense to USAFE. It therefore requested USCINCEUR to clarify the question of responsibility for West German airspace and to specify the activity permitted USAREUR's armed helicopters within the context of USAFE's assigned responsibilities.²⁵

USAREUR conceded USAFE's authority and responsibility for air defense, arguing that the proposed modification was merely intended to establish a basis upon which Army border elements could take appropriate action to counter an aerial intrusion until Air Force elements were able to assume control of the situation.²⁶ USCINCEUR nevertheless rejected USAREUR's proposed definition of the ground environment--although he did approve the armed helicopter patrols and the changes in reporting procedures. SACEUR's rules of engagement, as established by MC 66/1, applied to all NATO airspace and all aircraft therein. Thus, although U.S. Army aircraft were not part of the air defense system, the air defense rules of engagement specified by MC 66/1 would apply whenever U.S. Army helicopters detected a border violation by Communist Bloc helicopters or other aircraft. Since CINCUSAFE was the commander responsible for air defense, USAREUR's proposal would have to be the subject of a joint USAREUR/USAFE study, and USEUCOM would have to take appropriate action on any mutually agreed-upon proposed changes resulting from such a study and would have to resolve areas of conflict.²⁷

f. The USAREUR Draft Revision. During the following weeks USAREUR developed a set of revised rules that would

²⁵ Cable OPL-10477, CINCUSAFE to USCINCEUR, 5 Aug 66.
SECRET. Gp-3.

²⁶ Cable SX-4605, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 6 Aug 66.
SECRET. NOFORN. G-3.

²⁷ (1) Any changes to SACEUR's MC 66/1 would require approval of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and Department of Defense, of the North Atlantic Council, and of the NATO Military Committee.
(2) Cable ECJC-P-11864, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, CINCUSAFE, 15 Aug 66. Both SECRET. Gp-3.

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better meet the problems of the Army forces engaged in border operations, while remaining within the restrictions of MC 66/1. With the concurrence of USAFE, USAREUR submitted the draft to USEUCOM for approval.²⁸

(1) The Rules of Engagement. In the future, border security and surveillance forces were not to tolerate any interference in their lawful duties. They were to use firepower when attacked, to prevent arrest or capture in the Federal Republic of Germany, or when ordered by an authorized commander. For a border violation on the ground, the Army commander at the scene could in certain circumstances determine whether firepower was necessary and if so to what degree. As a guideline, the rules stated that USAREUR forces "will use" firepower in reaction to a hostile act by Soviet Bloc forces that endangered U.S. or Allied lives, and when directly attacked. By contrast, they were "authorized" to use an appropriate degree of firepower to prevent arrest or capture on F.R.G. territory. In situations other than those cited above, corps commanders could authorize USAREUR forces to use firepower and could delegate this authority to the level of armored cavalry regiment commanders.

For so-called airborne objects, the rules were somewhat different. If attacked by an intruding Soviet Bloc helicopter or light aircraft, USAREUR forces would use firepower in self-defense. In the event of other hostile acts--such as Soviet Bloc aircraft maneuvering into position to attack U.S. or Allied aircraft; releasing or preparing to release bombs or to fire missiles, rockets, or guns in the Federal Republic; attacking friendly ground forces within the Federal Republic; or dropping paratroops or landing troops without proper clearance in the Federal Republic--U.S. Army elements could use firepower only if authorized by the USAFE 86th Air Division commander or his designated representative.²⁹

²⁸Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 21 Oct 66, subj: Border Operations (U). AEAGC-CO. SECRET. Gp-3.

²⁹Incl 2, Special Instructions and Rules of Engagement for United States Army Forces Engaged in Border Operations, to USAREUR ltr, 21 Oct 66, cited above, pp. 1 - 4. CONF. Gp-3.

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These rules of engagement applied to armed U.S. Army helicopters as well as to ground elements. In addition, however, armed helicopters received specific guidance peculiar to their characteristics. They were to maintain surveillance of intruding aircraft that did not commit acts meriting engagement, to signal the pilots of such aircraft to land, and to guide them to appropriate landing areas. If required, helicopter pilots would request assistance from other Army helicopters or from USAFE.

In all situations, both ground and airborne Army elements would report the development of any incident by FRAGREP.³⁰

(2) USAREUR's Reservations. CINCUSAREUR emphasized that the above rules were the only ones he and CINCUSAFE could agree upon under the limitations of MC 66/1. Because of those limitations, the new rules still imposed undesirable restrictions on USAREUR forces on the border. Neither USAFE interceptors nor air defense missile elements could render effective support to Army forces under attack or harassment at the border because of the characteristics of the fighter aircraft and the weapons systems. Accordingly, USAREUR recommended modifying MC 66/1 so as to authorize U.S. Army elements--including armed helicopters--to operate outside the Allied Command Europe (ACE) Air Defense Rules in reaction to Soviet Bloc ground and airborne border violations.

To speed reactions to airborne border violations, USAREUR also requested USCINCEUR to modify the proposed rules of engagement so as to authorize CINCUSAREUR--rather than the 86th Air Division commander--to declare an aerial incursion a hostile act, and to further authorize CINCUSAREUR to delegate this authority down to the armored cavalry regimental commander level.³¹

On 1 December USCINCEUR approved USAREUR's proposed rules of engagement, but he refused to authorize Army ground elements

³⁰Ibid., pp. 1, 4 - 5. CONF. Gp-3.

³¹Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 21 Oct 66, cited above.
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and helicopters to operate independently of the ACE Air Defense Rules and did not grant CINCUSAREUR the authority to declare an aerial incursion a hostile act. These two changes would require modification of MC 66/1, and USCINCEUR did not consider any such modification desirable at the current time. Despite this position, USCINCEUR considered that there was sufficient latitude within the rules and definitions to permit an armed helicopter or ground element to protect itself when necessary without referral to higher authority. For example, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had specifically stated, with respect to rules of engagement for Southeast Asia, that "nothing in these rules modifies in any manner the requirement of a military commander to defend his unit against armed attack with all means at his disposal. In the event of such attack, the commander concerned will take immediate aggressive action against the attacking force." In less critical situations, however, USCINCEUR reiterated his belief that responsibility for air defense engagements would have to remain the exclusive province of the commanders assigned air defense responsibility in MC 66/1.³²

g. Reduction of Armed Helicopter Flights. During the summer Seventh Army had been conducting two flights per day along the USAREUR sector of the F.R.G. border, using armed UH-1B helicopters. Because of problems associated with aircraft and pilot availability and aircraft maintenance, and the relatively small amount of intelligence gathered by such patrols, Seventh Army recommended in mid-September to reduce the flights from two to one per day. This reduction in regularly scheduled patrolling would not, however, limit the authority of the corps and regimental commanders, or the commander of the 2d Squadron of the 9th Cavalry to conduct additional surveillance flights if they so desired.

Recognizing the problems involved, USAREUR approved the Seventh Army recommendation in early November.³³

³² Cable ECJC-P-18179, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 1 Dec 66. SECRET. Gp-3.

³³ (1) Cable AETGB-O(C)-24023, Seventh Army to CINCUSAREUR, 15 Sep 66. (2) Intvw, Mr. Siemon with LTC H. E. Kessinger, USAREUR Intel Div, 7 Nov 66. (3) Cable SX-6100, CINCUSAREUR to Seventh Army, 7 Nov 66. ALL SECRET. Gp-3.

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38. (S) Revised Aerial Surveillance Operations

a. Federal Republic of Germany. In November 1965 a USAREUR OV-1 aircraft flying an aerial surveillance mission with side-looking airborne radar (SLAR) had penetrated Austrian airspace twice, to depths of 1.5 and 5 kilometers. Subsequent investigation revealed that, in addition to pilot error, a major contributory cause was improper ground radar control of the flight. The investigation also revealed that in the last 8 months there had been 7 unreported incidents of faulty ground control.

Since USAREUR had to prevent inadvertent overflights of international boundaries at all cost, in January it suspended all further SLAR missions in the border area until positive control over such flights became possible.³⁴

Further investigation revealed the incorrect plotting of one of the USAFE radar antenna sites, which resulted in a 2-degree compass heading error and a displacement of one of the flight path checkpoints. A misalignment of the radar console introduced further error into the location of the same checkpoint, so that the flight path passed within 5 nautical miles of the border, rather than 16 nautical miles as intended. USAFE issued instructions to correct these technical errors.³⁵

To ascertain that no further border violations occurred, USAREUR proposed to remove aerial surveillance flight paths further from the border and establish checkpoints on fixed navigational aids to reduce the possibility of pilot error. While these changes would cause some loss of coverage of Soviet Bloc countries and a resultant decrease in intelligence

³⁴(1) DF, DCSOPS to CofS, 13 Jan 66, subj: Investigation of Overflight of Austria by an OV-1 (MOHAWK) Aircraft on 8 November 1965 (S), w/incls. AEAGC-A. (2) Cable SX-1468, CINCUSAREUR to Seventh Army, 31 Jan 66. Both SECRET. Gp-4.

³⁵DF, DCSOPS to CofS, 25 Feb 66, subj: "OH MY" Report (U), w/incls. AEAGC-A. SECRET. Gp-4.

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collection, USAREUR considered that there was an overriding need for maintaining positive control of aircraft in the border area.³⁶

USCINCEUR and the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the routes that USAREUR proposed and authorized the resumption of flights, provided that all surveillance flights were subject to compulsory radar monitoring and that the pilots responded to vectoring instructions from ground control elements.³⁷

In addition, Seventh Army initiated a special report whereby any individual or agency noting any irregularity, error, or violation in the border area would bring the matter to its attention within eight hours.³⁸

In the ensuing months USAREUR and Seventh Army prepared new instructions for border surveillance flights, and USAFE's 86th Air Division realigned and recalibrated its ground control radars to permit accurate control of aircraft flying the new SLAR routes. On 1 July an aircraft of the U.S. Army Security Agency, Europe (USASAE), equipped with a doppler navigational system began flights to check the new radar control network and gather data for its final calibration.³⁹

By 20 July the 86th Air Division had completed its final calibrations, and on 26 July the Federal Aviation Agency advised USAREUR that its flight checks had found the Air

³⁶ Cable SX-2044, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 2 Mar 66. SECRET. Gp-4.

³⁷ (1) Cable JCS-6189, JCS to USCINCEUR, 16 Mar 66. (2) Cable ECJCO-05021, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 21 Mar 66. Both CONF. Gp-4.

³⁸ Cable 13831, Seventh Army to distr, 8 Mar 66. UNCLAS.

³⁹ (1) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to 86th Air Div, 28 Jun 66, subj: Accuracy of Positive Radar Control Flight Vectoring (U). (2) DF, DCSOPS to CofS, 2 Jul 66, subj: SLAR Missions (U). Both AEAGC-A. CONF. Gp-4.

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Force navigational aids satisfactory for navigation at flight levels between approximately 13,000 and 19,000 feet above mean sea level. After the resolution of some minor communications problems involving the links between Seventh Army aircraft and 86th Air Division ground control operators, Seventh Army resumed SLAR flights on 17 August.⁴⁰

The greatly improved radar control and realignment of the flight routes combined to make border violations virtually impossible. However, as a final precaution USAREUR had directed that, upon detecting any conflict between the navigational aids and the vectoring instructions of ground control radar operators, pilots were to abort their missions immediately.⁴¹

Early in November the Schweinfurt nondirectional radio beacon temporarily suspended operations because a Polish radio station jammed the beacon frequency, thereby making it unreliable. Of 60 SLAR missions scheduled for November USAREUR was able to complete only 3. It canceled all further SLAR flights in 1966 because of the inoperative beacon. F.R.G. aviation safety authorities initiated action to obtain a change in frequency for the beacon, but it was not until 10 January 1967 that USAREUR was able to resume SLAR missions.⁴²

b. Berlin. In October USCOB proposed that Army O-1 light aircraft conduct aerial photographic missions in support of intelligence collection operations in the Berlin area instead of the USAFE T-29 aircraft that were currently in use. The O-1's slower airspeed would give the photographer more time to adjust, aim, and shoot the camera and would permit the use of high-resolution telephoto lenses. It would also be more responsive to Army needs since USAFE aircraft were sometimes not available because of other priority requirements.

⁴⁰
(1) Cable 21941, Seventh Army to CINCUSAREUR, 4 Aug 66.
(2) Cable SX-4579, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 5 Aug 66. Both SECRET. (3) Cable SX-4720, same to 86th Air Div, 15 Aug 66. CONF. (4) Cable SX-4744, same to Seventh Army, 16 Aug 66. SECRET. All Gp-4.

⁴¹
Cable SX-4510, CINCUSAREUR to Seventh Army, 1 Aug 66. SECRET. Gp-4.

⁴²
Cables SX-6630 and 1727, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 9 Dec 66 and 11 Feb 67. Both SECRET (info used CONF). NOFORN. Gp-3.

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The O-1 aircraft had been flying in the Berlin Control Zone for over one year, both to familiarize pilots with the area and to accustom Communist elements to the new aircraft. There would be no changes in flight patterns, since the U.S. Army, Berlin, had established the original flight routes with the photo reconnaissance mission in view. Accordingly, it seemed unlikely that the Soviets or East Germans would realize that the flights involved photographic missions.

The O-1 aircraft were to obtain large-scale, high-resolution oblique aerial photographs of Soviet and East German installations, facilities, equipment, training activities, and troop movements within the 20-mile radius of the Berlin Control Zone. Such photographic coverage would be highly desirable also because it would permit analysis of the characteristics of certain specific items of equipment that were in use in Vietnam. The potential value of expanded intelligence collections in the Berlin area more than compensated for the minimal risk of Communist detection and reaction. With the concurrence of the U.S. Embassy, USAREUR therefore approved the USCOB proposal.⁴³

39. (S) Withdrawal of French Border Surveillance Element

In 1959 the French Forces in Germany had offered a cavalry platoon to augment the U.S. Army forces performing peacetime border surveillance missions along the F.R.G. border. USAREUR had accepted the offer, and in January 1960 a French platoon had begun to assist in the surveillance of the southern sector of the Czech-F.R.G. border.

Presumably as a result of the French Government's decision to withdraw its armed forces from the NATO military alliance, on 4 July 1966 the French Forces headquarters in Germany advised USAREUR that it wanted to terminate its participation in border surveillance. At that time the French platoon was attached to the 2d Squadron, 9th Cavalry of the 24th Division.

⁴³(1) DF, USAREUR DCSI to CofS, 10 Oct 66, subj: Aerial Photography (U). AEAGB-C(GO). (2) Cables SX-5945 and SX-6132, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 28 Oct and 9 Nov 66. Both NOFORN. All SECRET. Gp-3. (3) Cable SC-46972, CINCUSAREUR to USCOB, 17 Oct 66. UNCLAS.

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With the concurrence of USCINCEUR, USAREUR accepted the proposed French termination date of 15 July; the 9th Cavalry assumed responsibility for the sector vacated by the French.⁴⁴

40. (C) The Military Liaison Missions

a. Statistical Summary. During 1966 the U.S. Military Liaison Mission (USMLM) to the Commander in Chief, GSFG, conducted 525 tours in East Germany. There were 100 instances of East German police (VOPO's) following USMLM tour vehicles and 6 detentions for actual or alleged violations of restricted areas or traffic laws. By comparison, during 1965 the USMLM conducted 406 tours and experienced 49 VOPO surveillances and 23 detentions.⁴⁵

In the period from 16 December 1965 to 15 December 1966 the Soviet Military Liaison Mission toured at an average rate of 39 tour-days (354 tour-hours) per month, a slight increase over the previous year's average of 37 tour-days (330 tour-hours). In the course of their touring the mission personnel committed 8 confirmed and 2 probable violations of restricted areas, but there was no indication of clandestine SMLM activity. However, Soviet emphasis on collecting order-of-battle information on USAREUR forces did not seem to have diminished.⁴⁶

b. A USMLM Incident. As suggested by the above statistics, the USMLM experienced less harassment in 1966 than in the previous year. The only incident of any seriousness occurred on 18 March, when a USMLM tour visited a Soviet training area in East Germany. The training area was not within a permanently restricted zone, and when Soviet guards attempted to detain the tour vehicle, its driver backed up in order to leave. At that point a Soviet noncommissioned

⁴⁴(1) Cable SX-4166, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 11 Jul 66. NOFORN, except France. (2) Cable ECJC-P-10540, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 19 Jul 66. NOFORN. (3) Intvw, Mr. Siemon with LTC Kessinger, 8 Nov 66. All SECRET. Gp-4.

⁴⁵Info from USAREUR Intel Div Col Br Gen Ops Sec files. CONF. Gp-3.

⁴⁶Info from USAREUR ODCSI Rept, 11 Jan 67, subj: Monthly Intelligence Appraisal, p. 11. GB 17-0001. SECRET (info used CONF). NOFORN. Gp-1.

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officer fired a warning burst from his automatic weapon, and the vehicle remained in place. The Soviets detained it for approximately 4 1/2 hours.⁴⁷

At the time of the incident USAREUR intended to reopen the question of the accreditation of Air Force LTC S. H. Swenson and to remind the Soviets of the unpaid bill for damage done at the USMLM facility in Potsdam during the June 1965 riot.⁴⁸ USAREUR also wanted to discuss some SMLM violations of restricted areas in the Federal Republic of Germany and an automobile accident.

Accordingly, in an attempt to resolve these outstanding matters and at the same time to protest the shooting incident of 18 March, the USAREUR Chief of Staff asked the Chief, SMLM, to visit him on 8 April. The Soviet general promised to refer to his headquarters the questions of the shooting incident, the accreditation of LTC Swenson, and the payment for the riot damage. He also promised to investigate the alleged violations of restricted areas and to inform USAREUR of his findings. Concerning the automobile accident, he stated that he had been in the vehicle and that he had left the scene without waiting for the arrival of the U.S. military police because he did not understand German and had not realized that the German police had summoned U.S. authorities. He suggested the joint U.S./Soviet investigation of similar incidents in the future to permit rapid clarification and settlement of any questions.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ Info from USAREUR Intel Div Col Br Gen Ops Sec files.
CONF. Gp-3.

⁴⁸ For details see USAREUR Anl Hist Sum, 1965, pp. 167 - 173.
TS (info used CONF. Gp-3).

⁴⁹ (1) DF, DCSI to CofS, 13 Mar 66, subj: Reaccreditation of Lieutenant Colonel Swenson, USAFE. (2) DF, same to same, 4 Apr 66, subj: Protests to Soviets (U). Both AEAGB-C(GO). CONF. Gp-3. (3) DF, C/Scty Br to DCSI, 9 Apr 66, subj: Report of Meeting of Chief, Soviet Military Liaison Mission-Frankfurt with Chief of Staff, 8 Apr 66. AEAGB-S(CE/S). FOUO. (4) Intvw, Mr. Siemon with 1LT S. Silva, USAREUR Intel Div, 14 Jun 66. Both UNCLAS.

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On 22 April the Soviets replied that the 18 March incident had resulted from illegal acts of USMLM personnel and that thorough investigation had shown the allegations against LTC Swenson to be true; he would therefore not receive reaccreditation.⁵⁰ Since LTC Swenson was to leave Europe in June, USAREUR did not pursue the question of his accreditation. Despite occasional reminders to the GSFG on the other three matters, USAREUR did not receive any favorable reply from the Soviets during 1966.⁵¹

c. A Soviet MLM Incident. Late in April an SMLM vehicle caused a serious incident in Bavaria. On 29 April German police observed the car parked near a U.S. Army installation at Murnau and approached it to ascertain the identity of its occupants. The driver ignored the policeman's request and left the scene at high speed, driving part of the way on the sidewalk and running through a red traffic light. During the police pursuit through several towns, the SMLM vehicle struck a German civilian automobile while attempting to overtake it in a no-passing zone. It then continued its flight until the German police finally stopped it. U.S. military police called by the German police arrived approximately two hours later. The occupants of the Soviet vehicle denied any involvement in an accident despite the damage to their automobile that military police estimated at \$120. The Soviets claimed, however, that the German police had fired upon them during the chase and had threatened them with weapons after their detention.

On the following day the Chief, SMLM, presented a formal protest to the USAREUR Chief of Staff who replied that the Soviet tour officer had caused the incident and that the German policemen had been within their rights in pursuing a fleeing vehicle that had violated a number of traffic laws. There were no further developments in 1966.⁵²

⁵⁰ Cable SX-3116, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 28 Apr 66. CONF. Gp-3.

⁵¹ Intvws, Mr. Siemon with 2LT N.J. Burke, USAREUR ODCSI, 17 Nov 66 and 15 Feb 67. Both CONF. Gp-3.

⁵² (1) Cable SX-3237, CINCUSAREUR to DA et al., 6 May 66.
(2) Intvws, Mr. Siemon with 2LT's Silva and Burke, 14 Jun 66 and 14 Feb 67. Both CONF. Gp-1.

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41. (S) Proposed Exchange of Military Observers

In 1965 Soviet Marshal A. A. Grechko, the First Deputy Minister of Defense, had proposed informally that U.S. and Soviet military observers attend the exercises of each other's forces. USCINCEUR had suggested that CINCUSAREUR might discuss the question at some future date with his GSFG counterpart, but no further developments had taken place before the end of the year.⁵³

In January the F.R.G. Government expressed its opposition to any exchange of U.S. and Soviet military observers on German territory, adding that it would not object to discussion of the subject in the North Atlantic Council.⁵⁴ The U.S. Ambassador reported that the German opposition stemmed from the consideration that an exchange of observers at NATO and Warsaw Pact maneuvers might equate the Warsaw Pact to NATO, thereby strengthening the claims of the East German regime--a member of the Warsaw Pact--to recognition as a sovereign state. The State Department thereupon decided to discuss the possibility of a bilateral U.S. and Soviet exchange to involve only the territory and troops of the two countries themselves. The U.S. Permanent Representative introduced the question to the North Atlantic Council, and the following discussion revealed general support for the principle. The F.R.G. Government, however, continued to emphasize that, although bilateral exchanges between individual NATO and Warsaw Pact nations on their own national territories would be acceptable, it opposed NATO-Warsaw Pact level exchanges.⁵⁵

The political question within NATO remained unresolved, when in April the Soviets unexpectedly reversed their stand. Soviet officials in Moscow told the U.S. Army attache that,

⁵³USAREUR Anl Hist Sum, 1965, pp. 165 - 167. TS (info used SECRET. Gp-3).

⁵⁴(1) Memo, U.S. Emb LO to CINCUSAREUR, 29 Jan 66, subj: Political Briefs (U). P01-30. Gp-1. (2) Cable BNN-403, AMEMB Bonn to CINCUSAFE and CINCUSAREUR, 31 Jan 66. Gp-3. Both SECRET.

⁵⁵(1) Memos, US Emb LO to CINCUSAREUR, 3, 10, and 15 Feb 66, subj: Political Briefs (U). ABAPO. (2) Cable 2608, AMEMB Bonn to Secy State, 26 Feb 66. All SECRET. Gp-1.

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because of the worsening situation in Vietnam, Marshal Grechko had concluded that it was neither desirable nor possible to discuss observer exchanges.⁵⁶

42. (C) USAREUR Defectors

As in the past, certain American soldiers thought they could find the answer to their personal difficulties by fleeing to Communist-controlled countries. During 1966 USAREUR listed four defectors--all native-born Americans. None of them had any security clearance.

a. PVT Billy Rein. In August 1965 Rein had gone AWOL from his unit while awaiting action for elimination from the service. Through a chance mail intercept USAREUR had learned in December that Rein might be in East Germany, and on 30 December the Soviet External Relations Branch (SERB) had indicated that he had requested political asylum in East Germany and did not wish a confrontation with U.S. authorities. On 5 January 1966 USAREUR officially declared him a defector.⁵⁷

Subsequent investigation revealed a history of personal instability. At different times Rein had told members of his unit that he was born in Russia and his parents were both still officers in the Soviet Armed Forces; he was of Czech origin, born in the United States, but had returned to Czechoslovakia during World War II and had fled after the Communist takeover with his parents; he was of German birth and had served in the East German Army; he had defected from Hungary after the 1956 uprising; he spoke fluent German and Russian; his religion was Zoroastrianism; and other equally fanciful tales. He came from a broken home, and his mother was reportedly highly unstable and under medical care for extreme nervousness.

No further information of significance became available, and Rein remained in East Germany during 1966.⁵⁸

⁵⁶ Cable SX-3201, CINCUSAREUR to Std Brief Adrs, 4 May 66. SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-1.

⁵⁷ Intvw, Mr. Siemon with Mr. G. M. Johnson, USAREUR Intel Div, 8 Jun 66. CONF. Gp-1.

⁵⁸ Invws, Mr. Siemon with Mr. Johnson, 8 Nov 66 and 14 Feb 67. Both CONF. Gp-1.

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b. PFC R. A. Balch. On 21 March Balch absented himself from his unit without authorization. His commanding officer stated that he knew of no personal problems that might have caused the man to leave his unit. On 9 May, however, Balch's parents in the United States received a letter from him in which he stated that, because the Army had blocked his attempts to marry his German girlfriend, he had fled to East Germany and requested political asylum.

At USAEUR's direction the USMLM requested information on Balch's status. On 27 May SERB confirmed that Balch was in East Germany and stated that he did not wish a confrontation with U.S. military authorities.

Subsequent investigation revealed that Balch had a background of instability and a juvenile delinquency record. He came from a broken home and had spent time in juvenile detention homes; his mother allegedly had psychopathic personality traits.

As of 31 December Balch was still in East Germany and U.S. authorities had not had a confrontation with him.⁵⁹

c. PVT L. J. Brenner. While on restriction and awaiting board action for involuntary separation from the Army, Brenner stole a jeep on 29 April and absented himself from his unit. In a note addressed to an officer in his unit, Brenner stated that he was leaving in the hope finding what he was looking for, but without stating where he planned to go. Military police found the stolen jeep approximately 11 kilometers from the East German border, and USAEUR heard nothing further about Brenner until he surrendered to another U.S. Army unit on 20 May. When U.S. intelligence representatives interrogated him, Brenner stated that he had driven the jeep toward the border until the vehicle became stuck and had then proceeded on foot. After arriving at the border he waited until daylight and then crossed into East Germany. East German border guards took him into custody and held him for the rest of the day and overnight at an unidentified military installation in the vicinity of the border. On the next day they transferred Brenner to East Berlin and lodged him in a house for Bundeswehr defectors. When questioned about his unit, Brenner revealed some routine order-of-battle and chain-of-command information. His East

⁵⁹ Ibid. CONF. Gp-1.

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German interrogators then gave Brenner three documents to sign: A statement to the effect that he did not wish a confrontation with U.S. personnel; a receipt for 100 Marks given by the East German "government" for "personal reasons;" and a request for East German citizenship. Brenner signed all three but added to the citizenship request that he had not made up his mind.

While in the East German facility, Brenner shared a room with another USAREUR defector, PVT D. M. Jones. After approximately two weeks Brenner requested his release. East German officials offered to release him into West Berlin, but Brenner declined because he had not yet decided to return to U.S. control.

On 18 May East German officials conducted Brenner and Jones, who had also decided to return, to the F.R.G. border near Goettingen. The East Germans furnished them with bus and train schedules and showed them a map of the area so they could orient themselves. On the following day Brenner surrendered to a U.S. Army unit near Hanau.

Subsequent interrogation and a number of polygraph examinations indicated no deception in the story Brenner told. The polygraph also confirmed he was not approached by East German authorities for an intelligence mission and did not volunteer his services.

Brenner was subsequently charged with AWOL, sentenced by a court martial to 30 days' detention, and eliminated from the service under the provisions of AR 635-208.⁶⁰

d. PVT D. M. Jones. More nearly than the others, Jones represented a typical defector, having a long record of punishments under Article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice and trials by courts martial. He absented himself from his unit without authority on 28 April and returned to U.S. control on 26 May. A court martial tried and sentenced Jones to six months of detention for absenting himself from his unit.⁶¹ He also was

⁶⁰ (1) Intvw, Mr. Siemon with Mr. Johnson, 8 Nov 66. (2) 54th Engr Bn SO 151, 13 Jul 66. Both UNCLAS.

⁶¹ Neither Jones nor Brenner was tried for defection because there is no such offense in military law; the option was between charges of AWOL or of desertion, and the conditions for desertion were not present in these two cases. UNCLAS.

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eliminated from the service under the provisions of AR 635-208.⁶²

43. (C) Communications Security

By far the most serious problem in communications security has traditionally been the discussion of classified matters on insecure communications circuits--most notably the telephone. In most cases, such security violations would warrant disciplinary action, but in the past commanders were reluctant to use evidence secured by monitoring communications because it might not be legally admissible.

In September, however, the Department of the Army announced a legal decision of far-reaching significance for the program to detect and punish communications security violations. Based on two decisions of the U.S. Court of Military Appeals,⁶³ the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the service departments, the National Security Agency (NSA), and the Defense Communications Agency (DCA) developed a coordinated legal opinion holding that the Federal Communications Act was not applicable to communications confined to a military telephone system--even if the system could be connected to a regular commercial one--or to communications made and completed within the boundaries of foreign countries.

Accordingly, the Department of the Army authorized the monitoring of telephone conversations between two military telephones, adding that any evidence thus obtained was admissible for disciplinary action. This broad decision enabled USAREUR to increase monitoring in an effort to reduce communications security violations.⁶⁴

⁶²(1) Intvws, Mr. Siemon with Mr. Johnson, 8 Jun and 8 Nov 66.
(2) 3d Armd Div SO 185, 1 Aug 66. Both UNCLAS.

⁶³U.S. vs Noce, 5 USCMA 715, 10 CMR 11; and U.S. vs Gopaulsingh, 5 USCMA 772, CMR 68. UNCLAS.

⁶⁴(1) Ltr, DA to distr, 9 Sep 66, subj: Individual Admonitory and Disciplinary Actions in COMSEC Violations (U). AGAM-P (M) (2 Sep 66) ACSI-ISSS. (2) Intvw, Mr. Siemon with LTC S. J. Weinberg, Intel Div, 2 Nov 66. Both CONF. Gp-4.

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44. (U) Personnel Security Investigations (PSI's)

A USAREUR study, conducted in the summer of 1966 to reduce the delay between the requesting of an investigation and the final granting of security clearance authority, confirmed that much of the time lag was attributable to the administrative processing of requests through command channels. The study also revealed that approximately 95 percent of the investigative effort required to meet USAREUR's PSI requests was expended in the United States.

Accordingly, on 28 September USAREUR and the U.S. Army Intelligence Command (USAINTC) concluded an agreement that authorized 18 major USAREUR units to submit requests for background investigations directly to the USAINTC investigations control office at Fort Holabird, Maryland. In return, USAREUR agreed to answer at least 80 percent of the investigation requests received from the United States within 20 days of receipt.

These mutually supporting arrangements became effective on 1 November 1966. The Department of the Army directed that the U.S. Army, Pacific, introduce a comparable program.⁶⁵

45. (C) Anti-American Demonstrations

a. Easter Demonstrations. For several years the F.R.G. pacifist organization known as the Easter Marchers had conducted annual marches and demonstrations for peace during the Easter season. Preparations for the 1966 marches had begun in late 1965, and the first quarter of the year saw a number of preliminary marches and demonstrations to solicit public support for the movement. As in 1965--and in contrast to the years before that--the demonstrations concentrated on attacking U.S. policy in Vietnam rather than upon general pacifist themes. A similar pattern was prevalent in France and Italy, where Communist and non-Communist elements conducted a large number of meetings and demonstrations to attack U.S. Vietnam policies during the first three months of 1966. In a few instances USAREUR installations in France were the scene of demonstrations, but none of these was large and there were no incidents.⁶⁶

⁶⁵Incl to DF, ODCSI to ODCSOPS, 27 Jan 67, cited above.
SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

⁶⁶USAREUR Qtrly U.S. CI Rept for SACEUR, 13 Apr 66, pp. 16 - 19. AEAGB-PDN(SPA). CONF. Gp-3.

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On the Easter weekend of 9 - 11 April approximately 10,000 persons participated in marches along 13 routes through the Federal Republic, and some 25,000 attended the rallies and demonstrations held along the way. The attacks on U.S. policy in Vietnam were even more pronounced than they had been in 1965, and a major secondary theme was the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in Europe. The marches did not directly involve any USAREUR installations, and the sponsoring organization was not Communist dominated. Nevertheless, USAREUR considered the Easter March movement a significant potential threat because of its size--approximately 100,000 members--its appeal to legitimate non-Communist pacifists, and the similarity between its targets of attack and those of the Communist propaganda effort.⁶⁷

b. The Fourth of July Demonstrations. Over the Fourth of July weekend a number of F.R.G. pacifist organizations engaged in protest demonstrations against U.S. policies in Vietnam. The three most prominent organizations were the Easter Marchers, the War Resisters' International, and the Socialist Students' League. While all three included Communist sympathizers at lower levels, the absence of Communist influence at higher levels led USAREUR to conclude that none of the organizations was an actual Communist front.

U.S. Consulates were the main targets of the demonstrations. However, only two were of significant size: A crowd of 1,000 assembled at the Hamburg Consulate, and approximately 700 demonstrated at the Munich Consulate. Both crowds became unruly, and police intervened. A small group of 25 to 30 conducted an orderly demonstration at the Frankfurt Consulate, but a planned protest march in Stuttgart did not take place.

Pacifist activities at USAREUR installations were limited: In Nuernberg 22 demonstrators marched with placards in front of the U.S. Army transient hotel; a pacifist attempt to present a protest letter to Army authorities in Kassel failed; demonstrators established an information booth in the vicinity of a barracks complex in Hanau; others attempted to distribute leaflets in the U.S. housing area at Kaiserslautern, but German police deterred them; and in West Berlin a small pacifist group demonstrated before the U.S. headquarters and attempted to distribute leaflets in the U.S. housing area.

The most significant aspect of the 4 July manifestations, however, was an English-language leaflet urging U.S. military personnel to defect (Figure 1). West German police confiscated

⁶⁷ Rept, subj: Easter Marches--Anti-U.S. Demonstrations in West Germany (U). AEAGB-PDN(SPA). CONF. Gp-3.

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To American soldiers in Europe

You could not have been in Europe long without discovering how widespread is criticism of the American war in Vietnam, and you may have discovered how false is much of the information in the American press and from the American government.

We are asking you to consider what action you can take to end this war. We know that you are in an extremely difficult position and that it is easy for us to talk. We only ask you after weighing up all the possible consequences, to consider what you can do.

During the Algerian war thousands of young French conscripts demonstrated against the war and helped in some measure to end it. They demonstrated openly in the streets, and some even sat down in front of the trains taking them to Marseilles for embarkation. Some deserted rather than take part in what they considered an unjust war; others voluntarily gave themselves up and went to prison as conscientious objectors. What can you consider?

(1) Making clear your objection to the Vietnam war by petitioning and writing letters to superior officers, President Johnson, senators, congressmen etc.

(2) Staging protests within the barracks or taking part in public demonstrations.

(3) Holding a token walk-out of the barracks or some other action of this kind.

(4) Registering as a conscientious objector. Did you know that American law provides for conscientious objection to the war? That even men in the army can get out if they firmly maintain their views? That at least 300 men have received discharges because they can no longer honestly support war?

(5) Defecting, either singly or in groups. This action would have very serious consequences, such as the imprisonment of those involved. We do not ask you to undertake it lightly without considering exactly what might happen. But we hope you will consider it. It could have a



"We are a very peculiar people. We should be proud of what we are doing there, in applying an unlimited military power in pursuit of a limited political objective."

— Secretary of State R. McNamara

VIETNAM

32 million inhabitants (15.7 in the South, 16.5 in the North)

70-80% Buddhists, 7% Catholics

Both parts are underdeveloped, predominantly agricultural, with a low average life expectancy — in the South no more than 35 years; a rapidly growing population — 2.8% per year.

THE WAR

1947 The war starts (Indo-Chinese War) — resistance against foreign occupation

1949 French compelled to proclaim Vietnam an independent state under Bao Dai

1954 Dien Bien Phu Battle. The Geneva Conference — the Agreement demands general election before 1956, prohibition of introduction of foreign troops and arms, etc.

1955 Bao Dai deposed and Diem becomes President

1960 National Liberation Front comes into being

1963 Buddhist opposition to Diem's regime and its fall

1964 Gulf of Tonkin incident

1965 America starts regular bombing of North Vietnam

1966 Internal opposition against the war increases.

powerful effect in building up pressure against the war.

Your action could help to end a terrible war and save Vietnamese and American lives. It is quite wrong to suppose that only "communists" are against the American policy in Vietnam. Many religious and other organisations have opposed it. The War Resisters' International, which publishes this leaflet, has opposed all wars since 1921, many of its members have been imprisoned for their beliefs and have taken action against both Soviet and Western military policies.

The Nuremberg Judgment places on you the duty to decide whether a war is right or wrong. Every day innocent lives are being lost in Vietnam. Will you consider taking some action that could help to end this bloodshed? Any of the following organisations will be pleased to give you advice and help:

WAR RESISTERS' INTERNATIONAL

88 Park Avenue, Enfield, Middlesex, England

PEACE PLEDGE UNION

6 Endleigh Street, London, W.C.1, England

COMMITTEE OF 100

13 Goodwin Street, London N.4, England

PEACE NEWS

5 Caledonian Road, N.1, England

VERBAND DER KRIEGSDIENSTVERWEIGERER

Burharweg 161, 605 Offenbach, Main 4, Germany

INTERNATIONALE DER KRIEGSDIENSTGEGNER

Bornstrasse 6/11, Hamburg 13, Germany

ALGEMENE NEDERLANDSE VREDE ACTIE

Post Box 185, Amsterdam, Netherlands

MOVIMENTO NONVIOLENTO PER LA PACE

Castella posta e 231, Perugia, Italy

WAR RESISTERS' LEAGUE

Room 1225, 5 Beaman Street, New York 38, N.Y.

U.S.A.

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approximately 500 copies of the leaflet in Stuttgart before distribution could begin and stopped their dissemination in Karlsruhe after approximately 20 to 30 leaflets had been issued. Although the attempted distribution was no threat to the command, USAREUR considered it significant because it was the first known instance of a direct attempt to urge U.S. military personnel in Europe to defect.

In France and Italy the Communist Parties, Communist front groups, and non-Communist pacifist elements conducted similar protest actions without effect on USAREUR installations.

c. Anti-War Day. As in past years, F.R.G. pacifist elements celebrated the 1 September anniversary of the outbreak of World War II as "Anti-War Day." As in the case of the 4 July demonstrations, non-Communist elements of the peace movement, together with the Trade Unions Federation, sponsored meetings and demonstrations throughout the Federal Republic. The U.S. activities in Vietnam were again the main target of these propaganda attacks.⁶⁸

d. December Vietnam Demonstrations. On 10 December, the United Nations' "Day of Human Rights," a number of anti-American demonstrations took place in Europe. The largest was in Paris, where some 3,000 to 4,000 persons attended a mass meeting sponsored by the French Communist Party to protest U.S. actions in Vietnam. There were no significant incidents and no arrests.

In West Berlin approximately 1,000 participated in a march organized by the local chapter of the Easter March organization. The initial demonstration was quiet and orderly, except that police interfered when a small group of participants attempted to deviate from the approved route at the beginning of the march. After the march and closing speeches, however, approximately 200 demonstrators remained in the area and attempted to engage passers-by in discussion and from time to time started in the direction of the Amerika Haus. Police detained approximately 60 persons and succeeded in dispersing the crowd about 3 1/2 hours after the initial demonstrations had ended.⁶⁹

⁶⁸(1) USAREUR Qtrly U.S. CI Rept for SACEUR, 15 Oct 66, pp. 19 - 25. AEAGB-PDN(SPA). (2) Intvw, Mr. Siemon with Mr. R. R. Eland, USAREUR Intel Div, 21 Nov 66. Both CONF. Gp-3.

⁶⁹(1) Cable C-BLN-0524-66, Berlin Sta 513th MI Gp to USAREUR DCSI, 13 Dec 66. (2) Cables IO/COB-551-66, 553-66, and 555-66, USCOB to Std Berlin SITREF Adrs, 9 and 10 Dec 66. All CONF. Gp-3.

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The Easter March organization and affiliated pacifist groups sponsored minor demonstrations in 15 to 20 West German cities on the same date. All were small and uneventful.⁷⁰

⁷⁰Intvw, Mr. Siemon with Mr. W. Kovalecz, USAREUR ODCSI,
15 Dec 66. CONF. Gp-4.

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Chapter 7

Fast Relocation of the Line of Communications (FRELOC)

46. (TS) Background

In the spring of 1965 the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) had begun to prepare an emergency plan for the possibility of an early withdrawal of U.S. forces from France. The President of the Republic of France had indicated that by 1969 no foreign troops or military installation not under French command would be on French soil, and it was likely that he would give his intentions practical application if reelected. The so-called EULOC study, published by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in July 1965, evaluated alternative logistic support bases; covered the problems associated with moving all U.S. units, facilities, and materiel from France; and analyzed the several possible relocation sites in Western Europe or the United Kingdom (U.K.).

Like USAREUR in its supporting study,¹ the Joint Chiefs of Staff had emphasized the critical importance of France as a logistic support base. Although an effective defense of Europe without France was a military possibility, the absence of the security and depth afforded by French national territory would make such a defense more difficult, uncertain, and hazardous. The immense value of France--as it related to the defense of Europe--might even require the military use of French terrain in wartime, regardless of political decisions or ante bellum agreements on reentry rights. USEUCOM had commented that not one of the alternates to a French line of communications (LOC) could improve the U.S. or NATO strategic position, regardless of the amount of funds or effort expended. Therefore, to avoid, delay, or restrict a withdrawal from France would best serve the U.S. and NATO

¹USAREUR Anl Hist Sum, 1965, p. 55. TS. Gp-1.

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interests. Even more important would be the application of measures designed to guarantee the continuation of current U.S. rights.²

In December 1965 the French had narrowly but conclusively reelected Charles de Gaulle as their president for another 7-year term. On 29 March 1966 the French Government informed the representatives of the United States, Great Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany (F.R.G.), and Italy that it would withdraw all French forces from NATO military commands by 1 July, that NATO military headquarters would have to leave France by 31 March 1967, and that the United States would have to vacate its bases and remove its personnel and materiel by 1 April 1967.³

47. (S) Basic Planning

a. The JCS Steering Group. In April the Joint Chiefs of Staff announced the formation of a steering group--with the JCS Director of Logistics as chairman and composed of representatives of the Joint Staff, the services, and USEUCOM--to monitor the preparation of a detailed plan for the establishment and operation of a U.K.-BENELUX-F.R.G. LOC and depot system. USEUCOM would prepare the Phase I--the period to 31 March 1967--plans, and the steering group, in collaboration with USEUCOM, would be responsible for preparing an outline plan for the second phase.

The planners were to take into account the need for a peacetime support system capable of rapid expansion in an emergency and thus provide credible evidence to all other NATO nations of U.S. logistic capability to support forces for sustained combat. Planners were also to consider the impact of LOC relocation on the cooperative logistics program (particularly the joint U.S.-F.R.G. Combat Logistics Support System planning accomplished in the last three years); the competition for land, facilities, and transportation resources in the BENELUX area and the need for a NATO agency to establish priorities and allocations for these resources; the vulnerability of the ports of Antwerp, Amsterdam, and Rotterdam to bombing and missile attacks and the attendant need for offshore loading and possible over-the-beach operations; the need for an in-transit depot relatively near the port of Antwerp to clear and sort materiel before its on-shipment; the provision for the receipt, storage, and issue of the TOE equipment of those units that could arrive at the BENELUX water and air landing facilities, and the mating of troops and equipment; and the adequacy of BENELUX aerial

²USEUCOM Anl Hist Rept, 1965, pp. 1 - 5. TS. Gp-1.

³USACOMZEU Semiannual Hist Rept, 1 Jan - 30 Jun 66, pp. 47 - 48.
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facilities in wartime and the possible need for new airfield construction. For Phase I implementation, planners were to consider the logistic and transportation system improvements that the services had already made. For Phase II, planners were to take into account the improvements the services intended to implement in the next two or three years, such as the use of an aerial port with backup facilities.

The plan for the depot supply and maintenance system was to take into consideration the prepositioned storage of war reserve materiel at a level to support the D plus 30 forces. Plans were also to include the use of the existing depot storage capacity in F.R.G. depots, and the new construction required to accommodate the storage, distribution, and issue mission in peace and war; the support of the Air Force units in the United Kingdom and the BENELUX countries without the need for backhauling from U.S. Army depots in Germany; the need for storing theater levels of prepositioned war reserves, with priority to those included in the Phase I relocation from France; and the depot level maintenance facilities required to perform the kind of maintenance authorized under emergency conditions, such as the rebuilding of parts, components, and assemblies, and the maintenance of end items.

Concerning petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL), Phase I planning was to give first priority to the interim storage of war reserve stocks in commercial, NATO, and national facilities in the Federal Republic of Germany, the BENELUX nations, and at the U.S. Air Force bases in those countries. However, if commercial, NATO, and national tankage proved to be unavailable, planners would have to consider the suitability and feasibility of employing other POL storage means. Phase II POL planning was to provide for a complete independence from the U.S. and NATO pipeline systems in France as an ultimate objective. Plans for a U.S. pipeline system across Belgium were to be in consonance with SHAPE plans for alternate pipeline facilities. The United States would have to make every effort to obtain common funding for new POL storage facilities.

Finally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff specified that U.S. representatives survey the areas considered in the BENELUX LOC plan and start technical consultations with NATO allies, particularly the host countries, as soon as the Secretary of Defense authorized these actions.⁴

⁴(1) Cables JCS-9070, 9173, and 1111, JCS to USCINCEUR, 21 and 23 Apr and 5 May 66. (2) Memo, DCSLOG to CofS, 28 Apr 66, subj: Highlights of 25-26 April Meeting at Headquarters USEUCOM with the FRELOC Steering Group: LTG Meyer, J-4 Joint Staff, Chairman; LTG Lincoln, DCSLOG DA; LTG Colglazier, Special Assistant to Chairman, JCS; LTG Bowen, Chief of Staff, USEUCOM; MG Helton, J-4, USEUCOM; and their staffs. AEAGD. Both SECRET. Gp-3.

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b. The USEUCOM Planning Directive. In the planning directive to its component commands, USEUCOM specified that the new LOC would have to provide the resources for the peace- and wartime logistic support of U.S. forces currently in Europe, and provide for the reception of the planned D plus 30 augmentation forces and their support through the first 60 days of combat. Although this objective would represent only an interim achievement--it did not satisfy the ultimate requirement for a 90-day level of war reserves at combat rates--the relocated logistic support system would have to be capable of rapid expansion in an emergency so as to guarantee sustained support in combat for these forces and augmentation forces arriving after D plus 30. USEUCOM emphasized the need for establishing the resources essential for the support of combat operations by 30 April 1967. Any resources not relocated by 31 March 1967 would have to leave France as soon as facilities became available.

Without France, the United States would use BENELUX and F.R.G. ports, airfields, and land lines to handle most resupply movements, unit deployments, and individual personnel replacements. In the BENELUX part of the LOC, the U.S. would exert its primary effort on developing a throughput capability--as distinguished from the static storage of reserve stock--and use only minimum fixed facilities. The United States would develop airport, seaport, and beach capabilities; transportation arrangements; and minimum in-transit storage facilities to support the D plus 30 forces. Stocks exceeding these requirements would be stored in the Federal Republic or, when necessary, in other locations, either afloat or ashore.

Phase II planning would include the actions required to restore the logistics capability lost as a result of the LOC relocation, and would take into account new logistic concepts and the worldwide resources programed for availability by FY 1970 or 1971.

USEUCOM then delineated the scope of the component commanders' planning submissions that were to be complete by 1 July.⁵

c. USAREUR's Comments and Proposals. In its first comments USAREUR doubted the possibility of moving its stocks from France by 31 March 1967 without additional construction. It had already recommended urgent action to authorize and fund the construction of ammunition storage facilities in the Saar area of Germany.

⁵Cable ECJD-P-06883, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR et al., 28 Apr 66. SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-4.

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Emphasizing that without adequate facilities it would be impossible to provide effective maintenance, storage, and stock control throughout the relocation period, USAREUR recalled its experience in establishing the French LOC--when it had to reposition stocks from Germany to France on a crash basis. It had taken more than ten years to make these repositioned stocks serviceable and to place them in proper storage.

USAREUR recommended locating all new construction in the Saar because Seventh Army provided a military shield and the terrain would serve as natural protection. USAREUR rejected the concept--favored by the Department of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff--that called for establishing depots astride the vulnerable main supply route (MSR) through the BENELUX countries because the construction of base-type facilities in this area would unnecessarily duplicate the kind of facilities recommended for development in the United Kingdom. USAREUR thought it highly probable that the facilities required for the reception, port discharge, and break-bulk operations of a throughput cargo concept might be available commercially or through U.S.-BENELUX agreements.

Another factor was the uncertainty that the Germans would consent to the waiver of current NATO ammunition criteria on quantity-distance standards. Although the Germans had been cooperative in approving minor exceptions to NATO criteria, they might object to an exception of the magnitude proposed as seriously jeopardizing the safety of the German population.⁶

To facilitate the relocation--while retaining the capability of supporting U.S. forces--the Department of the Army planned to move all vital reserves, project stocks, and peacetime operating supplies from USACOMZEUR facilities in France to U.S. depots and storage sites in other European countries. To this end USAREUR was to prepare a list of proposed actions, by priority, in two categories: Those feasible under USEUCOM or its own authority, and those requiring higher level approval. The planning assumptions were to relocate to the maximum extent through attrition; to give a low priority to the movement of excess and unserviceable stocks and reduce the tonnages of these stocks; and to hold military assistance program (MAP) items, including those in depots in Germany, until firm requirement data existed.⁷

⁶ Cable SX-2634, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 4 Apr 66. SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-4.

⁷ Cable DA-760774, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 16 Apr 66. CONF. Gp-4.

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In reply USAREUR stated that it had already reduced stocks by attrition, disposed of stocks not needed to support the JCS plan for relocation, stopped or curtailed construction in France, stopped shipments into French depots, filled TR-4 shortages in Leghorn from stocks in French storage facilities, and developed a concept of installing data processing equipment on rail cars to provide for an interim consolidation of Supply and Maintenance Agency (SAMA) operations at a static location somewhere in the Saar.

USAREUR submitted 59 Category I and 16 Category II proposals, both in three orders of priority. It estimated that to implement the proposed actions requiring Department of the Army funding would cost \$33.5 million, of which \$30.4 million would enter into the international balance of payments. This sum was the projected unfinanced requirement for funds needed to accomplish actions scheduled for the near future and for which the Department of State, the Department of the Army, USEUCOM, or USAREUR had implementation authority.⁸

The Department of the Army assumed that USAREUR would implement the 59 Category I proposals to the extent possible within its resources and in accordance with current guidance, authorizations, and existing agreements with host countries. The Department supported USAREUR's request for additional funds and either approved⁹ or took into immediate consideration the 16 Category II proposals.

d. Implementation of Category I Proposals. Based on these instructions, USAREUR directed USACOMZEUR to start implementing 39 of the 59 Category I proposals. Before implementing the others, USAREUR had to await fund allocations for 11 and the conclusion of U.S.-host nation negotiations for 8; the last one was a USEUCOM responsibility.¹⁰

USAREUR had previously started action on three of the Category I proposals requiring departmental funding. It had reduced stock levels by issuing as many supplies as possible from depots in France, drawing down current operating stocks, diverting

⁸ Cable SX-3030, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 23 Apr 66. SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-4.

⁹ Cable DA-763904, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 7 May 66. SECRET. Gp-4.

¹⁰ Cable SX-3384, CINCUSAREUR to USACOMZEUR, 16 May 66. CONF. Gp-4.

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shipments of unserviceable repairable assets to German depots, controlling levels of the stocks for commissaries, and reducing the slow-moving items to a zero balance through excessing action, issue to units in Germany, or transfer to depots in Germany and Italy. It had relocated ammunition stocks from France to Germany in accordance with revised expenditure rates and the capacity of German depots to receive additional ammunition without obtaining waivers to NATO quantity-distance standards. Finally, USAREUR had expedited the shipment of excesses stored in France.

Since the relocation of reserve stocks had been under way for some time, and USAREUR had expended 88 percent of its central supply activities (Budget Program 2200) funds at the end of April, it asked the Department of the Army to furnish \$1.5 million for the support of the program to the end of FY 1966. USAREUR also asked for \$1.3 million to move excess supplies, and the Department furnished the requested funds.¹¹

e. The JCS Reaction to USCINCEUR's Phase I Plan. On 1 July USAREUR submitted its contribution to USCINCEUR's Final Phase I Plan,¹² which went to the Joint Chiefs of Staff a few days later.¹³

In analyzing that plan the Joint Chiefs questioned the validity of the basic assumption that certain U.S. personnel, facilities, and stocks would remain in France after 1 April 1967.

¹¹(1) Cable SX-3437, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 19 May 66. SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-4. (2) Program and Funding Authorization Schedule, Advice 1120 and 1217, 12 May and 1 Jun 66, COA to CINCUSAREUR. In AEACO-B. (3) Intvw, Mr. J. E. Carlisle, USAREUR Ops Div Mil Hist Sec, with Mr. V. K. Buck, Compt Div, 24 Jun 66. Both UNCLAS.

¹²(1) USAREUR FRELOC - FINAL PHASE I PLAN, Relocation of Logistics (U), 1 Jul 66. (2) Incl 1 through 5 to ltr, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR et al., 8 Jul 66, subj: CHANGE 1 to USAREUR Final Phase I FRELOC Plan Draft (U) Revised, 1 Jul 66. Both SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-3.

¹³(1) Incl 1 through 5 to ltr, USCINCEUR to JCS et al., 6 Jul 66, subj: Relocation of Materiel and Personnel in the French LOC (U) (hereafter cited as USCINCEUR FRELOC Plan, Final Phase I), and Incl 1 to ltr, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 9 Jul 66, same subject. ECJD-PW. SECRET. (2) Incl 1 to ltr, USCINCEUR to JCS, 17 Aug 66, subj: USCINCEUR FRELOC Plan, Final Phase I (U). ICJD. CONF. Both NOFORN. Gp-3.

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The progressive hardening of the French Government's attitude seemed to indicate that it would not authorize a single U.S. soldier or a piece of U.S. equipment to remain on French soil after the deadline. The Joint Chiefs therefore asked for a supplementary plan for an accelerated withdrawal of all resources by 1 April 1967, which would take into consideration the legal, operational, logistic, and cost implications of such a near-term relocation.¹⁴ The accelerated withdrawal might require considerable augmentation personnel and a realignment of priorities for both personnel and materiel movement. These requirements might have a serious impact on worldwide commitments, especially the support of U.S. operations in Southeast Asia. Since the relocation of the bulk of the tonnages to either the United States or the United Kingdom would require transportation resources not available in Europe, the accelerated withdrawal might also lead to a revision of transportation needs to permit the timely execution of movement plans.

In addition, USCINCEUR was to identify the U.S. personnel and materiel resources in France, recommend alternate locations, and provide an estimate of the associated costs. The four major planning objectives were as follows:

- (1) To position 60 days' combat supplies for D plus 30 forces in the Federal Republic of Germany and in Italy, and to provide a peacetime line of communications capable of supporting the wartime requirements as of D plus 60, including the reception and onward movement of the programed post-D-day augmentation forces and the provision of replacement personnel and medical services;
- (2) To position peacetime support activities, units, and functions in support of the first objective;
- (3) To position in the United Kingdom and the BENELUX countries 30 days' combat support for the D plus 30 forces; and
- (4) To relocate residual personnel and materiel remaining in France after 1 April 1967.

The Joint Chiefs indicated their preferred courses of action under each of these four major objectives, except for the plans related to the establishment of an Army logistic base in the

¹⁴(1) JCS Memo SM-621-66 to USCINCEUR, 2 Aug 66, subj: Near-Term Relocation of Materiel and Personnel in the French LOC (U).
(2) Cables JCS-8377 and 9425, JCS to USCINCEUR, 4 and 18 Aug 66. Both SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-3.

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United Kingdom, the LOC requirements for medical support, and the reception and transportation capability because either the negotiations in these areas were still underway or planning had not yet advanced to the decision stage.¹⁵

48. (S) The USAREUR Studies

USAREUR immediately began to prepare the studies requested by the Joint Chiefs.

a. Major Objective I. The plans to position 60 days' combat supplies in the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy consisted of the following six major subordinate objectives:

(1) Relocation of 246,000 Tons of Combat Support Materiel. USAREUR estimated that the accelerated withdrawal from France would involve the movement of 50 percent of its total inventory--777,000 tons¹⁶--excluding the bulk POL, household goods, and troop unit equipment. USAREUR was currently processing 417,000 tons for shipment: 246,000 tons of combat essential stocks¹⁷ for movement from France to Germany; 114,000 tons of MAP and excess stocks, mainly for shipment from the Federal Republic to the United States; and 57,000 tons of post, camp, and station (PCS) property and miscellaneous stocks for movement from France to the Federal Republic. The disposition of the remaining 360,000 tons--half combat essential and half property earmarked for return to the United States or disposal as excess--would depend on a combination of such options as moving stockages to the United Kingdom, increasing USAREUR's capability to receive additional tonnages into the Federal Republic, disposing of excess through established property disposal channels, and shipping materiel to the United

¹⁵(1) Cable ECJD-PW-11716, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 11 Aug 66.
(2) Cable JCS-9265, JCS to USCINCEUR, 16 Aug 66. Both NOFORN.
(3) Cable ECJD-PP-12831, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR et al., 2 Sep 66.
All SECRET. Gp-3.

¹⁶By moving 655,000 tons into the Federal Republic and 122,000 tons of excess and MAP stocks out of the Federal Republic to make room for shipments from France. SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-3.

¹⁷USAREUR had the authority to move this tonnage of peacetime operating stocks (POS), Theater Reserve 1 (TR-1), and project stocks. SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-3.

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States. The use of these options, however, would depend on the progress, character, and results of negotiations with other countries.

Previously USAREUR had estimated its FRELOC Phase I construction fund requirement at \$14 million--\$5 million (already approved by the Department of Defense) for construction to round out the existing facilities for the storage of 222,000 tons of stocks of all classes to be relocated from France to Germany; \$2.5 million for the construction of facilities to store 24,000 additional tons of general supplies; and \$6.5 million (approved by the Congress but not by the Secretary of Defense) for construction of atomic-blast-resistant (ABREST) igloos to store 38,000 tons of ammunition. By planning for a more efficient use of the existing storage space and of the construction under the \$5 million authorization, USAREUR eliminated the need for the \$2.5 million for the purpose originally projected. Therefore, the \$5 million would suffice to provide the new facilities required to store the entire 246,000 tons scheduled for relocation from France to Germany. However, USAREUR's total 60-day reserve requirement was 384,000 tons--273,000 tons of general supplies and 111,000 tons of ammunition. The 246,000 tons would consist of 185,000 tons of general supplies and 61,000 tons of ammunition to apply against this requirement, thereby leaving a shortfall of 88,000 tons of general and 50,000 tons of class V supplies. Since USAREUR could store in Germany 6,000 tons of the class V stocks originally earmarked for storage in the United Kingdom, the ammunition shortfall would be only 44,000 tons.

USAREUR proposed to use the \$2.5 million of construction funds no longer needed for their original purpose to construct facilities for storing 25,000 tons of the 88,000-ton general supplies. If approved, this would bring the general supplies shortfall down to 63,000 tons. New construction addressed in the Phase II plan would be necessary to store any part of these 63,000 tons. Meanwhile, USAREUR would have to store in the open any part of this total arriving in the theater, some of it in forward areas. Open storage in forward areas would not only accelerate stockage deterioration but would also be tactically unsound. USAREUR also pointed out another difficulty: The anticipated receipt of 32,000 tons of general supplies in the first half of FY 1967, plus 33,000 tons of ammunition either already received or on firm dues-in, preempted the use of the storage space earmarked for stocks from France. Of the 33,000 tons of ammunition displaced by shipments from the United States, USAREUR could store only 6,000; the remaining tonnage would have to be in open storage in unimproved areas.

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USAREUR based its construction cost estimates on the establishment of austere pre-engineered storage facilities with the minimum essential utilities, since storage sites would be at or near existing depot activities. Long-range plans to raise or expand these new facilities to a depot status would be part of USAREUR's Phase II planning.¹⁸

By the end of September USAREUR had moved or otherwise disposed of 47 percent of the tonnages scheduled for either relocation from France or on-site disposition as excess.¹⁹ This achievement had been possible because of a combination of fortunate circumstances, such as the good summer weather, the availability of storage space at the relocation sites, and the availability of the necessary personnel and facilities. USAREUR anticipated, however, that the rate of stock movement would decline because of bad weather, the progressive diminution of available space at relocation sites, and other factors.²⁰

Major factors contributing to the success of the initial FRELOC stock movements were the redistribution of USACOMZEUR's highway movement resources--to avoid gold-flow payments to commercial carriers--and the institution of temporary self-support transportation programs by Seventh Army and USAACOM for the period of near-term relocation operations. In so doing, Seventh Army had to reduce temporarily the transportation support of tactical units in training areas, and its materiel readiness status suffered considerably.²¹ The main difficulty

¹⁸(1) USAREUR FRELOC - FINAL PHASE I PLAN, 1 Jul 66, cited above. (2) USCINCEUR FRELOC Plan, Final Phase I, 6 Jul 66, cited above. (3) USAREUR FRELOC/CRELOC Decision Paper, 2 Sep 66, subj: Change 1 to FRELOC/CRELOC Decision Paper (U). AEAGD-PL. All SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-3.

¹⁹The Stars and Stripes (Eur. ed.), 20 Oct 66, p. 1. UNCLAS.

²⁰(1) Briefing, USAREUR Log Div for Mr. S. R. Resor, SA, 13 Oct 66. SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-4. (2) Cable ECJD-T-15226, USCINCEUR to JCS, 13 Oct 66. UNCLAS.

²¹(1) Cable SX-4922, CINCUSAREUR to Seventh Army and USAACOM, 26 Aug 66. (2) Cable AENGL-SV-0157AC, USAACOM to CINCUSAREUR, 3 Sep 66. (3) Cable SC-41707, CINCUSAREUR to USACOMZEUR, 9 Sep 66. UNCLAS. (4) Cable AETGD-VT-24143, Seventh Army to CINCUSAREUR, 19 Sep 66. All except (3) SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-4.

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was that, as an operating command, USACOMZEUR continued to receive items requisitioned before the development of the FRELOC requirement. For example, from 1 April to 31 October 24,647 tons of supplies arrived at USACOMZEUR installations in France.²² As early as May, USACOMZEUR had taken action to review all outstanding requirements and reconsign certain items requisitioned from stateside supply agencies to specified destinations in Germany and Italy. However, it could not suddenly terminate its supply support obligations or divert all incoming shipments.²³

As of 31 December, the situation was as follows:²⁴

Mission Stocks

(a) On hand as of 31 March 1966	593,000
(b) Total moved as of 31 December	427,239
(c) Net adjustments	5,397
(d) Remaining to be moved	171,158

Nonmission Stocks

(a) On hand as of 31 March 1966	110,584
(b) Total moved as of 31 December	33,350
(c) Remaining to be moved	77,234

Total Tonnage

Moved	460,589
Remaining	248,392

(2) POL Storage and Distribution Facilities. The accelerated POL storage and distribution plan--developed by USEUCOM, USAREUR, USAFE, and USACOMZEUR representatives--refined and consolidated USCINCEUR's Final Phase I Plan. One major addition was the proposal to undertake an architectural and engineering study for constructing 1,200,000 barrels of POL storage on F.R.G.-controlled real estate near Saarbruecken, Germany. The four major

²²(1) Sec I, Materiel Moved, FRELOC Status Report (RCS ECJD-120), 11 Nov 66. SECRET (info used CONF). NOFORN. (2) Intvw, Mr. Carlisle with SSG R. A. Allen, USAREUR ODCSLOG Trans Dir, 29 Dec 66. CONF. Both Gp-4.

²³(1) Cable 6-138, USASMC to CINCUSAREUR and USACOMZEUR, 28 Jun 66. CONF. Gp-4. (2) Cable DA-777979, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 12 Aug 66. (3) Cable AEZSM-SMOB-35315, USACOMZEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 23 Aug 66. Both UNCLAS.

²⁴ECJD-120 Rept for December 1966. UNCLAS.

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tasks essential to relocating U.S. POL resources were to obtain POL storage facilities in Germany and the BENELUX countries to support the D plus 30 force for 60 days' combat; to obtain U.K. storage facilities for the additional requirements imposed by the relocation of units from France; to establish in Germany and the BENELUX countries a POL distribution system free from French veto action; and to reduce stocks in France to the levels established by U.S.-French negotiations.²⁵

USEUCOM asked for the authority to contract for the commercial storage of 3,030,000 barrels of POL at a cost of \$1.8 million,²⁶ and advised the Defense Fuel Supply Center (DFSC) of the probable need for a drastic downward revision of POL distribution schedules and--starting in October--a possible decrease in the number of tankers discharging at Donges.²⁷

USAREUR pointed out that, because of the displacement of bulk POL from France and the stoppage of fuel input at Donges, POL inventories in Central Europe would fluctuate between a 30- to 60-day reserve level during a 6-month period. This would be the time required to conclude commercial contract negotiations and to reconstitute POL stocks in U.S. storage facilities.²⁸

In early October USCINCEUR informed the Joint Chiefs that attrition alone would not drastically reduce the POL products in the U.S. system in France before 31 March 1967. The unloading of additional tankers in France might cause heavy costs for later relocation measures. The shortage of storage facilities in Germany and the BENELUX countries would prevent the diversion of arriving tankers, and reserve stock levels in Central Europe would thus progressively decrease. USCINCEUR had the choice of two disadvantageous possibilities--either halting inbound POL shipments and accepting the risk of temporarily reducing stocks

²⁵Ltr w/4 Incl, USCINCEUR to distr, 30 Aug 66, subj: FRELOC-Phase I POL Decisions. ECJC-00. SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-4.

²⁶Ltr, USCINCEUR to JCS, 9 Sep 66, subj: FRELOC - Phase I Decisions. ECJD-00. SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-4.

²⁷Cable ECJD-00-13681, USCINCEUR to DFSC, 17 Sep 66. SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-4.

²⁸Cable SX-6468, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 29 Sep 66. SECRET. Gp-4.

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below the 60-day level, or continuing tanker shipments with the attendant risk of generating excessive costs associated with failure to remove POL stocks from France by 1 April 1967.

The Federal Republic had declared that U.S. reentry rights to the Farge depot near Bremerhaven applied only to emergencies not exceeding three weeks. Although the United States intended to achieve a broader interpretation of its reentry rights, a failure to obtain storage for the 1,250,000 barrels specified in the 1960 Farge turnback agreement would mean that commercial storage facilities in Germany and the BENELUX countries would have to increase by 1,000,000 barrels.

In conclusion, USCINCEUR again asked the Joint Chiefs for authority to contract for commercial POL storage facilities and to exercise the option to reenter the Farge depot pending a final U.S.-F.R.G. agreement on the terms of depot usage. Approval would permit USCINCEUR to maintain the maximum level of POL reserve support during the relocation period and to hold to a minimum the costs associated with the double handling of the POL still in the U.S. system in France.²⁹

The Joint Chiefs then requested the Secretary of Defense to grant USCINCEUR authority to contract for commercial storage of 3,000,000 barrels of POL, to exercise the U.S. 1960 agreement option to reenter the Farge depot, to make maximum use of the NATO pipeline outside France, to cancel tanker shipments to Donges and deplete through attrition U.S. POL inventories in France, to relocate U.S. POL stocks remaining in France, and to lease or purchase tank cars from the Germans.³⁰

Other recommendations submitted to the Secretary of Defense included requests for authorization to start architectural and engineering studies for the proposed POL storage facility near Homburg, Germany;³¹ to increase the procurement of POL in Germany;

²⁹Cable ECJD-00-14735, USCINCEUR to JCS, 5 Oct 66. SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-4.

³⁰(1) Cable ECJD-00-14735, USCINCEUR to JCS, 5 Oct 66. NOFORN. (2) Cable AFSSSEEE-82453, CSAF to ALFC, 27 Nov 66. Both SECRET. Gp-4.

³¹When German industry requested the use of the F.R.G.-owned land, the Federal Republic asked USCINCEUR for a firm decision on U.S. intentions. (Cable ECJD-00-15340, USCINCEUR to JCS, 14 Oct 66.) SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-4.

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and to continue the limited use of the pipeline in France after 31 March 1967, the extent of usage to depend on the results of U.S.-France negotiations.³²

At approximately the same time USCINCEUR delegated to CINCUSAREUR the authority to conduct negotiations for the local procurement of POL products and for the lease of commercial POL storage facilities. Although formal and binding contracts were subject to Secretary of Defense approval of both the procurement proposal and the fund authorization for commercial POL storage, USAREUR would be able to complete all the preliminary measures to permit expeditious contracting action immediately after the announcement of the Secretary's decision.³³

A few days later the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized the reduction of POL stocks in France through attrition, and the cancellation or reduction of scheduled POL deliveries to French ports. This authority was in consonance with the 60-day on-Continent FRELOC stockage objective and anticipated the early Secretary of Defense approval of USCINCEUR's proposal to cease POL deliveries to Donges.³⁴

In early November the Secretary of Defense authorized leasing Farge POL depot for the storage of approximately 1,250,000 barrels of U.S. products and leasing commercial storage facilities for 3,000,000 barrels in the BENELUX countries and Germany, provided that the incurred costs would not greatly exceed the yearly leasing cost estimated at \$2,298,000 and that the United States had the option of canceling the leases within one year or less without penalty. USCINCEUR could use the existing NATO pipeline system outside France to the maximum for POL product distribution, and, to the extent necessary to supplement the supply available from the NATO pipeline system outside France, continue to use the U.S. and NATO pipeline and storage system in France for the peacetime supply of U.S. forces. USCINCEUR was to negotiate with the French for an

³²Cable JCS-5078, JCS to USCINCEUR, 12 Oct 66. SECRET. Gp-4.

³³(1) Cable DFSC-F-66185, DFSC to USCINCEUR, 19 Oct 66.
(2) Cable ECJD-00-15931, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 21 Oct 66. Both SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-4.

³⁴Cable JCS-6373, JCS to USCINCEUR, 25 Oct 66. SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-4.

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acceptable agreement permitting the United States continued use of the pipeline and storage systems in France. The Secretary of Defense preferred the retention of the French system at no extra cost to the U.S. Government to the alternative of using the Farge depot for peacetime supply at an annual cost of more than \$2 million.

He disapproved the procurement of POL from German refiners and the purchase of additional POL tank cars, but authorized U.S.-F.R.G. negotiations to obtain POL supplies and tank cars in wartime. In authorizing USCINCEUR to proceed with a feasibility study on constructing a POL terminal on land offered by the Federal Republic, he emphasized that the project would have to comply with NATO procedures so as to provide the United States the strongest position when presenting the project for NATO infrastructure common funding.

Finally, the Secretary of Defense stopped tanker deliveries to Donges and directed the reduction of U.S. stocks in France by attrition, provided supplies in France did not fall below the minimum level necessary for peacetime operations.³⁵

In commenting on these decisions, CINCUSAREUR stated that--although the storage of 1 1/4 million barrels of POL war reserve at Farge might have political value--in any but the most sedentary and inactive kinds of campaigns these stocks would lose their military value upon the outbreak of hostilities.³⁶

However, when the United States informed the Germans of its decision to exercise the option in the 1960 agreement whereby the United States could store 200,000 cubic meters of POL and make POL shipments to and from the depot, the Germans replied that they would make available a storage capacity of only 160,000 cubic meters.

USCINCEUR held that the German proposal was unacceptable because it implied a U.S. waiver or diminution of a firmly established legal right. However, he agreed to accept the German

³⁵ (1) Cable JCS-7303, JCS to USCINCEUR, 5 Nov 66. NOFORN.
(2) Cable ECJD-00-16850, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 7 Nov 66. (3)
Cable SX-6229, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 15 Nov 66. ALL SECRET. Gp-4.

³⁶ Cable SX-6188, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 12 Nov 66. SECRET.
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release of the total space in increments, provided the Germans recognized their obligations under the 1960 agreement.³⁷

(3) Relocation of Certain Stocks and Military Units From France to Italy. In 1965 the Secretary of Defense directed the implementation of a McNamara Study Group³⁸ recommendation calling for the closedown of Camp Passalacqua at Verona and the return of its control to Italian authorities. He authorized, however, the retention of part of the installation to support a U.S. laundry and drycleaning plant, a European Exchange Service warehouse, and certain other facilities moved from nearby leased buildings to decrease the outflow of gold. The operation of the installation under this partial retention plan would require 123 personnel and an annual expenditure of \$513,000. In addition, the Department of the Army approved and funded a contract for \$99,572 to modify warehouse facilities.

In May 1966, however, the Secretary of Defense authorized the suspension of all incompleted actions associated with the previously directed phasedown until he had made a final decision on moving certain military units from France to Verona. Consequently, the Department of the Army canceled the contract for modifying the warehouse facilities.³⁹

In June USAREUR undertook studies to determine the logistic requirements to support approximately 1,000 military personnel who would move to Verona.⁴⁰ USAREUR considered relocating to

³⁷(1) Cable JCS-7303, JCS to USCINCEUR, 5 Nov 66. (2) Cable ECJD-00-16850, USCINCEUR to JCS, 7 Nov 66. (3) Cable MGP 3-7006, 15 Dec 66. (4) Cable ECJD-00-18959, USCINCEUR to AMEMB Bonn, 16 Dec 66. All SECRET. (5) Cable ECJD-OS-18883, 15 Dec 66. CONF. All Gp-4.

³⁸See USAREUR Anl Hist Sum, 1965, pp. 38 - 44. TS (info used SECRET. Gp-4).

³⁹(1) Cable SX-3583, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 29 May 66. NOFORN. (2) Cable ECJD-PP-08479, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 31 May 66. (3) Cable DA-768269, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 4 Jun 66. NOFORN. (4) Cable SX-3754, CINCUSAREUR to USASETAF, 11 Jun 66. (5) Cable SX-3782, CINCUSAREUR to AMEMB Rome et al., 13 Jun 66. NOFORN. All SECRET. Gp-3.

⁴⁰(1) Cable SX-3639, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 27 Jun 66. NOFORN. (2) Cable ECJD-PP-08833, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 8 Jun 66. (3) Cable SX-3701, CINCUSAREUR to 10th SFG, 8 Jun 66. (4) Cable SX-3702, CINCUSAREUR to USACOMZEU, 8 Jun 66. (5) Cable DA-769814, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 15 Jun 66. NOFORN. All SECRET. Gp-3.

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Camp Passalacqua one platoon of the 557th Quartermaster Company from France, and one Special Forces company from Germany. In addition, the transfer of the USASTRATCOM-EUR (Mediterranean) headquarters from Camp Darby near Leghorn to Camp Passalacqua--where adequate facilities were available--would save \$136,000 programed for the construction of a new headquarters building near Camp Darby.⁴¹

In late September the Italian Foreign Minister disapproved--for political reasons--the stationing of Special Forces troops in Italy. He feared that the Italian Communist Party would use the character and mission of the unit to embarrass his government and that the lack of a clear NATO assignment for the unit might create political difficulties.⁴²

Under these circumstances USAREUR preferred to revert to the McNamara Group recommendation to release to the Italians that part of Camp Passalacqua not planned for U.S. retention. The Special Forces company would stay at its home station, USASTRATCOM-EUR (Mediterranean) headquarters would either remain at Camp Darby or relocate to another U.S.-controlled facility in Italy, and the entire 557th Quartermaster Company would move to Mainz, Germany. The project stocks scheduled for storage at Camp Passalacqua would go to Camp Darby.⁴³

USAREUR also requested the Department of the Army to reinstate the previously approved Military Construction, Army (MCA) project

⁴¹FRELOC/CRELOC Decision Paper, subj: Move from France to Italy Certain Stocks and Military Units (C), 14 Sep 66. SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-4.

⁴²(1) Cable 1767, AMEMB Rome to Secy State (855), 30 Sep 66. (2) ECJD-PP-14546, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 1 Oct 66. Both CONF. Gp-4.

⁴³(1) Cable 0170, USAACOM to Rhineland Dist, 12 Sep 66. UNCLAS. (2) Cable SX-5715, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 14 Oct 66. CONF. (3) Cable SX-5716, CINCUSAREUR to USASETAF, 14 Oct 66. SECRET. (4) Intvw, Mr. Carlisle with LTC R. G. Hensel and MAJ J. E. Stice, USAREUR Log Div Plans Br, 19 Oct 66. CONF. (5) Cable ECJD-OS-15619, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 18 Oct 66. SECRET. (6) Cable SX-5956, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 28 Oct 66. (7) Cable ECJD-OS-16556, USCINCEUR to JCS, 1 Nov 66. Both SECRET. NOFORN. All except (1) Gp-4.

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for modifying warehouse facilities at Camp Passalacqua,⁴⁴ and directed USASETAF to prepare the release of that portion of the installation scheduled for return to the Italian Government. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the turnback; the target completion date was 30 June 1967.⁴⁵

(4) Disposal of Excess and MAP Stocks. In June the Joint Chiefs directed USCINCEUR to develop--in coordination with USAREUR--a study and recommendations on the disposal of excess property. USAREUR pointed out that the Department of the Army had already established policies and procedures to expedite the disposal of excesses in France, Germany, and Italy. Since the responsible supply agencies had provided USAREUR with timely disposition instructions, there seemed to be no need for a specific study on excess disposal. The Joint Chiefs agreed.⁴⁶

Of the 129,500 tons of excess property in Germany and Italy,⁴⁷ USAREUR had disposed of 91,846 tons by the end of December.⁴⁸

(5) Provision of Rail-Car-Mounted Data Processing Equipment. In late 1965 the McNamara Study Group had recommended that the Supply and Maintenance Agency (SAMA) return to the United States.

⁴⁴Cable SC-46004, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 10 Oct 66. UNCLAS.

⁴⁵(1) Cable SX-5990, CINCUSAREUR to DA and USASETAF, 31 Oct 66. NOFORN. (2) Cable AESE-GDL-P-0-439, USASETAF to CINCUSAREUR, 2 Nov 66. Both CONF. (3) Cable 8692, JCS to USCINCEUR, 23 Nov 66. SECRET. All Gp-4. (4) Cables SC-53354 and 53380, CINCUSAREUR to USASETAF, 8 and 9 Dec 66. Both UNCLAS.

⁴⁶(1) Cable DA-767376, DA to USAMC and DSA, 30 May 66. (2) Memo, SECDEF to Svc Secy's, 17 Jun 66, Cy in AEAGD-S-P-M files. Both NOFORN. (3) Cable DA-771243, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 24 Jun 66. All SECRET. (4) Cable DA-776230, DA to USAMC, 2 Aug 66. CONF. (5) Memo, USAREUR Log Div Mat Readiness Dir to S&S Dir, 15 Sep 66. AEAGD-M. UNCLAS. (6) DF, DCSLOG to Cofs, 20 Sep 66, subj: FRELOC/CRELOC Decision Paper (U). AEAGD-S-P-M. CONF. NOFORN. (7) Cable ECJD-PW-13908, USCINCEUR to JCS, 21 Sep 66. SECRET. NOFORN. (8) Cable 3591, JCS to CINCUSAREUR, 23 Sep 66. UNCLAS. All except (5) and (8) Gp-4.

⁴⁷114,000 in Germany; 15,500 in Italy. SECRET.. NOFORN. Gp-4.

⁴⁸Incl 3 to ltr, USACOMZEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 7 Jan 67, subj: FRELOC Status Report (RCS: ECJD - 120 (U)). AEZCP-RA. SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-4.

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Another study group--the Bishop Group--had subsequently reviewed this recommendation, arriving at the conclusion that SAMA should remain in Europe. However, the Bishop Group recommended the consolidation of SAMA's stock control element at Verdun with the supply management element at Maison Fort.⁴⁹

In early 1966 USAREUR submitted a minor MCA project for \$127,000 to expand the facilities at Maison Fort (near Orleans) to accommodate the Verdun stock control element. In March USAREUR canceled the fund request and proposed the deferment of any Bishop Group recommendation that required the movement of personnel or activities to or within France.⁵⁰

The Secretary of Defense suspended the implementation of the Bishop Group recommendations until clarification of the situation in France. In the interim, however, USAREUR was to continue its systems planning for the consolidation of the supply management and stock control functions.⁵¹

The most effective means of accomplishing this consolidation seemed to be the establishment of automatic data processing (ADP) equipment on rail cars in the country of SAMA's new location. A mobile SAMA would be more economical and provide greater flexibility and protection in time of war. The best solution would be to install the ADP equipment on European 60-passenger rail cars that were available and after modification would provide the necessary environmental conditions. USAREUR estimated the cost of converting the rail cars--excluding communications requirements--at \$439,500, which was considerably less than the cost for rehabilitating or constructing permanent facilities.⁵²

⁴⁹(1) Cable DEF-2512, OSD to USCINCEUR and CINCUSAREUR, 24 Sep 65. (2) Cable DA-733094, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 21 Dec 65. Both UNCLAS. (3) Draft Study of U.S. Army Europe Materiel Management System, Vol 1, Chaps II and III. AEAGD-S. SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-1.

⁵⁰Cable SX-2567, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 30 Mar 66. SECRET. Gp-4.

⁵¹Cable DA-758925, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 7 Apr 66. SECRET. Gp-4.

⁵²(1) Ltr, USACOMZEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 10 Mar 66, subj: Mobile Data Processing Capability (U). AEZSM. CONF. (2) Cable SX-3030, 23 Apr 66, cited above. SECRET. NOFORN. Both Gp-4.

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USAREUR recommended that the supply management and control operations continue at Verdun and Maison Fort until tests had shown the new mobile center to be satisfactory. The consolidated SAMA should be either at the same location or in the near vicinity of USACOMZEUR headquarters.⁵³

The Bishop Group had confirmed the need for augmenting SAMA's ADP configuration with additional disc storage capacity to a total of 702 million characters. Since an upgrading of SAMA's automation level would compensate for the eventual and inevitable loss of French analysts and clerical personnel, USAREUR recommended the installation of the equipment specified in the Bishop Group study in the new mobile facility. However, if such equipment was not readily available, USAREUR suggested acquiring and installing other equipment of similar capacity that could handle existing computer programs without change.

In early May the Department of the Army announced its general concurrence in the proposals for new ADP equipment and the establishment of SAMA capabilities outside France on rail cars. It sent two representatives to Europe to assist USAREUR in further studies of the equipment needs and the methods for effecting the operational transfer.⁵⁴ In addition, it took funding action to start the SAMA relocation, granted USAREUR authority to use available funds to begin preliminary rail car stripping and design, and provided further guidance on the progressive development of the new installation.⁵⁵

In June the Secretary of Defense approved--for immediate action--the mobile SAMA concept and waived established data selection requirements to permit the noncompetitive acquisition of the new equipment configuration. Since the SAMA consolidation would be an essential condition toward the realization of the final relocation plan, USAREUR was to determine the site for the consolidated agency as soon as possible, so that it could recruit and train the required personnel in the remaining time.⁵⁶

⁵³Cables SX-2960, 2961, and 3020, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 20 and 22 Apr 66. All SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-4.

⁵⁴Cable DA-763808, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 6 May 66. SECRET. Gp-4.

⁵⁵Cable DA-765938, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 20 May 66. SECRET. Gp-4.

⁵⁶(1) Cable DA-769311, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 13 Jun 66. SECRET. Gp-4. (2) For details on SAMA's relocation, see b(1) below. UNCLAS.

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In June USAREUR awarded the contract for the modification of 10 rail cars. In July procurement agencies placed orders for the delivery of the necessary ADP equipment to coincide with the readiness date of the modified rail cars. According to the USAREUR plan, in early January 1967 the mobile SAMA site would be ready to accept the first four cars with installed equipment, plus one car housing a generator that would furnish the necessary power if commercial power was not immediately available. By 15 February USAREUR would complete the testing, and by 22 March the mobile facility would be operational.

By the end of December the contractor had delivered five cars to the site near Zweibruecken, where computer equipment was installed.⁵⁷

(6) Relocation of the Floating Marine Reserve Fleet.
USAREUR's reserve fleet--required to support Section 29 of Project AEG 102-50-OP stocks--consisted of 177 major end items plus repair parts support and kits with a total tonnage of 37,200. Space requirements for wet and dry storage--including maintenance and administrative operations--totaled 877,000 square feet.

After study of the advantages and disadvantages of moving the fleet to the United Kingdom, the BENELUX countries, or the United States, USAREUR recommended storage in the United Kingdom. This recommendation was based on the fact that the fleet would be less vulnerable to enemy land actions than in the BENELUX countries, that the storage costs would be considerably lower than in the United States and almost the same as in the BENELUX countries, and that storage in the United States would not provide USAREUR the capability to respond effectively to an emergency and would preclude the orderly accomplishment of its wartime missions.⁵⁸

⁵⁷(1) Incl 1 to DF, Dir, Trans Dir to DCSLOG, 16 Sep 66, subj: FRELOC Status Report (U). AEAGD-RAR. SECRET. NOFORN. (2) Intvw, Mr. Carlisle with MAJ C. E. Young, USAREUR Log Div Prog & Pol Br, 19 Oct 66. CONF. Both Gp-4. (3) MFR, COL W. E. Gill, Dep Dir, USAREUR ODCSLOG S&S Dir, 12 Dec 66, subj: Rail Cars for the Mobile Stock Control Center. AEAGD-S. UNCLAS.

⁵⁸(1) Cable SX-4930, CINCUSAREUR to distr, 26 Aug 66. (2) USAREUR FRELOC/CRELOC Decision Paper, 7 Sep 66, subj: Relocation from France of the Prepositioned Floating Marine Reserve Fleet (S). (3) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 13 Sep 66, same subject. AEAGD-T-RAR. All SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-4.

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USCINCEUR, however, recommended relocating the reserve marine fleet to the BENELUX area. He believed that no alternative was feasible and that storage in the BENELUX countries would place the fleet at or near the sites where it would be most needed. He placed more emphasis on the importance of providing the NATO allies visible evidence of U.S. intentions to resist on the European continent and rejected the reasoning that assumed the early loss of the BENELUX area to enemy forces.⁵⁹

Three days after USCINCEUR had forwarded his recommendations to the Joint Chiefs, the Secretary of Defense directed the withdrawal of 53 LCM-8 and 16 LCU landing craft from the USAREUR reserve fleet to meet operational requirements in Southeast Asia. This withdrawal of approximately one-third of the reserve fleet changed the problem in several ways. While it would lighten the immediate movement and storage tasks, it would also completely eliminate USAREUR's current capability for over-the-beach operations.⁶⁰

Since subsequent site surveys revealed that no suitable storage facilities were available in the BENELUX countries, USCINCEUR reversed his position and recommended approval of USAREUR's proposal to store the fleet near Southampton, England. One-time costs would be approximately \$93,500.⁶¹

⁵⁹Ltr, USCINCEUR to JCS, 20 Sep 66, subj: Near Term Relocation of Materiel and Personnel in the French LOC (U). ECJD-TP. SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-4.

⁶⁰(1) Cable 53047, Secy State to AMEMB's Bonn and Paris, 23 Sep 66. (2) Cable EUZCS-S-1355, USACOMZEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 27 Sep 66. (3) Cable ECJCO-14242, USCINCEUR to JCS, 27 Sep 66. (4) Cable AEZTC-PL-S-1382, USACOMZEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 13 Oct 66. (5) Cable AEZOT-S-1389, USACOMZEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 15 Oct 66. (6) Intvw, Mr. Carlisle with LTC W. L. Duncan, USAREUR Log Div Trans Dir, 21 Oct 66. All NOFORN. (7) Cable SX-5903, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 26 Oct 66. All SECRET. Gp-4.

⁶¹(1) Cable AEZTC-PL-S-1424, USACOMZEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 8 Nov 66. (2) Cable SX-6138, CINCUSAREUR to MAAG's BELLUX and Netherlands, 9 Nov 66. (3) Cable SX-6177, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 11 Nov 66. (4) Cable ECJD-TP-17283, USCINCEUR to JCS, 15 Nov 66. All SECRET. Gp-4.

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In late December the Secretary of Defense approved the USCINCEUR recommendation, subject to certain initial and annual cost ceilings and personnel limitations.⁶²

b. Major Objective II. The plans to position peacetime activities, units, and functions in support of the first major objective consisted of the following major subordinate tasks:

(1) Relocation of USACOMZEUR Headquarters and the Supply and Maintenance Agency. After examining several areas for their suitability, USAREUR recommended locating both USACOMZEUR headquarters and SAMA in the Zweibruecken area. At the Kreuzberg Kaserne--a U.S.-controlled and -occupied facility--USACOMZEUR headquarters would need space for 124 officers and 1,159 enlisted personnel. For the proposed relocation of SAMA, the United States would have to acquire Niederauerbach Kaserne--currently housing 2,200 German Army troops--and would have to offer to the Bundeswehr equivalent facilities. The acquisition of 359 family housing units in the Zweibruecken area would have the major advantage of offsetting the cost of rehabilitating Niederauerbach Kaserne and reducing gold-flow expenditures for economy housing rentals by more than \$540,000 a year.⁶³

By September preliminary discussions on a possible exchange of facilities with the Bundeswehr were progressing well.⁶⁴

However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that the outflow of gold caused by renting the 359 family housing units vacated by the Bundeswehr militated against the approval of the USAREUR recommendation. They called attention to the current offset problem facing the United Kingdom, which might result in a reduction of the British forces in Germany. Since such force reductions were not in the interest of the United States, the Department

⁶²(1) Memo, SECDEF to CJCS, 24 Dec 66, subj: Relocation of Floating Marine Reserve from the French Coast (U) (quoted in Cable JCS-2210, JCS to USCINCEUR et al., 24 Dec 66). (2) Cable AEZKG-S-1475, USACOMZEUR to 3d AF, 27 Dec 66. Both SECRET. Gp-4.

⁶³(1) FRELOC/CRELOC Decision Paper, 31 Aug 66, subj: Relocation of Headquarters, USACOMZEUR and the Supply and Maintenance Agency. (2) Ltr, USCINCEUR to JCS, 24 Sep 66, subj: Relocation of Hq. USACOMZEUR and the Supply and Maintenance Agency (SAMA) (U). ECJC-P. Both SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-4.

⁶⁴Cable SX-5307, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 21 Sep 66. SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-3.

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of Defense had identified certain possibilities for alleviating a part of the U.K. offset problem by stationing more U.S. troops and storing more supplies in the United Kingdom. The Joint Chiefs therefore suggested relocating USACOMZEUR headquarters and SAMA to the United Kingdom.⁶⁵

USACOMZEUR and USAREUR representatives found that Burtonwood was the only U.K. site available for locating both USACOMZEUR headquarters and SAMA. Their installation at Burtonwood would make them less vulnerable to ground attack, reduce the concentration of U.S. headquarters in Germany, and provide a base for a major command control facility for offshore operations in wartime. However, these gains would not compensate for the attendant loss of USAREUR's capability to accomplish effectively its peace- and wartime mission. For these reasons USCINCEUR concurred again in USAREUR's recommendation to colocate both agencies in Zweibruecken and to conclude the negotiations for the U.S. acquisition of the Niederauerbach Kaserne.⁶⁶

In early November the Secretary of Defense announced his decision to relocate USACOMZEUR headquarters to Taukkunen Barracks in Worms and SAMA to Kreuzberg Kaserne in Zweibruecken before 31 March 1967. By 30 September 1967 USAACOM headquarters would merge with USACOMZEUR headquarters at Worms.⁶⁷

In light of this development, USAREUR terminated its negotiations for the acquisition of Niederauerbach Kaserne, but asked the German authorities to return as soon as possible the four buildings at Kreuzberg Kaserne loaned to the Bundeswehr. The necessity to displace units in Germany to make room at Worms also required the reacquisition of some facilities at Ruesselsheim that USAREUR had loaned to the Bundeswehr.⁶⁸

⁶⁵ Cable JCS-3772, JCS to USCINCEUR, 27 Sep 66. SECRET. Gp-4.

⁶⁶ Cable ECJC-P-15027, USCINCEUR to JCS, 10 Oct 66. SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-4.

⁶⁷ Cable 81451, Secy State to AMEMB Paris et al., 9 Nov 66. SECRET. Gp-4.

⁶⁸ (1) Cable SX-6141, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 9 Nov 66. CONF. Gp-4. (2) Cables SC-49937 and 49938, CINCUSAREUR to USAACOM, 10 Nov 66. (3) Cable 4893, USAACOM to Palatinate Dist, 14 Nov 66. (2) and (3) UNCLAS. EFTO. FOUO.

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(2) Establishment of a 100-Bed Expandable Hospital in the Saar. The plan to relocate a peacetime operating hospital from France to the Saar lost its validity when the Secretary of Defense decided that no major headquarters or unit would move to that area. Two U.S. Army general hospitals were within a 20-mile radius of Worms and Zweibruecken; with minor personnel augmentations they could support the medical needs of headquarters and units relocated from France.

In place of the original proposal, USAREUR recommended inactivating one USACOMZEUR hospital and transferring 219 medical personnel to Seventh Army. The capability of Seventh Army's medical units to support initial combat operations was less than marginal, and with the current reduction in wartime backup support for these units, the recommended transfer of spaces would improve USAREUR's readiness posture.⁶⁹

At the end of 1966 USAREUR had not received a decision.⁷⁰

(3) Relocation of Peacetime Operating Hospitals. Since the U.S. Element of SHAPE would need medical support in Belgium, USAREUR recommended relocating the 196th Station Hospital from Paris to Casteau, where it would support SHAPE. USAREUR could then either relocate or inactivate the other three general hospitals in France. Relocation would provide a nucleus for establishing and expanding a USACOMZEUR wartime fixed-bed asset and would represent the retention of a 3,000-bed potential. On the other hand, relocation would require that the associated medical units receive training and acquire experience in treating actual patients. Since the units would not have a peacetime support mission, USAREUR would experience difficulties in furnishing them the level of training essential for the maintenance of medical specialist proficiency. USAREUR therefore recommended the transfer of the three general hospital designations to Germany for the purpose of redesignating three station hospitals presently operating as fixed hospitals. The economies associated with the consolidation of USACOMZEUR personnel in F.R.G. areas currently served by the 9th Hospital Center would permit USAREUR to save 425 medical

⁶⁹(1) FRELOC/CRELOC Decision Paper, 20 Sep 66, subj: Establishment in the Saar of a 100-Bed Operating Hospital With a Capacity of 1000 Bed Expansion (S). SECRET. NOFORN. (2) DF, USAREUR Surg to DCSLOG, 12 Oct 66, subj: USACOMZEUR FRELOC Status Report, RCS: ECJO-120 (U). AEAMD-PO. CONF. Both Gp-4.

⁷⁰(1) Cable JCS-9299, JCS to CINCUSAREUR, 1 Dec 66. (2) Cable SX-6568, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 6 Dec 66. (3) Intvw, Mr. Carlisle with CPT J. M. Mendell, USAREUR OSurg Plans & Ops Br, 4 Jan 67. All SECRET. Gp-4.

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personnel spaces. These actions would alleviate the loss of USAREUR's wartime bed expansion potential and would provide realistic planning factors.⁷¹

To the end of 1966 the Secretary of Defense had not announced his decision.⁷²

(4) Relocation of Peactime Depot Maintenance Activities.

(a) Tactical Wheeled Vehicles and Engine Assemblies.

To permit the relocation of depot maintenance activities for tactical wheeled vehicles and engine assemblies, USAREUR proposed expanding the Boeblingen maintenance plant, a commercial contractor activity that could absorb the annual commandwide overhaul workload of 400 tactical vehicles and 1,852 engine assemblies. The plant had the necessary tools, equipment, and managerial and technical skills, and would require no new construction or installation modification. The alternative of performing overhaul in the United States for return to Europe would result in excessive costs, and the attendant long turn-around time would either increase the current theater maintenance float or degrade USAREUR's readiness condition. One-time relocation costs to Germany would be \$105,800; to the United States, \$1,191,500. Estimated annual operating costs for maintenance would be \$962,700 in Germany against \$1,191,500 in the United States.

In November the Secretary of Defense approved the expansion of the Boeblingen maintenance plant and directed the cancellation of current personnel authorizations associated with the maintenance activity in France as soon as possible. USCINCEUR, however, decided to make no adjustment to current authorizations until the fourth quarter of FY 1967 so that the authorized personnel could assist in the relocation.⁷³

⁷¹(1) FRELOC/CRELOC Decision Paper, 19 Sep 66, subj: Relocation From France of Hospital Capability Required to Support the Planned D plus 60 Forces for 60 Days of Combat (S). (2) Incl 1 to ltr, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 26 Sep 66, subj: FRELOC Near Term Relocation of Materiel and Personnel in the French LOC (U). ECMD. (3) Intvw, Mr. Carlisle with CPT Mendell, 1 Dec 66. All SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-4.

⁷²(1) Cable JCS-9299, 1 Dec 66, cited above. (2) Cable SX-6568, 6 Dec 66, cited above. (3) Intvw, Mr. Carlisle with CPT Mendell, 4 Jan 67. All SECRET. Gp-4.

⁷³Cable ECJD-OS-17538, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 18 Nov 66 (quoting cable JCS-8109). SECRET. Gp-4.

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(b) Construction Equipment Overhaul. USAREUR recommended transferring major construction equipment overhaul functions to maintenance activities at the Kaiserslautern General Depot, which already had a construction equipment maintenance mission and possessed the operational assets needed to complete the annual program of 30 pieces of major construction items, 300 special-purpose vehicles, and 12 major items of general equipment. There would be no need for modifying the Kaiserslautern facilities, but USACOMZEUR would require additional personnel--115 military and 4 U.S. and 60 local national (LN) civilian spaces--to provide for the expansion of plant operations. Compared to other alternatives, the costs for transferring maintenance to Kaiserslautern would be far less than those incurred for contractor services in Europe or for maintenance in the United States. One-time relocation costs to Germany, the United States, or to a contractor facility would amount to \$202,800, \$1,018,000, or \$178,000, respectively. Annual operating costs would be \$534,800 for the additional workload at Kaiserslautern; \$1,018,000 for maintenance in the United States; and \$669,000 for contract services.

(c) Ammunition Maintenance. Before the advent of FRELOC, USAREUR's annual ammunition maintenance capability was 31,000 tons. The closures of the Trois Fontaines Ammunition Depot--a General McNamara Group action completed on 30 June 1966--and the Captieux Ammunition Depot by 1 April 1967 would reduce this capability to the 11,000-ton maintenance capacity at the Miesau Ammunition Depot in Germany. Since USAREUR had given priority to ammunition shipments to Southeast Asia and had deferred maintenance activities at Captieux and Trois Fontaines, its ammunition maintenance backlog would increase from 40,000 tons to 70,000 tons by 1 April 1968, which would correspond to approximately 20 percent of the 60-day level authorized for storage in Germany.

USAREUR had recommended the construction of a 38,000-ton ammunition storage facility consisting of 73 ABREST igloos at 5 separate locations well removed from, though designated a subinstallation of, the Miesau Depot. The addition of an ammunition maintenance facility in Germany would increase the annual maintenance capacity from 11,000 tons to 24,000 tons, which would still be 5,000 tons short of the annual rate of deterioration. However, USAREUR might eliminate this shortfall by rotating stocks and using some stored items for training.

The question was whether the new ammunition maintenance facility should be near the ABREST facilities in the Saar or near the Miesau Depot that was to hold 240,000 tons of ammunition. Since the maintenance backlog would increase rapidly with the

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closure of the depots in France, the time lag for the completion of construction assumed a special importance. If MCA funds for a maintenance facility in the Saar were made available in FY 1968, it would not be ready for operations until 1970. By that time the maintenance backlog would have increased to 40 percent of the theater ammunition reserve stored in Germany. Construction in the Saar would cost three times as much as adding to the Miesau depot complex, and the annual operating costs in the Saar would also be higher. For these reasons USAREUR recommended the construction of the ammunition maintenance facility at Miesau Depot.⁷⁴

In late December the Secretary of Defense authorized USAREUR to expand the Miesau Depot's ammunition maintenance capability to 24,000 tons. He limited the construction cost to \$435,000, of which \$360,000 had been included in his \$5 million construction authorization.⁷⁵

(5) Generators, Electronic Communications Equipment, and Automotive Assemblies. USAREUR's annual maintenance program included the overhaul of 1,323 generators, 719 items of electronic communications equipment, and 2,600 selected automotive assemblies. The three possible courses of action were to perform the work under the terms of an offshore contract; to return the items to the United States for overhaul and reshipment to Europe; or to perform overhaul operations at Camp Darby, Leghorn, Italy.

After analysis USAREUR recommended performing overhaul at Camp Darby, where only minor modifications to existing facilities and the addition of some items of capital equipment were necessary. The \$5 million construction funds approved by the Secretary of Defense would provide for the modification costs, and USAREUR had most of the required capital equipment on hand. Camp Darby also had the managerial capability and the nucleus of technically qualified personnel to complete the FY 1967 workload. Modification, movement, and operating costs would be less than those incurred

⁷⁴ (1) FRELOC/CRELOC Decision Paper, 3 Sep 66, subj: Relocation from France of Essential Maintenance Activities (U). (2) Cable JCS-4701, JCS to USCINCEUR, 7 Oct 66. Both SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-4

⁷⁵ Memo, SECDEF to CJCS, 24 Dec 66, cited above. SECRET.
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for either of the other two options, and fewer personnel would be necessary than in the United States.⁷⁶

(6) Status at the End of 1966. Concluding that German contractors could perform the remainder of the maintenance operations at less cost, the Secretary of Defense directed the Joint Chiefs to negotiate the necessary contract arrangements and to plan for the return of residual U.S. personnel to the United States. He specified, however, that he would reconsider his decision if USAREUR's analysis showed that contractual arrangements would be unworkable or too expensive.⁷⁷

(7) Intransit Storage or Port Facilities in the BENELUX Countries. In the absence of established rights of wartime reentry into France, the United States would have to rely on a U.K.-BENELUX supply route. For this purpose, it would need a 50,000-ton intransit storage capability in the BENELUX area where it could receive, segregate, and forward air and surface cargo in support of wartime resupply operations. USAREUR reasoned that it would need such a facility even in peacetime in order to store its project and reserve stocks for quick issue in an emergency and to lessen the peacetime storage congestion in Germany.

Constructing a facility to satisfy the peacetime static storage and wartime resupply requirements would be very costly and time consuming. It seemed preferable to lease a facility for active peacetime general depot supply operations because it would incur the lowest initial cost, provide for favorable siting, and relieve the storage problem in Germany. However, annual operating costs would be high because of the comparative inefficiency attending the use of facilities not designed for specific mission accomplishment. In addition, active depot operations would mean greater personnel requirements than those needed for static storage.

USAREUR therefore recommended a compromise solution--leasing BENELUX facilities for peacetime static storage, which could provide the wartime storage capability.⁷⁸

⁷⁶ FRELOC/CRELOC Decision Paper, Relocation from France of Essential Maintenance Activities, cited above. SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-4.

⁷⁷ Memo, SECDEF to CJCS, 24 Dec 66, cited above. SECRET. Gp-4.

⁷⁸ FRELOC/CRELOC Decision Papers (U), 18 Oct 66, subj: Establishment of a 50,000 Ton Intransit Storage Facility in the BENELUX (S). SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-4.

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(8) Establishment of Aerial Ports in Germany and the BENELUX Countries. USAFE was the action agency on this study; to the end of 1966, USAREUR had not received any draft on which to develop a position.⁷⁹

(9) Repositioning of Engineer Construction Units.⁸⁰ USAREUR's engineer construction and support units in France represented 40 percent of its military engineer construction resources. In examining the possibilities of relocating the units to Germany or returning them to the United States, USAREUR saw little advantage in the latter solution. Their presence in Germany would permit USAREUR to retain its current limited troop design and construction capability; provide for a maximum flexibility in using scarce engineer construction skills; allow for the efficient and economical restationing of construction assets, thereby reducing temporary duty costs associated with troop construction projects executed away from unit home stations; continue to realize gold-flow savings in an amount equal to the troop construction program; maintain current limited troop construction capability to plan for, design, and start the highest priority general war tasks; and provide a source of knowledgeable engineers and contract supervisors for resident field offices at major contract construction sites in Germany. The one-time cost of unit displacement would be \$1.47 million to Germany, and \$4.8 million to the United States.⁸¹

Based on additional data submitted by USAREUR and a strong recommendation by USEUCOM the Secretary of Defense approved the relocation of the 83d and 97th Engineer Battalions (Construction) and the pipeline construction support company to Germany to guarantee adequate troop construction support during the relocation period. He specified, however, that USAREUR revalidate the

⁷⁹(1) Intvws, Mr. Carlisle with LTC Hensel and MAJ Stice, 28 Nov 66. (2) Cable ECJD-P-17181, USCINCEUR to JCS, 12 Nov 66. (3) Cable SX-6867, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 27 Dec 66. NOFORN. All SECRET. Gp-4.

⁸⁰The USACOMZEUR-assigned 32d Engineer Group (Construction), composed of two construction battalions (the 83d and 97th); two construction companies (the 68th and 78th); one pipeline construction support company (the 543d); and the USAREUR assigned unit, the USAREUR Engineer Element Area Office, France. UNCLAS.

⁸¹FRELOC/CRELOC Decision Paper, 16 Sep 66, subj: Reposition Necessary Engineer Construction Units From France to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) (S). SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-4.

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requirements for these units in Germany in the first quarter of FY 1968 and that the 68th and 78th Engineer Companies (Construction) return to the United States.⁸²

(10) Redistribution of Spaces. This study addressed the positioning of all those TD spaces, TOE units, and Labor Service (LS) elements not covered in other USAREUR decision papers. USAREUR needed these personnel and spaces to perform its peacetime missions and still provide a limited but essential base on which to expand to an effective wartime support stature. For instance, this study considered the personnel required to provide SHAPE and USEUCOM headquarters with the level of support they would require at their relocation sites. USAREUR concluded that it would require additional military space authorizations to support increased populations and activity expansions in Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the BENELUX area, particularly if the anticipated shortage of LN employees at the relocation sites materialized.

A particular problem was the disposition of the approximately 1,200 personnel of the 21 LS units in France. An agreement with the French required the United States to remove LS employees when they were no longer needed to support U.S. operations in France. Only those LS personnel who obtained permits from the French Ministry of the Interior might remain. The others would have to return to Germany at an estimated cost of \$836,000. USAREUR could assign the 900 personnel who had expressed a desire to continue their employment with the U.S. Army to currently vacant LS and LN spaces in Germany or transfer them to Italy, the United Kingdom, and the BENELUX area to support relocated U.S. activities.⁸³

In general USAREUR proposed transferring 7,475 manpower space authorizations from France to other locations in Europe.

⁸²(1) Cable 8229, JCS to USCINCEUR, 18 Nov 66. (2) Cable SX-6359, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 22 Nov 66. (3) Cables ECJD-E-17835 and 19054, USCINCEUR to JCS, 23 Nov and 19 Dec 66. Both NOFORN. (4) Memo, SECDEF to CJCS, 24 Dec 66, cited above. All SECRET. Gp-4.

⁸³FRELOC/CRELOC Decision Paper, 24 Oct 66, subj: Reposition TD Spaces, TOE Units and Labor Service Necessary to Support Objective I - FRELOC (U), and C 1, 25 Oct 66. SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-4.

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However, the Secretary of Defense authorized the transfer of a specific number of USACOMZEUR's personnel each time he approved the relocation of a unit or a headquarters,⁸⁴ thus successively reducing this figure. On 31 December the Joint Chiefs of Staff presented to the Secretary of Defense detailed justifications for retaining in Europe 5,242 of the USACOMZEUR spaces authorized for France. They estimated one-time personnel costs at \$2 million (Chart 8).⁸⁵

c. Major Objective III. The task of positioning in the United Kingdom and the BENELUX countries 30 days' combat support for the D plus 30 forces involved the following two major subordinate objectives:

(1) Relocation of the Wartime Hospital Capability. USAREUR would require 15,000 fixed hospital beds to support nonnuclear warfare through D plus 60. In France USAREUR's peacetime hospital bed capability of 6,706 beds was readily expandable to 10,600 beds. USAREUR scheduled the assemblages for four hospitals--a total capability for 3,600 beds--for relocation to Germany, and had to find the means for storing the equipment assemblages for the remaining 7,000 beds.

Their storage in Germany would place USAREUR's hospital capability far forward in a relatively small and congested area, where stored supplies would be vulnerable to destruction by enemy forces. A forced withdrawal in time of emergency would increase the possibility of materiel loss because of the relatively low mobility of medical units.

Storing assemblages in the United States and shipping them to the United Kingdom in time of emergency would reduce USAREUR's reaction capability and be very expensive. And even if the French permitted USAREUR to store the equipment in France, the absence of firm U.S. peacetime access rights to the storage sites would rule out this option. For these reasons, USAREUR recommended

⁸⁴ Such as the movement of the 557th Quartermaster Company from Evreux, France, to Mainz, Germany, and of the personnel authorized for the support of SHAPE, AFCENT, and USEUCOM headquarters. (Intvws, Mr. Carlisle with LTC R. C. Lehman and MAJ J. S. Kramer, USAREUR ODCSOPS, 26 and 27 Jan 67. CONF. Gp-4.)

⁸⁵ (1) DF, ODCSOPS to CofS/Dep CINCUSAREUR, 5 Dec 66, subj: FRELOC TELECON. AEAGC-F. CONF. Gp-4. (2) JCSM-813-66, 31 Dec 66, subj: Relocation of Personnel From France (U). SECRET. Gp-4. Cy in AEAGC-F files.

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Chart 8 (S)

USACOMZEUR Manpower Space Authorizations
Recommended for Transfer From France to Other Countries in Europe
31 December 1966

A. BY SELECTED CATEGORY

	<u>Total</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>U.S. Civilian</u>	<u>Local National</u>
TOTALS	<u>5,242</u>	<u>2,906</u>	<u>155</u>	<u>2,181</u>
Depot Activities	<u>2,137</u>	902	63	1,172
Mission Units	<u>1,404</u>	1,102	60	242
Garrison and Support Units	<u>1,573</u>	774	32	767
Headquarters Support	<u>128</u>	128	--	--

B. BY FUNCTIONAL AREA

	<u>Total</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>U.S. Civilian</u>	<u>Local National</u>
TOTALS	<u>5,242</u>	<u>2,906</u>	<u>155</u>	<u>2,181</u>
Depot Activities	<u>2,137</u>	902	63	1,172
Garrison Activities	<u>525</u>	--	--	525
Medical	<u>231</u>	177	14	40
Signal	<u>671</u>	490	9	172
Comptroller	<u>231</u>	145	18	68
Military Police	<u>166</u>	161	--	5
Personnel Services	<u>16</u>	7	3	6
Adjutant General Services	<u>99</u>	65	3	31
Public Affairs	<u>15</u>	10	--	5
Transportation	<u>554</u>	463	19	72
Intelligence	<u>36</u>	35	1	--
Logistic-type Units	<u>435</u>	325	25	85
Engineer	<u>126</u>	126	--	--

Source: JCSM-813-66, 31 Dec 66, subj: Relocation of Personnel
From France (U). SECRET. Gp-4.

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storing the assemblages in the United Kingdom. Although the English Channel barrier and the lack of a surface chain of medical evacuation facilities would mean a complete dependence on intratheater aeromedical resources, storage in the United Kingdom would make it possible to install the equipment in depth at a reasonable distance from the expected zone of combat. Since current planning called for phasing out hospitals in the forward areas of Germany as soon as hostilities became imminent, the released medical units could immediately move to the United Kingdom, where they would set up the stored equipment and prepare to accept patients.

USAREUR's recommended course of action provided the best nucleus for the creation of a wartime medical chain of evacuation and had the advantage of placing the equipment and physical facilities in the most desirable location in peacetime.⁸⁶

USAREUR plans for implementing the Secretary of Defense decision to store 30 days' war reserves in the United Kingdom--announced in late December--included the wartime medical assemblages.⁸⁷

(2) Relocation of Vital Stocks. USAREUR had the authority to store 90 days of reserve support supplies in Europe, two-thirds of which it planned to store in the Federal Republic of Germany. It had to find another country for the adequate storage and maintenance of 30 days' support supplies.

USAREUR estimated that after the transfer of all 60-day level supplies to Germany, 80,000 tons of general supplies and 76,000 tons of ammunition would still remain in French depots. These tonnages would not represent the entire 30-day reserve; to complete the reserve requirement, USAREUR would need an additional 61,000 tons of general supplies and 33,000 tons of ammunition. Of the four storage location possibilities--the United Kingdom, the United States, the Federal Republic, or floating depots--cost comparisons favored the United Kingdom: The relocation of

⁸⁶Incl 1 to ltr, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR et al., 20 Sep 66, subj: Change 1 to FRELOC/CRELOC Decision Paper, Relocation from France of Hospital Capability Not Included in That Planned in the FRG (S). AEAMD-PO. SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-4.

⁸⁷Intvw, Mr. Carlisle with CPT Mendell, 4 Jan 67. SECRET. Gp-4.

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stocks would involve a one-time expenditure of \$12.2 million and annual operating costs of \$3.1 million. The corresponding amounts would be \$21.1 million for relocation to the United States and \$4.5 million for annual operating costs.

USAREUR rejected the stateside storage concept because the attendant reduction of theater-based reserves to a 60-day level would seriously degrade its combat capability. Storage in the Federal Republic of Germany furnished no realistic solution because of the lack of immediately available storage facilities in that country. USAREUR's experience in negotiating for real estate had conclusively demonstrated the difficulty in acquiring new F.R.G. property for the use of its forces. However, even if USAREUR succeeded in acquiring real estate, the property would become available in small increments, negotiations would be time consuming, costs would be high and would consist of gold-flow expenditures exclusively, stocks would be in the open at widely scattered locations, current maintenance capability could not effectively absorb the additional workload, and numerous waivers to established ammunition quantity-distance criteria would be necessary. USAREUR emphasized that these and other factors, such as the need to accept a rapid stock deterioration and shortening of the useful life of ammunition by at least 20 percent, would result in the development of unacceptable logistic and security conditions.

USAREUR quickly abandoned the floating storage concept because of its high initial and recurring costs; the difficulty of rotating, maintaining, preserving, and controlling the stocks stored; the loss of flexibility in using space; and the vulnerability to enemy air or naval action.

Remaining then was storage in the United Kingdom, which USAREUR favored and recommended. Facilities at Burtonwood Air Station were adequate for storing not only the 80,000 tons of general supplies from France but also the 61,000 tons required to complete the 30-day reserve of general supplies. The Royal Air Force (RAF) station at Fauld and the ammunition storage area at Bramshall would provide adequate facilities for 57,500 of the 76,000 tons of class V supplies from France. It was highly probable that the United Kingdom would provide additional sites to store the 18,500 tons of ammunition remaining in France and the 33,000 tons authorized to complete the 30-day ammunition

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reserve level. The adoption of the recommended course of action would require a temporary augmentation of the current workforce by about 1,700.⁸⁸

On 12 December the Secretary of Defense approved the U.K. storage concept. In addition to establishing fund limitations, he specified that not more than 211 U.S. and LN full-time personnel would service the 30-day war reserve stockage level--the 165,000 tons on hand at depots in France, plus 94,000 tons from the United States. As a temporary augmentation, however, he authorized the use of 247 U.S. and 1,808 LN personnel through 30 June 1967.⁸⁹

The first 200 military personnel were to move to the United Kingdom shortly after 1 January 1967.⁹⁰

d. Major Objective IV. The task of relocating residual personnel and materiel from France after 1 April 1967 involved the following five major subordinate objectives:

(1) Disposal of Excess Stocks. USAREUR intended to dispose of three kinds of property in accordance with existing supply disposition procedures: 115,000 tons of depot stocks; 8,000 tons of hold-for-MAP supplies; and an estimated 100,000 tons of post, camp, and station (PCS) property. In August USAREUR shipped all the hold-for-MAP supplies--7,000 tons to the United States and the remainder to Italy. By the end of that month it had also received disposition instructions for 74,000 tons of the excess depot stocks. Of these, 10,500 tons went to property disposal agencies and the remainder to MAP recipients, the Federal Republic of Germany, or to supply agencies in the United States. USAREUR estimated that it would dispose of the remaining 41,000 tons of depot stocks in a similar manner. Moving and handling

⁸⁸(1) FRELOC/CRELOC Decision Paper, 7 Sep 66, subj: Relocation from France of Vital Army Stocks Not Included in the 60-Day Support Stockage in the FRG (S). (2) Cable ECJD-OS-13233, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 9 Sep 66. (3) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR et al., 13 Sep 66, same subj as (1) above. AEAGD-M. (4) Cable ECJD-PW-13839, USCINCEUR to JCS, 20 Sep 66. (5) Cable SX-5623, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 8 Oct 66. All SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-4.

⁸⁹Cable JCS-1284, JCS to USCINCEUR, 13 Dec 66. SECRET. Gp-4,

⁹⁰The Stars and Stripes (Eur. ed.), 28 Dec 66, p. 8. UNCLAS.

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costs would be about \$2.8 million. Of the 100,000 tons of PCS property--valued at \$200 million--USAREUR estimated that about 28,000 tons of nonusable items would go to property disposal agencies and that continued screening of the remaining tonnage against commandwide requirements would permit the use of this type of property throughout the relocation period. The tonnage of excess PCS property remaining 30 June 1967 would depend on whether the U.S. supply agencies gave to this type of property the same expedited and accelerated treatment as to excess depot stocks. In any event, the U.S. Liquidation Agency⁹¹ for residual property in France would then assume responsibility for these stocks. Another solution was to ship the residual PCS property to Germany and place it under the control of USAACOM until final disposition. Although this solution would aggravate the storage and stock maintenance problem in Germany, the costs for handling and shipping would be far less than those incurred for transportation to either the United States or the United Kingdom.⁹²

(2) Establishment of a U.S. Liquidation Agency in France. Very early in FRELOC planning it became obvious that the United States would need an agency in France to discharge its obligations, to protect its interests, and to handle residual matters after the relocation of most of its personnel and materiel. Since the French had tacitly agreed to allow certain schools and support facilities--such as medical services, commissaries, and administrative support activities--to remain and function in France until the end of the 1966 - 1967 school year, some U.S. military control agency would have to be in France after 1 April 1967.

In late 1966 the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed the activation of a liquidation agency that would initially operate under the control of USEUCOM and later under the aegis of the U.S. Embassy at Paris. USAREUR recommended that the transfer of responsibilities from USACOMZEUR to the liquidation agency should occur after 1 July 1967, by which time USACOMZEUR would have relocated the bulk of its stocks, operating equipment, and personnel.⁹³ USEUCOM

⁹¹ See next subparagraph. UNCLAS.

⁹² (1) Draft, FRELOC/CRELOC Decision Paper, Disposal of Excess Stocks in France. AEAGE-S-P-M. (2) Intvw, Mr. Carlisle with LTC McConaghy, 23 Nov 66. Both CONF. NOFORN. Gp-4.

⁹³ (1) FRELOC/CRELOC Decision Paper, 8 Sep 66, subj: Relocation and U.S. Liquidation Agency (U). (2) Cable SX-5285, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 19 Sep 66. Both SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-4.

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recommended establishing the agency as early as 1 February 1967, so that it would be fully operational by 1 July, when it would pass from USEUCOM to Department of Defense control. However, USEUCOM's component commanders would retain ownership and inventory management responsibility for all removable and salvageable U.S. property in France until shipped or released to the liquidation agency for disposal. They would also operate the U.S. dependent schools functioning in France after 1 July 1967. The U.S. Embassy at Paris would be responsible for the conduct of residual value negotiations, and when the remaining military interests reached the point at which there was no further need for physical custody of facilities and other assets, the U.S. Embassy would assume complete agency management and control.⁹⁴

In late December the Departments of Defense and State were coordinating the terms of reference for the liquidation organization and the development of procedures for the sale of personal property to agencies of the French Government.⁹⁵

(3) Retention of Stocks in ABREST Depots in France.

Survival stocks of general supplies for V Corps positioned at the Aboncourt ABREST facility near Metz, France, were part of the 60-day reserve stocks scheduled for relocation to Germany. Survival stocks of conventional ammunition positioned at the Vatry and Rozelier ABREST facilities in France were part of the 30-day reserve scheduled for relocation to the United Kingdom or BENELUX countries. USAREUR's ABREST-type facilities near Pirmasens, Germany, consisted of eight 20,000-square-foot warehouses, each having a capacity to store from 8,000 to 9,000 tons of general supplies, and 73 Stradley igloos with a total capacity of 30,000 tons of conventional ammunition. Survival levels for both corps were 8,200 tons of general supplies, 46,000 tons of conventional ammunition, and 3,000 tons of classified ammunition.

The Joint Chiefs wanted either to exchange French-controlled facilities in Germany for those the United States was to vacate

⁹⁴ (1) Cable ECJD-PP-13684, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR et al., 17 Sep 66. (2) Cable ECJD-PP-14071, USCINCEUR to JCS, 23 Sep 66. (3) Intvw, Mr. Carlisle with LTC Hensel, 25 Oct 66. (4) Cable ECJD-PP-16243, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR and CINCUSAFE, 26 Oct 66. All SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-4.

⁹⁵ Memo, SECDEF to CJCS, 24 Dec 66, cited above. SECRET. Gp-4.

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in France, or to retain the ABREST facilities in eastern France for as long as the French forces remained in Germany. However, negotiations for either of these options seemed to have little chance for success. Even assuming a favorable outcome, the time lag before the conclusion of a bilateral accord would preclude an early decision. For planning purposes, USCINCEUR therefore assumed that the French would not permit the storage of U.S. stocks on their territory.

Under these circumstances the most acceptable immediate solution was to store a part of the survival requirement for each corps in the ABREST facilities currently available in Germany and to provide complete ABREST protection for all survival stocks of ammunition for both corps in newly constructed facilities. USAREUR recommended that the Secretary of Defense approve the previously requested \$6.5 million construction funds included in the study on the relocation of 246,000 tons of supplies from France to Germany and Italy. All survival stocks of general supplies and about 65 percent of the conventional ammunition of both corps would thus have complete ABREST protection. The other 35 percent of the conventional ammunition would be in ordinary storage facilities until completion of additional ABREST construction. The best overall solution, however, seemed to be to retain the ABREST facilities in France and to obtain reentry rights to these installations.⁹⁶

In September USAREUR directed USACOMZEUR to move all corps survival stocks, except the ammunition stored at Vatry and Rozelier, to the ABREST facilities in Germany and to keep the supplies of each corps separate. The class I rations stored in the ABREST complex at Pirmasens would go to nearby caves, and USAREUR would survey the caves to separate the supplies for each corps. The warehouse facilities at Pirmasens were more than adequate for storing the 5,509 tons of classes II, III, and IV supplies for both corps. The 73 Stradley igloos at Pirmasens could hold a total of 30,000 tons of conventional ammunition, whereas the two corps' survival stocks amounted to approximately 46,000 tons.

⁹⁶(1) FRELOC/CRELOC Decision Paper, 14 Sep 66, subj: Retain Stocks in the ABREST Depot at Verdun (Aboncourt and Vatry/Rozelier) Indefinitely Subject to Agreement with GOF. Copy in AEAGC-PFD.
(2) Cable ECJD-PW-13908, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 21 Sep 66.
(3) Cable SX-5672, CINCUSAREUR to USACOMZEUR, 14 Oct 66. All SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-4.

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The construction of additional igloos would therefore be necessary to protect the corps survival stocks of ammunition currently stored in France.⁹⁷

(4) Relocation of Dependents and Associated Support Activities. Early in the spring the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed a progressive withdrawal of dependents and related support facilities from France during the relocation. USAREUR, however, held that such an action would divert badly needed resources from the primary task of relocating war reserve stocks and essential operating supplies. The morale aspects of the question favored leaving dependents in France so as to provide a relatively stable family environment during the transfer period and guarantee the adequacy of dependent support facilities in other areas before moving the families. As a partial solution, USAREUR recommended the establishment of an early cutoff date for the travel of additional dependents to France.⁹⁸

USEUCOM agreed that the removal of all dependents and support facilities from France by 31 March 1967 would cause undue hardships. It urged that dependents' schools continue to operate in France for the entire 1966 - 67 school year, that dependent support facilities should not completely phase out before 1 September 1967, and that the Department of Defense restrict dependent travel to France as soon as possible.⁹⁹

Early in May the Department of the Army advised that the Secretary of Defense had so far not approved suspension of dependent

⁹⁷(1) Cable S-1302, USACOMZEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 16 Aug 66. (2) DF, DCSLOG to CofS, 31 Aug 66, subj: Stockage of Corps Survival Depots. AEAGD-S-P-M. (3) Cables SX-5052 and 5552, CINCUSAREUR to USACOMZEUR, 5 Sep and 4 Oct 66. (4) Cable ECDS-13253, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 12 Sep 66. NOFORN. (5) DF, DCSLOG to CofS, 3 Oct 66, subj: Stockage of Corps Survival Depots (U). AEAGD-S-P-M. (6) DF, DCSLOG to CofS, 15 Nov 66, subj: Stockage at Corps Survival Depots (U). AEAGD. (7) DF, DCSLOG S&S Dir to ADCSOPS, 29 Nov 66, subj: Corps Survival Depots. AEAGD-S-P-M. All SECRET. Gp-4.

⁹⁸Cable SX-2704, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 6 Apr 66. SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-4.

⁹⁹Cable ECJA-B-06638, USCINCEUR to JCS, 23 Apr 66. SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-3.

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travel to France but that, if he did, the Army would try to establish a 12-month unaccompanied tour for personnel assigned to France.¹⁰⁰

On 15 June the Secretary of Defense announced that officially sanctioned travel of both military and civilian dependents to duty stations in France would cease, effective 1 August. A few days later the Department of the Army announced that a sponsor assigned to France and scheduled to travel before 1 August could either move his dependents to France or relocate them within the United States. For personnel already stationed in France with dependents and those electing to move their dependents to France, the normal tour length of 36 months would apply. Those personnel assigned to France before 1 August who elected to leave their dependents in the United States, together with all personnel assigned to France after 1 August, would serve a 24-month tour.

On 15 August the Department of the Army adjusted tour lengths of personnel assigned to France. Personnel assigned to France before 1 August would serve tours of 36 or 24 months, depending on whether accompanied or not. Personnel assigned after 1 August, however, would serve short tours of 12 months.¹⁰¹

The Department of the Army warned that the unsettled conditions in France could cause inconvenience and expense to families. It instructed commanders to counsel sponsors and advise them of the progressive phaseout of military installations and dependent support facilities in France, the likelihood of a relocation to other European countries without adequate dependent support and housing facilities, the possibility of many dependents having to return to the United States while their sponsors completed adjusted unaccompanied tours, and the high cost of living on the local economy in Europe without access to dependent support facilities.¹⁰²

In mid-May USAREUR estimated that some 1,750 military and civilian personnel, with approximately 8,700 dependents, would

¹⁰⁰ Cable DA-763904, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 7 May 66. SECRET.
Gp-4.

¹⁰¹ (1) Cable DA-770662, DA to CINCUSAREUR et al., 21 Jun 66.
(2) AR 614-30, Assignments, Details, and Transfers, U.S. Army Replacement System, Oversea Service. Both UNCLAS. (3) Cable DA-778046, DA to CINCUSAREUR et al., 15 Aug 66. UNCLAS. FOUO.

¹⁰² Cable DA-770662, cited above. UNCLAS.

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remain in France on 1 April 1967.¹⁰³ Accordingly, USAREUR and USEUCOM both challenged the Department of the Army assumption that no U.S. personnel would remain in France after 1 April 1967. By the end of June USEUCOM estimated that approximately 1,900 U.S. military and civilian personnel plus several thousand dependents would remain in France after the cut-off date and that these would relocate gradually as residual U.S. materiel and facilities in France declined. Accordingly, USEUCOM intended to request French permission to continue operating the dependents' school system in France until the end of the school year and to continue furnishing dependents' support facilities for as long as necessary.¹⁰⁴

Actually, the problem consisted of two separate, although related, considerations: In the period from 1 April to 30 June 1967 USAREUR would have to maintain the U.S. Liquidation Agency in France and provide support for dependents. During the same period, but continuing past 30 June, USAREUR would also have to maintain personnel in France in connection with activities that might not depart until 1969. Included in the latter category were the personnel associated with stocks and depots that USAREUR might be unable to remove from France by the deadline; personnel representing U.S. interests in the POL pipeline and communications installations; and personnel associated with the Paris Claims Office and similar residual service-type activities that would continue for several years after the U.S. departure. Based on these considerations, USAREUR estimated in July that approximately 1,600 U.S. military and civilian personnel, plus over 4,000 dependents, would remain in France from 1 April to 30 June 1967, and that thereafter approximately 825 personnel would remain.¹⁰⁵

To support these personnel in the period from April through June, USAREUR would require housing, medical, commissary, and post exchange facilities at Paris, Orleans, Verdun, and Ingrandes. In addition, it would have to operate elementary and high schools

¹⁰³(1) Cable ECAP-P-07749, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 16 May 66.
(2) Cable SX-3398, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 17 May 66. Both SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-4.

¹⁰⁴(1) Cable ECJA-P-09738, USCINCEUR to DA, 29 Jun 66.
SECRET. (2) Cable SX-4022, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 30 Jun 66. CONF.
Both Gp-4.

¹⁰⁵(1) Cable SX-4216, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 14 Jul 66. (2)
Cable SX-4410, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 26 Jul 66. Both SECRET.
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at Paris, Orleans, and Verdun, and elementary schools at Fontainebleau, Toul, and Ingrandes. For an indefinite period after 1 July 1967 USAREUR would continue to require housing, medical, commissary, and exchange facilities at Paris, Verdun, and Ingrandes, and would continue to operate the schools in Paris.¹⁰⁶

On 28 July the U.S. Embassy requested the French Government to authorize retention of the above-listed facilities beyond the scheduled 31 March departure date. Two weeks later a French Government spokesman stated that the question had gone all the way to President de Gaulle for decision, that the United States might retain the requested schools and support facilities until 30 June, but that his government preferred not to make any written agreement on the subject because the United States would thus have greater freedom of action.¹⁰⁷ The question of continuing support functions beyond 30 June 1967 thus remained unresolved.

The issue lay dormant until late November, when the Joint Chiefs of Staff--citing the French agreement to let facilities remain open beyond 31 March--requested USCINCEUR's plan for retaining and supporting dependents in France after that date.¹⁰⁸ In response to USEUCOM's request, and based on data that USACOMZEUR compiled, USAREUR furnished the requested information. For this purpose USAREUR assumed the approval and implementation of FRELOC plans; that USACOMZEUR dependents would remain only until 30 June; that thereafter only Joint Liquidation Agency dependents would remain in France; that a dependent school would operate at Captieux, in addition to the locations cited in the July estimates; and that all Army dependent housing facilities would remain open after 31 March. The computations did not include any non-USAREUR personnel.

USAREUR estimated that 8,231 dependents would be in France on 31 March 1967 and 6,962 on 31 May, and that all but the dependents of the Joint Liquidation Agency personnel would depart by 30 June.

To furnish community and welfare support to the dependents remaining on 31 March, USAREUR estimated that it would need

¹⁰⁶ Cable SX-4410, cited above. SECRET. Gp-4.

¹⁰⁷ Cable 2056, AMEMB Paris to Secy State (1378), et al., 12 Aug 66. SECRET. Gp-3.

¹⁰⁸ Cable JCS-9168, JCS to USCINCEUR, 30 Nov 66. SECRET. Gp-4. AG TS 42-27

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837 military, 207 U.S. civilian (186 of them for the schools), and 898 LN personnel. As the number of dependents declined between 31 March and 30 June, USAREUR would simultaneously phase down support activities and the personnel operating them, until by 30 June only the 205 USAREUR members of the Joint Liquidation Agency--together with an estimated 149 dependents--would remain.¹⁰⁹

(5) Relocation of Units and Personnel Not Covered in Other Studies. At the end of the reporting period, USAREUR had completed only part of the requirements for this study.¹¹⁰

49. (S) U.S. Reentry Rights Into France

Along with the immediate problems attending the relocation of U.S. forces from France, U.S. military and diplomatic agencies had to recognize the importance of reacquiring the use of certain vacated installations in time of crisis.¹¹¹

The French had indicated their intention of remaining entirely free in deciding whether they wanted to provide military support to a NATO victim of aggression. Concerning the possible U.S. reactivation of, or automatic reentry rights to, the vacated bases, they refused to make any comment for the period preceding their unilateral declaration of intent to support an attacked NATO ally.¹¹²

In August the U.S. Ambassador to France presented to the French Foreign Minister a list of the U.S. installations for which the United States desired reentry rights. After reviewing the list, CINCUSAREUR commented that the rationale supporting the

¹⁰⁹(1) Cable AEZPA-PS-S-1455, USACOMZEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 10 Dec 66. (2) Cable SX-6783, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 20 Dec 66. Both SECRET. Gp-4.

¹¹⁰Intvw, Mr. Carlisle with MAJ Stice, 29 Dec 66. UNCLAS.

¹¹¹(1) Memo, USLO Bonn to CINCUSAREUR, 11 Jul 66, subj: Political Briefs (U). AEAP0. (2) Cable 1928, AMEMB Paris to CINCUSAREUR, 12 Jul 66. Both SECRET. Gp-4. (3) The Stars and Stripes (Eur. ed.), 19 Jul 66, p. 1. UNCLAS.

¹¹²Cable 2162, AMEMB Bonn to Secy State, 22 Aug 66. UNCLAS.

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selection of the ports and depots was not clear. He suggested that the United States should negotiate reentry rights to installations and sites essential for the early reestablishment of the line of communications across France.¹¹³ USCINCEUR, who had not participated in the preparation of the Ambassador's list, recognized the risks of placing great dependence on using any vacated installations or facilities in France in time of crisis. In his opinion, the Ambassador's list represented only a point of departure for negotiations and did not completely reflect his own selection of facilities required for LOC reestablishment.¹¹⁴

In October the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked for a new list that might serve for further U.S.-French reentry negotiations after the Secretaries of State and Defense had approved it.

The main disadvantages of relying on reentry rights were the uncertainty of basing U.S. wartime plans on a tenuous French approval, and--assuming the ultimate conclusion of an agreement--the probable French insistence that the United States pay the costs incurred for the maintenance of the selected installations, plus the charges imposed for granting the recovery privilege.¹¹⁵

In preparing a list of Army installations for which the United States should request reentry rights, CINCUSAREUR was to assume that the use of the selected facilities would be possible only after the French had declared a state of war or emergency, that no U.S. stocks or personnel would remain in France in peacetime, and that the unmanned facilities would require reactivation before the start of U.S. operations.¹¹⁶

¹¹³(1) DF, DCSOPS to CofS, 8 Aug 66, subj: Reentry Rights for LOC in France (S). AEAGC-P. (2) Cable SX-4630, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 9 Aug 66. Both SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-4.

¹¹⁴Cable ECJD-PH-11744, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 12 Aug 66. SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-4.

¹¹⁵Cable JCS-4483, JCS to USCINCEUR, 6 Oct 66. SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-3.

¹¹⁶(1) Cable ECJD-PP-14276, USCINCEUR to JCS et al., 27 Sep 66. (2) Cables ECJD-PP-14889 and 14943, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR et al., 7 and 8 Oct 66. All SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-4.

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The USAREUR list represented the minimum considered necessary for the initial reestablishment of the line of communications across France. It assumed that airfields, such as Chateauroux and Evreux, and the St. Nazaire, La Rochelle, and Bordeaux port and beach complexes would be immediately available to U.S. forces in time of crisis or war, and that the recommended facilities would operate on an austere basis.

USAREUR emphasized that these facilities were only a small part of its total D plus 30 property requirements. Their availability would permit an initial step toward LOC reestablishment; however, all the installations and facilities recognized as necessary for the operation of a wartime French line of communications would have to be available to support forces in prolonged general war.

As first priority facilities, USAREUR designated the Donges-Metz pipeline and its associated tank farms at Donges, Melun, Chalons, and Metz. The use of the pipeline would reduce USAREUR's need for transportation units, equipment, and storage facilities for large quantities of bulk POL. Although USAREUR assumed that the system would be operational at the time of reentry, the early assignment of certain specialized pipeline operating units would be necessary to guarantee a smooth transfer to U.S. control without any loss of support capability.

The recovery of nine vacated U.S. hospitals having a total constructed capacity for 6,359 beds had second priority. These hospitals would partially satisfy the overall D plus 30 requirement for 15,000 beds.

USAREUR gave third priority to the supply and administration facilities essential for reopening and operating the lines of communications across France. Since depots in the eastern part of France would be essential for attaining an initial capability to support forces in Germany, it would be necessary to route to this area all supplies arriving at French Atlantic ports and not delivered directly to Germany or immediately consumed. The Maginot Caserne and the Chicago Area--both near Verdun--would be the sites for the Eastern Area Support Command headquarters and its support facilities. Nancy General Depot--for the storage and issue of bulk POL and ammunition--and the Rozelier Depot--for the storage and issue of ammunition--would be the first operating depots in eastern France.

As the site for Western Area Support Command headquarters USAREUR selected Aboville Caserne at Poitiers because of its central location and support facilities.

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When the ports in western France became operational, USAREUR would need the depot facilities at Ingrandes General Depot to expedite the supply, storage, and port operations. After the Ingrandes activation, USAREUR would start operations at the Vatry Depot to provide additional ammunition support to the forward area. It would need Braconne Depot to furnish a supply activity in the Bordeaux port complex, and Captieux Depot to store ammunition in western France. To provide additional space for depot operations in eastern France--excluding the storage and issue of POL and ammunition--USAREUR recommended reopening the Toul General Depot. Saumur Depot would provide the additional space necessary for activities supporting the ports and for storage of supplies in western France. The ABREST depot facility at Aboncourt (near Metz) would protect classes II, III, and IV supplies. Maison Fort would be the site for the command installation controlling the entire logistic system. The activation of the medical depots at Croix Chapeau and Vitry le Francois would coincide with the activation of the hospitals at these two sites.

For fourth priority USAREUR listed the airfields at Rozelier (near Verdun), Biard (near Poitiers), and Saran (near Orleans), which would support the nearby headquarters.¹¹⁷

50. (S) Real Estate Problems

a. Germany. In early April USAREUR proposed that the U.S. Ambassador at Bonn approach the German authorities to inform them of the real estate needs that would arise from moving headquarters and supply facilities from France to Germany. As an alternative, USAREUR suggested that it present the problem to the Germans as a routine matter through normal military channels.¹¹⁸

By the end of April the U.S. Secretary of Defense and his German counterpart had agreed to start joint discussions and site reconnaissance. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, wanted to limit initial discussions to the requirements associated with the more complete use of the real estate already under U.S. control, the possibility of reciprocal real estate exchanges, the joint

¹¹⁷ Cable SX-5884, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 24 Oct 66. SECRET. Gp-4.

¹¹⁸ Cables SX-2640 and 2705, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 3 and 6 Apr 66. SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-3.

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use of real property, and the minor real estate acquisition actions directly related to currently available space.¹¹⁹

On 5 May the first U.S.-F.R.G. discussion took place at Bonn. The Germans asked the U.S. representatives to list their space requirements and indicate the kind and quantities of supplies and the desired availability dates. They would furnish USAREUR a list of facilities suitable for joint usage and discuss space requirements related to U.S. POL storage needs.¹²⁰

Toward the end of October the Germans asked USAREUR for its final real estate acquisition proposals. They had offered about 60 properties for the relocation of U.S. materiel, including ammunition, and suggested the initiation of applicable legal procedures in case the increased storage of ammunition and POL supplies required the addition or extension of restricted areas. Even though USAREUR intended to use its own resources to establish, extend, or modify its storage facilities, coordination with the appropriate German administrative agencies was necessary so that the construction projects would comply with local building codes.¹²¹

At the end of 1966, USAREUR had acquired no properties to satisfy requirements engendered by FRELOC.¹²²

b. France. On 31 March USAREUR held 357 properties¹²³ in France, which it had to release to the French authorities. In the past, the French had delayed the turnover of U.S. facilities by not being ready to receive them. They acknowledged the problem and insisted that the United States furnish them a schedule for the closeout of each property. However, the United States

¹¹⁹ Cable JCS-9975, CJCS to USCINCEUR, 30 Apr 66. SECRET. Gp-4.

¹²⁰ Cable MGP-3-1900, MAAG Bonn to USCINCEUR, 5 May 66. SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-4.

¹²¹ Cable SX-5881, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 24 Oct 66. CONF. Gp-4.

¹²² Intvw, Mr. Carlisle with Mr. P. L. Harper, USAREUR Engr and Instl Div Real Estate Br, 17 Mar 67. CONF. Gp-4.

¹²³ 130 rent-paid--including 15 surplus commodity housing areas--and 227 rent-free. UNCLAS.

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could not make any accurate forecasts until the Department of Defense had announced decisions on the relocation of supplies and units.¹²⁴

At the end of October USAREUR had released only 41 minor properties, and it was apparent that the delay in decisions would mean that 13¹²⁵ of the 23 major installations in France would not be ready for closeout by 1 April 1967.¹²⁶

To help accelerate the release program, USAREUR authorized USACOMZEUR to turn over excess properties without obtaining its approval. Such releases would accord with current FRELOC planning objectives, and before actual turnover, USACOMZEUR would screen each property to determine the economic advantage of removing or retaining U.S. improvements and installed equipment. This release authority did not extend to rent-paid leased properties, NATO- or joint-funded construction and improvements, surplus commodity housing, and position public housing.¹²⁷

USAREUR also authorized USACOMZEUR to start dismantling--on a selective basis--a group of 8,000 prefabricated buildings. As the next step, USACOMZEUR established a priority listing of installations for screening and actual property removal.¹²⁸

¹²⁴(1) Cables 2461 and 2515, AMEMB Paris to Secy State, 23 and 24 Aug 66. (2) Cable S-1350, USACOMZEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 22 Sep 66. NOFORN. Both SECRET. Gp-4.

¹²⁵Captieux, Chize, Braconne, Ingrandes, Chinon, Saumur, and St. Nazaire in Western France; Nancy, Toul, and Verdun in Eastern France; and the Orleans and Paris Posts and the Petroleum Distribution Command headquarters at Fontainebleau in Central France. UNCLAS.

¹²⁶(1) Cable ECJD-FRELOC-16567, USCINCEUR to JCS, 1 Nov 66. CONF. (2) Sec III to Incl 1 to ltr, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 11 Nov 66. subj: FRELOC Status Report (RCS ECJD-120). AEAGD-T. SECRET. Both NOFORN. Gp-4.

¹²⁷(1) Cable AEZIS-IN-C-0864, USACOMZEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 30 Aug 66. (2) Cable SX-5504, CINCUSAREUR to USACOMZEUR, 30 Sep 66. Both CONF. Gp-4.

¹²⁸(1) Cable SC-48151, CINCUSAREUR to USACOMZEUR, 26 Sep 66. (2) Cable AEZIS-IN-36342, USACOMZEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 28 Oct 66. Both UNCLAS. (3) Cable AEZIS-IN-C-1108, USACOMZEUR to CINCUSAREUR et al., 4 Nov 66. CONF. NOFORN. Gp-4.

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In November USEUCOM directed USAREUR to suspend temporarily all U.S.-France joint inventories and scheduled transfers of U.S. facilities pending a review and clarification of current property disposal policies.¹²⁹ The suspension was still in effect on 31 December.¹³⁰

c. The United Kingdom and BENELUX Countries. Until late December, when the Secretary of Defense announced his decision, bilateral negotiations for the acquisition of real estate in the United Kingdom consisted mainly of the compilation of technical survey data and cost estimates. Although the British authorities fully cooperated with USAREUR, the absence of firm requirements and storage plans presented difficulties often embarrassing to both parties. For example, the British postponed demolishing certain facilities at Burtonwood because the United States had no definite plan for the use of that installation. However, even under these limiting conditions USCINCEUR established procedures for the processing of probable U.S. needs.¹³¹

¹²⁹(1) Cable ECDV-17179, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR. (2) Cable SX-6190, CINCUSAREUR to USACOMZEUR. Both 12 Nov 66. CONF. Gp-4.

¹³⁰Intvw, Mr. Carlisle with MAJ Stice, 17 Mar 67. CONF. Gp-1.

¹³¹(1) Cable OPLP-00084, 3d AF to CINCUSAFE, 1 Jul 66. (2) Cable ECJD-OS-10100, USCINCEUR to JCS, 7 Jul 66. (3) Cable OPRD-09017, CINCUSAFE to CINCUSAREUR and 3d AF, 12 Jul 66. NOFORN. All CONF. (4) Cable JCS-6519, JCS to USCINCEUR, 12 Jul 66. (5) Cable OPLP-00102, 3d AF to CINCUSAREUR, 22 Jul 66. (6) Cables SX-4375 and 4707, CINCUSAREUR to 3d AF, 11 and 13 Aug 66. (7) Cable OPLP-00132, 3d AF to CINCUSAREUR et al., 23 Aug 66. (8) Cable OPLP-00143, 3d AF to CINCUSAREUR, 7 Sep 66. NOFORN. (4) through (8) SECRET. (9) Cable AEZCS-C-1052, USACOMZEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 25 Oct 66. CONF. (10) Cable ECJD-TP-17283, USCINCEUR to JCS, 15 Nov 66. SECRET. All Gp-3.

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Chapter 8

Logistics

51. (S) Impact of the Vietnam Conflict

a. Temporary Deferral of Equipment Modernization.

By February the Army supply system had to satisfy substantial unprogramed requirements caused by the increasing tempo of the buildup in Vietnam and the concurrent expansion of forces in the United States. After analysis of a study on current and future commitments, the Department of the Army concluded that all available assets, including less-than-Standard-A items, would have to continue in use. Despite accelerated procurement and production, including the use of commercial substitutes and the repair and rebuild of unserviceables, the Department had to revise its current equipment distribution schedules and defer by six to nine months the shipment of some items previously planned for equipment modernization programs in oversea commands.¹

b. Review of Operational Project Stocks. In addition, the Department of the Army asked USAREUR to review operational project stocks to determine what essential supplies could be made available for the support of Southeast Asian (SEA) operations. The Department of the Army approved USAREUR's recommendation to delete 23 line items from operational project stocks.²

¹Cable DA-752544, DA to CINCUSAREUR et al., 26 Feb 66.
SECRET. Gp-4.

²(1) Cable DA-749718, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 5 Feb 66. (2) Cable SX-1718, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR et al., 11 Feb 66. Both CONF. Gp-4. (3) Cable SC-18139, same to DA, 8 Mar 66. (4) Intvw, Mr. J. E. Carlisle, USAREUR Ops Div Mil Hist Sec, with MAJ R. E. Berg, USAREUR Log Div, 22 Apr 66. Both UNCLAS.

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c. Waterproofing of M-16 Mines. In March the U.S. Army Ammunition Procurement and Supply Agency (USAAPSA) requested USAREUR to establish a capability to waterproof and ship each month 86,000 M-16 mines to Vietnam.³ USAREUR replied that it had almost 1.5 million excess M-16's; however, to establish the requested capability, it would have to curtail its current ammunition renovation program, unless the Department of the Army furnished additional funds and personnel authorizations to waterproof the mines at the Trois Fontaines Ammunition Depot, which was to close on 30 June 1966.⁴

The Department of the Army directed USAREUR to waterproof M-16's to the limit of its capacity until the end of June, then ship the remaining excess to the United States for further processing and eventual disposition.⁵

d. Tents. USAREUR's theater reserves of medium general purpose tents were far less than the quantity required to support the emergency evacuation of noncombatants, to stage Post M-day Deployment List (PMDL) units, and to support war and contingency operations in the Middle East, Southern Asia, and Africa South of the Sahara (MEAFSA) area. Nevertheless, the urgent need for this item both in the United States

³ USAAPSA determined that returning the mines to the United States for processing and on-shipment to Vietnam would not be economical. (Cable SX-2519, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 28 Mar 66. SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-4.)

⁴ (1) Cables AEZSM-DO-PA-S-1093 and AEZCG-S-1099, USACOMZEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 15 and 25 Mar 66. (2) Cable SX-2519, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 28 Mar 66. All SECRET. NOFORN. (3) Cable QFDB-6083485, USAAPSA to USAMICOM, 29 Mar 66. CONF. All Gp-4.

⁵ (1) Cable AEZSM-DO-OC-27730, USACOMZEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 3 Jun 66. UNCLAS. (2) Intvws, Mr. Carlisle with LTC R. D. Funke, Mr. D. W. Robinder, and Mr. C. A. Schellinger, USAREUR Log Div, 7 and 8 Jun 66. SECRET. Gp-4.

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and in Southeast Asia made it essential to ship 4,000 tents from Europe to Vietnam and to redistribute the major part of the remaining tents authorized under Section 13, AEG-102-OP.⁶

e. Shipments From France. To avoid jeopardizing the U.S. position in line of communications (LOC) negotiations with the French, USEUCOM prohibited direct shipments of materiel to Vietnam from air or sea ports in France. Instead, depots were to forward such materiel to points outside France; from there the shipments would proceed to their destination.⁷ However, USEUCOM lifted this restriction in December and authorized the resumption of shipments from France. Depots were to use Vietnam MILSTRIP/MILSTAMP codes for shipments and avoid the use of "Vietnam" in the clear.⁸

f. Marine Landing Craft. In the midst of USAREUR's planning for relocating its marine fleet from France to the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, or Belgium, the Secretary of Defense approved a Department of the Army request to withdraw 53 LCM's and 16 LCU's from USAREUR's marine reserve fleet and to send them to Southeast Asia.⁹ USCINCEUR pointed out the consequences of this decision: Current plans called for relocating the LOC through the BENELUX area, where ports would cease to operate on the declaration of a reinforced alert. Thus, the U.S. forces in Europe would have to rely

⁶(1) Cable SX-1606, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 7 Feb 66. (2) Cable DA-757437, DA to CINCUSAREUR et al., 28 Mar 66. Both SECRET. (3) Cable 3166, USASMC to CINCUSAREUR et al., 31 Mar 66. CONF. All Gp-4. (4) Cable SC-21785, CINCUSAREUR to USACOMZEUR, 1 Apr 66. UNCLAS.

⁷(1) Cable EDJC-OS-06635, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR et al., 23 Apr 66. (2) Cable SX-3062, CINCUSAREUR to USACOMZEUR, 26 Apr 66. (3) Cable AEZCS-S-1168, USACOMZEUR to distr, 29 Apr 66. All SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-4.

⁸Cable ECJD-OS-17668, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR et al., 5 Dec 66. CONF. Gp-4.

⁹(1) Cable DA-780731, DA to CINCUSAREUR et al., 2 Sep 66. (2) Cable SX-5633, CINCUSAREUR to USACOMZEUR, 8 Sep 66. (3) Cable 53047, Secy State to AMEMB's Bonn and Paris, 23 Sep 66. NOFORN. All SECRET. Gp-4.

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on the terminal service units, arriving from the United States and employing prestocked equipment, to start over-the-beach operations. The reserve marine fleet represented the only craft available for this purpose, pending the reopening of the ports. However, even the reopening of ports would not remove the need for lighterage capability, since the initial port workload would be so heavy that supplementary resources would be essential for realizing early reinforcement objectives. USCINCEUR therefore asked for the early replacement of the withdrawn craft.¹⁰

52. (S) Elimination of Certain Prestocks

In 1964 the Joint Chiefs of Staff had decided to eliminate the prestocks that the Department of the Army had positioned in Italy and Turkey for the support of contingency operations in the MEAFSA areas.¹¹

At the end of 1966 USAREUR controlled no stocks solely owned or specifically held for MEAFSA operational support. However, USAREUR independently earmarked about 3,500 tons--consisting of all classes of supply--of its regular Theater Reserve 1 (TR-1) stocks positioned in Italy for the resupply of Seventh Army forces that might have to support MEAFSA operations or contingency operations anywhere in the Mediterranean area. USAREUR asked USEUCOM not to refer to these supplies as "MEAFSA prestocks," because they were a part of normal TR-1 stocks and were not earmarked for specific contingency operations.¹²

¹⁰ Cable ECJCO-14242, USCINCEUR to JCS, 27 Sep 66.
SECRET. Gp-4.

¹¹ For background, see USAREUR Anl Hist Sum, 1965, pp. 185 - 87. TS (info used SECRET. Gp-4).

¹² (1) Cable SX-6583, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 7 Dec 66. (2) Intvw, Mr. Carlisle with LTC D. D. McConaghy, USAREUR ODCSLOG S&S Dir, 23 Dec 66. Both SECRET. Gp-4.

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53. (S) Evaluation of Reserve Supply Levels

In late March the Department of the Army asked USAREUR to reexamine its supply levels, taking into account the comparative transit times required to move each class of supply from French and BENELUX ports to USAREUR depots and to distribute these supplies to the using units under wartime conditions. The Department made reference to its 1964 directive establishing a 30-day minimum for post-D-day supplies and asked USAREUR to study the possibility of reducing this level.¹³

USAREUR had no experience factors for the BENELUX area but estimated that under wartime conditions movement in those countries would be slower than in France because of the less favorable road net and the attendant need for circuitous routing, the character of the terrain in the Schnee Eifel area astride the new LOC, and the possibility that the Rhine River would freeze in the winter months. Specifying that any estimates of transit times would be subject to such variable factors as available facilities, personnel, materials handling equipment, transportation, and diverse conditions, USAREUR estimated that it would need an average of 15 days to process a wide variety of items from ship to depot, and an average of 14 days from the depot to the division rear boundary.

USAREUR placed 10 days' supplies of its post-D-day theater reserves in Seventh Army supply points. If it reduced its theater reserves from a 45-day level to a 30-day minimum, it might at one point of time have only 5 days' resupply in USACOMZEUR depots pending the arrival of shipments from the United States.¹⁴ Since any slippage in shipping schedules or losses caused by enemy action would reduce depot stocks to zero and immediately impair combat effectiveness, USAREUR opposed any change in current post-D-day supply levels.¹⁵

To the end of the year there were no further developments.¹⁶

¹³Cable DA-757434, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 28 Mar 66. SECRET. Gp-4.

¹⁴Assuming the arrival of replenishment supplies from the United States every 15 days. UNCLAS.

¹⁵(1) Cable S-1106, USACOMZEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 31 Mar 66.
(2) Cable SX-2617, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 1 Apr 66. Both SECRET. Gp-4.

¹⁶Intvw, Mr. Carlisle with LTC R. B. Simms, USAREUR ODCSLOG Plans Br, 31 Dec 66. UNCLAS.

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54. (S) Logistic Support of Guided Missile Systems

a. Background. Approximately 80 percent of all missile failures occurred for unpredictable reasons, mainly because the highly complex mechanisms did not lend themselves to a realistic analysis of part and component mortality data. In addition, the Army's limited maintenance experience did not permit the determination of reliable demand factors for repair part requirements. Prescribed load lists and authorized stockage lists were of little value in meeting operational requirements for missile repair parts.

As early as June 1965 the Army Vice Chief of Staff had expressed concern over the support and management of high-cost, low-density missile systems. The Army had apparently failed to adjust its current logistic and management systems to the support of low-density equipment and units. Although efficiency and economy would continue to be primary considerations, planners would have to consider instituting procedures that might appear wasteful to doctrinaire logisticians. Since true economy required that the Army realize the maximum return in operational effectiveness for the large investment in its missile systems, it might be necessary to disregard current principles by procuring and distributing large numbers of certain components or replacement parts, even though there might not be a need for them within a one-year period. This apparent conflict with current supply doctrine would be justifiable if it was the only way to guarantee missile combat readiness.

Accordingly, the Vice Chief of Staff had directed the development of new approaches to the question of logistic support and management of missile systems.¹⁷ Special supply support arrangements developed for Hawk operations

¹⁷In this context, logistic support and management included the development of optimum organizational structures; the provision of adequate manpower authorization, trained personnel, and missile-peculiar and standard maintenance equipment; and the establishment of appropriate regulations, procedures, and techniques to insure adequate logistic support. UNCLAS.

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in Southeast Asia and USAREUR's recent test of the Pershing system in the QRA role had provided valuable lessons that the Army planners were to exploit in developing proposals for modified missile support systems.¹⁸

b. USAREUR Reorganization. USAREUR's difficulties stemmed mainly from the prevailing U.S. policy of procuring high-cost missile repair parts and components in only minimum quantities and the necessity of repairing and rebuilding in the United States all items that were beyond the local maintenance capability. The inordinate quantities of missile components that were in maintenance channels caused extended equipment downtime. Slippages in returns under the rebuild program depleted USAREUR's missile reserve stocks to unacceptable levels. For example, in April shipments to U.S. repair shops reduced the Hawk reserve stocks to 21 percent of current authorizations.¹⁹

Since it was neither feasible nor economical to store high-cost missile repair parts and components in Europe, USAREUR developed an alternate missile logistic support plan that would apply streamlined supply and maintenance procedures. The plan called for three missile support depots: One Hawk and Nike Hercules depot at Miesau, one Sergeant depot at Fischbach, and one Pershing depot at Kaiserslautern.²⁰ All missile general support units (GSU's)

¹⁸(1) Memo, VCoFS to Heads of Stf Agcys, 15 Jun 65, subj: Logistic Support and Management for Sophisticated Army Missile Systems (U). CS 471.94 (15 Jun 65). Cy in AEAGD-M-AMG files. CONF. Gp-4. (2) For coverage of the Pershing tests in the QRA role, see USAREUR Anl Hist Sum, 1965, pp. 248 - 56. TS (info used CONF. Gp-4).

¹⁹(1) Summary Sheet, Log Div, 16 Feb 66, subj: Logistical Support of Guided Missile Systems in USAREUR. AEAGD-M-AMG. CONF. (2) Cable S-1131, USACOMZEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 12 Apr 66. SECRET. Both Gp-4.

²⁰It was necessary to separate the Sergeant and Pershing support installations because the Pershing in the quick-reaction-alert (QRA) role required increased supply activity. (Summary Sheet, 16 Feb 66, cited above. CONF. Gp-4.)

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assigned to Seventh Army were to come under USACOMZEUR and move to the three depots.

By the end of June Seventh Army had moved all missile-peculiar items to the Kaiserslautern General Depot for segregation and shipment to appropriate support installations. However, the installation of a fire prevention system at the three depots would delay their assumption of the support functions until March 1967.²¹

c. Special Supply Support for Pershing. After examining the worldwide missile support problem, the Department of the Army reached the conclusion that each weapons system would need a special support arrangement. In September it directed the U.S. Army Materiel Command (USAMC) to develop--in coordination with USAREUR--a plan to provide intensified supply management support for the Pershing in Europe, which would be similar to the support furnished the Hawk weapons system in the Republic of Vietnam.²²

The USAMC plan presented in November called for designating the U.S. Army Missile Command (USAMICOM) as the single stateside processing agency for all repair parts required to support Pershing-peculiar major items of equipment²³ for the U.S. and F.R.G. Pershing units. After establishing an airmail flow of requisitions from the USAREUR control point, USAMICOM would process or pass USAREUR requisitions to other stateside supply sources, monitor supply performance, and furnish supply and shipment status data to the control point. USAMICOM would use air transportation as the primary method for shipping repair parts and--by augmenting the existing unit in USAREUR--establish the single control

²¹(1) Cmt 3, Mat Readiness Dir to C/Prog Br, 10 Jun 66, to DF, Compt Div to Log Div, 27 May 66, subj: U.S. General Accounting Office Draft Regarding Materiel Readiness of Hawk Missile Systems. AEAGO-M-AMG. UNCLAS. (2) Ltr, USACOMZEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 5 Aug 66, subj: Reorganization of Logistical Support for Guided Missile Systems (U). AEZSM-SMMM-XX. (3) Intvw, Mr. Carlisle with CPT J. L. Kemble, USAREUR ODCSLOG Mat Readiness Dir, 7 Dec 66. Both CONF. Gp-4.

²²Cable DA-784372, DA to CINCUSAREUR and USAMC, 29 Sep 66. UNCLAS.

²³Plus some essential items such as generators, air conditioners, and critical items. UNCLAS.

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point and storage capability in Europe. As the centralized fund control authority, USAMICOM would allocate the funds needed to reimburse the stock fund for the items forwarded from the USAREUR control point, cite the funds for other items, and forward requisitions to the appropriate national inventory control points (NICP's). Under this concept, USAMICOM--through a capitalization of the USAREUR stock fund related to the Pershing system--would assume accountability for Pershing stock items on order, in the pipeline, and on hand. Since the proposed plan represented only a shift of command responsibility, no increase or change in the overall mission for Pershing support would be necessary. USAMC would not require additional resources to implement the plan in the United States, but USAREUR would need additional personnel and facilities. It proposed to establish the 579th Ordnance Guided Missile Support Company as the single point of contact for the U.S. and F.R.G. Pershing battalions in Germany. USAREUR would accord F.R.G. requisitions for stockage list items the same special support treatment it gave to its own Pershing units but would process F.R.G. requisitions for items not on the stockage list through regular U.S. supply channels. For U.S. Pershing units in Europe, USAREUR would establish a reduced theater stockage list consisting of missile-peculiar and mission-essential items.

USAREUR intended to locate the control point at the former USAFE station at Pforzheim.²⁴

The Department of the Army modified the USAMC plan and approved it at the end of 1966. It specified that its approval was contingent on certain funding limitations, the conduct and conclusion of specific coordination actions, and the development of detailed implementing procedures. The Department of the Army also refused to allocate additional personnel to USAREUR and directed the application of

²⁴(1) Cables SC-47440 and 48695, CINCUSAREUR to USAMICOM, 21 Oct and 2 Nov 66. FOUO. (2) Cable SC-51400, same to USACOMZEUR, 22 Nov 66. (3) Cable DA-793043, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 7 Dec 66. (4) Cable SC-10037, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 3 Jan 67. All UNCLAS.

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Standard Army Management System, Supply Support Arrangements (SAMSA) procedures for the delivery of Pershing replacement parts to the Federal Republic of Germany.²⁵

55. (S) Construction

a. Curtailment of Construction in France. In March the Department of the Army considered terminating construction contracts for 132 ammunition igloos at the Captieux Ammunition Depot in France.²⁶ A study was under way to determine the desirability of terminating all active construction, alteration, maintenance, and repair projects in France, and the Department of the Army asked USAREUR to furnish details about current construction activities.²⁷

In the same month USEUCOM directed its component commands to withhold the award of new contracts for construction in France pending the announcement of U.S. national policy.²⁸ In late April USEUCOM asked USAREUR to terminate the construction contracts at Captieux as soon as possible because the United States would remove all war materiel from France. In addition, USAREUR was to review all active construction projects in France in order to terminate them.²⁹ In directing the termination of the Captieux contracts, USAREUR specified that troops would finish the construction of those igloos whose contract portion was complete.³⁰

²⁵(1) Ltr, USAMC to DCSLOG DA, 4 Jan 67, subj: Special Supply Support - PERSHING. AMCSU. (2) Cable DA-708119, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 20 Jan 67. (3) For a description of the SAMSA procedures, see subparagraph on Project 7 in the Cooperative Logistics paragraph. All UNCLAS.

²⁶At the end of February, the project was 50 percent complete. UNCLAS.

²⁷Cables DA-753570, 756387, and 757044, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 4, 16, and 22 Mar 66. All SECRET. Gp-4.

²⁸(1) Cable ECJD-E-05435, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR et al., 20 Mar 66. NOFORN. (2) Cables SX-2577 and 2901, CINCUSAREUR to Seventh Army et al., 31 Mar and 1 Apr 66. All CONF. Gp-4.

²⁹Cable ECJD-E-06822, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 28 Apr 66. SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-4.

³⁰Cable SX-3172, CINCUSAREUR to USACOMZEUR et al., 2 May 66. SECRET. Gp-4.

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In May USAREUR canceled 19 construction projects in France--7 minor Military Construction, Army (MCA) and 12 Operation and Maintenance, Army (OMA) projects valued at \$910,300 and \$689,200, respectively.³¹

b. MCA Projects for LOC Relocation. The USAREUR-proposed FY 1967 MCA program did not include funds for the LOC relocation construction needed before any supplemental appropriation became available. The Department of the Army therefore requested USAREUR to assist in the preparation of a funding study for special presentation to Congress and to provide a list of those proposed MCA projects for which it would need funds in 1966 and an estimate of the date on which associated funds would have to be available.³²

USAREUR estimated the cost of the construction needed to relocate the LOC at approximately \$250 million, of which it would need \$61.5 million in the first half of FY 1967.³³

To provide for the most pressing immediate need--the physical movement of combat-essential supplies from France by 31 March 1967--the Secretary of Defense established a ceiling of \$5 million for construction costs. That sum would pay for the minimum essential rehabilitation and modification of existing facilities at which USAREUR would store relocated tonnages under austere conditions.

USAREUR had estimated, however, that it would need at least \$14 million for immediate construction to store Phase I supplies. In rejecting this estimate, the Secretary of Defense made a detailed analysis of the storage situation as he understood it. He pointed out that he would not include any of the ABREST ammunition igloos listed by USAREUR because

³¹(1) Cable SX-3208, CINCUSAREUR to USACOMZEUR et al., 4 May 66. (2) Cable SX-3472, same to USCINCEUR, 20 May 66. Both SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-4.

³²Cable DA-763228, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 3 May 66. SECRET. Gp-4.

³³Cable SX-3256, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 7 May 66. SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-4.

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they were not essential to the initial movement of stocks. Of the 246,000 tons of supplies authorized and scheduled for movement out of France, USAREUR could store 61,000 tons of ammunition in existing facilities in Germany without additional construction. Of the remaining 185,000 tons, USAREUR could store 95,000 tons in covered space in facilities in Germany after the removal of designated excesses. USAREUR could satisfy the additional needs for covered storage for 40,400 tons by constructing new facilities to store 20,000 tons at a cost of \$3 million, erecting prefabricated buildings for 12,000 tons at a cost of \$500,000, and using the balance of \$1.5 million to provide covered storage space for some of its project stocks.³⁴

After examining several combinations of projects, USAREUR proposed spending \$4.5 million for facilities providing 460,000 square feet of covered storage, 410,000 square feet of open-shed storage, and 44,000 square yards of open-storage hardstands. Of the remaining funds, \$26,000 would serve to modify buildings at Camp Darby, Italy, and \$360,000 to construct an ammunition renovation shop at the Miesau Ammunition Depot.

USAREUR wanted to construct thirteen 40- by 100-foot prefabricated buildings at 4 hospital sites and open-storage hardstands at Pirmasens and Germersheim. It also planned to build one 32,000-square-foot preengineered steel warehouse at Pirmasens, nine 39,000-square-foot warehouses at Germersheim, and one 32,400-square-foot warehouse at Nahbollenbach. By using troop labor when possible and materials on hand, USAREUR would not only shorten the time required to effect procurement,³⁵ complete designs, and start construction, but also reduce overall costs and gold outflow.

The ammunition renovation project would provide a 12,000-square-foot facility having an annual capacity for processing 13,000 tons of class V supplies.

³⁴(1) Cable ECJD-09292, USCINCEUR to JCS, 13 Jun 66. (2) Cable JCS-4620, JCS to USCINCEUR. (3) Cable DA-770251, DA to CINCUSAREUR. Both 17 Jun 66. (4) Intvw, Mr. Carlisle with LTC A. E. Lewis, USAREUR Log Div, 21 Jun 66. All SECRET. Gp-4.

³⁵German contractors would install lighting and heating. UNCLAS.

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The Camp Darby project called for modifying two buildings to provide space for maintaining 1,200 generators and 700 electronic and communications equipment items currently stored near Nancy, France.³⁶

In September the Secretary of Defense approved the USAREUR proposals and released \$5 million for construction.³⁷

c. Special Ammunition Storage Sites. In March the Department of Defense approved 10 of 20 basic load sites as minor MCA projects and made available \$1.8 million to pay for their construction. USAREUR planned to use as much troop labor as possible so as to reduce foreign exchange costs.³⁸

³⁶(1) DF, Dir, Mat Readiness to USAREUR Engr, 29 Jun 66, subj: Construction Under Three Options (U). AEAGD-M. CONF. Gp-4. (2) DD Forms 1391, Military Construction Line Item Data, 15 Jul 66, subj's: Storage Facilities, German; Maintenance Shops, Italy; and Ammo Renovation Shop, Germany. In AEAEN-EN files. UNCLAS. (3) Cable SX-4871, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR et al., 1 Aug 66. (4) Ltr, same to USACOMZEUR, 13 Aug 66, subj: FRELOC Phase I Construction Plan. AEAEN-EN. Both CONF. Gp-4. (5) MFR, Mr. B. G. Thornberry, 2 Sep 66, subj: Option II Construction Requirements. AEACO-EP. UNCLAS. (6) MFR, LTC W. H. Johnson, subj: FRELOC Construction Item, Maintenance Shops, Camp Darby, Italy. AEAEN-EN. UNCLAS. (7) Intvw, Mr. Carlisle with Mr. T. F. Karge, USAREUR Engr & Instl Dir, Engr Br, 28 Nov 66. CONF. Gp-4.

³⁷(1) Memo, SECDEF to SA, 19 Sep 66, subj: Unfinanced MCA Requirements for Relocation of Materials and Equipment from France. Cy in AEAEN-EN files. UNCLAS. (2) Cable JCS-3210, JCS to USCINCEUR, 21 Sep 66. SECRET. Gp-4. (3) Cable DA-783184, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 21 Sep 66. UNCLAS.

³⁸(1) Cable DA-753465, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 4 Mar 66. (2) DA Form 1223, Program and Funding Authorization Schedule, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 4 Mar 66. In AEAGD-I files. (3) MFR, Mr. F. T. Kishaba, 17 May 66, subj: Construction Directive for Ten Minor MCA Basic Load Sites. AEAGD-I. All CONF. Gp-4.

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The schedule called for completion of the first 10 sites by the end of May 1967; the other 10 sites were to be part of the FY 1968 MCA program.³⁹

d. Controlled Humidity Storage Facilities for Prepositioned Equipment.

(1) Equipment for Ten Combat Support Units. In April USAREUR completed the erection of six prefabricated controlled humidity (CH) storage buildings at Germersheim.⁴⁰

(2) Equipment for Two Divisions. In November 1965 the Department of the Army had informed USAREUR that the FY 1966 MCA Act had provided \$4 million of the \$8.2 million project requirement.⁴¹ The Department of the Army had advised USAREUR to program the remainder of the project for FY 1967 or FY 1968.⁴²

Within the \$4 million authorization, USAREUR planned to erect 25 CH storage buildings⁴³--21 for the armored division equipment and 4 for the mechanized infantry division equipment. Some of the buildings would be larger than the normal size (180 by 200 feet) so as to maintain the in-storage integrity of unit equipment.⁴⁴

³⁹(1) Cable SX-2330, CINCUSAREUR to USAREUR Engr Elm, 18 Mar 66. (2) Cable SX-2368, same to USCINCEUR, 22 Mar 66. Both CONF. Gp-4. (3) Ltr, same to DA, 21 Mar 66, subj: USAREUR FY 1968 MCA Program. AEAGD-EN. UNCLAS.

⁴⁰(1) USAREUR Anl Hist Sum, 1965, pp. 193 - 94. TS (info used UNCLAS). (2) Intvw, Mr. Carlisle with Mr. Karge, 4 Apr 66. CONF. Gp-4.

⁴¹These figures were the programmed amounts approved by Congress; however, the Bureau of the Budget withheld a 5 percent contingency reserve. (Cable SC-15156, CINCUSARUER to USAREUR Engr Elm, 12 Feb 66. UNCLAS.)

⁴²USAREUR Anl Hist Sum, 1965, pp. 194 - 96. TS (info used UNCLAS).

⁴³Ten at Rhein Ordnance Barracks (370,000 square feet), 7 at Nahbollenbach (273,600), 4 at Pirmasens (151,000), and 4 at Germersheim. (Intvw, Mr. Carlisle with Mr. Karge, 1 Dec 66. CONF. Gp-4.)

⁴⁴(1) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to USAREUR Engr Elm, 20 Jan 66, subj: Directive 4 (Design) Germany - CH Storage-66-MCA (Military Construction, Army). AEAGD-E-EN. (2) Cables SC-13183 and 13425, same to same, 27 and 29 Jan 66. All UNCLAS.

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USACOMZEUR recommended sites for the 18 additional buildings needed for storing the balance of the infantry division equipment. In forwarding the revised project documents to the Department of the Army, USAREUR proposed the project for inclusion in the regular FY 1968 MCA program.⁴⁵

There were no further developments in 1966.⁴⁶

56. (S) Infrastructure

a. Prefinancing. Hoping to recover a part of the expenditures incurred, USAREUR processed as projects warranting NATO infrastructure common funding⁴⁷ the construction needed to move and support personnel and materiel withdrawn from France.

Because the normal procedures for NATO infrastructure common funding would have delayed the completion of urgently needed projects, and none of the construction projects associated with the withdrawal from France came under the established NATO common-funding categories, USEUCOM developed a modified procedure that not only permitted the early start of construction but also protected U.S. interests.

Under the modified procedure, USAREUR first obtained the national authority and funds to construct a project. USEUCOM then notified the NATO Progress and Payments Committee of the U.S. intention to prefinance⁴⁸ the project and invited

⁴⁵(1) Cable AEZIS-INCN-0917, USACOMZEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 10 Mar 66. (2) Cmt 2, Engr & Instl Dir to Mat Readiness Dir, 31 Mar 66, to DF, Mat Readiness Dir to Engr & Instl Dir, 24 Mar 66, subj: Prepositioned Material. AEAGD-E-EN. Both CONF. Gp-4. (3) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 16 Aug 66, subj: Controlled Humidity Storage Project. AEAEN-EN. CONF (info used UNCLAS).

⁴⁶Intvw, Mr. Carlisle with Mr. Karge, 1 Dec 66. UNCLAS.

⁴⁷Prorated costs for facilities or items constructed or procured in the interest of two or more NATO member nations. UNCLAS.

⁴⁸Notification of intent to use national funds for financing construction costs and to seek recovery of the funds representing the other NATO members' shares of these costs. UNCLAS.

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the international staff to review the design. After completion of the design review, USAREUR notified the host nation that construction would take place, directed the start of construction, and initiated and monitored separate accounting procedures.

Closely related to the U.S. fund recoupment concept was the plan to conduct bilateral negotiations with the French concerning the residual value of U.S. properties left in France.

By 1 December USAREUR had programed \$88 million for FRELOC-related projects and had furnished prefinancing statements for the \$11.3 million already approved--\$5 million for additional storage and maintenance facilities in Germany and Italy, \$3 million for the USEUCOM Command and Control Center, and \$3.3 million for such other Phase I requirements as the relocations of USEUCOM and USACOMZEUR headquarters, the Seventh Army Inventory Control Center, and the Supply and Maintenance Agency (SAMA).⁴⁹

b. 18th Slice Program. In late 1965 USAREUR had proposed eight projects for the 18th Slice (1967) program, including two 17th Slice projects SHAPE had previously rejected. In February 1966 USAREUR withdrew the project for the construction of the 20 basic load sites for special ammunition storage. Concerning the other seven, SHAPE recommended the following four projects for approval: the construction of CH storage facilities, Pershing QRA facilities, installation of target ranging radar for 12 U.S.-manned Nike batteries, and on-site sleeping facilities at 24 U.S. Nike battery sites. SHAPE did not consider the Lance missile body storage proposal, and it deferred discussion of the projects for POL storage facilities

⁴⁹(1) Cable ECJD-E-12308, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR et al., 24 Aug 66. (2) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to distr, 14 Sep 66, subj: FRELOC--NATO Prefinancing of U.S. Relocation Costs. AEAEN-EN. (3) Ltr, USAACOM to North Baden Dist, 27 Oct 66, subj: Approval and Cost Recording for OMA Projects. AENIN-PF. (4) Briefing, USAREUR Log Div for Dr. R. Bullock, House Com on Gov Op, 17 Nov 66. (5) Intvws, Mr. Carlisle with MAJ B. J. Roth and Mr. F. T. Kishaba, USAREUR OEngr Prog Br, 5 Dec 66. All UNCLAS.

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and Seventh Army prestock points pending further study. USAREUR planned to submit a Hawk group operations center project for the 19th Slice.⁵⁰

(1) Controlled Humidity Storage Facilities.

This \$8.6 million project warranted common infrastructure funding because the two U.S. divisions and ten combat support units for which USAREUR prepositioned equipment were to support CENTAG Emergency Defense Plan 1-65 and would be essential for the implementation of NATO's forward defense strategy. The units could not deploy and fight within the time specified in these plans unless they received prepositioned equipment immediately after their arrival from the United States. If left in open storage or in facilities that provided only marginal protection, some items of equipment would require rehabilitation, rebuild, or replacement every 3 to 5 years. The rate of deterioration and attendant unserviceability would have an unacceptable impact on the combat readiness of the deployed units. In addition, the deprocessing and issue of stored equipment would require significant percentages of USAREUR's total logistic capability, which would not be available under conditions of actual mobilization.

For these reasons, the most satisfactory and least costly means of ensuring the combat readiness of the equipment would be to construct CH storage facilities.

⁵⁰(1) Incl 1, Project Data and Justification, NATO Common Funded Infrastructure, to ltr, CINCUSAREUR to AMEMB Bonn LO, 20 Nov 65, subj: Letter of Transmittal. AEAGD-E-EN. SECRET. Gp-4. (2) Cable CX/LOG/312, CENTAG to LANDCENT, 18 Feb 66. NATO SECRET. (3) Cable SX-1942, CINCUSAREUR to CINCENT, 22 Feb 66. CONF. Gp-4. (4) Anx 1, SHAPE Annual Infrastructure Conference, 14 - 16 Sep 66, to ltr, SHAPE to distr, 31 Oct 66, subj: Summary Record of 1966 Infrastructure Conference, 6100/18-8-192/66. NATO SECRET. (5) Ltr, SHAPE to NATO Mil Com, 26 Oct 66, subj: SHAPE Recommended 18th Slice NATO Common Infrastructure Program (1967) - Revised Edition. 6100.18/18. NATO SECRET.

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Since the United States would not use the storage facilities after the deployed units had received the equipment, the project would serve only NATO requirements.⁵¹

The Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Central Europe (CINCENT), commented that the project represented a new category of infrastructure not covered in NATO guidance documents. Except for special ammunition facilities, maintenance and storage projects for ground forces had hitherto not been eligible for common funding. In compliance with SACEUR's guidance to consider forward defense requirements first, CINCENT decided that CH storage had a lower priority than pipeline extensions, forward defense depots, and other urgent projects. He concluded that he would not initiate a cost effectiveness study or request common funding for CH storage facilities until SACEUR had made a decision on the general question of funding such installations.⁵²

To overcome these objections, USAREUR proposed placing the CH storage project in a special construction category and proceeded to develop a cost effectiveness study.⁵³

In June the Secretary of Defense confirmed the urgency of completing the project before the end of the winter and emphasized the attendant need for obtaining a waiver of the infrastructure ruling calling for international competitive bidding (ICB).⁵⁴ The United States had already initiated direct procurement and had thus disregarded the ICB requirement. Procurement costs for CH storage would

⁵¹(1) Incl 1 to 1tr, CINCUSAREUR to AMEMB Bonn LO, 20 Nov 65, cited above. SECRET. (2) Cable SX-1999, same to SACEUR et al., 28 Feb 66. CONF. Both Gp-4.

⁵²Cable CE/LOG-15530, CINCENT to SACEUR, 25 Feb 66. NATO SECRET.

⁵³(1) Cable SX-2004, CINCUSAREUR to CINCENT et al., 25 Feb 66. CONF. Gp-4. (2) DF, Engr to DCSLOG, 7 Apr 66, subj: Requirements for Study - Controlled Humidity Storage. AEAGD-E-EN. SECRET (info used CONF. Gp-4).

⁵⁴Cable DEF-4455, SECDEF to AMEMB Paris, 15 Jun 66. SECRET. Gp-4.

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amount to \$10.40 per square meter, and the first buildings for the armored division equipment were to be available by December.⁵⁵

At the June meeting of the infrastructure committee, SHAPE presented strong justification for common funding. France, however, insisted that the project was not in an established construction category and that the introduction of new categories was inopportune because of the current shortage of infrastructure funds. The Canadians supported the French view but indicated they might consider the project favorably if it did not create a precedent. Although the other NATO members were either noncommittal or somewhat negative, they promised to give the matter further study.⁵⁶

However, at the end of 1966 it seemed that, even if the committee established a special category for this storage facility, the United States would still have to convince other NATO members that they should not rule out common funding because of its failure to abide by the ICB requirement.⁵⁷

(2) Pershing QRA Facilities. In December 1965 USAREUR's Pershing units had assumed the QRA role assigned by SHAPE. The 16th Slice had included a project for 15 firing battery positions--9 field sites and 6 sheltered sites. Each field site would have a cleared and graded area, concertina barbed wire fencing, access roads, and power and sanitary facilities. Each sheltered site would have missile shelters, custodial and alert guard buildings, a ready building, a generator shelter, hardstands, security fencing, and internal and access roads.⁵⁸

⁵⁵ Cable SX-3920, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 22 Jun 66. CONF. Gp-4.

⁵⁶ Cable 8919, AMEMB Paris to Secy State, 18 Jun 66. CONF. Gp-4.

⁵⁷ Intvw, Mr. Carlisle with Mr. Kishaba, 7 Dec 66. CONF. Gp-4.

⁵⁸ (1) Ltr, SACEUR to distr, 23 Jun 65, subj: Approved 1965 (SHAPE) 16th Slice NATO Common Infrastructure Program. 6100/21-5-104/65. NATO SECRET. (2) Incl 1 to ltr, CINCUSAREUR to AMEMB Bonn LO, 20 Nov 65, cited above. (3) Intvw, Mr. Carlisle with LTC S. Wood, USAREUR Log Div Eng Br, 15 Apr 66. Both SECRET. Gp-4.

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USAREUR's proposal for the 18th Slice called for expanding these facilities to provide for 12 Phase II kaserne-type firing positions, at which construction would be of a much broader scope than that planned in the 16th Slice for the 6 sheltered sites. Each of the 12 firing positions--located 20 to 30 kilometers from headquarters and service elements of the Pershing battalions and at a similar distance from other installations and possible nuclear targets for enemy forces--would have a cantonment to support 200 military personnel. Construction would include billets, sanitary and security facilities, dayrooms and messes, motor maintenance shops, ready rooms, hardstands, utilities, and extensive site preparation.

The justification for NATO funding was that the project supported the NATO Nuclear Strike Plan and would reduce reaction time and increase the target coverage area.⁵⁹

(3) Installation of Target Ranging Radar for Nike Batteries. This \$79,000 project would provide for the establishment of target ranging radar (TRR) for the 12 U.S.-manned batteries that did not yet possess this capability. The project supported the ACE air defense plan and complied with NATO criteria.⁶⁰

(4) On-Site Sleeping Facilities at 24 U.S. Nike Battery Sites. Since the Nike system had to be operational within five minutes after the declaration of an alert, each battery required a sleeping area so that personnel would be immediately available around the clock. However, the existing NATO criteria did not provide for adequate sleeping quarters. The personnel shelter established at each site did not satisfy the requirement, because it was too small for circulating, presented a safety hazard, and was detrimental to morale, welfare, and operational efficiency. When the NATO authorities later recognized that the construction of adequate sleeping quarters represented an essential

⁵⁹Intvw, Mr. Carlisle with Mr. Kishaba, 7 Dec 66.
SECRET. Gp-4.

⁶⁰Incl 1 to ltr, CINCUSAREUR to AMEMB Bonn LO,
20 Nov 65, cited above. SECRET. Gp-4.

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operational need, USAREUR had more than sufficient justification for the addition of these facilities as a NATO common-funded project. USAREUR proposed to construct a standard 30-square-meter barracks next to the earth barricade in the immediate vicinity of the entrance to the personnel shelter. It estimated the construction costs for the 24 buildings at \$240,000.⁶¹

57. (S) Cooperative Logistics

a. Italy. In January the Italians accepted a military assistance sales order (MASO) 1, valued at \$3.3 million, and a MASO 2 at \$1.8 million.⁶² Under the agreed arrangements USAREUR provided depot supply support for 1,000 Italian-owned M-113's. The Italians submitted repair part requisitions to the U.S. Army depot at Leghorn, which transmitted them to the USAREUR supply control agency for further processing. U.S. supply agencies forwarded the repair parts directly to Leghorn.⁶³

Initial implementation of the supply support arrangements came at a time when the United States suffered from a shortage of M-113 repair parts. To satisfy both the U.S. and Italian requirements, USEUCOM proposed a barter arrangement whereby the Italians would manufacture the repair parts in exchange for credits against further purchases of U.S. military items.

⁶¹(1) Cable AETL-GD-6148-17, 32d AADC to Seventh Army, 20 May 66. (2) MFR, LTC Wood, Log Div, 31 May 66, AEAEN-E-EN. (3) Incl 1, Project Data and Justification NATO Common Funded Infrastructure - Ready Room Sleeping Facility (NIKE), 23 May 66, to ltr, CINCUSAREUR to MOD Germany, 3 Jun 66. AEAEN-E-EN. (4) Cable SX-3693, CINCUSAREUR to MOD Germany et al., 7 Jun 66. (5) Cable SX-3973, same to 32d AADC, 27 Jun 66. All CONF. Gp-4.

⁶²MASO 1 funds covered the cost of support items in the U.S. supply pipeline; MASO 2 covered the funds required to pay for the annual supply drawdown. UNCLAS.

⁶³(1) Cable SX-1821, CINCUSAREUR to USACOMZEUR, 17 Feb 66. CONF. Gp-4. (2) Fact Sheet, 12 May 66, subj: Summary of U.S.-Italian Cooperative Logistics. AEAGD-IL-C. SECRET. Gp-3.

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The barter arrangement would not affect gold flow and would provide Italy--a NATO ally--the means of increasing the combat effectiveness of its armed forces through the acquisition of U.S. equipment it could not otherwise afford.⁶⁴

In reply the Department of the Army stated that the worldwide shortage was temporary and that aggressive procurement action and accelerated U.S. production would eliminate or at least relieve it. Meanwhile, USAREUR might either use existing offshore procurement procedures to purchase critical repair parts in Italy or arrange for a loan of Italian assets.⁶⁵

b. Federal Republic of Germany.

(1) Project 5 (Joint Use of Local Training Areas).
In February USAREUR authorized Bundeswehr units to use U.S.-controlled local training areas in Germany on a space-available basis in accordance with the agreement established in 1965.⁶⁶

In FY 1966 the Federal Republic incurred \$151,709 in costs for 2,289 training days on 71 USAREUR-controlled local training areas. There was no significant change in the level of Bundeswehr usage in the first half of FY 1967.⁶⁷

(2) Project 6 (Joint Use of Major Training Areas).

(a) Grafenwoehr, Hohenfels, and Wildflecken. On 18 February U.S. and F.R.G. representatives signed a formal

⁶⁴ Cable ECJD-PC-05227, USCINCEUR to DA, 24 Mar 66. CONF. Gp-4.

⁶⁵ (1) Cable DA-760813, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 18 Apr 66. NOFORN. (2) Cable ECJD-PC-06958, USCINCEUR to DA, 27 Apr 66. Both CONF. Gp-4.

⁶⁶ (1) For background coverage of the agreement, see USAREUR Anl Hist Sum, 1965, pp. 207 - 08. TS (info used CONF. Gp-4). (2) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to USAACOM, 10 Feb 66, subj: Joint Utilization of Local Training Areas. AEAGC-TT. UNCLAS.

⁶⁷ (1) Cable AENGO-03672, USAACOM to CINCUSAREUR, 12 Aug 66. (2) Cmt 2, DCSOPS to DCSLOG, 22 Aug 66, to DF, DCSLOG to DCSOPS, 1 Aug 66, subj: Logistics Review - Germany, 19 - 22 September 1966. AEAGC-TT. Both UNCLAS.

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agreement covering the rights and obligations of both nations for the joint use of Grafenwoehr, Hohenfels, and Wildflecken. The new agreement incorporated all the provisions of previous arrangements made over a number of years, protected the interests of the United States, and spelled out in detail the special considerations applicable to each area.

In FY 1966 the Bundeswehr trained a total of 342 battalion weeks--201.5 at Grafenwoehr, 110 at Hohenfels, and 30.5 at Wildflecken--for which USAREUR charged \$347,000.⁶⁸

(b) Baumholder. The Federal Republic agreed that U.S. obligations to pay a share of Baumholder joint-use construction costs should start on the effective date of a new Baumholder agreement. During the first half of 1966, however, the Germans continued to insist that the United States should pay its share of Baumholder's operation and maintenance costs retroactively to 1 January 1963.⁶⁹

However, the Germans finally accepted the U.S. position and signed a formal agreement specifying that the U.S. financial obligations for both joint-use construction and operation and maintenance costs at the Baumholder training area would start on 14 September 1966.⁷⁰

⁶⁸(1) For background, see USAREUR Anl Hist Sum, 1965, p. 208. TS (info used UNCLAS). (2) DF, DCSOPS to CofS, 8 Jan 66, subj: Joint Use Agreement for Grafenwoehr, Hohenfels, and Wildflecken. AEAGC-TT. CONF. Gp-4. (3) Cable SC-27739, CINCUSAREUR to USAACOM, 17 May 66. UNCLAS.

⁶⁹(1) For background, see USAREUR Anl Hist Sum, 1965, pp. 209 - 10. TS (info used UNCLAS). (2) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to MOD Bonn, 7 Apr 66. AEAGD-E-RE. (3) Intvw, Mr. Carlisle with Mr. K. D. Martin, USAREUR Log Div, 10 Jun 66. All UNCLAS.

⁷⁰(1) Ltrs, MOD Bonn to CINCUSAREUR, 28 Oct and 7 Nov 66, subj: Agreement on Joint Utilization by the U.S. Forces of the Baumholder Training Area. VR II 4 - Az: 45-10-20/2. (2) DF's, CINCUSAREUR AMEMB Bonn LO to CINCUSAREUR, 24 Oct and 7 Nov 66, subj: Joint Utilization Agreement for the Baumholder Training Area. AMEMB LNO 6-370 and 6-403. All UNCLAS.

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(3) Project 7 (Depot Supply Support). As a result of the several studies and reviews--both U.S. and joint U.S.-F.R.G.--of Project 7 management, the Department of Defense directed that USAREUR take specific steps to increase the initial rate of fill of F.R.G. nonstockage-list items from 60 to at least 70 percent by 31 March 1967. USAREUR was also to develop and present to the Germans the procedures for the future issue of nonstockage-list items and for automatically modifying MASO 1 on the basis of recorded demand data pertaining to weapons systems. In addition, USAREUR was to notify the Department of the Army of any disruption of Project 7 support caused by withdrawal from France.⁷¹

In reply, USAREUR pointed out that an analysis of data for the last 16 months showed that the initial F.R.G. class II and IV rate of fill to be higher than the rate recorded for all other customers. The performance of the overall U.S. supply system was continuing to improve, and further improvement in the fill rate could be achieved by establishing separate management and accounting systems to protect German assets in the U.S. pipeline. Service to the Germans could be even better if the United States granted F.R.G. requisitions a higher priority; however, this course of action would be contrary to Department of Defense policy, and its adoption would divert USAREUR from the support of its own units. USAREUR also called attention to its recommendations concerning the need to revise current supply performance reporting so that the conclusions derived from accumulated supply data would reflect reality more clearly.

Revising MASO 1 by March of each year would depend on the workloads and machine priorities at both USACOMZEUR headquarters and its German counterpart agency. Since USAREUR experience had shown that F.R.G. internal processing required an inordinate amount of time, the accomplishment of MASO 1 revisions by 1 March 1967 seemed unlikely. However, after implementation of the automatic MASO 1 revision procedures--developed by USACOMZEUR, recommended by USAREUR, and accepted by F.R.G. authorities--the MASO 1 revisions

⁷¹Cable DA-789809, DA to CINCUSAREUR and USAMC, 9 Nov 66.
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could and would be accomplished by the prescribed date in each subsequent year.

USAREUR had also initiated actions to control F.R.G. requisitioning for non-MASO 1 items by 1 April 1967; these measures were to coincide with USACOMZEUR's initial use of its second generation automatic ADP system. By mid-December, the U.S. withdrawal from France had not adversely affected Project 7 operations.⁷²

(a) Establishment of Separate Management and Accounting Systems To Protect German Assets in the U.S. Pipeline. At their December 1965 meeting Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and his German counterpart had agreed to establish a separate F.R.G. ownership account to improve U.S. supply performance and protect the German equity from depletion through U.S. unit requisitioning. In commenting on this agreement, USAREUR stated that supply performance would improve by maintaining an up-to-date MASO 1 and restricting F.R.G. requisitions to listed items. However, a significant improvement would be possible only to the extent that the U.S. supply system guaranteed stock availability through timely procurement and the Department of the Army furnished sufficient stock funds. USAREUR added that under the current procedures the United States could not accurately determine its Project 7 costs and that they were probably higher than the charges paid by the Germans.⁷³

In March the Department of the Army directed USAREUR and the U.S. Army Maintenance Center to design and test separate management and accounting system procedures for F.R.G.-funded assets established in the U.S. supply pipeline under Project 7.⁷⁴

⁷²Cables SC-53588 and 53782, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 10 and 12 Dec 66. Both UNCLAS.

⁷³(1) Cables DA-747584 and 754485, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 18 Jan and 11 Mar 66. (2) Cable SC-14448, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 7 Feb 66. All UNCLAS.

⁷⁴The project was designated as the "Standard Army Management System, Supply Support Arrangements (SAMSA)." (Cable DA-754485, 11 Mar 66, cited above. UNCLAS.)

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By October the tests had demonstrated that it was possible to safeguard German pipeline assets from indiscriminate issue by using protected levels and separate purpose codes. In November USAREUR presented to the F.R.G. authorities the details of the proposed procedures and forwarded the complete study to the Secretary of Defense for his decision.⁷⁵

(b) Support of Items Not on the F.R.G. Stockage List. The planned establishment of separate management and accounting procedures to protect German-owned pipeline assets had its counterpart in the U.S. Army effort to protect its own operating levels. An analysis showed that a significant number of F.R.G.-requisitioned items did not appear on the MASO 1 listing. USAREUR either withdrew these items from its long stocks--those quantities exceeding forecast U.S. requirements--or referred the requisitions to stateside supply or procurement sources, thereby incurring a delay in delivery and German dissatisfaction with U.S. supply support performance. For emergencies, or to satisfy special requests for expedited supply action, USAREUR withdrew items from its own operating stocks, sometimes to the detriment of unit readiness.

The U.S. Army pipeline system responded to recorded demands received from its worldwide activities. To support F.R.G. requirements, the Army added the items and quantities specified in the German MASO 1 to its own requisitioning objectives and gave them the same priority. Without distinction, the Army accepted all F.R.G. requisitions and processed them like those from U.S. customers.

⁷⁵(1) Cable DA-754485, 11 Mar 66, cited above. UNCLAS. (2) Cable SX-2872, CINCUSAREUR to USACOMZEUR, 14 Apr 66. (3) Cable DA-784824, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 4 Oct 66. (4) Cable SX-5654, CINCUSAREUR to USACOMZEUR, 7 Oct 66. (5) Cable C-1024, USACOMZEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 14 Oct 66. (2)-(5) CONF. Gp-4. (6) Cable SC-47244, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 19 Oct 66. UNCLAS. (7) Cable 45859, USAMC to CINCUSAREUR et al., 1 Nov 66. CONF. Gp-4. (8) Ltr, USACOMZEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 7 Nov 66. subj: Final Report - Standard Army Management System, Support Arrangments. AEZSM-PD. UNCLAS. (9) Cmt 2, CofS to DCSLOG, 8 Nov 66, to DF, DCSLOG to CofS, 8 Nov 66, subj: Cooperative Logistics Meeting Washington D.C., 14 - 18 Nov 66. AEAGD-IL. UNCLAS. (10) Cable ECJD-OS-17154, USCINCEUR to JCS, 10 Nov 66. CONF. Gp-4.

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Since the United States recognized that the Germans could not anticipate each supply requirement, Project 7 arrangements provided for an open-end sales order undefined as to items or quantities. The Germans appeared to believe, however, that their deposit of funds to pay for item withdrawals entitled them to expect normal supply performance, regardless of the stockage-list status of the items requisitioned, and that the detailed projection of their future needs was not of paramount importance. For example, although Project 7 arrangements provided that the Germans periodically amend their MASO's to cover forecast increases in stock levels and consumption rates, they took more than two years to revise their first MASO 1.

A complicating factor was that the Army's stock purification program diminished the availability of long stocks and fringe items needed to fill F.R.G. requisitions for nonstockage items. Still another complication was that the German forces needed U.S.-manufactured end items phased out of the logistics system. Good faith required continuing support, even though it became increasingly difficult to obtain the necessary replacement parts.

In May the Secretary of Defense directed the Department of the Army to establish a tight control over the stocks made available from USAREUR or stateside supply sources to satisfy F.R.G. requests, to enforce the monitorship of nonstockage list requisitions, and to avoid delays in reconciling and reviewing F.R.G. MASO's. USEUCOM, MAAG Bonn, and USACOMZEUR opposed the adoption of the proposed procedures for various reasons--such as the attendant need to modify computer programing and augment supply management personnel, their possible conflict with the intent and spirit of Project 7 arrangements, and their possible adverse effects on the overall U.S.-F.R.G. cooperative logistics program. Nevertheless, the Secretary of Defense reaffirmed his decision. Rather than reject F.R.G. requisitions for nonstockage list items, he preferred to establish an effective means of controlling and protecting the U.S. supply levels that had been computed, funded, procured, stored, and maintained to satisfy U.S. Army requirements and no others.

In September and October USAREUR and F.R.G. representatives discussed procedures by which the Federal Republic would use specified project codes to identify the stockage-list status of each requisitioned item. USAREUR modified these procedures

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so that the Germans would not have to change their supply system.

One of the main reasons for the inordinate number of F.R.G. requisitions for air troop support items was the U.S. failure to deliver spare parts with each item purchased by the Germans. Project 7 supply support arrangements did not provide for furnishing concurrent spare parts from USAREUR's stockage levels, because the Germans purchased parts with the appropriate end item under a separate MASO. Since they could justifiably expect Project 7 support to counter the effects of an apparent U.S. supply failure, USAREUR recommended expeditious concurrent-spare-part deliveries.

At the end of the reporting period USAREUR drafted a letter to notify the Germans of the details of the new procedures introduced by the Secretary of Defense.⁷⁶

(4) Project 9 (Depot Maintenance Support). From the beginning of the U.S.-F.R.G. cooperative logistics program to the end of 1965, USAREUR had provided the Federal Republic with depot maintenance services valued at \$14.2 million.⁷⁷

⁷⁶(1) Cables DA-765950 and 789953, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 20 May and 10 Nov 66. Both CONF. Gp-4. (2) Cable SC-28986, CINCUSAREUR to USACOMZEUR, 25 May 66. UNCLAS. (3) Cable AEZSM-PD-C-0508, USACOMZEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 26 May 66. CONF. Gp-4. (4) Cable 2725, same to same, 3 Jun 66. UNCLAS. (5) Cable MGAS-3-5240, MAAG Bonn to USCINCEUR, 19 Aug 66. (6) Cable ECJD-OS-12170, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 10 Aug 66. (7) Cable 1766, SECDEF to USCINCEUR, 2 Sep 66. NOFORN. (5)-(7) CONF. Gp-4. (8) Cable DA-786987, DA to CINCUSAREUR and MAAG Bonn, 18 Oct 66. (9) Cable DA-788295, DA to USAMC, 28 Oct 66. (10) Cable AEZSM-PD-43075, USACOMZEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 16 Nov 66. (8)-(10) UNCLAS. (11) Cable SX-6068, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 5 Nov 66. (12) Cable ECJD-OS-18268, USCINCEUR to JCS, 2 Dec 66. NOFORN. (13) Intvw, Mr. Carlisle with Mr. S. Muller, USAREUR ODCSLOG Coop Log Br, 12 Dec 66. (11)-(13) CONF. Gp-4.

⁷⁷Incl 1, Memo, D. S. Cuffe, Dir for Intl Progs, OASDO to OASD et al., subj: Semiannual Review of U.S./German Cooperative Logistics Program, to ltr, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 27 May 66, same subj. ECJD-PC. CONF. Gp-4.

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By the end of FY 1966 USAREUR had completed \$5.1 million of its \$5.7 million rebuild program. The \$6.2 million program for FY 1967 called for overhauling 405 end items, 99 of them carried over from the previous fiscal year. USAREUR believed that the expansion of the Mainz, Boeblingen, and Roedelheim maintenance facilities in Germany would compensate for the loss of resources in France and would satisfy all rebuild requirements, including those programed for the Germans.⁷⁸

(5) Project 57 (Combat Logistics Support System [CLSS]). In June 1965 the Joint CLSS Planning Staff had completed the major part of a conceptual Phase II CLSS plan. Five months later USAREUR had accepted 28 Department of the Army recommendations for peacetime implementation.⁷⁹

In January 1966 the Secretary of Defense designated his Assistant for Installations and Logistics as the central national point of contact for bilateral review and coordination, and as the coordinator and monitor of the unilateral U.S. actions required to implement the Department of the Army's recommendations. The Assistant Secretary indicated that he would furnish overall coordination and review the existing peacetime cooperative logistics arrangements to make them applicable in times of tension or emergency. However, because of the expected impact of the program on NATO, he decided that USCINCEUR should be responsible for local implementation and that each component command should give him active support.⁸⁰

In May U.S. and German representatives agreed that they should complete the current CLSS plan on schedule and submit their product to the national authorities; develop a modified

⁷⁸Tab K, USAREUR Status Rept, Project 9, to Memo, D. S. Cuffe to ASECDEF (I&L), 19 Sep 66, subj: U.S./F.R.G. Cooperative Logistic Conference, Bonn, Germany, 15 - 19 Sep 66. CONF. Gp-4.

⁷⁹For background, see USAREUR Anl Hist Sum, 1965, pp. 213 - 19. TS (info used SECRET. Gp-4).

⁸⁰Cable JCS-4618, JCS to USCINCEUR, 23 Feb 66. CONF. Gp-4.

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CLSS plan conforming to the NATO, German, and U.S. plans, organizational structures, and arrangements that would emerge from the current situation; and advise and assist the national authorities and agencies responsible for implementing CLSS actions.⁸¹

In June the planning staff completed the second Phase II conceptual plan, which represented a correction, a refinement, and an expansion of the earlier Phase II planning effort.⁸²

The CLSS Phase II plan had been based on the assumption that the United States and the Federal Republic would use French territory for logistic operations. Because of the U.S. withdrawal from France, the plan had to be modified. In October the Secretary of Defense approved the new Phase II plan as a concept and stated that, since most of the peacetime implementation actions--including 11 additional proposals submitted by the German CLSS planning element--would have little reference to the new conditions resulting from the U.S. withdrawal, they would be subject to reconsideration after the announcement of associated U.S. decisions.

In anticipation of his meeting with his German counterpart in February 1967, he directed USEUCOM to prepare a progress report on the development of each implementation action.

Simultaneously, the German element prepared additional data on its 11 proposals, so that it would be possible to establish CLSS alternatives in light of the prevailing conditions. Since the United States would announce all decisions pertaining to the withdrawal from France by

⁸¹ Cable DA-765320, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 17 May 66.
CONF. Gp-4.

⁸² Incl 1 to ltr, U.S./German Logistics Planning Staff to DCSLOG DA, 30 Jun 66, subj: United States/Federal Republic of Germany, Combat Logistics Support System Plan (U.S./German CLSS Plan, 30 June 1966) (U).
Cy in AEAGD-IL-C. SECRET (info used UNCLAS).

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31 December 1966, it would be possible to prepare a time-phased schedule for implementing the approved peacetime actions.⁸³

(6) Cooperative Logistics Arrangements in Wartime.
In March the Department of the Army requested USAREUR to contribute to a Defense Department review of existing U.S.-F.R.G. cooperative logistics arrangements to determine their applicability in time of tension, emergency, or war.⁸⁴

USAREUR replied that the applicability of Projects 5 and 6--the joint use of local and major training areas--would depend on the scope of training undertaken in such a period of tension. However, assuming that some training would be possible, USAREUR stated that current project principles would apply and proposed no revision of current arrangements.

USAREUR restated that its capability to furnish effective wartime depot supply support to the Germans would be contingent on the peacetime establishment, positioning, and maintenance of F.R.G. war reserves, and on the peacetime preparations for orderly stock replenishment in emergency periods. Once again USAREUR emphasized the inadequacy of current depot supply support arrangements to satisfy F.R.G. wartime requirements and recommended that the United States

⁸³(1) Cables ECJD-PC-10850 and ECJD-PA-13284 and 18129, USCINCEUR to DA, 25 Jul, 12 Sep, and 30 Nov 66. (2) Cables ECJD-PC-12347 and ECJD-PA-16370, same to JCS, 24 Aug and 28 Oct 66. (3) Cable ECJD-PA-12518, same to CINCUSAREUR, 26 Aug 66. All CONF. Gp-4. (4) Cables JCS-1877 and 4737, JCS to USCINCEUR, 6 Sep and 7 Oct 66. Both SECRET. Gp-4. (5) Cable MGAS-55583, MAAG Germany to same, 12 Sep 66. UNCLAS. (6) Cables DA-782110 and 786451, DA to same, 14 Sep and 14 Oct 66. Both CONF. Gp-4. (7) Cable ECJD-PA-14609, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 3 Oct 66. UNCLAS. (8) Cable 5365, SECDEF to USCINCEUR, 14 Oct 66. (9) Cable MGUS-3-6160, MAAG Germany to same, 1 Dec 66. Both CONF. Gp-4.

⁸⁴(1) For background, see USAREUR Anl Hist Sum, 1965, pp. 211 - 12. TS (info used CONF. Gp-4). (2) Cable DA-753457, DA to CINCUSAREUR et al., 4 Mar 66. UNCLAS.

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inform the Germans that its troop supply support would be commensurate with the previously established German assets in the U.S. supply system. However, to make certain that the Germans would receive those items they had bought and paid for, USAREUR proposed identifying them so that it would furnish these items in an emergency--either from the pipeline or from other U.S. assets. USAREUR reemphasized the need for negotiating separate U.S.-F.R.G. arrangements that would cover German purchases of war reserves for storage in Europe and in the United States.

USAREUR recommended a modification of current arrangements to provide for emergency or wartime maintenance support. The Germans would have to provide each year their planned 5-year depot maintenance needs, furnish USACOMZEUR the repair parts no longer available through U.S. supply channels, and limit their requirements to reflect the priority depot maintenance of major items.⁸⁵

In late October the Germans expressed their desire to obligate \$20 million for a separate open-end MASO covering specific war reserve combat essential items. The Department of the Army approved the F.R.G. proposal, subject to the timely identification of the specific items and the limitations of the U.S. capability to furnish them. If the Germans intended to designate these supplies as in-country war reserve supplies, they would have to assume responsibility for their storage and maintenance. This was the first F.R.G. effort to establish war reserve stocks through the U.S.-F.R.G. cooperative logistics program.⁸⁶

58. (S) Study of the Army Logistic System in Support of USAREUR in Peace and Wartime

To provide the Secretary of Defense with data for an overall analysis of the conditions imposed by the relocation

⁸⁵Incl 1 thru 5 to ltr, CINCUSAREUR to DCSLOG DA, 23 Mar 66, subj: Review and Revision of U.S./German Cooperative Logistics Arrangements. AEAGD-IL-C. UNCLAS. FOUO.

⁸⁶(1) Cable DA-787718, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 25 Oct 66.
(2) Cable SX-6026, CINCUSAREUR to DA et al., 2 Nov 66.
Both CONF. Gp-4.

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of U.S. forces from France, the Army Chief of Staff established a full-time study group composed of representatives from several Army agencies and USAREUR. The group was to study the Army logistics and related financial system supporting U.S. forces in Europe both in peace and in war; prepare graphic and narrative expositions of the current system from the USAREUR direct-support unit to the stateside logistic and financial agencies; consider the feasible alternatives for the period from FY 1967 to FY 1972; evaluate the current system and each alternative in terms of overall effectiveness and response times; analyze the employment of personnel and materiel resources; and examine the capability to adapt to a wartime environment and satisfy attendant requirements for immediate, continuous, and effective support on and after D-day. The study was to include an evaluation of comparative costs of the current logistics system and feasible alternatives in terms of personnel, equipment, and physical facilities.⁸⁷

In late 1966 the Department of the Army representatives made plans to visit USAREUR, examine the Army logistic system in Europe, and to analyze the consequences of the implementation of FRELOC.⁸⁸

59. (U) USAREUR's Real Property Release Policy in Germany

In March USAREUR learned that the F.R.G. Minister of Defense had asked Mr. R. S. McNamara for assistance in modifying what he believed to be USAREUR's current real estate policy--reclaiming properties already turned back to the Bundeswehr and ceasing the return of properties to German control. He declared that this policy had caused many difficulties for the German forces.⁸⁹

⁸⁷ Cable DA-791242, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 22 Nov 66. CONF. Gp-4.

⁸⁸ (1) Cable DA-795546, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 20 Dec 66. SECRET. Gp-4. (2) Intvw, Mr. Carlisle with Mr. G. Faighes, USAREUR ODCSLOG Log Systems and Doctrine, 13 Mar 67. UNCLAS.

⁸⁹ Cable DA-753797, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 8 Mar 66. UNCLAS.

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When queried, USAREUR indicated that it had no policy resembling that described by the F.R.G. Minister. Its long-standing policy was to release to the Germans those properties the U.S. forces no longer required or for which the Germans were willing to provide adequate substitutes. USAREUR also recalled German NATO obligations to provide the necessary real estate to satisfy a variety of U.S.-user NATO projects, such as airfields, missile sites, and ammunition storage points. Citing the mutually advantageous USAREUR-Bundeswehr agreements on property acquisition and turnback, USAREUR presented specific examples of a progressive German departure from acknowledged principles and stated that German unwillingness to reciprocate had increased USAREUR's operational costs, degraded its readiness posture, and aggravated the crowded conditions on those properties it still controlled. The Germans seemed unimpressed with U.S. adherence to the agreements and USAREUR's requests for relief. Each retrocession seemed to fortify their belief that they were entitled to receive but were not obliged to give.

In 1965 CINCUSAREUR had centralized the authority to release real estate under his control and had thus placed more emphasis on the thoroughness of the evaluation process before releasing real estate to the Germans. This action had not halted the release of properties USAREUR no longer needed. Since the U.S. real estate acquisition process in Germany had become increasingly difficult and time consuming, since the demands of an ever-expanding German economy restricted even further the range of acquisition possibilities, and since the Federal Republic's attitude continued to harden, centralized control represented a valid method of protecting U.S. interests. In the past, hasty USAREUR releases of property with the hope that the Germans would make available adequate substitutes had been disappointing and often detrimental to the attainment of U.S. objectives.

As to the reclamation of already released property, USAREUR stated that within the past year it had asked the Federal Republic to consider the return of three facilities. The Germans had denied two of the requests, and USAREUR had taken no further action. However, for the third--an airfield at Malmsheim released to the F.R.G. forces subject to a USAREUR-Bundeswehr joint-usage accord--the Germans had declared their inability to accept the joint-usage arrangement because of local government rulings. USAREUR's request

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for the return of the airfield to U.S. control was therefore valid.⁹⁰

Throughout the remainder of 1966 USAREUR and F.R.G. representatives met frequently to discuss real property matters, particularly those relating to U.S. requirements in Germany generated by the relocation of U.S. forces from France. The Germans showed a spirit of cooperation, and USAREUR in no way deviated from its release policy or from exercising its legal rights.⁹¹

60. (C) The USAREUR Facilities in the Giessen Area

At the end of 1965 the four principal users of USAREUR's facilities in the Giessen area had completed a joint study recommending certain consolidations and other measures to reduce operating costs and to avoid competing for the limited local labor resources.⁹²

In 1966 USAREUR implemented most of these recommendations and made associated personnel space and fund adjustments. However, the withdrawal of materiel and personnel from France changed the original storage and operation plan because USACOMZEUR needed more space at Giessen.⁹³

⁹⁰ Cable SX-2184, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 9 Mar 66. CONF. Gp-4.

⁹¹ Intvws, Mr. Carlisle with Mr. J. L. Fuentes and Mr. K. D. Martin, USAREUR OEngr Real Estate Div, 14 Mar 67. UNCLAS.

⁹² USAREUR Anl Hist Sum, 1965, pp. 188 - 90. TS (info used CONF. Gp-4).

⁹³ (1) Cables 1475 and 1669, USAACOM to CINCUSAREUR, 29 Mar and 12 Apr 66. (2) Cable 1831, same to USACOMZEUR, 21 Apr 66. (3) Cables AEZPA-MP-22451, AEZTC-PL-23501, and AEZIS-INFE-C-0652, USACOMZEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 12 and 22 Apr and 1 Jul 66. (4) Cables SC-23549 and 49430, CINCUSAREUR to USAACOM, 15 Apr and 8 Nov 66. (5) Cable SC-25480, same to USACOMZEUR et al., 2 May 66. (1)-(5) UNCLAS. (6) DF, DCSOPS to distr, 27 Aug 66, subj: Stationing Situation at Giessen. AEAGC-OR. (7) Intvw, Mr. Carlisle with Mr. Martin, C/USAREUR OEngr Mgt & Dspo Br, 14 Jan 67. Both CONF. Gp-4.

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61. (C) The USAREUR Cost Reduction Program

a. The FY 1966 Program. The Department of the Army established the final overall USAREUR cost reduction target for FY 1966 at \$20,780,000. The following table shows the savings and percentages of goals achieved in those areas for which USAREUR reported data to the Department of the Army (Chart 9).⁹⁴

b. Plans for the FY 1967 Program. In view of the planned modification of cost reporting instructions and format, the Department of the Army announced its intention to modify the FY 1967 goals and canceled the requirement to report savings for the first quarter. Because of the turbulence resulting from the U.S. withdrawal from France and the merger of headquarters, USAREUR believed that the FY 1967 goals would be more difficult to achieve than those of previous years.⁹⁵

⁹⁴(1) For background, see USAREUR Anl Hist Sum, 1965, pp. 223 - 26. TS (info used UNCLAS). (2) Intvw, Mr. Carlisle with MAJ G. L. Brown, USAREUR ODCSLOG Plans & Progs Dir, 21 Dec 66. (3) Army Cost Reduction Program Quarterly Feedback Summary, FY 1966, Quarter Ending 30 June 1966 (DCSLOG Form 221), DA to CINCUSAREUR. Cy in AEAGD-PP-B-S. Both UNCLAS.

⁹⁵(1) Cable DA-786381, DA to CINCUSAREUR et al., 13 Oct 66. (2) Incl 1 to ltr, DCSLOG DA to CINCUSAREUR, 19 Nov 66, subj: Draft Circular 11-1-0, "Army Cost Reduction Program." LOG/AGRGP. Both UNCLAS. (3) Intvw, Mr. Carlisle with MAJ Brown, 21 Dec 66. CONF. Gp-4.

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Chart 9 (C)

Cost Reduction Achievements - FY 1966

<u>AREA</u>	<u>FY 1966 Goal</u>	<u>Savings as of 30 Jun 66</u>	<u>Percent of Goal Achieved</u>
TOTALS	<u>\$20,780,000</u>	<u>\$21,700,800</u>	104
Major Items of Equipment	\$ 1,000,000	\$ 353,600	35
Secondary Items	3,000,000	823,500	27
Data Processing Systems	462,000	704,200	152
Hospitals and Clinics	150,000	280,900	187
Schools and Other Educational Facilities	100,000	131,500	132
Armywide Activities	358,000	366,500	102
Local Logistic Services	200,000	230,100	115
Improvement of Management Functions	560,000	3,169,100	566
Telecommunications Management	440,000	399,300	91
Transportation and Traffic Management	500,000	1,698,100	340
Equipment Maintenance Management	5,500,000	5,516,400	100
Noncombat Vehicle Management	3,021,000	2,515,900	83
Military Housing Management	1,309,000	1,348,800	103
Real Property Management	4,180,000	4,114,000	98
Packaging, Preserving, and Packing	-0-	48,900	-

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Chapter 9

Comptroller Activities

62. (C) The International Balance of Payments Problem

a. General. In reply to a Department of the Army inquiry concerning its overall plan to reduce international-balance-of-payments (IBP) expenditures, USAREUR stated that it would continue to adhere strictly to current regulations and directives, consider the gold-flow implications of all command actions, and emphasize the role of the individual in achieving IBP savings. Command actions already implemented, plus those directed by higher authority, had thoroughly covered all established expenditure areas. Current expenditure estimates were those hard-core requirements over which USAREUR would have to exercise continuing surveillance to ensure compliance with its own and higher authority directives. USAREUR considered each proposed plan, action, and project in an effort to reduce the outflow of gold, to recognize offsetting possibilities, and to remain within the imposed IBP limitations.

However, USAREUR had little direct influence over individual expenditures, the largest single IBP item. It conducted surveys to determine the individual spending patterns of military and civilian personnel and used the data thus obtained to direct the command information program effort. Through a variety of publicity, training, and orientation media USAREUR reminded each military and civilian member that his active support was an absolute necessity for the nation's economic stability.

In the important area of construction, USAREUR used the revised procedures calling for the procurement of materiel

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and equipment in the United States and the use of troop labor.¹ For authorized FRELOC projects, USAREUR planned to use new prefabricated buildings manufactured in the United States and open-shed elements transferred from vacated installations in France.

Other specific IBP actions included a directive calling for review and validation of temporary-duty requirements for FY 1967, which resulted in an estimated FY 1967 IBP saving of \$1 million. Minute scrutiny of offshore procurement plans resulted in the return of 10 percent of the total scheduled offshore procurement to U.S. sources and an estimated FY 1967 IBP saving of \$26 million.

USAREUR also stressed the new Savings Deposits Program that--effective 1 September 1966 under Public Law 89-538--permitted uniformed military personnel stationed overseas to accrue on their deposits 10 percent interest, compounded quarterly. This new program provided an incentive to save, thus reducing individual expenditures and contributing to the attainment of IBP reduction objectives. USAREUR also urged individuals to use U.S. flag airlines for leave travel,² American carriers and marine insurance for the shipment of their private vehicles, the Armed Forces Recreation Centers for their vacations, and the facilities of the U.S. post exchange for their normal and special purchases.

Unfortunately, the continuing escalation of costs for local national (LN) and contractual services defied IBP reduction efforts. Despite all the previous reductions in the size of the LN workforce, the overall cost of LN services continued to increase. Since all expenditures for LN salaries constituted outflow of gold, the continuing escalation had severely hampered USAREUR's efforts to make reductions in this area.³

¹As it did for each of the several near-term relocation objectives, USAREUR emphasized the IBP advantages of retaining in Europe its troop construction potential. UNCLAS.

²USAREUR efforts had resulted in increasing by 15 percent the share of the traffic carried by U.S. flag airlines in 1965. Resultant IBP savings were estimated at \$385,000. UNCLAS.

³(1) Cable SX-3794, CINCUSAREUR to distr, 14 Jun 66. CONF. Gp-4. (2) Cable DA-781728, DA to CINCUSAREUR et al., 12 Sep 66. UNCLAS. (3) Cable DA-783284, same to same, 22 Sep 66. CONF. Gp-4. (4) Cable 216, CofEngrs to CINCUSAREUR et al., 23 Sep 66. UNCLAS. (5) Cable SX-5445, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 27 Sep 66. CONF. Gp-4. (6) Anx A, Summary of the Savings Deposit Program - Public Law 89-538, to USAREUR WB 40, 8 Oct 66. UNCLAS.

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b. Nonappropriated Fund (NAF) Activities.

(1) The Directive. In September the Department of the Army implemented a Department of Defense directive intended to reduce the outflow of gold by further restricting the procurement of foreign goods for resale in oversea nonappropriated-fund (NAF) activities, such as exchanges, clubs, and messes. NAF activities were to restrict the sales of foreign goods to items available on the "local market"⁴ and except for beverages, were to price all such goods as high as the local market.⁵

(2) USAREUR's Implementation. Though recognizing the value and purpose of the directive, USAREUR--after analyzing the significance of each factor--decided that it would be in the best interest of U.S. personnel to define the local market as the country in which the NAF activity was located. Supporting this reasoning was the fact that competitors of NAF activities included not only the local economy retail sales stores but also the vendors who offered--through advertisements in English language periodicals circulated among U.S. personnel--immediate duty-free delivery of foreign goods to Army post office addresses; the retail stores in cities near Army installations offering credit terms on high value purchases; and the Allied forces' retail outlets, such as the Canadian post exchanges, offering U.S. personnel foreign goods at attractive prices.

It was not feasible to decentralize the European Exchange System (EES), a single highly concentrated NAF entity, into several activities to satisfy a strict interpretation of the Department directive. Such action would result in a loss of management efficiency, a reduction in customer services, and the employment of many additional personnel to do manually the tasks

⁴USAREUR at first defined the local market in general terms as the area in which commercial sales outlets competed effectively with the NAF activity. The directive exempted goods manufactured in the Ryukyu Islands, purchased with excess foreign currencies, and morale and welfare items for personnel stationed in remote areas. UNCLAS.

⁵C3, 21 Sep 66, to AR 230-75, 26 Apr 65, subj: International Balance of Payments Program--Nonappropriated Fund Activities. UNCLAS.

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that sophisticated accounting machines performed. USAREUR concluded that the existing EES management and organizational structure could most effectively achieve the objectives of the goldflow reduction directive. It restricted EES sales to the items available on the local market in the countries where EES operated sales outlets, to include merchandise--such as Swiss watches--from third countries that sold through local outlets. In making this decision, USAREUR considered that the current dollar limitation on the amount of foreign goods that the European Exchange System could procure--an amount fixed by the Joint Army-Air Force Exchange Board--provided an effective control on the overall EES sales affecting the international balance of payments. Both USAFE and the European Exchange System agreed with these principles.⁶

63. (S) Funding

USAREUR received its operating funds from three main sources: The Department of the Army allocated direct funds--the largest part--to train and support its forces, educate and house dependents, support the Reserve Program in Europe, and support U.S. elements of NATO staffs. Reimbursements included payments from other U.S. agencies in the theater--such as Department of State and USAFE activities--for supplies and services furnished, and the payments and profits realized from sales of supplies and services to individuals. Finally, the Federal Republic of Germany contributed Deutsche Mark (DM) funds for the support of the U.S. occupation forces stationed in Berlin.

a. FY 1966.

(1) Fund Availability and Obligations. By 30 June USAREUR had obligated \$1,086,274,000 (98.3 percent) of its FY 1966 funds (Table 1).⁷

⁶(1) DF, DCSPER to CofS, 10 Nov 66, subj: Definition of Local Market for Nonappropriated Fund Activities. (2) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to Comd, EES, 16 Nov 66, subj: Procurement of Foreign Goods for Resale in the European Exchange System. (3) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to distr, 18 Nov 66, same subject. All AEAGA-PS. (4) Army Times (Eur. ed.), 8 Mar 67, p. 6. All UNCLAS.

⁷Compt Div Presentation of Fourth Quarter FY 1966 Review and Analysis to the USAREUR Chief of Staff, 1 Sep 66. Cy in AEACO-M files. UNCLAS.

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Table 1 (U)

FY 1966

A. Status of Available and Obligated Funds (30 June 1966)

<u>Totals</u>	<u>*Availability</u> \$1,105,204,837	<u>Obligation</u> \$1,086,274,000
Operations and Maintenance, Army (OMA)	538,284,000	537,842,000
Procurement of Equipment and Missiles, Army (PEMA)	27,397,454	23,072,000
Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDTE), Army	0	2,000
Military Assistance Program (MAP)	4,631,325	4,576,000
Military Construction, Army (MCA)	23,888,049	10,682,000
Army Stock Fund	456,000,000	455,223,000
Reserve Personnel, Army (RPA)	297,000	267,000
Family Housing Management	54,707,009	54,610,000

B. Status of Major OMA Programs (30 June 1966)

<u>Program</u>	<u>Totals</u>	<u>*Availability</u> \$ 538,284,000	<u>Obligation</u> \$ 537,842,000
2000		324,974,000	324,747,000
2100		2,734,000	2,708,000
2200		111,514,000	111,416,000
2300		31,224,000	31,195,000
2400		21,815,000	21,797,000
2500		40,359,000	40,329,000
2600		47,000	47,000
2800		5,004,000	4,991,000
2900		613,000	612,000

*Includes direct funds and funded reimbursements only.

SOURCE: AEACO-B. UNCLAS.

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(2) The DM Budget. In recognition of Berlin's status as an occupied city, the Federal Republic of Germany provided in 1966 DM 116,193,560 (\$29,048,390)⁸ for the support of the U.S. forces, which the three services shared as follows:⁹

	<u>Deutsche Mark</u>	<u>Dollar Equivalent</u>
Totals	<u>DM 116,193,560</u>	<u>\$29,048,390</u>
Army	90,537,500	22,634,375
Navy	168,300	42,075
Air Force	25,487,760	6,371,940

b. FY 1967.

(1) The Command Operating Budgets (COB's).¹⁰ The Department of the Army's FY 1967 OMA program and budget guidance (PBG) of \$530.4 million compared favorably with USAREUR's FY 1966 annual funding program (AFP) of \$518.3 million; however, it did not allow for the increased costs of LN pay, commercial line-haul, and port handling services; the relocation of personnel and materiel from France; and the one-time expenditures needed for an effective materiel readiness posture.

USAREUR requested \$124,110,599 for unfinanced requirements arising from increased costs for commercial materiel handling, the acquisition of supplies, the expansion of the combat vehicle maintenance program, and the accomplishment of maintenance and repair projects.

Of particular importance was the request for an additional \$29.5 million to remove the principal causes for the low logistic

⁸Computed at DM 4 to \$1. UNCLAS.

⁹(1) Emb Advices of Allotment No. 8, C1; No. 9, C6; and No. 7, C7; 8 Nov and 22 Dec 66 and 31 Jan 67. Cys in AEACO-B files. (2) Intvw, Mr. J. E. Carlisle, USAREUR Mil Hist Br, with LTC M. S. Baker, USAREUR OCOMPT Bud Div Sp Funds Br, 15 Feb 66. Both UNCLAS.

¹⁰The OMA COB included the reserve affairs program, the narrow scope of which did not warrant the submission of a separate COB. The third program--the family housing management account--for which USAREUR directly controlled or administered funds, was in a separate COB. UNCLAS.

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readiness of USAREUR's combat and other units. USAREUR pointed out that the shortages of supplies and repair parts would continue to be the most pressing materiel readiness funding problems, particularly for Seventh Army units.¹¹ Because USACOMZEUR had not been able to furnish \$58.5 million worth of supplies requisitioned by Seventh Army units in FY 1965, the demand carryover in FY 1966 had been extremely high. This pent-up demand, plus the progressively improved responsiveness of the entire supply system, had produced such a high rate of fund obligations that by 31 December 1965 Seventh Army had used 67 percent of its total FY 1966 supply funds. However, this improvement did not alleviate the zero balance or equipment deadline situation. At the beginning of 1966, for example, approximately 18,000 Seventh Army items--33 percent of the stockage list--were at zero balance, and many of the requisitioned items needed to repair deadlined equipment were not available because they were critically short throughout the U.S. supply system.

To satisfy the conditions imposed by a temporary shortage of funds and to slow down the rate of obligations--which threatened to exhaust Seventh Army's supply fund resources long before the end of the fiscal year--USAREUR curtailed and restricted the consumption of supplies and other resources. Although Seventh Army received \$22,167,000 in additional supply funds before the end of FY 1966, their late receipt and the lowered obligation rates in the period of curtailed requisitioning had an unfavorable effect on its logistic readiness.

CINCUSAREUR expected that continuing improvement of the U.S. supply system would bring about a one-time surge of deliveries of previously unavailable but required items, thereby reducing the huge backlog of unfilled requisitions. He proposed to take advantage of this circumstance to eliminate zero balances and improve materiel readiness.¹²

¹¹ \$27 million were for Seventh Army units. UNCLAS.

¹² (1) Cable AETGD-S-14577, Seventh Army to CINCUSAREUR, 19 Mar 66. CONF. Gp-4. (2) USAREUR COB 1967, cited above. UNCLAS. (3) Classified Supplement to Seventh Army Command Operating Budget, FY 1967, 17 Mar 66. Cy in AEAGC-XB files. SECRET. Gp-4.

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(2) The Annual Funding Programs. Based on USAREUR's COB proposals, the Department of the Army recognized direct-funding requirements amounting to \$547,632,000.¹³ For the FY 1967 family housing management account (FHMA) the Department recognized \$46,856,000 of the \$71,790,194 direct funds USAREUR had estimated as its requirement.¹⁴

By 31 December 1966 AFP adjustments had reduced USAREUR's FY 1967 OMA direct-fund availability to \$544,633,000. The reserve affairs and FHMA AFP figures remained the same (Table 2).¹⁵

64. (S) The FRELOC Budget

a. Cost Reporting. USAREUR could address only a part of the financial requirements imposed by the withdrawal of U.S. forces from France in its COB because, at the time of COB preparation in the spring of 1966, FRELOC planning had not sufficiently advanced to provide an adequate basis for realistic relocation cost estimates. Final costs would depend on the character and the impact of approved withdrawal plans. For this reason, USAREUR directed its commands, units, and activities in France to exclude from their COB proposals the costs for their movement from France. However, to facilitate later reprogramming, USAREUR directed them to identify separately their personnel and dollar requirements for activities associated with relocation directives. When developments had progressed to

¹³Including reserve affairs funds amounting to \$49,000.
UNCLAS.

¹⁴(1) Cable DA-769738, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 16 Jun 66.
(2) USAREUR FHMA Command Operating Budget, Fiscal Year 1967, 15 Apr 66. Cy in AEACO-B files. (3) Program and Funding Authorization Schedule, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 1 Jul 66. Cy in AEACO-B files. (4) Intvw, Mr. Carlisle with Mr. S. Martin, OCOMPT Bud Div Sp Funds Br, 27 Feb 67. All UNCLAS.

¹⁵(1) Incl 1 to ltr, TAG to CINCUSAREUR et al., 19 Dec 66, subj: Program and Budget Guidance, FY 1967 - 1968 (U). ACAM-P (M) (15 Dec 66) COMPT-B (BP). SECRET (info used CONF. Gp-4).
(2) USAREUR FY 1967, Status of Funds Availability as of 31 December 1966, 18 Jan 67. Cy in AEAGC-XB files. UNCLAS. (3) Intvw, Mr. Carlisle with SGT P. K. Toul, U.S.A. Res Aff, Eur, 27 Feb 67. UNCLAS.

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Table 2 (U)

FY 1967

A. Status of Available and Obligated Funds on 31 December 1966

<u>Totals</u>	<u>*Availability</u> <u>\$1,019,873,333</u>	<u>Obligation</u> <u>\$522,352,107</u>
Operation and Maintenance, Army (OMA)	549,264,000	294,142,000
Procurement of Equipment and Missiles, Army (PEMA)	60,000	18,456
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDTE), Army	0	0
Military Assistance Program (MAP)	3,279,908	681,299
Military Construction, Army (MCA)	12,538,625	2,890,618
Army Stock Fund	407,800,000	203,829,433
Reserve Personnel, Army (RPA)	210,000	186,000
Family Housing Management	46,720,800	20,604,301

B. Status of Major OMA Programs on 31 December 1966

<u>Program</u>	<u>Totals</u>	<u>*Availability</u> <u>\$ 549,264,000</u>	<u>Obligation</u> <u>\$294,142,000</u>
2000		322,865,000	172,508,000
2100		2,980,000	1,234,000
2200		115,439,000	66,730,000
2300		34,276,000	19,707,000
2400		24,129,000	12,205,000
2500		43,300,000	19,330,000
2600		34,000	21,000
2800		5,641,000	2,319,000
2900		600,000	88,000

*Includes direct funds and funded reimbursements only.

SOURCE: AEACO-B. UNCLAS.

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the stage that permitted firm planning, they would identify in supplemental budget submissions their fund requirements for relocation and the changes in their operational costs caused by FRELOC activities.¹⁶

In June USAREUR directed its commands, units, and activities to prepare data relating to extra identifiable FRELOC costs, which it defined as unprogramed direct obligations incurred as a direct or indirect result of the relocation requirement. They were to identify cost estimates--recurring or nonrecurring--by budget program, budget program account, and object class.¹⁷

USCINCEUR's Final Phase I Plan, the JCS memorandum calling for a near-term relocation plan, and USAREUR's COB identified \$48 million of OMA funds directly attributable to FRELOC costs. The Department of the Army directed USAREUR to prepare a detailed summary of all known and estimated FRELOC Phase I costs by budget program and budget program account, showing the gross, normal, and new costs, as well as the offset credits, realized as a result of FRELOC implementing actions. Gross costs were those directly related to FRELOC Phase I implementations; normal costs were amounts included in the gross costs of projects and activities normally programed for FY 1967, excluding the \$11,603,000 already provided as advance funding for initial FRELOC actions; offset credits were funds originally programed for activities in FY 1967 but reduced, canceled, or deferred because of FRELOC implications, such as LN pay and benefits; and the new costs were amounts directly related to the U.S. forces' withdrawal that exceeded those costs and obligations originally programed for FY 1967 (i.e., gross costs minus normal costs and offset credits).¹⁸

In accordance with a Department of the Army directive, in September USAREUR established a requirement to report FRELOC costs broken out in accordance with the 25 JCS objectives for a near-term relocation, plus 11 objectives, such as the merger of

¹⁶ Cable SX-3173, CINCUSAREUR to distr, 2 May 66. SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-4.

¹⁷ (1) Cable SC-30262, CINCUSAREUR to distr, 7 Jun 66. (2) Cable SC-42806, same to DA, 17 Sep 66. Both UNCLAS.

¹⁸ Cable DA-778981, DA to CINCUSAREUR et al., 19 Aug 66. UNCLAS.

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USAREUR and Seventh Army headquarters, the relocation of the Seventh Army Inventory Control Center, the separation and retention bonuses paid to local nationals, housing for third-country nationals, and the relocation planning and programing that could not be accurately related to any specific FRELOC objective.¹⁹

b. Financial Requirements. The estimates in the first FRELOC budget USAREUR forwarded to the Department of the Army were based on the FRELOC assumptions and decisions as of September.²⁰ The first financial requirement figures therefore had only a temporary validity and served as guidance for further planning (Table 3).²¹

USAREUR's revised FRELOC budget for FY 1967 and FY 1968 provided a more accurate, but not a final, expression of overall FRELOC financial requirements. The revisions were based on the decisions that the Secretary of Defense had announced since the publication of the first FRELOC budget in September 1966.²²

¹⁹DA Cir 37-30, 26 Aug 66, subj: Cost of Withdrawal of U.S. and NATO Forces From France, RCS CSCAB-222. UNCLAS.

²⁰The only actions approved at that time were the retention of Caserma Passalacqua; HEADCON: the movement of USEUCOM headquarters to Stuttgart; the movement of excesses and command stocks to the United States, Germany, and Italy; the mobile SAMA concept; and the MCA construction projects in the amount of \$5 million. SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-4.

²¹(1) Incl, USAREUR FRELOC Budget FY 1967 - 1968, to ltr, CINCUSAREUR to distr, 22 Sep 66, subj: Budget Estimates for FRELOC (U). AEACO-B. SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-4. (2) OMA figures do not include USASTRATCOM-EUR requirements. UNCLAS.

²²For instance, the relocations of USACOMZEUR headquarters to Worms and the Supply and Maintenance Agency to Zweibruecken; the storage of a 30-day theater reserve supply level in the United Kingdom; the relocation of specific units from France; and the leasing of POL storage facilities in Germany. SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-4.

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Table 3 (S)

USAREUR SUMMARY OF FRELOC FINANCIAL REQUIREMENTS
FOR FY's 1967 and 1968 (As of 10 September 1966)

Organization and Maintenance, Army
(For Approved Actions)

	<u>Gross</u>	<u>Normal</u>	<u>Offset</u>	<u>New</u>
FY 1967	\$22,347,000	\$1,524,000	\$2,868,000	\$17,955,000
FY 1968	<u>6,015,000</u>	4,045,000	48,000	1,922,000

(For Actions Not Yet Approved)

FY 1967	\$76,031,000	\$22,163,000	\$6,948,000	\$46,920,000
FY 1968	<u>45,963,000</u>	30,223,000	9,679,000	6,061,000

Family Housing Management

FY 1967	\$ 16,000	---	---	\$ 16,000
FY 1968	---	---	---	---

Military Construction, Army

FY 1967	\$28,812,000	---	---	\$28,812,000
FY 1968	<u>47,290,000</u>	---	---	47,290,000

Procurement of Equipment and Missiles, Army

FY 1967	\$ 646,000	---	---	\$ 646,000
FY 1968	---	---	---	---

Military Personnel, Army

FY 1967	\$10,084,000	---	---	\$10,084,000
FY 1968	---	---	---	---

SOURCE: USAREUR FRELOC Budget FY 1967 - 1968, 12 Sep 66. AEACO-B.
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Two objectives in the first FRELOC budget had been rescinded;²³ some had changed their scope, character, and direction; and a number of decisions on other objectives were still outstanding. In the revised FRELOC budget, USAREUR increased the number of objectives so that it now addressed 49 separate items (Table 4).²⁴

c. Funding Status on 31 December 1966. At the end of 1966 USAREUR had obligated \$20.2 million of the \$44.8 million the Department of the Army had made available to finance FRELOC actions.²⁵

65. (C) The Foreign Currency Program

U.S.-owned foreign currencies represented the reimbursements paid by foreign currencies to the United States in recognition of specific obligations. Periodically the U.S. Treasury designated certain amounts as excess available for purchase by other U.S. Government agencies. Of the \$5,110,000 excess earmarked for Army, USAREUR proposed purchasing from Poland \$410,000 worth of paint to rehabilitate buildings and \$1,605,000 worth of material to replace deteriorated fences throughout the command. In Yugoslavia, USAREUR wanted to spend \$995,000 for prefabricated buildings--to satisfy requirements for dependent school structures, aviation hangars, maintenance shops, recreation facilities, and facilities for nonappropriated-fund activities--and \$2.1 million for furniture and furnishings to replace similar items in family quarters. All purchases were subject to U.S. State Department approval.

Plans called for obligating \$140,000 in FY 1967 and \$270,000 in FY 1968 for paint, and \$535,000 in FY 1967 and \$1,070,000

²³ The establishment of a 100-bed hospital in the Saar, and the storage of USAREUR stocks in ABREST facilities in France. SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-4.

²⁴ (1) USAREUR FRELOC Budget (Revised) FY 1967 - 1968. 21 Jan 67. AEACO-B. SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-4. (2) OMA figures do not include USASTRATCOM-EUR requirements. UNCLAS.

²⁵ OCOMPT Presentation of Second Quarter FY 1967 Review and Analysis to the USAREUR Chief of Staff, 28 Feb 66. Cy in AEACO-M files. UNCLAS.

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Table 4 (S)

USAREUR SUMMARY OF REVISED FRELOC FINANCIAL REQUIREMENTS
FOR FY's 1967 and 1968 (As of 21 January 1967)

A. For Approved Actions:

	<u>Organization and Maintenance, Army</u>			
	<u>Gross</u>	<u>Normal</u>	<u>Offset</u>	<u>New</u>
FY 1967	\$33,122,000	\$ 1,153,000	\$5,286,000	\$26,683,000
FY 1968	<u>22,946,000</u>	11,527,000	933,000	10,486,000
	<u>Family Housing Management</u>			
FY 1967	<u>46,000</u>	---	---	46,000
FY 1968	---	---	---	---
	<u>Military Construction, Army</u>			
FY 1967	<u>12,478,000</u>	---	---	12,478,000
FY 1968	<u>40,839,000</u>	---	---	40,839,000
	<u>Procurement of Equipment and Missiles, Army</u>			
FY 1967	<u>1,989,000</u>	---	---	1,989,000
FY 1968	<u>567,000</u>	---	---	567,000
	<u>Military Personnel, Army</u>			
FY 1967	<u>3,119,000</u>	---	---	3,119,000
FY 1968	---	---	---	---
	<u>Army Management Funds</u>			
FY 1967	<u>37,000</u>	---	---	37,000
FY 1968	---	---	---	---
	<u>Military Assistance Program</u>			
FY 1967	<u>42,000</u>	---	---	42,000
FY 1968	---	---	---	---

B. For Actions Not Yet Approved:

	<u>Organization and Maintenance, Army</u>			
FY 1967	<u>27,159,000</u>	8,965,000	114,000	18,080,000
FY 1968	<u>2,959,000</u>	2,905,000	---	54,000
	<u>Family Housing Management</u>			
FY 1967	<u>423,000</u>	---	---	423,000
FY 1968	<u>700,000</u>	---	---	700,000
	<u>Military Construction, Army</u>			
FY 1967	<u>6,027,000</u>	---	---	6,027,000
FY 1968	<u>13,585,000</u>	---	---	13,585,000
	<u>Military Personnel, Army</u>			
FY 1967	<u>916,000</u>	---	---	916,000
FY 1968	---	---	---	---

SOURCE: USAREUR FRELOC Budget (Revised), FY 1967 - 1968, 21 Jan 67.
AEACO-B. SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-4.

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in FY 1968 for the fencing material. For the Yugoslav furniture, USAREUR intended to obligate \$700,000 in FY 1967 and \$1,400,000 in FY 1968. Since the Yugoslavs would manufacture the prefabricated building elements to USAREUR specifications, fund obligations for these items would take place in FY 1968. Although these items would not constitute a charge against regular appropriations or require any IBP expenditures, the erecting of the buildings and fences and the application of the paint would incur some regular and IBP costs.²⁶

66. (U) Overtime Payments

In October and November 1965 USAREUR had projected its FY 1967 overtime and holiday payments program at \$278,246 for Department of the Army civilians (DAC) and LN direct-hire personnel, not knowing that it might have to withdraw its forces from France. Even after the announcement of the French demand, the Department of the Army asked USAREUR not to spend more than one quarter of the projected total in the first quarter of FY 1967. In August the Department established USAREUR's overtime and holiday pay ceilings for the four quarters of FY 1967 at \$70,000, \$65,000, \$60,000, and \$55,000 for a total of \$250,000.²⁷

USAREUR's revised estimates called for \$341,000--\$91,000 more than the FY 1967 ceiling figure. USAREUR based the increase on FRELOC requirements, on the greater need for civilians caused by the military personnel drawdown, and on anticipated higher tonnages processed through command ports. USAREUR requested a revision of the quarterly ceilings to \$80,000, \$89,000, \$83,000, and \$89,000, and pointed out that later developments might require further revision.²⁸

In reply, the Department reaffirmed its quarterly ceilings and specified that USAREUR could not exceed them without its express approval.²⁹ Since any measurable relief from the imposed

- ²⁶ (1) Cable DA-791934, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 29 Nov 66. UNCLAS.
(2) Cable SX-6556, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 5 Dec 66. CONF. Gp-4.

²⁷ (1) Ltrs, CINCUSAREUR to COA, 22 Oct and 1 Nov 65, subj: Preparation and Submission of Data for Schedules of Detail of Personnel Compensation in Connection with the Department of the Army Annual Budget Estimate, FY 1967. AEACO-B. (2) Cable DA-773440, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 13 Jul 66. (3) Cable DA-776635, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 4 Aug 66. All UNCLAS.

²⁸ Cable SC-36851, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 12 Aug 66. UNCLAS.

²⁹ Cable DA-778442, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 17 Aug 66. UNCLAS.

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limitations was unlikely--except for activities having a direct relationship to Southeast Asian (SEA) operations, medical services, or natural catastrophes--USAREUR was to try to accomplish its workloads without resorting to the use of overtime or at least limit the overtime used to absolutely essential operations. At the same time, however, the Department granted USAREUR authority to use temporary and part-time positions outside current employment ceilings for operations having an urgent and heavy demand for overtime services. USAREUR could request an exception to the overtime and holiday pay limitations for the first quarter of FY 1967 after it had used its quarterly allotment and had exploited all other means of accomplishing workloads. Under no circumstances could it exceed the first quarter allotment without obtaining permission.³⁰

Since he had already exceeded the first quarter limitation by \$9,900, CINCUSAREUR directed the cessation of all operations requiring overtime pay expenditures until the start of the second quarter. In requesting a first quarter increase of \$41,500, he emphasized that FRELOC operations had increased the need for overtime and that the continued imposition of the overtime restrictions would diminish his capability to accomplish FRELOC objectives. Restrictive conditions--such as the reduced availability of military personnel because of the civilianization program, the shortage of officers caused by the personnel drawdown, and the need to increase the use of U.S. employees because of the NOFORN classification of some FRELOC actions--had further aggravated the problem. Since almost all LN employees in Italy were direct-hire personnel for whom U.S.-Italian agreements precluded the granting of compensatory time in place of overtime payments, it appeared logical to pay them overtime to unload and load time-charter ships at the Leghorn port rather than to incur demurrage charges. For example, in the first quarter of FY 1967 USAREUR had paid \$17,777--charged to SEA operations--for overtime services to correct an ammunition load shift on a ship halted in Leghorn waters. Without the use of overtime services, the increase in demurrage charges would have totaled \$30,000.

For these reasons, CINCUSAREUR stated that the \$41,500 that his command might save by denying overtime payments in September would not compensate for the risk of diminishing the momentum of materiel shipments from France and incurring increased demurrage charges. In conclusion, he requested that the Secretary of the

³⁰(1) Cable DA-779036, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 19 Aug 66. (2) Cable SC-39597, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 24 Aug 66. Both UNCLAS.

Army either exclude FRELOC overtime requirements from the Department's overtime limitations or raise the first quarter ceiling to \$111,500.³¹

It was not until late September, however, that the Department increased USAREUR's first quarter ceiling to the requested amount of \$111,500. The carryover, including adjustments for reimbursements, brought the funds available for overtime payments for the first half of FY 1967 to \$202,500, of which USAREUR used \$157,078 by 31 December 1966.³²

67. (U) New Resources Management System

In August the Secretary of Defense directed the development of a new resources management system and its implementation by 1 July 1967. It would include, but not be limited to, the existing systems for programing and budgeting; managing resources for operating activities; controlling inventories and similar assets; and managing the acquisition, use, and disposition of capital assets.³³

The new concept represented one more progression in the effort to establish effective management controls that had begun in 1949, when the Department of Defense started forming its financial management systems. Its central objective was to provide each manager with clearly defined goals, more discretion in determining the use of resources to achieve these goals, and a meaningful way of measuring and reporting his achievements and the use of his resources. Under the current system, the operating manager had goals--not always well defined--but he had little discretion in the use of his assigned resources and few means of gauging his effectiveness and efficiency. His motivation was directed toward getting his job accomplished and living within his budget, not on minimizing the amount of the resources he used, except to the extent that his fund limitations determined

³¹Cables SC-40488 and 41576, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 31 Aug and 9 Sep 66. Both UNCLAS.

³²(1) Cables DA-783935 and 783864, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 27 Sep 66. (2) MFR, Mr. V. K. Buck, USAREUR Compt Div Bud Br, 22 Oct 66, subj: Control of Overtime During FY 1967. AEACO-B. (3) Cable SC-54071, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 14 Dec 66. (4) Intvw, Mr. Carlisle with Mr. Buck, 2 Mar 66. All UNCLAS.

³³Cable DA-781540, DA to CINCUSAREUR et al., 9 Sep 66. UNCLAS.

his actions. Under some circumstances, he was even motivated to spend his entire allotment, regardless of his real need.

Resources management would focus attention on the resources each organization used in carrying out its part of an overall program. The current programing system provided rough data on expenses by program element, but neither budgeting nor accounting related directly to each program element. For example, only 15 to 20 percent of the resources actually used by an organization were reported as costs to that organization. The new system's long-range goal was to charge each organizational unit with 100 percent of the measured expenses it incurred.³⁴

68. (U) The Zero Defects Program

a. Background. Impressed with the success of the management tool used by the U.S. Army Materiel Command (USAMC) over the past three years, the Army Chief of Staff had announced in October 1965 his intention of extending the USAMC "Zero Defects" program throughout the Army. The primary objective of the new program was to improve the quality and reliability of goods furnished and services rendered by inspiring each service member--military and civilian--to perform his job properly the first time, thereby avoiding the delays, increased costs, and other disadvantages of making required corrections. The Army would have to imbue each service member with personal pride and motivation to demonstrate his professionalism by preventing errors, rather than by detecting and correcting mistakes after the completion of his tasks. The Army Chief of Staff planned to introduce this philosophy--which was simply the leadership principle as it was understood in the armed services--throughout all Army ranks and grades. He pointed out that, if all commanders used their initiative, ingenuity, and common sense in applying the principles of error avoidance, the Army would improve its readiness posture and increase its capability to accomplish its missions.³⁵

b. Developments in 1966. In January the Comptroller of the Army presented the Zero Defects briefing at Heidelberg, whereupon USAREUR conducted three 2-day workshops attended by 121 supervisory personnel. CINCUSAREUR gave his personal support to the program by stating that it represented a new challenge

³⁴Department of Defense, A Primer on Project PRIME, Nov 66. Cy in AEAGC-XH files. UNCLAS.


³⁵Ltr, CofSA to CINCUSAREUR, 29 Oct 65, and ltr, CINCUSAREUR to CofSA, 14 Nov 65. Cys in AEACO-M files. UNCLAS.

to management and the individual: Management would have to rely on the individual by motivating him toward defect-free work and recognizing superior performance; the individual would have to develop a personal pride in his contribution to the accomplishment of Army missions. He emphasized that, unless his equipment was defect-free, the fighting man might not be able to face an enemy successfully.³⁶

The program opened officially in July with the support of a variety of public information media. It produced significant benefits by the end of 1966. For example, errors in morning reports had decreased from 36 to 14.6 percent, and errors in military occupation specialty (MOS) testing had decreased to less than 1 percent. In 1967 USAREUR planned to present Zero Defects topics in leadership courses and in unit training orientations.³⁷

³⁶(1) Cable SC-15473, CINCUSAREUR to USARMC, 15 Feb 66. UNCLAS. (2) MFR's, Mr. F. Estrada, COMPT Mgt Asst Sec, 21 Mar and 27 Apr 66, subj: Zero Defects Workshops. AEACO-M. (3) Cable SC-21321, CINCUSAREUR to Seventh Army, 30 Mar 66. (4) Ltr, to distr, 31 May 66, subj: Zero Defects. AEACO-M. All UNCLAS.

³⁷Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to COA, 6 Feb 67, subj: Army Zero Defects Program Report, RCS: CSCAM-113. AEACO-M. UNCLAS.



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Chapter 10

Special Weapons

69. (TS) Pershing and the Quick Reaction Alert

a. Background. According to the Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) concept, elements of SACEUR's nuclear strike forces were to be on continuous alert and assigned to cover critical, preselected targets earmarked in the SACEUR Scheduled Program for destruction within a few hours of the release of nuclear weapons. As early as 1964 the Pershing system--designed for the general support of the field army--had been under consideration for employment in the QRA role. During March and April 1965 USCINCEUR had conducted a Joint Environmental Test (JET) of the Pershing system that had simulated QRA conditions. The next step had been to conduct a series of operational tests to fire the Pershing system under QRA conditions. USCINCEUR had delegated this responsibility to CINCUSAREUR. The first phase of the operational test program, designated demonstration and shakedown operations (DASO), had started in October 1965, when a battery of USAREUR's 4th Battalion, 41st Artillery, had returned to the United States and fired three missiles.

Subsequently, in March 1966, the Secretary of Defense approved plans to expand the Pershing QRA program, and in April the Department of the Army established QRA as the primary mission for the Pershing.¹

¹(1) USAREUR Anl Hist Sum, 1965, pp. 248 - 255. TS (info used SECRET). (2) Memo, SECDEF to CJCS, 10 Feb 66, subj: Evaluation of Pershing in a QRA Role (C). USAREUR AG TS 2-46. (3) Cable ECJC-P-04395, USCINCEUR to USNMR SHAPE, 7 Mar 66. Both TS. (4) DF, DCSOPS to Engr, 21 Oct 66, subj: Interim Pershing Sites (U). (5) Incl to DF, DCSOPS to DCSLOG, 17 Nov 66, subj: Pershing Weapon System Improvements and Operational Testing (U). Both AEAGC-NA. SECRET. All Gp-3.

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b. Concept BRAVO. USEUCOM's Concept BRAVO called for employing an 8-launcher Pershing battalion in the QRA role. One 4-launcher battery with two programmer test station/power station combinations was to be on field alert status (FAS), two 2-launcher batteries on garrison alert status (GARS), and the personnel of one battery--its launchers and programmer test station used to augment the FAS battery to a 4-launcher configuration--were to be on maintenance status with maximum leaves and passes. This concept required additional personnel and, pending their arrival in the fourth quarter of 1966, USAREUR's three Pershing battalions--the 4th Battalion, 41st Artillery; the 1st Battalion, 81st Artillery; and the 3d Battalion, 84th Artillery--assumed the QRA mission, each with a 2-launcher battery on field alert status.²

In October the augmentation personnel needed to implement Concept BRAVO began to arrive, and USAREUR asked the Department of the Army for authority to reorganize its Pershing units under a modified Delta-series table of organization and equipment (TOE).³ In the interim USAREUR authorized the issue of the additional equipment needed for the expanded QRA mission and currently available in the theater. In December the Department of the Army authorized the reorganization of USAREUR's Pershing battalions; each of the three battalions was to have one 4-launcher battery on field alert status by the end of March 1967.⁴

²(1) The concept under which USAREUR assumed the QRA mission--termed Concept CHARLIE--differed from Concept BRAVO only in the 2-launcher configuration of the FAS battery. The 4/41st Arty, the 1/81st Arty, and the 3/84th Arty assumed QRA status on 1 December 1965, 15 January and 15 April 1966, respectively. (USAREUR Anl Hist Sum, 1965, pp. 53 - 60. TS [info used SECRET].) (2) Cables SX-1116 and 2897, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR 9 Jan and 15 Apr 66. (3) Intvw, SP5 K. M. Johnson, USAREUR Ops Div Mil Hist Sec, with MAJ E. Van Keuren, USAREUR Ops Div, 23 May 66. All SECRET. Gp-1.

³USAREUR's Pershing battalions had been organized under TOE 6-615T. UNCLAS.

⁴(1) Cable SC-46052, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 8 Oct 66. (2) DF, DCSOPS to DCSPER and DCSLOG, 31 Oct 66, subj: Reorganization of Pershing Units (U). AEAGC-NA. Both UNCLAS. FOUO. (3) Cable SX-5849, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 21 Oct 66. (4) Intvw, Mr. K. M. Johnson, USAREUR Mil Hist Br, with MAJ R. V. Dennis, USAREUR ODCSOPS Arty & SW Div, 7 Dec 66. Both SECRET. Gp-3.

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c. Programed Changes. As approved by the Secretary of Defense, the Pershing QRA program called for developing improved ground support equipment and erector launchers scheduled for delivery in the second half of 1969. Each firing battery would receive 9 improved launchers so that the modified battalion would have up to 36 launchers.⁵

CINCUSAREUR emphasized the danger of presenting so lucrative a target as a 36-launcher battalion.⁶ He noted that peacetime stationing of a 9-launcher battery at a single location would invite covert enemy action at times when hostilities seemed imminent, and even the deployment of large covering forces could not preclude clandestine mortar attacks.

The Department of the Army acknowledged the increased vulnerability of the modified battalion but indicated that the 36-launcher battalion appeared to be the best solution to provide the desired firepower for the QRA mission.⁷

d. Missile Firings.

(1) Demonstration and Shakedown Operations. In October 1965 a USAREUR Pershing battery had fired three missiles in the first demonstration and shakedown operation of the Pershing Operational Test (POT) Program. While the first missile had successfully engaged its target, in-flight

⁵(1) Memo, SECDEF to CJCS, 10 Feb 66, cited above.
TS. (2) DF, DCSOPS to DCSLOG, 17 Nov 66, subj: Pershing Weapon System Improvements and Operational Testing (U).
AEAGC-NA. SECRET. Both Gp-3.

⁶(1) WSEG Rept 87, Sep 65, Pershing in a Quick Reaction Alert Role (C), pp. 12 - 15, 31. TS. RD. NOFORN. (2)
Cable SX-3355, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 13 May 66. SECRET. Both Gp-1.

⁷(1) Cable SX-5184, CINCUSAREUR to DA and USCINCEUR (O'Meara to Johnson and Burchinal), 13 Sep 66. (2) Cable DA-783591, DA to CINCUSAREUR (Abrams to O'Meara), 24 Sep 66. (3) Incl to DF, DCSOPS to DCSLOG, 17 Nov 66, cited above.
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technical difficulties had forced the range safety officer to destroy the other two missiles.⁸ In January 1966 USAREUR learned that the failure of a defective part had delayed stage separation and had allowed the buildup of interstage pressure. Plans called for replacing the part with one of improved design before the second DASO.⁹

Consequently the second DASO--originally scheduled for February 1966--was postponed until 25 July, when a USAREUR Pershing battery of the 1st Battalion, 81st Artillery, successfully fired three missiles from Black Mesa, Utah, to an impact point 304 nautical miles away at White Sands Missile Range. Tactical reaction times--measured from initiation of the release message to missile launch--for the first and second missiles on long hold were 19.5 and 67.5 minutes, respectively, while two other missiles not on long hold--one actually fired and the other simulated--scored reaction times of 50.1 and 98.0 minutes. All warheads fuzed above the desired height of burst and impacted short of the desired impact point.¹⁰

Late in November USAREUR representatives attended a Pershing pre-fire conference at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and

⁸USAREUR Anl Hist Sum, 1965, p. 252. TS (info used CONF. Gp-4).

⁹The failure of DASO rounds 2 and 3 resulted from improper functioning of the explosive bolts or associated electrical circuits in the interstage splice ring. This defect delayed separation and allowed interstage pressure to crush the thermal insulator that seals the end of the second stage, thereby allowing impingement of exhaust flame on electrical cables of the second stage control system. (MFR, LTC W. R. Miller, C/Pershing Op Test Div, 22 Jan 66, subj: DA PERSHING Meeting 10 - 11 Jan 66 (U). AETAT-POT. USAREUR AG TS 35-16. TS. Gp-1.)

¹⁰Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 4 Nov 66, subj: PERSHING Weapon System Operational Test Program Quarterly Report (U). AEAGC-NA. SECRET. Gp-3.

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preparations for the third and final DASO--scheduled for March 1967--were in progress at the end of 1966.¹¹

(2) Short Notice Annual Practice. In June and October two batteries--one from the 4th Battalion, 41st Artillery, and the other from the 3d Battalion, 84th Artillery--successfully fired two Pershing missiles on 353- and 420-nautical-mile trajectories from the Gilson Butte, Utah, launch site into the White Sands Missile Range.¹²

(3) Pershing Operational Test Unit. In 1965 USAREUR had organized the POT unit under a separate table of distribution (TD) to conduct the 10-year operational test program. While ballistic missile operational tests were not a standing requirement for field armies, the POT unit functioned as an integral part of Seventh Army's artillery staff. As a result of the consolidation of headquarters, USAREUR relocated the test unit to Heidelberg and integrated it into the Artillery and Special Weapons Directorate of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, on 1 December 1966.¹³

e. Field Alert Status Verifications. To provide reliable data on the Pershing in the QRA role, USAREUR tested each battery on field alert status. Designated Field Alert Status Verifications (FASV), the test consisted of a complete evaluation of each battery's functions from USCINCEUR's release of a simulated release-hour message until the simulated firing of two missiles.

During the Joint Environmental Test in early 1965 the Pershing batteries had scored mean reaction times of 54

¹¹DF, DCSOPS to CofS, 8 Nov 66, subj: Request for TDY to CONUS (U). AEAGC-NA. UNCLAS.

¹²DF, DCSOPS to CofS, 12 Nov 66, subj: PERSHING Missile Firings. AEAGC-NA. SECRET. Gp-4.

¹³(1) DF, DCSOPS to CofS, 1 Oct 66, subj: Location of Pershing Operational Test Unit (U). AEAGC-NA. CONF. Gp-4. (2) Cable SC-46691, CINCUSAREUR to Seventh Army, 14 Oct 66. UNCLAS.

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minutes for the first missile and 106 minutes for the second missile. In late December 1966 USCINCEUR reported that mean reaction times derived from tests conducted since 1 December 1965--when the first Pershing unit had assumed the QRA mission--were 29 minutes for the first missile and 61 minutes for the second.¹⁴

70. (TS) Weapons Dispersal

a. Overflights and Air Movements. As a result of the nuclear accident at Palomares, in January the Spanish Government prohibited overflights of its territory and territorial waters to all planes carrying nuclear weapons.¹⁵ This prohibition curtailed the dispersal of ground-delivered nuclear weapons to the Allied Command Europe (ACE) Southern Region. On the assumption that flights through the Straits of Gibraltar would be in international airspace and thus not subject to approval, USCINCEUR requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff to lift the restrictions they had imposed on overflying the Straits following the nuclear accident.¹⁶

Since the cost of improving European port facilities for the surface transportation of nuclear weapons was virtually prohibitive, U.S. authorities began new negotiations for the resumption of nuclear overflights of Spanish territory and the use of Rota as a staging base for nuclear logistics flights.¹⁷ USAREUR estimated that 34 intra- and intertheater

¹⁴(1) Memo, JCS to SECDEF, 25 Jun 66, subj: Status of Ballistic Missile Test Programs (U). USAREUR AG TS 1-86. TS (info used SECRET). (2) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 23 Jul 66, subj: Pershing Weapon System Operational Test Program Quarterly Report (U). AEAGC-NA. (3) Cable ECJC-O-19214, USCINCEUR to SACEUR, 21 Dec 66. Both SECRET. All Gp-1.

¹⁵(1) For further details, see USAREUR's Role in the Nuclear Accident in Spain, USAREUR Mil Hist Sec, 1966. (2) Cable SDO-00003, CINCUSAFE to CSAF, 23 Jan 66. Both SECRET. Gp-1.

¹⁶Cable ECJCO-06286, USCINCEUR to JCS, 15 Apr 66. TS. NOFORN. Gp-4.

¹⁷Cable ECJCO-10406, USCINCEUR to MAAG Madrid, 13 Jul 66. SECRET. Gp-3.

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flights might stage at Rota in the year ending in September 1967. By the end of December, however, the U.S. negotiators had not reached any agreement with the Government of Spain.¹⁸

In July the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the initiation of nuclear weapons flights through the Straits of Gibraltar within a corridor that was 4 1/2 nautical miles from the Spanish coast and 3 1/2 nautical miles from the coast of Morocco. USCINCEUR imposed navigational equipment and weather restrictions on all aircraft flying the Straits with nuclear components; in addition, changes to the Air Force's Special Weapons Overflight Guide reduced the danger of nuclear accidents. On 21 July the United States notified Spain that it intended to initiate nuclear weapons overflights of the Straits.¹⁹

USCINCEUR assigned priority to the dispersal of 8-inch warheads to Turkey and directed CINCUSAREUR to prepare for their movement. By mid-August USAREUR had resumed the dispersal of Army nuclear weapons to Greece and Turkey. Though inefficient, the Straits route proved workable, and in December nuclear weapons dispersal to the ACE Southern Region was nearing its authorized levels.²⁰

¹⁸(1) Cable SX-4695, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR et al., 13 Aug 66. FRD. NOFORN. (2) Cable ECJCO-13229, USCINCEUR to JUSMG-MAAG Madrid and JCS, 9 Sep 66. (3) Intvw, Mr. Johnson with MAJ W. F. Crews, USAREUR ODCSOPS Sp Wpns Div, 5 Dec 66. All SECRET. Gp-1.

¹⁹(1) Cable JCS-7420, JCS to USCINCEUR, 22 Jul 66. (2) Cable ECJCO-10743, USCINCEUR to CSAF et al., 22 Jul 66. (3) Cable MAOASN-52299, MAC to USCINCEUR and CINCUSAFE, 23 Jul 66. (4) Cable 83836, CSAF to same, 26 Jul 66. (5) Cable ECJCO-11021, USCINCEUR to CSAF et al., 28 Jul 66. (6) Cable ECJCO-11112, same to CINCUSAREUR et al., 29 Jul 66. All SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-1.

²⁰(1) Cable ECJD-WP-10879, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 26 Jul 66. (2) Cable SX-4468, CINCUSAREUR to USACOMZEUR, 29 Jul 66. (3) Cable SX-4718, same to 322d Air Div, 15 Aug 66. (4) Intvw, Mr. Johnson with MAJ Crews, cited above, 5 Dec 66. All SECRET. FRD. NOFORN. Gp-1.

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b. The Federal Republic of Germany. By the end of 1965 USAREUR had 91 percent of the special weapons allocated for positioning in, or for further dispersal from, the Federal Republic.²¹ The Department of the Army restrictions on the shipment and storage of plutonium-bearing weapons--principally the nuclear 155-mm howitzer rounds--had impeded the dispersal program. Late in 1965 USAREUR had requested a change in the shipment and storage criteria for these weapons. Early in 1966 the Department of the Army disseminated the requested change to its shipment and storage criteria--outlined in TM 39-20-12--which provided for more efficient use of aircraft and storage facilities. Under the new criteria, each aircraft could carry a mix of three plutonium- and five nonplutonium-bearing weapons. In addition, the so-called cubicle concept for subdividing storage igloos would allow for increased storage of plutonium-bearing weapons.²²

By the end of 1966 USAREUR had approximately 96 percent of its nuclear weapons allocation. However, the command experienced difficulties in calling forward the balance of its allocated weapons because of personnel shortages and delays in the deployment of custodial units and in the construction or modification of forward storage sites. The crux of the problem was that the positioning of weapons within the theater had not kept pace with the dispersal of weapons from the United States. Thus, during the fourth quarter of 1966 depot-stored nuclear weapons in the theater exceeded desired levels by approximately 34 percent, taxing to the limit the depot capacity of USAREUR's Advanced Weapons Support Command (AWSCOM). Most of the weapons comprising this overage had to await the availability of forward storage sites in Germany and Italy. Thus, further dispersal of weapons to Europe depended on accelerated positioning and a corresponding improvement in AWSCOM's

²¹ Cable SX-1789, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 15 Feb 66.
TS. FRD. Gp-1.

²²(1) Cable SX-1732, CINCUSAREUR to Seventh Army, 12 Feb 66. (2) Intvw, SP5 Johnson with MAJ Crews, 22 Jun 66. Both SECRET. RD. NOFORN. Gp-1.

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capacity to receive and store them. By the end of 1966 efforts to speed the initial positioning of nuclear weapons were in progress.²³

c. Phaseout of Tactical Atomic Demolition Munitions. In 1965 USAREUR's inventory of atomic demolition munitions (ADM) had included the .5 kiloton (KT) tactical atomic demolition munitions (TADM), the 2 and 10 KT medium atomic demolition munitions (MADM), and the .02 and .1 KT special atomic demolition munitions (SADM).²⁴ In November 1965 USCINCEUR had directed USAREUR to eliminate the .5 KT TADM's from the inventory during 1966; as replacements USAREUR received .75 KT MADM's. On 18 October USAREUR completed the final shipment of TADM's to the United States; it directed its subordinate commands to terminate the TADM mission and turn in the training devices to AWSCOM depots.²⁵

71. (TS) U.S. Support to Non-U.S. Nuclear Delivery Systems

a. Special Ammunition Support (SAS) for Turkey.

(1) Background. Under the provisions of USAREUR's 1959 service-to-service technical agreement with Turkey, U.S. custodial detachments provided nuclear warhead support to Turkish Honest John and 8-inch howitzer units. Similar agreements regulated the U.S. support of non-U.S. nuclear weapons systems in other NATO countries and provided for host country logistic support for the U.S. custodial detachments.²⁶

²³(1) Cable SX-6186, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR et al., 12 Nov 66. SECRET. (2) Intvws, Mr. Johnson with MAJ Crews, 14 Dec 66, and LTC S. N. Fitzpatrick, USAREUR ODCSOPS Sp Wpns Div, 15 Dec 66. TS. Both FRD. NOFORN. Gp-1.

²⁴USAREUR Anl Hist Sum, 1965, pp. 264 - 67. TS (info used SECRET. Gp-1).

²⁵(1) DF, DCSOPS to Cofs, 17 Nov 65, subj: Withdrawal of TADM from PAL Program (S). AEAGC-NN. (2) Cables SX-1065 and 2971, CINCUSAREUR to Seventh Army, 6 Jan and 20 Apr 66. (3) Cable SX-1127, same to CO 11th Engr Gp, 10 Jan 67. (4) Intvw, Mr. Johnson with MAJ Crews, 3 Mar 67. All SECRET. FRD. NOFORN. Gp-1.

²⁶(1) USAREUR Anl Hist Sums, 1 Jul 58 - 30 Jun 59, p. 127; and 1 Jul 59 - 31 Dec 59, pp. 27 - 28. (2) LTC W. M. Glasgow, USAREUR's Nuclear Weapons Responsibilities, 1953 - 1964 (U), pp. 33 - 35. Ops Div, Hq USAREUR, 1965. Both TS (info used SECRET). RD. NOFORN. Gp-1.

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In 1965 USAREUR had planned to add eight Nike Hercules batteries to its SAS program for Turkey. As the technical proficiency of the Turkish units increased and site construction neared completion, USAREUR intended to deploy two custodial detachments.²⁷ The Joint U.S. Military Mission for Aid to Turkey (JUSMMAT) had therefore opened discussions with the Turkish General Staff concerning their deployment. Meanwhile, the Turkish Government had decided unilaterally to transfer the responsibility for operating its Nike Hercules weapons system from the Army to the Air Force. In the ensuing discussions it had become apparent that the Turkish authorities intended to use this transfer as a reason for modifying the existing support arrangements.²⁸

USAREUR considered the existing agreements to be adequate for the support of Turkey's Nike Hercules units and maintained that any "substantive" change might create a precedent permitting other nations to reduce their logistic support of U.S. detachments.²⁹

(2) A Turkish Request and the U.S. Reaction. In February 1966 a Turkish General Staff representative indicated that his country was unable to meet its financial obligations and that modifications to the existing service-to-service technical agreement would be necessary.³⁰ CINCUSAREUR recognized that the Turkish position was tantamount to asking the United States to assume all support costs for

²⁷(1) USAREUR Anl Hist Sum, 1965, p. 268. TS (info used SECRET). (2) Cable SX-6394, CINCUSAREUR to JUSMMAT Ankara, 19 Sep 65. SECRET. NOFORN. Both Gp-1.

²⁸(1) Cable SX-6394, 19 Sep 65, cited above. (2) Cable ARFSP-C-00741, JUSMMAT Ankara to CINCUSAREUR, 18 Oct 65. CONF. (3) Cables SX-7067, 7172, and 7446, CINCUSAREUR to JUSMMAT Ankara, 25, 30 Oct and 15 Nov 65. (4) Cables ARFSP-C-00761, 00788, 00789, and 00831, JUSMMAT Ankara to CINCUSAREUR, 27 Oct, 9 and 22 Nov 65. All except (2) SECRET. NOFORN. All Gp-4.

²⁹(1) Cable SX-6394, 19 Sep 65, cited above. (2) Cable SX-6649, CINCUSAREUR to JUSMMAT Ankara, 2 Oct 65. (3) Cable SX-7384, same to USCINCEUR, 10 Nov 65. All SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-4.

³⁰Cable ARFSP-C-00121, JUSMMAT Ankara to CINCUSAREUR, 3 Feb 66. SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-4.

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the additional custodial detachments and would greatly increase U.S. costs for the units already in Turkey.³¹ Although he was reluctant to deploy the custodial detachments without a firm support agreement, he realized that a failure to deploy them upon completion of their training might result in their loss to other high-priority areas and a resulting delay of at least one year in making the Turkish units operational.³² On the basis of this information, USCINCEUR recommended that the Department of the Army provide USAREUR with additional funds and personnel to meet increased support requirements, and he directed CINCUSAREUR to refine his estimate of the costs involved.³³

USAREUR estimated that, if the United States used contractual services rather than additional military personnel, the extra cost of supporting the two detachments through FY 1967 would be \$1,376,820.³⁴

Subsequently the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the Department of the Army assume the increased support costs until further negotiations could resolve the question. Pending a decision from the Secretary of Defense, the Department of the Army canceled the deployment of the custodial detachments in early April.³⁵

³¹(1) Cable SX-1602, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 6 Feb 66. NOFORN. (2) Cable SX-1609, same to DA, 7 Feb 66. Both SECRET. Gp-3.

³²(1) Cable ECDC-02655, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 1 Feb 66. (2) Cable SX-1511, CINCUSAREUR to JUSMMAT Ankara, 2 Feb 66. (3) Cables ARFSP-C-00125 and 00136, JUSMMAT Ankara to CINCUSAREUR, 4 and 7 Feb 66. Both NOFORN. (4) Cables SX-1602 and 1609, 6 and 7 Feb 66, cited above. All SECRET. Gp-3.

³³(1) Cable ECJD-PP-03049, USCINCEUR to JCS, 8 Feb 66. NOFORN. (2) Cable ECJD-W-03066, same to CINCUSAREUR, 9 Feb 66. (3) Cable ECCS-03127, same to AMEMB and JUSMMAT Ankara. (4) Cable SX-1688, CINCUSAREUR to JUSMMAT Ankara. (5) Cable ARFSP-C-00146, JUSMMAT Ankara to USCINCEUR. (3) to (5) 10 Feb 66. All SECRET. Gp-3.

³⁴(1) Cable SX-1880, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 20 Feb 66. (2) DF, DCSOPS to CofS, 24 Feb 66, subj: Deployment of 40th and 41st Artillery Detachments to Turkey (U). ABAGC-NA. NOFORN. Both SECRET. Gp-3.

³⁵(1) Cable DA-725516, DA to CINCUSAREUR et al., 25 Feb 66. NOFORN. (2) Cable DA-759073, same to same, 8 Apr 66. Both SECRET. Gp-4.

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By mid-year the prospect of reaching an agreement at the service-to-service level had dimmed and USAREUR, reluctant to lose trained personnel, proposed to redesignate the two detachments and to employ their personnel to meet other nuclear weapons support requirements in Europe. The Department of the Army approved this proposal and assigned the personnel as teams to five artillery detachments. The first increments were to deploy to Europe in the first quarter of 1967.³⁶

While USAREUR continued its efforts to resolve the support question with Turkey at the service-to-service level, the impasse remained unbroken at the end of 1966.³⁷

b. Nuclear Support for NATO 155-mm Howitzers. In October USCINCEUR informed USAREUR that the President had approved for discussion--without definite U.S. commitment--a program to extend nuclear support to non-U.S. NATO 155-mm howitzers. USAREUR was to provide comments and recommendations on the financial, personnel, logistic, and political aspects of the proposed program.³⁸

Since the 155-mm nuclear round (MK-48) was exclusively an Army weapon, USAREUR was responsible for preparing oral and visual material for presentation to NATO representatives in early 1967. USAREUR therefore scheduled for mid-January a meeting with representatives of USEUCOM and the two subordinate commands directly concerned with implementing this program--the Special Ammunition Support Command (SASCOM) and U.S. Army Southern European Task Force (USASETAF).³⁹

³⁶(1) Draft Historical File, subj: 40th and 41st USA Artillery Dets. AEAGC-NAA. (2) Cable SX-6168, CINCUSAREUR to USASETAF and SASCOM, 10 Nov 66. (3) Intvw, Mr. Johnson with MAJ D. C. Cabell, USAREUR ODCSOPS Arty & Sp Wpns Div, 29 Dec 66. All SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-3.

³⁷(1) Cable 2609, AMEMB Ankara (from Hart) to Secy State, 26 Nov 66. CONF. (2) Intvw, Mr. Johnson with MAJ Cabell, 29 Dec 66. SECRET. NOFORN. Both Gp-3.

³⁸Cable ECJCO-16294, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR et al., 27 Oct 66. TS. FRD. NOFORN. Gp-1.

³⁹(1) Cables SX-6467 and 6838, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 30 Nov and 23 Dec 66. (2) Cable ECJCO-19542, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 28 Dec 66. (3) Intvw, Mr. Johnson with MAJ Cabell, 27 Feb 67. All SECRET. Gp-3.

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c. Other Special Ammunition Support.

(1) Program Expansion. Although all host nations except the Federal Republic of Germany encountered problems in providing the agreed level of logistic support to U.S. custodial detachments, USAREUR provided nuclear weapons and custodial support to 18 additional non-U.S. NATO delivery units that achieved nuclear operational status during 1966. (Chart 10). In addition, 14 Belgian, F.R.G., and Italian delivery units--including one 8-inch howitzer, three Honest John, and ten Nike Hercules batteries--were to achieve nuclear capability during the first half of 1967.⁴⁰

(2) British Inactivation of Corporal. Early in 1966 USAREUR learned that Great Britain planned to inactivate its 27th Artillery Regiment (Corporal)--the last Corporal unit in Europe--on 31 December, and the British subsequently expressed interest in the Lance system as a replacement. In the interim the British Army on the Rhine (BAOR) would equip two medium artillery regiments with 155-mm self-propelled howitzers. By the end of the year plans for the return of the remaining Corporal warheads to the United States were complete. USAREUR intended to inactivate its 26th Missile Detachment early in 1967 and use the Dortmund storage site to meet other programed requirements.⁴¹

(3) Italian Floods. Early in November USAREUR learned that severe flood conditions in northern Italy had reached proportions that could seriously impede USASETAF's emergency deployment capability. On 4 November nuclear weapons positioned near Portogruarno were loaded on Italian vehicles and--though not actually evacuated--remained loaded for several days against the possibility that further adverse weather would necessitate evacuation.

⁴⁰(1) DF, DCSOPS to IG, 8 Nov 66, subj: Status of ACE Land Launcher Nuclear Delivery Systems and Associated SAS Sites (U). AEAGC-NA. (2) Cable SX-6467, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 30 Nov 66. (3) Intvws, Mr. Johnson with MAJ Cabell, 30 Dec 66 and 11 Apr 67. All SECRET. Gp-3.

⁴¹(1) Cable 1902, USDAO London to USCINCEUR, 2 Nov 66. NOFORN. (2) Cable SX-6627, CINCUSAREUR to SASCOM, 9 Dec 66. FRD. Both SECRET. Gp-1.

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Chart 10 (S)

NUMBER OF NON-U.S. NATO BATTERIES PROGRAMED AND SUPPORTED BY USAREUR (U)

31 DECEMBER 1966

Country	8-Inch Howitzer		Honest John		Sergeant		Pershing		Nike Hercules	
	P*	S**	P*	S**	P*	S**	P*	S**	P*	S**
TOTAL	38	37	72	69	16	6	16	4	64	21
Belgium	2	2	6	6	--	--	--	--	8	4
Canada	--	--	2	2	--	--	--	--	--	--
Federal Republic of Germany	12	11	32	29	16	6	16	4	24	10
Greece	6	6	4	4	--	--	--	--	4	4
Italy	2	2	8	8	--	--	--	--	12	3
Netherlands	2	2	6	6	--	--	--	--	8	--
Turkey	8	8	8	8	--	--	--	--	8	--
United Kingdom	6	6	6	6	--	--	--	--	--	--

* Programed

** Supported

SOURCES: (1) SHAPE Conference on Land Weapons Spread Sheet, 7 - 9 Feb 67. NATO SECRET.
(2) Intvw, Mr. Johnson with MAJ Cabell, 11 Apr 67. SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-1.

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Subsequently the rising waters of the River Po threatened the site at Zelo, and USASETAF evacuated personnel and equipment from unpositioned sites at Catron and Ceggia, which the Italian Air Force declared nonoperational. Within a few days, however, USASETAF reported marked improvement, noting that the condition of roads and bridges in northeastern Italy no longer posed a serious threat to its emergency deployment plans. By 9 November all sites except Catron and Ceggia were safe and operationally unimpaired. The sites had to be cleaned up, and by the end of 1966 cost assessment of the damages was in progress.⁴²

72. (S) The Surety Program

a. Background. By the end of 1965 USAREUR's surety program had included activities connected with permissive action link (PAL) devices, nuclear safety inspections (NSI's), and technical proficiency inspections (TPI's). The joint visit of Dr. Glen T. Seaborg, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and GEN L. L. Lemnitzer, USCINCEUR, to one of USAREUR's nuclear delivery units in March was an indication of the national interest in the surety program.⁴³

b. PAL Program.

(1) Code Grouping. Late in 1965 USAREUR had objected to USCINCEUR's policy of grouping no more than 300 weapons under one PAL code. This policy restricted the Seventh Army commander's deployment flexibility since he might not be able to switch artillery units from one corps to another without changing PAL codes. In January USCINCEUR approved seven exceptions that USAREUR had requested for specific units.

⁴²(1) Cables SX-6084, 6102, and 6128, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 6, 7, and 8 Nov 66. (2) Cable P-6-145, USASETAF to CINCUSAREUR, 9 Nov 66. (3) Intvw, Mr. Johnson with MAJ Cabell, 30 Dec 66. All SECRET. Gp-4.

⁴³(1) USAREUR Anl Hist Sum, 1965, pp. 245 - 46. TS (info used SECRET. Gp-4). (2) Ltr, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR et al., 17 Mar 66, subj: Release of PAL Information to NATO (U). ECJCO. TS (info used SECRET). (3) Cable ALO-6-593, same to CINCUSAREUR and CINCUSAFE, 25 Mar 66. CONF. Both Gp-1.

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As a result, 155-mm howitzer nuclear rounds were no longer in the 8-inch howitzer code group. The PAL Detachment completed the recoding of all of Seventh Army's 155-mm nuclear rounds by mid-April.⁴⁴

(2) Weapons Recoding. From 12 September through 14 October USAREUR conducted a 3-phase operation--code named MOON PIE--to change the effective PAL codes for all nuclear weapons, except atomic demolition munitions. PAL Detachment teams tagged weapons with PAL page numbers, and USCINCEUR enlarged the format of release messages to permit the use of both old and new code series concurrently if the emergency release of weapons became necessary during the recoding period. PAL Management and Control Teams (PMCT) followed the recoding teams at each site, and by mid-October USAREUR had completed Operation MOON PIE without incident.⁴⁵

(3) PAL Devices for Atomic Demolition Munitions. Until 1966 a shortage of ADM 5-position devices had impeded the extension of PAL control to atomic demolition munitions. USAREUR planned to exchange all 3-position devices in use in 1965 for 5-position devices retrofitted to eliminate the so-called click that permitted an unauthorized listener to hear the setting of a combination. Initially USAREUR estimated that it would have locks suitable for PAL control on all special ADM's by October 1966 and that sufficient new 5-position devices for all medium ADM's would be available by March 1967.

Whereas USCINCEUR wanted to bring ADM's under PAL control as the devices became available, CINCUSAREUR

⁴⁴(1) USAREUR Anl Hist Sum, 1965, p. 246. TS (info used SECRET). (2) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 6 Dec 65, subj: Request for Exceptions to USCINCEUR OPLAN. EC 303 (PAL) (U). AEAGC-NN. NOFORN. (3) Cable ECJCO-02199, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 21 Jan 66. Both FRD. (4) Cable SX-1496, CINCUSAREUR to Seventh Army, 31 Jan 66. All except (1) SECRET. All Gp-1.

⁴⁵(1) Cables SX-4892, 4954, and 5317, CINCUSAREUR to Seventh Army et al., 25 and 29 Aug, and 20 Sep 66. (2) Intvw, Mr. Johnson with MAJ Crews, 3 Jan 67. All SECRET. FRD. NOFORN. Gp-1.

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objected to having some of them under PAL control and others on discrete codes. USCINCEUR therefore decided to hold the PAL lockup of ADM's in abeyance pending completion of device modification and preinstallation testing.⁴⁶

In late 1966 the Defense Atomic Support Agency (DASA) informed USAREUR that available 5-position devices opened prematurely as a result of design deficiencies and would require further modification. At the end of 1966 USAREUR had no further information on the time required to complete the program.⁴⁷

c. Technical Proficiency Inspections. Before positioning weapons and thereafter at 6- and 12-month intervals--depending on the length of personnel tours--USAREUR conducted technical proficiency inspections of all its units handling nuclear weapons.⁴⁸

The rating received by an inspected unit was either satisfactory or unsatisfactory. During 1966 USAREUR teams inspected 215 units, of which 33 received unsatisfactory ratings. Upon immediate reinspection, 23 of these qualified for a satisfactory rating.⁴⁹

73. (S) Withdrawal of French Air Defense Units

a. Operation FAST DRAW. Under a 1960 agreement USAREUR had supported French nuclear delivery units with 100 Honest

⁴⁶(1) Cable ECJCO-02532, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 31 Jan 66. (2) Cable SX-1654, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 8 Feb 66. (3) Cable SX-3013, same to same, 22 Apr 66. (4) Cable ECJCO-07004, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 30 Apr 66. (5) Cable SX-3484, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 21 May 66. (6) Intvw, SP5 Johnson with MAJ Crews, 15 Jun 66. All SECRET. NOFORN. FRD. Gp-1.

⁴⁷Intvw, Mr. Johnson with MAJ Crews, 4 Jan 67. SECRET. RD. Gp-1.

⁴⁸TPI evaluations included observation of actual operations involving ability to handle, store, transport, inspect, load, assemble, maintain, and accomplish related actions with nuclear weapons, stressing individual proficiency in these operations. The inspections also stressed the equipment and plans of U.S. custodial and delivery units to support the evacuation and destruction of nuclear weapons. (USEUCOM Dir 60-10, Dispersal, Storage and Peacetime Utilization of Nuclear Weapons (U), 3 Aug 64, w/ch dtd 4 Aug 65, Anx F.) SECRET. Gp-1.

⁴⁹Intvw, Mr. Johnson with MAJ S. Washington, USAREUR ODCSOPS Arty & Sp Wpns Div, 5 Jan 67. CONF. Gp-4.

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John and Nike Hercules warheads positioned at 6 sites in the Federal Republic of Germany. These French units had been within the NATO command structure, and when the French decided to withdraw from NATO, USCINCEUR prepared a plan for withdrawing nuclear support.⁵⁰

USCINCEUR's OPLAN 4343 (FAST DRAW) provided for two possible courses of U.S. action. Option 1 would require the immediate evacuation of all weapons, while Option 2 would withdraw support but leave the weapons in their sites.⁵¹ On 29 June USCINCEUR alerted CINCUSAREUR to prepare for the execution of FAST DRAW on 1 July. The following day the U.S. Ambassador at Paris notified the French Government of the withdrawal, and USCINCEUR ordered the execution of Option 1.⁵²

USAREUR immediately assembled the necessary personnel and equipment. In accordance with USCINCEUR's plan, USAREUR had prepared messages formally notifying the French delivery units of the withdrawal. Upon receipt of the execution order, the commanders of the U.S. support units delivered these messages, and on 1 July they began the withdrawal with the full support of the French units. By 5 July USAREUR had completed its assigned tasks without incident.⁵³

⁵⁰(1) Incl to DF, DCSOPS to CofS, 19 Mar 66, subj: Termination of U.S. Nuclear Support of French Forces (S). AEAGC-N. FRD. (2) Ltr, USCINCEUR to distr, 28 Mar 66, subj: USCINCEUR OPLAN 4343 (FAST DRAW) (U). ECJCO. NOFORN. Both SECRET. Gp-1.

⁵¹(1) Incl to DF, DCSOPS to CofS, 19 Mar 66, cited above. FRD. (2) The French sites involved were Saarlouis, Trier, Villigen, and Radolfzell (Honest John); and Boettingen and Innergen (Nike Hercules). (Cable ECJCO-09855, USCINCEUR to JCS, 30 Jun 66.) Both SECRET. Gp-1.

⁵²(1) Cable ECJCO-09778, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR et al., 29 Jun 66. (2) Cable JCS-5554, JCS to USCINCEUR, 29 Jun 66. Both SECRET. Gp-3. (3) Cable ECJCO-09843, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR et al., 30 Jun 66. UNCLAS.

⁵³(1) Cable SX-4017, CINCUSAREUR to Seventh Army et al., 29 Jun 66. NOFORN. (2) Cable ECJCO-09855, 30 Jun 66, cited above. Both SECRET. (3) Cable ECJCO-09971, same to same, 5 Jul 66. CONF. All Gp-1.

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USAREUR used the personnel and equipment of the 576th Artillery Group, which had supported the French delivery units, to fill other nuclear weapons support requirements. By mid-September SASCOM had accomplished the reassignment of personnel and redistribution of equipment, and USAREUR inactivated the 576th Artillery Group and its subordinate detachments.⁵⁴

b. The Nike Hercules Equipment. Through the Military Assistance Program (MAP), the United States had provided France with 48 Nike Hercules launchers and related equipment--valued at approximately \$30.9 million--for the purpose of integrating NATO's air defense system.⁵⁵

In July USAREUR learned that the French intended to withdraw their Nike Hercules units early in October. Since the United States wanted to regain custody of the equipment, USAREUR was to prepare the necessary plans.⁵⁶

CINCUSAREUR planned to inventory and effect transfer of the equipment at the French sites, and the French agreed to leave the MAP equipment in place for turnover.⁵⁷ The turnover began in October with the full cooperation of the

⁵⁴(1) Cable ECJD-WM-10070, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, et al., 7 Jul 66. SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-4. (2) Cable SC-35925, CINCUSAREUR to SASCOM, 26 Jul 66. UNCLAS. (3) Cable SX-4440, same to same, 28 Jul 66. CONF. (4) Cable SX-4441, same to DA, 28 Jul 66. SECRET. Both Gp-4. (5) USAREUR GO 231, 15 Sep 66. UNCLAS.

⁵⁵(1) French use of the equipment was subject to the Military Defense Assistance Agreement of 27 January 1950 between the United States and France. (2) Cable JCS-6401, JCS to USCINCEUR, 11 Jul 66. (3) Cable ECMAP-EU-10433, USCINCEUR to SECDEF, 15 Jul 66. All SECRET. Gp-1.

⁵⁶(1) Cable JCS-6760, JCS to USCINCEUR, 14 Jul 66. (2) Cable ECJC-P-10484, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 16 Jul 66. Both SECRET. Gp-1.

⁵⁷(1) Cable SX-5400, CINCUSAREUR to USACOMZEUR, 24 Sep 66. Gp-4. (2) Cable 4300, AMEMB Paris to Secy State, 26 Sep 66. Both SECRET.

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French, who remained at the sites until completion of the transfer. All the equipment was in U.S. custody by 23 December.⁵⁸

74. (S) Air Defense

a. Tactical Midrange Air Defense. In December 1965 the Secretary of Defense had tentatively approved the Tactical Midrange Air Defense (TAMIRAD) study that envisaged a mix of Nike Hercules, Hawk, Chaparral, and automatic weapons for the air defense of the U.S. ground forces in Central Europe. USAREUR was to develop a plan for implementing the new concept under which it would lose 2 of its 6 Nike Hercules battalions but gain 7 composite gun/Chaparral battalions.

USAREUR completed its implementation plan in May 1966, and on 7 September USEUCOM forwarded it to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The USAREUR plan provided for relocating three towed Hawk battalions from the forward Hawk belt to the airbase/logistics complex in the Bitburg, Hahn, Miesau, Kaiserslautern and Ramstein area. Two gun/Chaparral battalions would supplement the Hawk defense of this area. USAREUR would retrofit to a self-propelled configuration 4 of the 6 remaining Hawk battalions and deploy 1 gun/Chaparral battalion to each of its 5 divisions.

Late in 1966 USAREUR noted that FRELOC might modify some of the rear-area stationing included in the implementation plan. In addition, since the plan was not releasable to foreign nationals, USAREUR was unable to discuss with NATO officials the TAMIRAD-related problems generated by the withdrawal of French air defense units. By the end of 1966 USAREUR had not received approval of its implementation plan.⁵⁹

⁵⁸(1) Cable SX-5769, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 17 Oct 66.
(2) Cable SX-5999, same to DA, 1 Nov 66. (3) Intvw, Mr. Johnson with Mr. L. T. Gregg, USAREUR ODCSLOG Mat Readiness Dir, 16 Dec 66.
(4) Cable ECJC-P-19631, USCINCEUR to JCS, 3 Jan 67. NOFORN. All SECRET. Gp-4.

⁵⁹(1) Draft Memo, SECDEF to the President, 20 Oct 65, subj: Recommended Army and Marine Corps General Purpose Forces, Fiscal Years 1967 - 1971 (U), p. 54. USAREUR AG TS 5-36. (2) USAREUR Anl Hist Sum, 1965, pp. 256 - 64. Both TS (info used SECRET). FRD. (3) Incl to DF, DCSOPS to DCSLOG, 7 Nov 66. subj: Tactical Midrange Air Defense (TAMIRAD) (U). AEAGC-NA. SECRET. All NOFORN. Gp-1.

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b. Air Defense of Southern Germany. During the first six months of 1966 the French contribution to the air defense of the ACE Central Region consisted of two Nike Hercules and two Hawk battalions under the operational control of the Fourth Allied Tactical Air Force (4 ATAF). On 1 Jul the French withdrew these units from NATO command and informed SACEUR that they would move from Germany to France. To close the gap in the air defense of southern Germany created by the French action, SACEUR proposed to redeploy one U.S. Nike Hercules battalion and one F.R.G. Hawk battalion to the vacated areas. Under this recommendation USAREUR would have to accept responsibility for an additional battalion-size block of the Hawk belt. Thus, SACEUR's proposal, coupled with the inactivation of two Nike Hercules battalions to implement TAMIRAD, would result in a two-way reduction of USAREUR's air defense capability.⁶⁰

USAREUR considered that redeploying a U.S. Nike Hercules battalion within the 4 ATAF area would only weaken the air defense of the Central Region. Before the French withdrawal there had been a balance in air defense capabilities, 4 ATAF and 2 ATAF each having nine Nike Hercules battalions. USAREUR recommended the deployment of an F.R.G. Nike Hercules battalion from 2 ATAF to 4 ATAF to restore the balance. This transfer would also reduce construction costs, since the F.R.G. battalion would move from 4 temporary sites in 2 ATAF to 2 permanent and 2 temporary sites in 4 ATAF.

Although USCINCEUR favored this recommendation, he directed USAREUR to prepare plans for the possible redeployment of one U.S. Nike Hercules battalion to the vacated French areas. At the end of 1966, however, this question was still pending.⁶¹

⁶⁰ (1) Cable SX-4334, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 21 Jul 66. (2) Cable SH-24583, SACEUR to SECDEF, 30 Jul 66. NATO SECRET. (3) Cable ECJC-P-12233, USCINCEUR to JCS, 22 Aug 66. (1) and (3) SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-1.

⁶¹ (1) Cable ECJC-P-12233, cited above, 22 Aug 66. (2) Cable ECJC-P-14168, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 26 Sep 66. (3) Cable SX-5570, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 5 Oct 66. (4) Cables SX-6071 and 6686, same to DA, 5 Nov and 14 Dec 66. All SECRET. FRD. NOFORN. Gp-1.

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c. Composite Air Defense Battalions. During 1966 USAREUR prepared stationing and training plans for the composite air defense battalions that were to deploy to Europe in 1968. Planned for deployment as tactical entities, the new battalions would each consist of two 20-mm Vulcan gun and two Chaparral missile batteries.

The stationing plans were tentative, pending the resolution of problems generated by FRELOC and the French withdrawal. In the interim, USAREUR sought ranges where the units could fire their annual service practices (ASP). The F.R.G.-controlled range at Todendorf in northern Germany could accommodate the Vulcan units, but locating areas suitable for firing the Chaparral proved more difficult. USAREUR narrowed the choice to the NATO Missile Firing Installation at Souda Bay on the island of Crete and the Italian range at Salto di Quirra on the island of Sardinia. In September the Italian Government made a formal offer for the use of the Salto di Quirra range, but at the end of the year USAREUR had not made a final selection.⁶²

d. Deployment of Redeye. The Redeye, a surface-to-air missile system carried and fired by the individual soldier against low-flying aircraft, was supposed to be available in Europe by January 1967. Late in December, however, the Department of the Army notified USAREUR that the deployment schedule had slipped to the fourth quarter of FY 1967.⁶³

⁶²(1) Cable SX-1296, CINCUSAREUR to Seventh Army, 20 Jan 66. NOFORN. (2) DF, DCSOPS to CofS, 12 Apr 66, subj: Gun Component of the Composite Gun/CHAPARRAL Battalion (U). AEAGC-NA. (3) Cable 17662, Seventh Army to CINCUSAREUR, 16 May 66. (4) Cable SX-3447, CINCUSAREUR to JUSMAGG Athens, 19 May 66. (5) DF, DCSOPS to CofS, 26 Sep 66, subj: Annual Service Practice (ASP) Ranges for use by Gun/Chaparral Battalions (U). AEAGC-TT. (6) Intvw, Mr. Johnson with LTC D. E. Mulligan, USAREUR ODCSOPS Tng Div, 28 Dec 66. All SECRET. Gp-4.

⁶³(1) Army, Oct 66, pp. 157 - 60. UNCLAS. (2) Cable DA-794966, DA to CINCUSAREUR et al., 23 Dec 66. (3) Intvw, Mr. Johnson with LTC J. E. Miller, USAREUR ODCSOPS Arty & Sp Wpns Div, 28 Dec 66. Both SECRET. Gp-4.

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e. The Self-Propelled Hawk. In order to retrofit four Hawk battalions to a self-propelled configuration, USAREUR intended to return 48 launchers and 8 assault fire command consoles to the United States beginning in November 1966. However, labor problems in the United States caused slippages in the retrofit program, so that USAREUR had to reschedule the shipping date for the first 12 launchers to May 1967.⁶⁴


f. Deployment of Mobile HIPAR. The mobile high-power acquisition radar (HIPAR) provided Nike Hercules units in the field army with the same long-range detection and improved electronic countermeasures capabilities as those available at fixed sites in the United States. In April 1964 USAREUR had asked for 12 mobile HIPAR systems, and it had subsequently included fund requests for permanent sites in the NATO infrastructure Slices XV and XVI.

During 1966 engineer troops began construction of three temporary sites. The first two were complete by the end of 1966, and USAREUR called forward the first mobile HIPAR system; it was to arrive in Europe in February 1967.⁶⁵

⁶⁴(1) Ltr, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 7 Mar 66, subj: SP HAWK Retrofit Program (U). FOR DS CAS. (2) Cables SX-2083 and 2420, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 3 and 23 Mar 66. (3) Cable SX-2821, same to USAMICOM, 12 Apr 66. (4) Cable SX-2868, same to USACOMZEUR et al., 14 Apr 66. (5) DF, DCSOPS to CofS, 7 Jan 66, subj: Self-Propelled Hawk (U). AEAGC-NA. (6) Draft DF, Arty & Sp Wpns Div to DCSOPS, subj: Self-Propelled Hawk (U). AEAGC-NAA. (7) Intvw, Mr. Johnson with LTC Miller, 28 Dec 66. All SECRET. Gp-4.

⁶⁵(1) Army Research and Development Newsmagazine, Oct 66, p. 27. UNCLAS. (2) Draft DF, Arty & Sp Wpns Div to DCSOPS, 31 Dec 66, subj: Mobile HIPAR. AEAGC-NAA. (3) Intvw, Mr. Johnson with MAJ G. E. Greene, USAREUR ODCSOPS Arty & Sp Wpns Div, 4 Jan 67. Both SECRET. Gp-4.

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Chapter 11

Communications

75. (C) Realignment of Communications Support


a. Background. On 1 July 1964 the Department of the Army had activated the United States Army Strategic Communications Command (USASTRATCOM) as a separate major command under the Army Chief of Staff. Concurrently, the Department had formed the United States Army Strategic Communications Command, Europe (USASTRATCOM-EUR), as a subcommand that was to control a substantial portion of USAREUR's communications resources, including the 106th Signal Group--supporting USEUCOM--the 22d Signal Group, and the major relay stations.¹ After several months of experience, USAREUR had recommended improvements in the support rendered by USASTRATCOM-EUR, which were in full agreement with the unified-management principle for communications resources. In July 1965 the Department of the Army had therefore directed the further realignment of USAREUR's signal resources under USASTRATCOM-EUR, stipulating that the Commanding General of USASTRATCOM-EUR serve also as USAREUR's Deputy Chief of Staff, Communications-Electronics (DCSC-E). On 1 November USAREUR had transferred 17 units, including the 516th Signal Group--supporting USAREUR headquarters--and the headquarters resources of the U.S. Army Signal Brigade, Europe, to USASTRATCOM-EUR (Chart 11).²

¹(1) USAREUR Anl Hist Sum, 1964, pp. 126 - 27. TS (info used UNCLAS). (2) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 27 Oct 65, subj: Realignment of Communications Support in the United States Army, Europe (U). AEASC-PO. UNCLAS.

²(1) Appendix I to Memo of Understanding between CINCUSAREUR and CGUSASTRATCOM, 10 Sep 65. AEAGE-SA. UNCLAS. (2) USAREUR Anl Hist Sum, 1965, p. 272. TS (info used CONF. Gp-4).

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ARMY COMMUNICATIONS ORGANIZATION IN EUROPE
31 December 1966



----- Day-to-day telecommunications support.

* Programed for transfer to USASTRATCOM-EUR upon relocation from France.

** Transferred from USAACOM.

Sources: (1) Incl to Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 27 Oct 65, subj: Realignment of Communications Support in USAREUR (U). AEASC-PO. (2) Joint Report by CINCUSAREUR and CG, USASTRATCOM on the Evaluation of Realignment of Communications Support in USAREUR (U), 9 May 66. (3) Intvw, Mr. K. M. Johnson, USAREUR Ops Div M11 Hist Sec with Mr. F. Timmerman, Sp Asst to the DCSC-E, 4 Nov 66. (4) USAREUR GO 237, 7 Sep 66. All info used UNCLAS.

Chart 11 (U)

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b. The 1966 Reorganization. In January 1966 USAREUR and USASTRATCOM conducted a joint review to determine the effectiveness of the communications support and to recommend adjustments based on the year's operating experience.³

The 1965 realignment had left two of USAREUR's major commands--the United States Army Area Command (USAACOM) and the United States Army Communications Zone, Europe (USACOMZEUR)--with extensive organic communications capabilities. In April USAREUR considered the transfer of their signal support units--the 4th and 1st Signal Groups, respectively--to USASTRATCOM-EUR. This realignment would consolidate the responsibility for operating and maintaining the Automatic Voice Switching Network (AUTOVON), Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN), interface equipment, telephone exchanges, and communications centers.⁴ While USAACOM favored the transfer of the 4th Signal Group to USASTRATCOM-EUR,⁵ USACOMZEUR preferred to retain control of the 1st Signal Group during the critical months of the relocation from France. A realignment before completion of the relocation would complicate the difficult negotiations with the French for the continued use of the tropospheric-scatter and other long line systems.⁶

In their second joint report, USAREUR and USASTRATCOM-EUR recommended the complete integration of the staffs of USAREUR's Communications-Electronics Division and USASTRATCOM-EUR headquarters. They also advocated the extension of the single-managership principle to include all of USAREUR's fixed-plant communications facilities. To implement this recommendation CINCUSAREUR proposed to transfer USAACOM's 4th Signal Group to USASTRATCOM-EUR

³Joint Report by CINCUSAREUR and CGUSASTRATCOM-EUR on Realignment of Communications Support in the United States Army, Europe (U), 1 Jan 66. AEAGE-SA. CONF.

⁴Cable SX-2683, CINCUSAREUR to USAACOM and USACOMZEUR, 5 Apr 66. CONF. Gp-4.

⁵(1) Cable AENSI-9-0059-AC, USAACOM to CINCUSAREUR, 14 Apr 66.
(2) Cable AEZG-SCE-C-0321, USACOMZEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 13 Apr 66.
Both CONF. Gp-4.

⁶Cable AEZCG-C-0349, USACOMZEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 20 Apr 66.
CONF. Gp-4.

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by 1 October, whereas the timing of the transfer of the 1st Signal Group would depend on the problems incident to the relocation of USACOMZEUR.⁷

USAREUR implemented the immediately feasible portion of the joint report by transferring the 4th Signal Group to USASTRATCOM-EUR on 25 August. The integration of USASTRATCOM-EUR headquarters and USAREUR's Communications-Electronics Division was to await the completion of the merger of USAREUR and Seventh Army headquarters.⁸

76. (S) FRELOC and HEADCON Communications

a. In Belgium. The separation of SHAPE and USEUCOM headquarters made it necessary to provide USCINCEUR with communications support in Belgium. The provision of emergency communications at Casteau involved the procurement and installation of cryptologic and teletype equipment, ground stations for USCINCEUR's airborne command post (SILK PURSE) and his command and control radio net, broadband system access to the Defense Communications System (DCS), and leased circuits. USEUCOM estimated the total cost of the Phase I communications facility at Casteau--scheduled to be operational by 15 March 1967--at \$731,000, of which \$531,000 would be one-time expenditures.

USCINCEUR tasked CINCUSAREUR to install the KG-13/HY-2 terminal and the KY-3 narrow-band terminal extensions at the new SHAPE location.⁹

⁷Joint Report by CINCUSAREUR and CGUSASTRATCOM-EUR on the Evaluation of Realignment of Communications Support in the United States Army, Europe (U), 9 May 66. CONF. Gp-4.

⁸(1) USAREUR GO 237, 7 Sep 66. UNCLAS. (2) Intvw, Mr. K. M. Johnson, USAREUR Ops Div Mil Hist Sec, with Mr. E. Timmerman, Asst to the USAREUR DCSC-E, 4 Nov 66. CONF. Gp-4.

⁹(1) Cable ECJC-P-07790, USCINCEUR to JCS, 16 May 66. NOFORN. (2) Cable ECJA-P-14482, same to same, 30 Sep 66. (3) App I to USEUCOM Communications-Electronics Plan, 16 Sep 66, p. 8. In AEAGE-FRELOC files. All SECRET. Gp-3.

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b. At Stuttgart.

(1) Overall Requirements. The communications facilities planned for USEUCOM headquarters at Stuttgart included the relocation or installation of an automatic-dial telephone exchange--with related equipment and services--expanded from a 1,000- to a 1,200-line capacity; a permanently installed communications center; two AUTOVON access lines bypassing France; the Emergency Action Transmission System (EMATS)--its direct link with the Joint Chiefs of Staff--with related cryptologic gear; voice and secure voice equipment; a ground station for USCINCEUR's command and control radio net and SILK PURSE; temporary European Tropospheric-scatter System, Army (ET-A) circuitry; a 120-channel microwave system with interfaces to the broadband system; and the addition of two new consoles. These facilities were to be operational by 1 March 1967.¹⁰

(2) USAREUR's Responsibilities. The USEUCOM communications-electronics support plan assigned the following tasks to USAREUR:¹¹

(a) Funding. In August the Department of Defense authorized \$4,028,600 from Army FY-1967 funds for USEUCOM's communications at Stuttgart--to include transportation, building, and installation.¹² On 1 November the Department of the Army allocated to USAREUR \$2,932,000 for the new USEUCOM command center but did not make available the funds needed for other communications projects.¹³

¹⁰ Cable ECCE-O-12564, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 27 Aug 66. SECRET. Gp-3.

¹¹ USEUCOM Communications-Electronics Plan, cited above, p. 5. SECRET. Gp-4.

¹² Cable JCS-1053, JCS to USCINCEUR and CofSA, 25 Aug 66. SECRET. Gp-4.

¹³ (1) Cable SX-5205, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 14 Sep 66. (2) USEUCOM Communications-Electronics Plan, cited above, p. 5. (3) Cable ECCEO-13744, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 19 Sep 66. (4) Cable JCS-5685, JCS to USCINCEUR, 19 Oct 66. (5) Cable DA-788248, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 27 Oct 66. (6) Cable ECJD-E-16332, USCINCEUR to JCS (Burchinal to Wheeler), 28 Oct 66. (7) Cable SX-6061, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 4 Nov 66. (8) Cable ECJC-C-17094, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR et al., 10 Nov 66. All SECRET. Gp-4.

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(b) Military Construction. The military construction projects initiated by USAREUR included building modifications for the communications center, a telephone exchange building, and a facility for the Defense Communications Agency, Europe (DCA-EUR). Construction on the telephone exchange was to begin by 10 October, and the other two projects were to be in progress by 1 December. Since the timely completion of these Phase I projects was essential to the timely relocation of communications, USAREUR submitted requests for construction authority on 21 September. However, delays in obtaining approval produced slippages in USAREUR's construction projects.¹⁴

(c) Installation. In late 1966 USAREUR installed at Stuttgart approximately 40 percent of the long line radio systems for which it was responsible. It established the temporary communications center in vans near the communications center building and expanded the telephone system by installing equipment and cable nets.¹⁵

(d) Relocation of the 106th Signal Group. To provide sufficient signal personnel for the communications projects at Stuttgart, USAREUR phased the movement of personnel from the 106th Signal Group and the 257th Signal Company in such a manner that the advance elements were on station by 1 November and an additional company--the 246th Signal Company--was on station by the end of December.¹⁶

c. At Worms and Zweibruecken. In November the Secretary of Defense decided to move USACOMZEUR to Worms and the Supply

¹⁴(1) App I to USEUCOM Communications-Electronics Plan, pp. 2 - 3, 15. (2) Cable ECJD-E-16332, 28 Oct 66. Both cited above. SECRET. Gp-4.

¹⁵(1) App I to USEUCOM Communications-Electronics Plan, cited above, pp. 2 - 4, 15. (2) Intvw, Mr. Johnson with LTC R. B. Shields, ODCSC-E, 6 Jan 67. Both SECRET. Gp-4.

¹⁶(1) Cable SCCE-OP3-CX-627803, USASTRATCOM-EUR to CINCUSAREUR, 5 Oct 66. SECRET (info used CONF). (2) Cable SCCE-OP3-CX-627808, same to same, 5 Oct 66. CONF. Both Gp-4. (3) Cable SC-46608, CINCUSAREUR to USASTRATCOM-EUR, 13 Oct 66. U-FOUO. (4) Intvws, Mr. Johnson with LTC Shields, 4 Nov 66 and 6 Jan 67. CONF. Gp-4.

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and Maintenance Agency to Zweibruecken. To meet the initial communications requirements at Worms, USAREUR planned to convert the unmanned satellite switchboard to a manned configuration, add 500 lines to the telephone exchange, expand the cable distribution system, and provide an interim communications center. The target completion date for these projects was 1 March 1967. Similar requirements existed at Zweibruecken. At the end of 1966 detailed planning and engineering design were in progress.¹⁷

d. Support of Wartime Headquarters Echelons. As a result of the realignment of headquarters, USAREUR had to assist in locating a site and provide communications support for GREYHOUND--the wartime ground alternate echelon of USEUCOM--and for the relocated USAREUR wartime headquarters.

(1) GREYHOUND. USAREUR surveyed possible GREYHOUND sites on U.S. installations approximately equidistant on the Casteau-Stuttgart communications axis. The only USAREUR facilities that met both geographic and technical criteria were at Pirmasens, Idar-Oberstein, and Zweibruecken. USEUCOM, however, considered these facilities technically unsuitable and directed USAREUR and USAFE to determine jointly the merits of Air Force facilities at Bitburg, Hahn, and Spangdahlem. CINCUSAFE objected that these tactical airfields were unsuitable for GREYHOUND, since they would be prime targets for enemy attack. In December, therefore, USEUCOM officers surveyed the sites proposed by USAREUR and USAFE in order to recommend a suitable choice.¹⁸

(2) USAREUR Main and Alternate Headquarters. To meet the requirements for wartime main and alternate headquarters, USAREUR developed the new concept of presurveying and selecting

¹⁷(1) Cable AEZQ-SCE-43592, USACOMZEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 23 Nov 66. UNCLAS. FOUO. (2) Cable SX-6557, CINCUSAREUR to USACOMZEUR, 6 Dec 66. SECRET. Gp-4. (3) Intvw, Mr. Johnson with CPT S. F. Putnam, USAREUR ODCSC-E, 9 Dec 66. UNCLAS.

¹⁸(1) Cable SX-5988, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 31 Oct 66. (2) Cable ECJC-L-16983, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR and CINCUSAFE, 8 Nov 66. (3) Cable ECJC-L-18259, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR and CINCUSAFE, 2 Dec 66. All SECRET. Gp-4.

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a number of possible sites which, like wartime QRA Pershing sites, would not be improved or occupied before the outbreak of hostilities. In September USAREUR surveyed and selected sites lying along the communications axis in the western areas of the Federal Republic of Germany. It prepositioned transportable communications equipment and personnel in existing U.S. facilities, where they were ready to deploy to a designated headquarters site at short notice. In November USAREUR closed its wartime headquarters in Maison Fort, France, and by December the new concept was in effect.¹⁹

e. HEADCON Communications.

(1) Peacetime. USAREUR's initial study concluded that the existing and programed facilities of the USAREUR Operations Center were--with two exceptions--adequate to support the consolidated USAREUR and Seventh Army headquarters in all peacetime operations up to and including the announcement of a state of alert. For normal operations the consolidation required the rerouting of seven leased teletype circuits and the extension of USAREUR's tactical alert net to Seventh Army troop units.²⁰

(2) Wartime. Upon the announcement of an alert, designated personnel would separate from USAREUR, reestablish Seventh Army headquarters, and assume tactical control of Seventh Army units. In order to accomplish this action with a minimum of delay, USAREUR decided to establish an initial Seventh Army tactical operations center at Tompkins Barracks, Schwetzingen, about six miles from Heidelberg. This operations center--subsequently designated Seventh Army Main Lead Element Command Post (MLE-CP)--would assume tactical control of Seventh

¹⁹(1) Fact Sheet (presented to TIG Aug 66), subj: Command and Control, Part I, p. 47. AEAGC-PCC. (2) Intvws, Mr. Johnson with MAJ R. K. Flint, USAREUR Ops Div, 28 and 29 Nov 66. All SECRET. Gp-1.

²⁰(1) Incl to DF, DCSOPS to CofS, 12 Aug 66, subj: Communications Requirements for HEADCON Implementation. AEAGC-CO. (2) Cable SX-6319, CINCUSAREUR to Seventh Army et al., 20 Nov 66. Both CONF. Gp-4.

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Army elements within two hours after an alert and would function until the establishment of the Seventh Army Main Command Post. By 14 November the MLE-CP communications were in place.²¹

(3) Seventh Army Communications Command. As part of the HEADCON reorganization, USAREUR created the Seventh Army Communications Command--Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment (HHD) and supporting elements--at Coleman Barracks, near Mannheim, from the resources of the 12th Signal Group.²²

f. Other Actions. USAREUR also had to assist in locating sites and providing support for the European Data Gateway Station and the U.S. Army Command Issuing Office, Europe (USACIO-EUR), at Poitiers, France. In addition, USAREUR had to obtain the Italian Government's approval for locating the AUTODIN center--programed for Maison Fort, France--at Coltano, Italy, and to ask the Netherlands Government for approval to locate a tropospheric-scatter site in Rotterdam.²³

(1) European Data Gateway Station. In its efforts to locate a site for the European Data Gateway Station, USAREUR surveyed several sites and proposed to DCA-EUR a site at Pirmasens. Since DCA-EUR found the site technically acceptable, it scheduled the relocation of the station for the second quarter of 1967.²⁴

²¹(1) Incl to DF, cited above, 12 Aug 66. (2) Anx E to USAREUR Op Order 2-66, 29 Oct 66. (3) Intvw, Mr. Johnson with LTC W. J. Worth, USAREUR Ops Div, 25 Nov 66. All CONF. Gp-4.

²²(1) USAREUR GO 297, 17 Nov 66. (2) For further information, see paragraph 1e, above. Both UNCLAS.

²³(1) Cable ECJC-L-13727, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 19 Sep 66. SECRET. (2) Cable SX-4147, CINCUSAREUR to DCA-EUR, 8 Jul 66. (3) Cable SX-6191, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 12 Nov 66. Both CONF. (4) Cables ECCE-P-14892 and 15714, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 7 and 19 Oct 66. Both SECRET. NOFORN. All Gp-3.

²⁴(1) Cable SX-5017, CINCUSAREUR to DCA-EUR, 1 Sep 66. (2) Cable E-321/0075, DCA-EUR to CINCUSAREUR, 16 Sep 66. Both SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-4.

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(2) USACIO-EUR. The relocation of USACIO-EUR was urgent because it was USAREUR's sole source of cryptologic support. USAREUR proposed its establishment at De La Police Caserne, Worms, Germany, beginning on 10 December, but by 31 December the Department of the Army had not approved the relocation. In the interim USAREUR had proceeded with the minor construction of alterations needed to support the USACIO-EUR.²⁵

(3) AUTODIN/Coltano. The establishment of the AUTODIN center at Coltano presented no major difficulties since the funds and equipment already programed for Maison Fort were available. By late November USAREUR had secured DCA approval of the Coltano site, and during the following weeks negotiations for a formal agreement with the Italian Government were in progress.²⁶

(4) The Tropospheric-Scatter Site at Rotterdam. In November a survey team including USAREUR representatives visited the proposed tropospheric-scatter site at Rotterdam. However, pending the Secretary of Defense's approval of the project--a part of DCA's FRELOC plan--there was no further progress.²⁷

77. (S) Command and Control

a. Army Command and Control Network. USAREUR's command and control communications linked the Heidelberg headquarters

²⁵(1) Cable SX-6191, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 12 Nov 66. (2) Cable ECCE-S-17338, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR and CofSA, 15 Nov 66. NOFORN. (3) Cable SX-6151, CINCUSAREUR to USASTRATCOM-EUR, 10 Nov 66. (4) Intvws, Mr. Johnson with MAJ S. J. Williams III, USAREUR Ops Div, 22 Nov and 31 Dec 66. All CONF. Gp-4.

²⁶(1) Cable ECCE-P-14891, USCINCEUR to MAAG Rome, 7 Oct 66. (2) Cable SX-5768, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 17 Oct 66. (3) Cable 355/01349, DCA to DA, 21 Oct 66. CONF. (4) Cable ECCE-P-17829, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 23 Nov 66. UNCLAS. FOUO. (5) Intvw, Mr. Johnson with Mr. Timmerman, 21 Nov 66. (1), (2), and (5) SECRET. NOFORN. All except (4) Gp-4.

²⁷(1) Cable ECCE-P-15882, USCINCEUR to MAAG The Hague, 20 Oct 66. (2) Intvw, Mr. Johnson with Mr. Timmerman, 31 Dec 66. Both SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-3.

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to USEUCOM in peacetime and had to be capable of assuming USEUCOM's command and control functions in a wartime emergency. USAREUR therefore continued to develop a number of projects designed to enhance its command and control posture and--through the Defense Communications System--link it with U.S. Army forces worldwide. During 1966 a private contractor installed Army Command and Control Network (ARCCNET) switching equipment in the USAREUR Operations Center at Heidelberg. The equipment included the ARCCNET Emergency Action Console--part of a system that would eventually link major Army headquarters throughout the world. USAREUR planned to install similar equipment at the Seventh Army Main Lead Element Command Post and at the new USACOMZEUR headquarters at Worms during the first quarter of 1967.²⁸

b. Interim Computer Facility. In 1965 USAREUR had requested funds to begin building modifications for its interim computer facility. On 21 March 1966 the Department of the Army approved the request and released \$13,900 for the design phase of the project. On 13 May USAREUR issued the construction directive to its Engineer Element, which scheduled the project for completion in November 1967.²⁹

c. Automated Systems Design. In 1966 USAREUR continued the systems design study--begun in 1965--to identify areas of its command and control system most suitable for automation. As a preliminary step USAREUR had submitted the data automation requirement for its Command Center Support System, which the Department of the Army approved in March 1966. Subsequently, in April, USAREUR headquarters established the Support Systems Branch that prepared and submitted the computer system specifications.³⁰

²⁸(1) Fact Sheet, Command and Control, cited above, Part I, p. 48. AEAGC-PCC. (2) Intvw, Mr. Johnson with MAJ C. R. Paparone, USAREUR ODCSC-E, 1 Dec 66. Both SECRET. Gp-4.

²⁹Fact Sheet, Command and Control, cited above, Part I, p. 24. SECRET. Gp-4.

³⁰(1) Fact Sheet, Command and Control, cited above, Part II, p. 1. SECRET. (2) MFR, LTC W. E. Thomes, USAREUR Ops Div Spt Sys Br, 5 Oct 66, subj: Computer System Specifications. (3) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 11 Oct 66, same subj. Both AEAGC-S. CONF. All Gp-4.

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d. Interim Defense Communications Satellite Project.
In 1965 USAREUR, the Satellite Command (SATCOM), and DCA had agreed on Landstuhl, Germany, as the test site for satellite communications ground terminal equipment. However, protracted negotiations with the Federal Republic of Germany delayed host-nation approval of the project until early 1966. In March communications personnel of USASTRATCOM-EUR moved the transportable ground terminal equipment to Landstuhl, where they tested it during the remainder of the year.³¹

³¹(1) USAREUR Anl Hist Sum, 1965, pp. 279 - 81. TS
(info used SECRET. Gp-3). (2) Intvw, Mr. Johnson with
MAJ Paparone, 1 Dec 66. SECRET. Gp-3.

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Chapter 12

Berlin Events

78. (S) LIVE OAK Problems

a. French Presence in Berlin. In April the Allies studied the effects that a French military withdrawal from NATO might have on the tripartite occupation of West Berlin and on the continuation of LIVE OAK. In commenting on these initial discussions, CINCUSAREUR cautioned that the future of the LIVE OAK organization should not assume greater importance than it merited within the context of the larger problems of Berlin and the U.S. status in Europe.¹

In subsequent discussion at Bonn, the U.S. military and diplomatic representatives agreed that the United States should continue to encourage the French to remain in Berlin, to work harmoniously with the U.S. and British forces in that city, and to participate in LIVE OAK. The United States and United Kingdom (U.K.) should be willing to examine French proposals to change the LIVE OAK organization in the light of the continuing need for some kind of centralized control mechanism for Berlin contingency operations, especially with regard to air access.

Since France's role in Berlin was essentially separate from its relationship with NATO, the withdrawal of French troops from NATO did not necessarily affect the Allied position in Berlin. The U.S. Ambassador at Bonn believed that the United

¹(1) Cables 886 and 890, AMEMB Bonn to USBER et al., 25 Apr 66. (2) Cable SX-3094, CINCUSAREUR to AMEMB Bonn, 27 Apr 66. All SECRET. Gp-3.

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States needed the French in Berlin to buttress the legal position that supported its own presence in the city. For this reason the French presence and flag outweighed the importance of a French military contribution to Berlin contingency operations. The French had never contributed their fair share in troops or money toward Berlin. The United States had long acquiesced in this inequality, and would probably have to continue to do so.²

The Department of State questioned whether the continued French presence in Berlin was really indispensable to maintaining the legality of the Allied presence. The United States and its Allies were in Berlin by right of conquest; from the legal viewpoint, a French decision to depart would not affect the other Allies' right to remain. The Department of State recognized, however, the propaganda opportunities offered to the Communists, if the French were to defect.³

In reply to a speech given by General (Ret.) Lucius D. Clay at Berlin on 1 June, the French Commandant made it clear that tripartite Allied cooperation in Berlin would continue and that, if the situation became serious, France would be at the side of its Allies.⁴

b. LIVE OAK Relocation. SACEUR strongly recommended the colocation of LIVE OAK with SHAPE to guarantee the continued effectiveness of LIVE OAK planning and operations. For this purpose all four governments involved in LIVE OAK had to agree to finance the move. In late September France promised full participation in future LIVE OAK operations and stated that its withdrawal of troops from NATO did not affect its commitments in Berlin. A few days later the quadripartite group at Bonn tentatively agreed to colocate LIVE OAK headquarters with SHAPE at Casteau, to share equally the costs of the move--except nationally incurred costs--and to seek the approval of Belgium as the host government.⁵

²Cable 3503, AMEMB Bonn to Secy State, 28 Apr 66. SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-3.

³Circular-2200, Secy State to AMEMB Bonn, 10 May 66. SECRET. Gp-3.

⁴Cable UNN, USBER to Secy State (USAREUR SMC IN 64841), 2 Jun 66. CONF. Gp-4.

⁵Cables 3658, 3949, and 4238, AMEMB Bonn to Secy State, 26 Sep, 3 and 7 Oct 66. SECRET. Gp-3.

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Later in October Belgium approved the move, whereupon the U.S. Embassy at Bonn initiated the necessary administrative and technical arrangements for rerouting the teletype circuits when LIVE OAK would move to Casteau.⁶

79. (S) Contingency Plans and Exercises

a. Revision and Preparation of Plans. During 1966 USAREUR reviewed, revised, and staffed all Berlin plans for which it was responsible. In addition, it revoked one plan, and prepared two new plans--OPLAN's AE 210-10 and 250-10. By early December, 4 of the 16 Berlin plans had been published, and most of the others were in final form.⁷

b. USAREUR OPLAN AE 210-10. This new unilateral plan provided for countermeasures to East German helicopter flights in the Berlin control zone. By the end of 1966 USAREUR had coordinated the final draft and intended to forward it to USEUCOM headquarters for approval.⁸

c. USAREUR OPLAN AE 250-2. USAREUR revised this plan and published it on 10 June. The SCEPTRE (C)⁹ elements rehearsed it during Exercises TROJAN HORSE in February, READY MADE in May, and PANS PIPE in December. The British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) directed and conducted all three exercises at Wolfenbuettel and Sennelager. The objective of these exercises were to practice the assembly and deployment of the SCEPTRE (C) force and to test the command, control, and liaison communications associated with it.¹⁰

⁶ Cable 4625, AMEMB Bonn to Secy State, 18 Oct 66. CONF. Gp-4.

⁷ Intvw, Mr. G. E. Blau, ODCSOPS Mil Hist Br with LTC W. J. Worth, ODCSOPS, 8 Dec 66. UNCLAS.

⁸ Intvw, Mr. Blau with LTC Worth, 5 Jan 67. CONF. Gp-4.

⁹ In August the designation VALTOS (C) was changed to SCEPTRE (C) by cable SX-4696, CINCUSAREUR to Seventh Army et al., 13 Aug 66. CONF. Gp-3.

¹⁰ (1) Cables SX-1239 and 2863, CINCUSAREUR to USCOB et al., 17 Jan and 14 Apr 66. CONF. Gp-1. (2) Cable KFF-586, BAOR to CINCUSAREUR et al., 17 Oct 66. SECRET.

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d. USAREUR OPLAN AE 250-3.

(1) Changes in USAREUR's Contribution. In early September LIVE OAK reduced the U.S. contribution to the tripartite force from 375 to 245 personnel and from 110 to 50 vehicles, because the British infantry battalion had been issued organic armored personnel carriers and USAREUR's M-113 support to the British contingent was no longer necessary. USAREUR published a revision of OPLAN AE 250-3 on 23 September.¹¹

(2) Exercises. USAREUR provided approximately 500 personnel for Exercise STAR TURN--a tripartite reinforced battalion-size probe rehearsing Operation GROVESEND (C)¹²--that took place at the Sennelager Training Center from 19 to 26 March; during its course one H-34 helicopter crashed, killing its crew of three.¹³

In July USAREUR cancelled Exercise CLEAN SWEEP, scheduled for 5 - 12 November, because LIVE OAK had approved the BAOR recommendation to hold one exercise rather than two training periods per year for the tripartite force.¹⁴

e. USAREUR OPLAN AE 250-6. In early January the Washington Ambassadorial Group concurred in assembling the SPIELER (C) forces for training purposes. LIVE OAK directed USAREUR to plan and execute a limited rehearsal of OPLAN AE 250-6 in accordance with the concepts it had outlined in August 1965.¹⁵ On 22 June USAREUR conducted Exercise STOVE PIPE that involved the marshaling of the complete train at the Mannheim-Rheinau

¹¹ Cable SHLO-5-00267, LIVE OAK to Bonn Quad Gp, 9 Sep 66. SECRET.

¹² Changed to SARDIS (C) by cables SX-5371 and 5392, CINCUSAREUR to Seventh Army et al., 23 and 24 Sep 66. CONF. Gp-3.

¹³ Cable SX-1908, CINCUSAREUR to USCOB et al., 23 Feb 66. CONF. Gp-4.

¹⁴ (1) Cable SX-4146, CINCUSAREUR to Seventh Army et al., 8 Jul 66. CONF. Gp-4. (2) Cable SHLO-5-00254, LIVE OAK to CINCUSAREUR et al., 2 Sep 66. SECRET.

¹⁵ (1) Cable WAGTO-33, Secy State to LIVE OAK, 5 Jan 66. (2) Cable SHLO-5-0027, LIVE OAK to CINCUSAREUR, 14 Jan 66. Both SECRET.

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U.S. Army transportation terminal; the briefing of selected key personnel, staff officers, and interested observers; and an inspection of the probe train.¹⁶

USAREUR published a revision of its OPLAN AE 250-6 on 24 September.

f. USAREUR OPLAN AE 250-10. This new USAREUR plan provided for conducting tripartite rail probes that would test Soviet/East German intentions to block the rail movement of civilian freight to and from Berlin under Allied aegis. In December USAREUR revised the final draft of the plan, which was scheduled for publication in early 1967.¹⁷

80. (S) Aircraft Accidents

a. A Soviet Military Aircraft Crashes in the British Sector. On 6 April a Soviet YAK-28 (FIREBAR) aircraft crashed into Stoessensee, a lake in the British Sector of Berlin. The Allies immediately protested against this latest example of irresponsible flying over heavily populated areas.

Within a few hours after the incident approximately 25 armed Soviet soldiers from the detachment guarding the Soviet war memorial arrived in the vicinity of the crash site. They joined six Soviet officers who had previously entered West Berlin through Checkpoint Charlie. The Soviets wanted to take over the salvage operations, but the Allies firmly opposed them.

The British cordoned off the area around the crash site. In addition, U.S. and British water patrols and land observation posts, stationed at access points, prevented any Soviet interference. The U.S. Army, Berlin (USAB), implemented its draft plan to deny Soviet vehicular access to West Berlin.

¹⁶Cable SX-3611, CINCUSAREUR to CINCBAOR et al., 1 Jun 66. SECRET. Gp-1.

¹⁷(1) DF, USAREUR DCSOPS to distr, 15 Mar 66, subj: USAREUR OPLAN AE 250-10. AEAGC-OCO. (2) Intvw, Mr. Blau with LTC Worth, cited above. Both SECRET. NOFORN (except UK, FRG, and FR). Gp-1.

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Under this plan, squad-size elements, stationed at established crossing points within the American Sector, denied access to all Soviet vehicles except sedans. The British and French took similar actions in their sectors. To put more emphasis on the British request for the immediate withdrawal of all armed Soviet soldiers, USCOB detained a Soviet bus with 14 officers and 2 enlisted men at Checkpoint Charlie. The Soviets withdrew the troops from the crash site but left a staff car with 3 or 4 officers on duty. They relieved the stationary sedan two or three times daily, keeping the crash site under constant observation.¹⁸

On 7 April a German salvage firm operating under British supervision moved to the crash site. The Soviets demanded that the British stop interfering with the prompt recovery of the aircraft and authorize their military personnel to start working on the evacuation. Immediately after this demand, however, the Soviets partly reversed themselves and asked for British help in finding the pilots' bodies and recovering the aircraft.

The British began the salvage operations later in the morning and recovered the bodies of the two Soviet pilots later that day. They turned over the bodies to the Soviets in a small ceremony in the early hours of 8 April. The recovery of the aircraft suffered many delays because the British salvage team of four divers and three Royal Air Force technical experts operated under extremely difficult conditions. Most of the fuselage was in deep mud, and the remaining parts of the wreckage were scattered around the bottom of the lake. After the recovery of the bulk of the wreckage, British and American intelligence personnel inspected each part aboard a recovery barge.¹⁹

The Soviets continued to ask for participation in the salvage operations in the face of firm Allied determination

¹⁸(1) Cables IO/COB-125, 126, 127, and 129-66, USCOB to Std Berlin SITREP Adrs, 6 Apr 66. All CONF. (2) USAB Semiannual Hist Sum, 1 Jan - 30 Jun 66, pp. 11 - 12. SECRET. All Gp-1.

¹⁹Cables USAB-085, 088, and 094, USCOB to CINCUSAREUR, 7 and 8 April 66. All CONF. Gp-4.

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that salvage should remain an exclusively British responsibility. The U.S. intelligence experts had meanwhile completed their examination of the parts recovered by 9 April and had no objection to their return. The Soviets, however, demanded the return of the aircraft complete with all recoverable pieces. The British had so far failed to recover the engine main sections, which were of intelligence value.²⁰

On 13 April the Soviets accepted the transfer of the salvaged items--less the unrecovered engine components--to one of their barges positioned on the British-Soviet border of the Havel River.²¹

However, it was not until 2 May that the British transferred the two recovered engines and last items of other salvage to a Soviet barge. Two hours later the Soviet observer party still remained at the crash site. The Allies, however, considered the incident as closed.²²

b. A Chartered U.S. Air Freighter Crashes in the Soviet Zone. In the early morning hours of 15 November a Pan American Airways 727 jet air freighter crashed in a Soviet training area a few miles west of Berlin during its final approach to Tegel Airfield. The Soviets stalled immediate U.S. efforts to obtain access to the crash site and to recover the bodies of the crew and the cargo of the aircraft. During the morning the Soviet controller in the Berlin Air Safety Center warned his U.S. counterpart that American aircraft searching for the missing aircraft should not go beyond the limits of West Berlin. Since quadripartite agreements authorized U.S. aircraft to fly within the 20-mile Berlin Control Zone, USCOB dispatched an L-19 on a search flight despite this warning. However, bad weather conditions forced the aircraft to turn back and land after 20 minutes.²³

²⁰ Cable IO/COB-144-66, USCOB to Std Berlin SITREP Adrs, 9 Apr 66. CONF. Gp-4.

²¹ Cables IO/COB-151 and 152-66, USCOB to Std Berlin SITREP Adrs, 13 Apr 66. CONF. Gp-4.

²² Cable IO/COB-193-66, USCOB to Std Berlin SITREP Adrs, 2 May 66. CONF. Gp-4.

²³ (1) Cables IO/COB-493, 496, and 497, USCOB to Std Berlin SITREP Adrs. (2) Cable SX-6232, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR. All 15 Nov 66. CONF. Gp-4.

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When the Soviets refused to give any information pertaining to the crash, the U.S. authorities reminded them of the obligations set forth in the quadripartite agreement of 2 February 1946, dealing with aircraft accident procedures. The actions specified in that agreement included the provision of full information on the location of any downed aircraft and the obligation to expedite access of the investigating party to the scene of the crash. This reminder was all the more necessary, since the Soviets tried to use the accident as a means toward bringing the U.S. Government into some official dealings with the so-called German Democratic Republic (G.D.R.).²⁴

On the morning of 16 November a U.S. L-19 flying at 1,200 feet spotted small, entirely disintegrated pieces of the crashed plane scattered over a wide area. About 60 military vehicles were at the crash site. Apparently, the Soviets retained control over the remains of the aircraft and the bodies of the crew and kept them under guard, probably for intelligence purposes. They held a 3-man U.S. Military Liaison Mission (USMLM) search team overnight at the Potsdam Kommandatura, allegedly for violating a restricted area near the crash site.²⁵

Late on 16 November the Chief, USMLM, protested strongly to the Group Soviet Forces, Germany (GSFG), headquarters that he had been prevented from visiting the crash site. The Soviet representative arranged for another meeting on the following morning, at which he wanted to discuss the transfer of the bodies. Almost simultaneously, the U.S. Mission in Berlin delivered a similar protest through diplomatic channels.²⁶

On the next morning the Soviets indicated that they would transfer the remains of the crew, mail, and aircraft in the afternoon, and that G.D.R. military authorities would participate in the turnover. Upon receiving this information, USAREUR

²⁴ Cable USAB-222, USCOB to CINCUSAREUR, 15 Nov 66. CONF. Gp-4.

²⁵ (1) Cable IO/COB-503-66, USCOB to Std Berlin SITREP
Adrs. (2) Cables 658 and 660, USBER to Secy State. All
16 Nov 66. CONF. Gp-4.

²⁶ (1) Cable IO/COB-506-66, USCOB to Std Berlin SITREP
Adrs. (2) Cable 664, USBER to AMEMB Bonn. Both 17 Nov 66.
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immediately instructed the Chief, USMLM, not to give the presence of the G.D.R. representative any more recognition than during the RB-66 incident in 1964. At that time an East German lieutenant colonel had added his signature, but the text of the documents referred only to the U.S. and Soviet representatives. The Department of State did not attach much significance to the presence of a G.D.R. officer; the Soviets were apparently cooperating, and the G.D.R. participation seemed to be only a face-saving device. It authorized the U.S. Mission in Berlin to use "maximum flexibility in achieving objectives."²⁷

The transfer took place as scheduled. U.S. vehicles carried three flag-draped coffins, 46 bags containing mail and cargo, and the charred and shredded aircraft wreckage through the Heerstrasse crossing point into West Berlin. The Soviets cooperated and showed due reverence to the remains of the crew. East German officers were present but played a passive role. Three Soviet and three U.S. officers signed three receipts for the remains of the crew, mail, and wreckage, respectively. A G.D.R. lieutenant colonel and a representative of Pan American Airways also signed the receipts. The Chief, USMLM, protested that he regarded the G.D.R. officer as an observer--not as a participant--in the proceedings between USAREUR and GSFG representatives. He also ignored the East German officer's outstretched hand when the two met at the checkpoint. Television audiences in West Berlin observed this rebuff.²⁸

Careful examination of the crash wreckage revealed that the fire-resistant flight and voice recorders were missing. The Chief, USMLM, asked the Soviets to return these items, particularly the small tape cassettes in the flight recorder, which were essential for determining the precise cause of the crash. He also asked for pictures of the impact point and offered reimbursement for the three caskets used for the crew members.²⁹

²⁷(1) Cable 667, USBER to Secy State. (2) Cable SX-6264, CINCUSAREUR to USBER. (3) Cable 86250, Secy State to USBER. All 17 Nov 66. CONF. Gp-4.

²⁸(1) Cables 674 and 675, USBER to Secy State, 17 Nov 66. (2) Cable 687, same to same, 19 Nov 66. All CONF. Gp-3.

²⁹(1) Cable USAB-227, USCOB to CINCUSAREUR, 24 Nov 66. (2) Cable SX-6428, CINCUSAREUR to C/USMLM, 28 Nov 66. (3) Cable MLM-789-66, USMLM to CINCUSAREUR, 29 Nov 66. All CONF. Gp-4.

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Since the Soviet reply to the Chief, USMLM, was unsatisfactory, USCOB recommended the use of parallel political channels for any further action to recover the flight and voice recorders. He believed that the recently signed U.S.-Soviet civil air transport agreement might serve as a basis for a new approach to obtain the missing instruments. CINCUSAREUR agreed.³⁰ However, the Soviets did not return the recorders before the end of 1966.

81. (S) The U.S. Berlin Garrison

a. The Last Augmentation Unit. The withdrawal of the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, 24th Infantry Division, from Berlin took place from 17 to 20 January. It involved four autobahn and four rail movements; there were no incidents.³¹

b. Army Aviation Requirements. Since there had not been any East German helicopter flights over West Berlin since June 1965,³² USCOB had recommended that USAREUR withdraw some of the augmentation aircraft, crews, and crew chiefs. Seventh Army would have to maintain a pool of Berlin-oriented aviators for rapid reinforcement, if necessary. On the basis of these recommendations, USAREUR established a new aircraft authorization for the U.S. Army, Berlin, consisting of six UH-1B's, one O-1A, and one U-8. The withdrawal of the excess aircraft took place over a 6-month period without drawing any public attention.³³

c. Drawdown. During the first half of the year the drawdown of combat arms personnel reduced the combat readiness of tactical units considerably. The Berlin Brigade lost over

³⁰(1) Cable USAB-234, USCOB to CINCUSAREUR, 12 Dec 66.
(2) Cable SX-6669, CINCUSAREUR to USCOB, 13 Dec 66. Both CONF. Gp-4.

³¹Cables USAB-1013 and 1023, USCOB to CINCUSAREUR, 13 and 20 Jan 66. Both CONF. Gp-4.

³²USAREUR Anl Hist Sum, 1965, p. 292. TS (info used SECRET. Gp-3).

³³(1) Cable SX-1571, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 4 Feb 66.
(2) Intvw, Mr. Blau with LTC Worth, 11 Oct 66. Both CONF. Gp-4.

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one third of its rifle strength, and about 10 percent of its tank crews. A major retraining effort was necessary to restore the tactical communications capability.³⁴

d. Readiness. On 31 December the U.S. Army, Berlin, reported that it was capable of accomplishing that portion of its assigned mission that dealt with autobahn and rail access and with the maintenance of U.S. presence and appearance in Berlin. It added that its capability to carry out contingency plans in the defense of Berlin had increased during the last three months of 1966 because of improvements in training readiness. All eleven reportable units had achieved REDCON 1 in personnel and logistics and REDCON 2 in training.³⁵

82. (S) Autobahn Incidents

a. Individual Travelers. There were no incidents on the autobahn until 4 May, when East German checkpoint personnel at Marienborn detained a U.S. enlisted man for 30 minutes because he refused to show his identification papers. He was traveling in his German car with U.S. military license plates. The U.S. checkpoint commander at Helmstedt delivered an official protest to his Soviet counterpart; the latter agreed that the East Germans had exceeded their authority.³⁶

When several similar incidents occurred during the following weeks, CINCUSAREUR directed the Chief, USMLM, to deliver an official protest to GSFG headquarters. The U.S. Ambassador at Bonn agreed that U.S. personnel driving cars with military license plates should continue not to show travel documents to the East Germans.³⁷

In early June the growing number of checkpoint incidents--9 in the first 9 days--seemed to indicate that the East Germans

³⁴USAB Semiannual Hist Sum, 1 Jan - 30 Jun 66, p. 1. SECRET (info used CONF. Gp-1).

³⁵Cable USAB-1032, USCOB to CINCUSAREUR, 25 Jan 67. CONF. Gp-4.

³⁶Cables IO/COB-200 and 202-66, USCOB to Std Berlin SITREP Adrs, 5 and 6 May 66. Both CONF. Gp-4.

³⁷(1) Cables IO/COB-208 and 211-66, USCOB to Std Berlin SITREP Adrs, 9 and 11 May 66. (2) Cable USAB-135, USCOB to CINCUSAREUR, 9 May 66. (3) Cable 967, AMEMB Bonn to USBER, 11 May 66. (4) Cable SX-3419, CINCUSAREUR to C/USMLM, 18 May 66. All CONF. Gp-4.

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were attempting to obtain at least some measure of control over U.S. travelers. They probably also wished to bring U.S. practice into conformity with the British and French procedures, since personnel of these two nations showed flag documentation when challenged. Standard USAREUR license plates identified 95 percent of the nonmilitary U.S. vehicles traveling through the Soviet Zone; however, there were seven other kinds of plates on the remaining 5 percent of U.S.-registered vehicles.

USCOB recommended that U.S. checkpoint officials continue to protest against East German demands for documents but that USAREUR take no higher level action unless the problem became more acute. USCOB also proposed the introduction of a flag placard to help identify U.S. vehicles. According to the proposal, Allied checkpoint personnel would issue the placards to all vehicles traveling on flag orders and collect them after they had crossed the Soviet Zone. The British and French Commandants might agree to harmonize procedures.³⁸

USAREUR did not doubt that the East Germans liked to harass U.S. travelers if they could find an excuse to do so. The current U.S. procedures gave them such an excuse. If U.S. private vehicles were clearly identified, American travelers would be able to take a firm stand against any further delays or requirements to show such documentation as flag orders.

When USCOB initiated tripartite discussions, the British and French showed interest in harmonizing the Allied procedures and agreed that, after the introduction of the flag placards, their travelers would no longer show their flag orders to East German sentries when challenged.³⁹

USAREUR approved the concept of using flag placards to facilitate the identification of Allied travelers on the autobahn.

³⁸ Cable USAB-151, USCOB to CINCUSAREUR, 10 Jun 66. CONF. Gp-4.

³⁹ (1) DF, USAREUR DCSOPS to CofS, 7 Jul 66, subj: East German Interference with U.S. Vehicles on Autobahn. AEAGC. (2) Cable SX-4136, CINCUSAREUR to USCOB, 9 Jul 66. Both SECRET. (3) Cable USAB-179, USCOB to CINCUSAREUR, 27 Jul 66. CONF. (4) Cable USAB-192, USCOB to CINCUSAREUR, 21 Aug 66. SECRET. All Gp-4.

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The next steps would be to reach tripartite agreement on the subject and to notify the Soviets accordingly.⁴⁰

This traffic problem had meanwhile lost its urgency in July, when the Soviets had moved an enlisted man from the vicinity of their checkpoint building in the eastbound lane to the first East German barrier of the westbound lane. After this change in procedures there were no further incidents of East German interference with Allied individual travelers at this particular point.⁴¹

b. The Processing of Small Administrative Convoys. On 25 May the Soviet checkpoint personnel at Marienborn caused a 50-minute delay in processing a 3-truck convoy by requesting that the vehicles move to the right lane. There was no apparent reason for this change in procedures. When the U.S. representative refused the request, the Soviets agreed to process the convoy in the left lane as in the past.⁴² Three weeks later a very similar incident happened to a 4-vehicle convoy. The same Soviet officer was on duty, and this time the U.S. detachment commander at Helmstedt had to intervene. Finally, the Soviet officer agreed to process the convoy in the left lane, whereupon the vehicles left the checkpoint with a 55-minute delay.⁴³

After this incident the Soviet checkpoint officer explained that military convoys halting in the left lane might cause congestion and tieups when civilian traffic was heavy. The U.S. representative replied--without authority--that he desired a permanent processing area for westbound convoys which would be free from civilian traffic interference. The two officers reached a tentative agreement on changing the processing area from the left lane to an area off the right lane.

USCOB proposed to introduce the new procedure on 21 June--the day after he had informed USCINCEUR and CINCUSAREUR. If several small administrative convoys encountered no difficulties, he would change the pertinent regulations. USAREUR immediately replied that the proposal constituted a basic change in policy that required its careful study and full coordination with USCINCEUR and the U.S. Ambassador at Bonn. Until completion

⁴⁰ Cable SX-4962, CINCUSAREUR to USCOB, 30 Aug 66. SECRET. Gp-3.

⁴¹ Cable USAB-226, USCOB to CINCUSAREUR, 18 Nov 66. CONF. Gp-3

⁴² Cable USAB-1157, USCOB to CINCUSAREUR, 25 May 66. CONF. Gp-4.

⁴³ Cable USAB-1172, USCOB to CINCUSAREUR, 14 Jun 66. CONF. Gp-4.

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of these actions USCOB was to refrain from any change in current procedures for the processing of administrative vehicle movements.⁴⁴

To clarify the issue, the U.S. Embassy at Bonn asked the representatives of the interested military headquarters to attend a meeting on 1 July. The conferees agreed that the convoy vehicles should park in the right lane and not off the autobahn. This course of action would free the left lane for movement of West German private cars and would be consistent with the current policy that convoys should remain on the autobahn during processing.⁴⁵

USCINCEUR and CINCUSAREUR approved the new procedures and asked USCOB to inform the Soviets accordingly, making simultaneous proposals for eliminating obstacles to rapid processing and to the orderly flow of traffic.⁴⁶

On 13 July the U.S. commander of the Helmstedt Detachment informed the Soviet checkpoint commander, and on the next day a 4-vehicle convoy tested the new procedures without incident. On 16 July the Soviet checkpoint commander informed the Allies of some changes in procedures designed to expedite the flow of traffic. When the Soviets introduced the new procedures two days later, Allied traffic passed smoothly through the checkpoint. During the following weeks four small administrative convoys processed without incident.⁴⁷

⁴⁴(1) Cable USAB-1167, USCOB to CINCUSAREUR. (2) Cable SX-3876, CINCUSAREUR to USCOB. Both 20 Jun 66. CONF. Gp-4.

⁴⁵(1) Cable SX-3962, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR and AMEMB Bonn, 25 Jun 66. (2) Cables 4282 and 12, AMEMB Bonn to Secy State, 28 Jun and 1 Jul 66. (3) Cable USAB-1199, USCOB to CINCUSAREUR, 6 Jul 66. All CONF. Gp-4.

⁴⁶(1) Cable ECJC-J-10224, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 9 Jul 66. (2) Cable SX-4169, CINCUSAREUR to USCOB, 11 Jul 66. Both CONF. Gp-4.

⁴⁷(1) Cables USAB-1204, 1206, 1210, and 1213, USCOB to CINCUSAREUR, 12, 13, 16, and 18 Jul 66. (2) DF, USAREUR DCSOPS to CofS, 6 Sep 66, subj: U.S. Convoy Autobahn Incident, 1 Sep 66. AEAGC-CO. All CONF. Gp-4.

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On 1 September Soviet checkpoint personnel initially refused to process a 3-vehicle convoy in the right lane, then reversed this decision, causing a delay of half an hour.⁴⁸ When the Helmstedt Detachment commander protested this incident on 12 September, the Soviet representative reiterated his recommendation that small U.S. convoys move off the autobahn for traffic and safety reasons, at least while construction was under way. The U.S. Ambassador at Bonn, USCINCEUR, and CINCUSAREUR then reached agreement that USCOB would authorize the Helmstedt Detachment commander to deviate from established parking procedures for small administrative westbound convoys on a case-by-case basis and without creating a precedent or making any permanent change in the processing of convoys. This deviation from established procedure would end with the completion of the construction work.⁴⁹

When the U.S. checkpoint commander stated the U.S. position, the Soviet representative asked him why he should persist in making so complicated a project out of a simple request. The Soviet officer made a counterproposal that small administrative convoys move off the autobahn or stop, park, and process in the area where large convoys usually parked. USCOB considered the previously envisaged flexible approach to be the best, but the Departments of State and Defense preferred a simpler, easily understandable operating procedure that would not require individual case-by-case policy judgments. Since the Soviets apparently wanted to avoid trouble on the autobahn, it might be preferable to park small convoys in the parking lot until the construction work was complete. The instructions issued

⁴⁸(1) Cable USAB-197, USCOB to CINCUSAREUR, 3 Sep 66. CONF. Gp-4. (2) Cable SC-41296, CINCUSAREUR to USCOB, 8 Sep 66. UNCLAS.

⁴⁹(1) Cable USAB-201, USCOB to CINCUSAREUR, 13 Sep 66. (2) Cable 3195, AMEMB Bonn to CINCUSAREUR, 14 Sep 66. (3) Cable SX-5483, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR and AMEMB Bonn, 29 Sep 66. (4) Cable ECJC-J-14614, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 4 Oct 66. (5) Cable SX-5594, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 6 Oct 66. (6) Cables 4152 and 4236, AMEMB Bonn to CINCUSAREUR et al., 6 and 7 Oct 66. (7) Cable ECJC-J-15152, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 12 Oct 66. (8) Cable SX-5772, CINCUSAREUR to USCOB, 17 Oct 66. All CONF. Gp-4.

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to U.S. convoy commanders would then have the obvious merit of being uncomplicated. An understanding at the protocol officer level might be more binding than loose arrangements between checkpoint commanders.⁵⁰

USCOB reviewed the entire problem once again and recommended this time that the United States accept the Soviet counterproposal. The adoption of this course would eliminate the possibility of conflict or tension over a minor issue.⁵¹ USAREUR was willing to concur in this recommendation, but USCINCEUR was not. He preferred the previously proposed flexible procedure, mainly because the Soviets would have no incentive to clear rapidly any convoy that had moved off the autobahn. Parking off the autobahn might generate more confrontation incidents than the flexible procedure, and--while intended as a temporary expedient--could easily become the basis for a permanent change in all convoy procedures and thus further erode U.S. rights to unrestricted access.

USCINCEUR requested JCS approval for the flexible procedure. In the meantime he suspended the dispatch of 2- or 3-vehicle convoys pending further instructions.⁵²

83. (S) Rail Access

a. U.S. Command Diesel Trains. In the early morning of 15 June the East German Reichsbahn (railroad administration) delayed the passage of a U.S. command train carrying the USAREUR Staff Judge Advocate to Berlin. The Reichsbahn representative at Helmstedt stated that he had no clearance for the train. Two hours later the U.S. detachment commander at Helmstedt delivered a protest to the Soviet duty officer, who asserted that the order to delay the train had come from the highest Soviet officials.

⁵⁰(1) Cables USAB-1393 and 215, USCOB to CINCUSAREUR, 1 and 4 Nov 66. (2) Cable 616, USBER to Secy State, 9 Nov 66. (3) Cable 83698, Secy State to USBER, 12 Nov 66. All CONF. Gp-4.

⁵¹Cable USAB-226, USCOB to CINCUSAREUR, 18 Nov 66. CONF. Gp-3.

⁵²(1) Cable SC-51465, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 23 Nov 66. UNCLAS. (2) Cable ECJC-J-18351, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 5 Dec 66. (3) Cable ECJC-J-18446, USCINCEUR to JCS, 6 Dec 66. Both CONF. Gp-4.

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The train stood at Helmstedt throughout the morning hours while various forms of U.S. protests and actions were under consideration. In the early afternoon, after the Chief, USMLM, had delivered a protest at Potsdam, the Soviets released the train. It arrived in Berlin with a delay of more than 13 hours.⁵³

The British commented on this incident that the notice given to the Reichsbahn--two days, disregarding the weekend--was not sufficient. They considered a notice of seven working days to be a minimum.⁵⁴

Under the circumstances CINCUSAREUR decided that a protest would not serve any useful purpose and might result in an inflation of the incident.⁵⁵

In late July another incident occurred. Following established procedures, USAREUR requested clearances for four command diesel trains for the first half of August. The Soviets cleared only the train for the USAREUR Chief of Staff and refused to grant clearance for the command diesels of three staff division chiefs. They explained that they thus reverted to the principle of granting permission only for the USAREUR Commander in Chief and his Chief of Staff. In reply, the Chief, USMLM, objected to the term "permission" in referring to diesel train clearances, since train access was an agreed right. The Soviet representative answered that the train access rights applied only to passenger and freight trains, not to special diesels.

In response to this restriction, CINCUSAREUR instructed the Chief, USMLM, to deliver an oral protest, pointing to the long-established use of command diesels in transporting representatives of his headquarters to and from Berlin.⁵⁶

⁵³Cables IO/COB-256, 259, 260, 263, and 266-66, USCOB to Std Berlin SITREP Adrs, 15 Jun 66. All CONF. Gp-4.

⁵⁴Cable KFF-521, BAOR to LIVE OAK, 15 Jun 66. SECRET.

⁵⁵Cable SX-3854, CINCUSAREUR to AMEMB Bonn, 18 Jun 66. CONF. Gp-4.

⁵⁶(1) Cable SX-4449, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR and AMEMB Bonn, 29 Jul 66. (2) Cable SX-4477, same to AMEMB Bonn, 30 Jul 66. Both CONF. Gp-3.

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From a legal standpoint, the Allied rights of unrestricted access to Berlin were beyond dispute. Immediately after World War II, the Allied control authorities had made certain arrangements to guarantee an orderly exercise of these rights. In the field of rail access, the 1945 agreements established train paths sufficient to meet all Allied military and civilian needs. These agreements did not specifically mention command diesel trains, which were originally part of the allotted Allied train paths. Subsequently, the Soviets cleared most command diesels without reference to these paths, indicating that these trains were only for the U.S. Ambassador, CINCUSAREUR, and his Chief of Staff. Recently, the Soviets also stipulated that the number of command diesels not exceed the limit established by past practice.

Thus, over the years the United States had gained the right to use command diesel trains, although the rail access agreements did not specifically cover them. The French and British had also acquired the right to run special freight and passenger trains to Berlin and had established procedures for notifying the Soviets and the Reichsbahn of the scheduling of such special trains.

It was clearly in the U.S. interest to be able to run special trains and to maintain the right of determining who should actually ride on these trains. The Soviets had not contested the U.S. right to have command diesel trains, and their recent statement did not necessarily mean that CINCUSAREUR or his Chief of Staff would have to be physically present on each train to obtain clearance.⁵⁷

In early August the Soviets cleared two of the three command diesels scheduled for USAREUR staff division chiefs. They also decided to keep the question of future diesel clearances open and reserved for themselves the right to grant individual requests on the basis of the command position of the officer concerned.⁵⁸ Since the Soviets had thus reversed their position

⁵⁷ Cable 1369, AMEMB Bonn to CINCUSAREUR et al., 1 Aug 66. CONF. Gp-4.

⁵⁸ Cable SX-4532, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR and AMEMB Bonn, 2 Aug 66. CONF. Gp-4.

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and had agreed to clear two additional command diesels to Berlin, the U.S. Embassy at Bonn recommended that USAREUR limit special trains for the following months to the approximate number requested during comparable periods in previous years. USAREUR agreed to this proposal and indicated that it would maintain normal scheduling and notifying procedures.⁵⁹

b. Flags on U.S. Military Trains. In recent years the East Germans attached flags on engines moving U.S. military trains through the Soviet Zone of Germany on 1 and 8 May. As a result of incidents that had arisen in October 1965 from U.S. train commanders attempting to determine whether flags were on the engines, the United States had adopted a new train inspection policy.⁶⁰

To avoid further incidents, USCOB proposed not to make any inspections of U.S. portions of military trains on 1 and 8 May; to continue routine weekly inspections of U.S. portions on other dates; to protest promptly to Soviet duty officers at Marienborn if Communist flags were on U.S. trains; and to request their removal if such action was still timely. The U.S. Ambassador at Bonn approved these proposals.⁶¹

Observers reported that East German and red metal flags were on U.S. military trains on 1, 7, and 8 May between Marienborn and Potsdam. There were no flags on engines moving trains through Allied-controlled areas from Helmstedt to Marienborn and from Potsdam into West Berlin. The Soviet checkpoint officer at Marienborn did not accept the formal oral U.S. and British protests against the mounting of Communist emblems on military trains.⁶²

⁵⁹(1) Cable 1457, AMEMB Bonn to CINCUSAREUR, 3 Aug 66.
(2) DF, USAREUR DCSOPS to CofS, 19 Aug 66, subj: Scheduling of Command Diesels. AEAGC-CO. Both CONF. Gp-4.

⁶⁰USAREUR Anl Hist Sum, 1965, pp. 296 - 97. TS (info used CONF. Gp-4).

⁶¹(1) Cable USAB-115, USCOB to CINCUSAREUR, 22 Apr 66.
(2) Cable 878, AMEMB Bonn to USBER, 23 Apr 66. Both CONF. Gp-4.

⁶²Cables IO/COB-190, 206, 209, and 210-66, USCOB to Std Berlin SITREP Adrs, 1, 8, 9, and 10 May 66. All CONF. Gp-3.

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There were no further flag incidents during 1966.

84. (C) The Sector Border

a. Construction at the Wall. In January the East Germans reinforced with metal stakes the second slalom barrier on their side of Checkpoint Charlie and the Chausseestrasse checkpoint in the French Sector. The purpose of this project seemed to be to bind the loosely joined concrete slabs into a more stable barrier rather than to restrict further the access through the crossing point. No narrowing of the vehicular lane took place.⁶³

After the harsh winter months, the East Germans resumed the construction of border fortifications around the West Berlin perimeter. The so-called modern border consisted of deep ditches, perimeter access roads, fencing, tetrahedrons, and illumination and signal alarm devices. In addition, the East Germans installed mesh wire fencing, electrified alarm fencing, prefabricated concrete 1- or 2-man shelters that served as firing points, guard towers with spotlights, dog runs, new pole lighting of the mercury-vapor type that greatly increased night visibility, and remote control devices to lift barriers at crossing points.⁶⁴

In April they widened the death strip at various points of the border in order to improve fields of fire. They also constructed border access roads with a minimum of equipment and preparation. Bulldozers scooped trenches about 8 to 12 inches deep, then a detail placed what appeared to be roofing paper on top of the sandy bed, poured concrete, and leveled the surface. However, the most intensive East German effort focused on razing a great number of buildings in the immediate vicinity of the West Berlin perimeter. These buildings ranged in size from multiple apartment structures to huts in weekend gardens. The East Germans also cleared several parcels

⁶³ Cable IO/COB-028-66, USCOB to Std Berlin SITREP Adrs, 20 Jan 66. CONF. Gp-4.

⁶⁴ Cable IO/COB-112-66, USCOB to Std Berlin SITREP Adrs, 25 Mar 66. CONF. Gp-4.

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of forest land and set fires to underbrush where escapees had hidden in the past. All these measures were instrumental in improving observation and fields of fire in border areas.⁶⁵ They did not, however, stop knowledgeable East German border guards from defecting. In the period from 8 to 27 November eight border guards succeeded in escaping into West Berlin--the highest number of military defections since December 1965. In addition, 41 East German civilians escaped in October and 23 in November.⁶⁶

b. East German Pilings in the Griebnitz Lake. Toward the end of July the East Germans installed pairs of pilings at six points along the U.S. Sector-Soviet Zone boundary in Griebnitz lake. The sets of pilings were at irregular intervals approximately 300 to 500 yards apart. Two sets of these pilings seemed to be within the U.S. Sector, one approximately 6 feet from the actual demarkation line and the other approximately 90 feet inside the boundary. In a countermove, USCOB proposed to install on the pilings near the actual border the usual signs warning West Berlin residents that they were leaving the U.S. Sector. He also asked for authority to remove the other set of poles by blowing them up with approximately three pounds of TNT attached to each pole. The Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to defer the demolitions pending further considerations.⁶⁷

Two days later the Department of State expressed its reluctance to approve the demolitions because the East Germans might have misunderstood the location of the actual boundary. The U.S. authorities in Berlin were to attach warning signs on pilings near the boundary and place buoys marking the actual border near the East German pilings within the U.S. Sector. On 3 August USCOB completed this action without East German interference.⁶⁸

⁶⁵USAB Semiannual Hist Sum, 1 Jan - 30 Jun 66, pp. 15 - 19. SECRET (info used CONF. Gp-3).

⁶⁶Cables IO/COB-520, 530, and 548-66, USCOB to Std Berlin SITREP Adrs, 19 and 27 Nov and 7 Dec 66. All CONF. Gp-4.

⁶⁷(1) Cable USAB-182, USCOB to CINCUSAREUR, 29 Jul 66.
(2) Cable 7993, JCS to USCINCEUR, 30 Jul 66. Both CONF. Gp-4.

⁶⁸(1) Cable 18960, Secy State to USBER, 1 Aug 66. (2) Cable USAB-185, USCOB to CINCUSAREUR, 3 Aug 66. Both CONF. Gp-4.

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On the next day West Berlin survey authorities, who had again reviewed the boundary, stated that the two East German pilings believed to be 6 and 90 feet inside the U.S. Sector were actually within the Soviet Zone. While this question was under investigation in Washington, USCOB recommended the suspension of all actions to remove the pilings.⁶⁹

Early on 5 August the East Germans removed the U.S. warning signs from all the pilings near the boundary and replaced them with metal East German flags; they did not approach the set believed to be within the U.S. Sector. They also began to place buoys in the upper Havel along the French Sector.⁷⁰

Research in Washington had meanwhile revealed that the East German border pilings were legally as valid as the course of the boundary claimed by the U.S. authorities. Under the circumstances the Department of State preferred to leave matters as they stood and not to protest the East German actions to the Soviets.⁷¹

The solution came as suddenly as the problem had arisen. On 8 August an East German tug approached the U.S. military police boat at the site and asked whether an East German crew could remove the two poles that had seemed to be in the U.S. Sector. The U.S. boat commander replied that he had no authority to grant such a request. USCOB then asked for authority to let an East German tug and barge, manned only by civilians, remove the pilings. The Department of State approved this recommendation.⁷²

A West Berlin patrol boat informed the East Germans that they could remove the poles, adding that, if they did not reply by noon on 10 August, the U.S. Sector authorities would take care of the matter themselves. Between 1000 and 1035 hours on 10 August an East German barge and tug with civilian crews removed the two pilings. A small West Berlin press contingent observed the action from the U.S. Sector shore.⁷³

⁶⁹(1) Cable 172, USBER to Secy State. (2) Cable USAB-186, USCOB to CINCUSAREUR. Both 4 Aug 66. CONF. Gp-4.

⁷⁰(1) Cable USAB-187, USCOB to CINCUSAREUR. (2) Cable 182, USBER to Secy State. Both 5 Aug 66. CONF. Gp-4.

⁷¹Cable 23286, Secy State to USBER, 6 Aug 66. CONF. Gp-4.

⁷²(1) Cable IO/COB-342-66, USCOB to Std Berlin SITREP Adrs. (2) Cable 23648, Secy State to USBER. Both 8 Aug 66. CONF. Gp-4.

⁷³Cables USAB-190 and 191, USCOB to CINCUSAREUR, 9 and 10 Aug 66. Both CONF. Gp-4.

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85. (S) Access to East Berlin

a. Allied Civilian Entry into East Berlin.

(1) Background. From October 1961 until June 1965, U.S. and French civilian officials and military dependents had not entered East Berlin. This self-imposed restriction resulted from a dispute, following the creation of the Wall, over East German insistence that all persons not in uniform, even those traveling in official vehicles, show their identification documents to East German guards at the checkpoint. The British had been the first to permit their civilian officials and dependents to identify themselves to the East Germans. In June 1965 USCOB had made a first step toward harmonizing Allied procedures. After detailed preparations, U.S. officials holding diplomatic passports had entered East Berlin; they had identified themselves by showing their passports from within the vehicle. By that time, however, the British and French civilian officials had begun to use a document that identified them as occupation authority members entitled to the rights of circulation within Berlin.

(2) Proposal for Changing U.S. Procedures. Since the British and French practices presented distinct advantages, USCOB recommended the issuance of special U.S. occupation authority documents to American civilian officials and their dependents and to certain military dependents, authorizing them to enter East Berlin in an official or private vehicle. This identification card would be available only for selected Berlin-assigned personnel. Individuals from outside Berlin visiting the Soviet Sector by bus or in military sedans would use their passports to identify themselves at the crossing point. The Allies would thus distinguish between members of the occupation authority entitled to the rights of circulation--who would use the new identification cards--and personnel from outside Berlin, who would continue to show passports. USAREUR concurred in this new concept, which would have the additional advantage of increasing U.S. presence in East Berlin. The British and French were also in favor of harmonizing the Allied identification procedures.⁷⁴

⁷⁴(1) Cables USAB-158 and 169, USCOB to CINCUSAREUR, 14 Jun and 1 Jul 66. (2) Cable SX-4137, CINCUSAREUR to USCOB/CG USAB, 8 Jul 66. All CONF. Gp-3.

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(3) The Tests of the New Procedures. The U.S. authorities in Berlin intended to introduce the new procedures gradually after appropriate notification of the Soviet Embassy in East Berlin and the West Berlin Senat. The Department of State approved this concept, and the U.S. Mission in Berlin developed detailed plans for introducing and testing the new U.S. Element Allied Kommandatura (USEAK) identification cards. In early September the first nine tests of the new procedure took place without incident.⁷⁵ However, on 20 September an East German guard refused to accept the identification card shown by a U.S. Mission official driving his U.S. licensed private car. In accordance with instructions, the U.S. official did not comply with East German requests to show "proper documentation" and returned to West Berlin. After consultation with the French and British authorities, USCOB decided to attempt another probe. Three hours after the first incident a French civilian in a private vehicle passed through the checkpoint, showing only his identity document. Two U.S. officials traveling directly behind the French vehicle were unable to enter East Berlin, when they showed their USEAK identification cards. A British civilian in a vehicle following behind the U.S. car and showing his documentation entered without difficulty. Both before and after the test, U.S. patrol vehicles passed through the checkpoint without incident.⁷⁶

During the following days these two incidents were the subject of several discussions between U.S. and Soviet diplomatic officials who stated that the matter was not within their jurisdiction. USCOB had meanwhile suspended the use of the USEAK identification cards upon orders from the Department of State.⁷⁷

⁷⁵(1) Cable 285, USBER to Secy State, 31 Aug 66. (2) Cable IO/COB-408-66, USCOB to Std Berlin SITREP Adrs, 15 Sep 66. Both CONF. Gp-4.

⁷⁶Cable IO/COB-416-66, USCOB to Std Berlin SITREP Adrs, 20 Sep 66. CONF. Gp-3.

⁷⁷(1) Cable 51041, Secy State to USBER. (2) Cable IO/COB-417-66, USCOB to Std Berlin SITREP Adrs. Both 21 Sep 66. CONF. Gp-3.

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In early October the Secretary of State directed U.S. Mission personnel to use diplomatic passports exclusively and not to discuss the subject of identity cards with the press.⁷⁸ However, this directive did not close the issue. A few days later the Soviet protocol officer in Berlin indicated unofficially that the term "Allied Kommandatura" insulted the East Germans since it referred to a body that they and the Soviets did not recognize. If the U.S. identity cards were "national," like those of the British and French, U.S. civilians would receive the same treatment at the checkpoint as their Allies. The U.S. Mission believed that it could devise a suitable wording to describe the U.S. status in Berlin and at the same time take into account the Soviet comments.⁷⁹

While the U.S. Embassy at Bonn favored this course of action, the Secretary of State refused to authorize any further efforts at identity card harmonization unless there was real harmony--even the French and British cards were not identical with one another--and there were tangible benefits to compensate for the disadvantages of further eroding the U.S. position.⁸⁰ These instructions arrived on the day the U.S. Ambassador received the Soviet Ambassador to East Germany at his residence in West Berlin. When the U.S. Ambassador touched lightly on the issue of U.S. identity cards, the Soviet Ambassador suggested that all four occupying powers might use similar cards for movement throughout Berlin. In making this suggestion, he did not seem to attach great importance to this minor procedural change.⁸¹

⁷⁸ Cable 59567, Secy State to USBER, 5 Oct 66. CONF.
Gp-4.

⁷⁹ Cable USBER-546, USBER to Secy State, 14 Oct 66. CONF.
Gp-3.

⁸⁰ (1) Cable 5080, AMEMB Bonn to Secy State, 26 Oct 66.
Gp-4. (2) Cable 75767, Secy State to USBER, 31 Oct 66. Both CONF.

⁸¹ (1) Cable 584, USBER from Ambassador McGhee to Secy State, 1 Nov 66. (2) Cable 5409, AMEMB Bonn to Secy State, 3 Nov 66. Both CONF. Gp-4.

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The U.S. Mission considered the expected benefits from successful introduction of identity cards to be substantial, although the issue itself was not vital. There might not be any "true" harmonization among the Allies, but then their procedures were not fully harmonized in most other areas. The point was to eliminate East German discrimination against U.S. civilians by dropping the reference to the Allied Kommandatura on identity cards. As to the Soviet Ambassador's suggestion, the U.S. Mission's immediate reaction was to accept it, since the introduction of such identity cards would constitute a more explicit Soviet acknowledgement of Four-Power responsibility in Berlin than any action in many years. If, however, the Soviets did not follow up--and this seemed more likely--the U.S. Mission wanted to proceed with the introduction of a "national" identity card at the checkpoint.⁸²

After consultation with Department of State officials in Washington and Bonn, the U.S. Mission gave advance notice to the Soviet Embassy that it intended to issue U.S. identification cards to its personnel entering East Berlin. The Soviet representative answered that his government would consider U.S. identification cards as appropriate documentation for American representatives in Berlin.

On 27 November the first U.S. officials entered East Berlin with the new identification cards. The U.S. Mission planned to expand the issuance of the cards to U.S. civilian personnel on a controlled basis.⁸³

b. USCOB Entry into East Berlin. On 23 December 1961 East German border guards had demanded identity documents of the U.S. civilian official who accompanied USCOB. In accordance with the then current policy, the official had refused the demand, and USCOB had not entered East Berlin. A subsequent exchange of letters had barred the Soviet Commandant and his political adviser from entering the U.S. Sector and had denied USCOB further access to East Berlin. On 23 August 1962 the Soviets had abolished the position of the Soviet Commandant.⁸⁴

⁸² Cable 601, USBER to Secy State, 3 Nov 66. CONF. Gp-3.

⁸³ Cable 730, USBER to AMEMB Bonn, 26 Nov 66. CONF. Gp-4.

⁸⁴ USAREUR Anl Hist Summaries, 1961, p. 55, and 1962, p. 17. Both TS (info used CONF. Gp-4).

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Attempts to lift the ban had failed during the following years, mainly because of the issue of U.S. civilian identification. Since this issue seemed to have been resolved, USCOB planned to inform the Chief of Staff, GSFG--through the Chief, USMLM--that the United States was willing to rescind the ban on Soviet officials entering the U.S. Sector, provided the Soviets lifted the restrictions on USCOB's entry into East Berlin.⁸⁵

On 8 December USCOB deferred the planned actions because of sudden difficulties that U.S. civilians encountered in obtaining recognition of the new identification cards by East German border guards.⁸⁶

c. U.S. Vehicles in East Berlin. Except for one instance on 31 January, East German police did not tail or detain U.S. Army patrols in East Berlin in early 1966. On 22 April, however, the East Germans tailed a U.S. sedan. On the next day they detained another American patrol vehicle, and on 29 April an East German sedan tailed another U.S. patrol. In retaliation for these incidents, U.S. military police detained a Soviet sedan in the U.S. Sector of West Berlin for 45 minutes. When the Soviets protested this detention, USAREUR informed them through military and diplomatic channels that the U.S. action was in retaliation for the unjustified harassment and detention of a U.S. military vehicle in the Soviet Sector. The U.S. authorities indicated they would continue to hold the Soviets responsible for guaranteeing the right of free and unhindered circulation of U.S. vehicles in the Soviet Sector and for any consequences that might arise from interfering with this right.⁸⁷

⁸⁵(1) DF, USAREUR DCSOPS to CofS, 12 Sep 66, subj: USCOB Visit to East Berlin. AEAGC-CO. (2) Cable 625, USBER to Secy State, 11 Nov 66. (3) Cable 83695, Secy State to USBER, 12 Nov 66. (4) Cable 663, USBER to Secy State, 17 Nov 66. (5) Cable USAB-232, USCOB to CINCUSAREUR, 6 Dec 66. All CONF. Gp-3.

⁸⁶Cable USAB-233, USCOB to CINCUSAREUR, 8 Dec 66. SECRET. Gp-4.

⁸⁷(1) Cables IO/COB-045, 167, 171, 185, 195, 196, and 201-66, USCOB to Std Berlin SITREP Adrs, 1 Feb; 22, 23, and 29 Apr; 3 and 5 May 66. (2) Cable USAB-134, USCOB to CINCUSAREUR, 7 May 66. (3) DF, DCSOPS to CofS, 13 May 66, subj: Reply to Soviet Protest of 5 May 66. AEAGC-CO. All CONF. Gp-4.

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On the afternoon of 23 November about 35 armed East German border guards blocked a stationary patrol sedan in East Berlin, loaded and cocked their rifles and pointed them at the four occupants, rocked the car, sat on its hood, and let the air out of one tire. The U.S. personnel eventually replaced the flat tire and returned to West Berlin. Later in the evening another patrol vehicle had difficulties with some apparently intoxicated East German civilians, one of whom threw himself across the hood of the sedan moving at crawl speed and fell off the car. One of the patrol members saw the man stand up and brush himself off. Since he did not seem to have suffered an injury, the patrol continued on its mission.

On the next day the Soviet Embassy made an official protest, alleging that a U.S. patrol vehicle, traveling at high speed, had hit a G.D.R. citizen and had left the scene of the accident without caring for the injured who had sustained head injuries requiring hospitalization.

After investigating the Soviet allegation, the U.S. Mission presented a correct account of the facts in both incidents and protested against the threatening and abusive attitude of the East Germans. The Soviet representative noted the facts, but added that his Embassy could not prevent a recurrence since the incidents did not directly involve the Soviets. The United States, of course, maintained that the Soviet authorities were responsible for preventing such incidents in the future.⁸⁸

d. Behavior of U.S. Servicemen in East Berlin. One of the topics discussed by the U.S. and Soviet Ambassadors at their meeting in West Berlin on 31 October concerned allegations of improper behavior of U.S. servicemen on official patrol duty in East Berlin. On this occasion the Soviet Ambassador produced a list of six incidents that USCOB immediately investigated. He found that there was no justification for the first two allegations pertaining to patrol vehicles stopping in a no-stopping area to photograph or sketch buildings. The third allegation, that an American patrol vehicle had deliberately "left a Playboy magazine near an objective guarded by a military

⁸⁸ (1) Cables IO/COB-526, 527, and 529-66, USCOB to Std Berlin SITREP Adrs, 23, 24, and 26 Nov 66. (2) Cable 728, USBER to AMEMB Bonn. (3) Cable 635, AMEMB Bonn to USBER, Both 26 Nov 66. (4) Cable 739, USBER to Secy State, 29 Nov 66. All CONF. Gp-3.

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regiment," was true only insofar as the magazine had fallen out of the patrol car window. The other three allegations were factual: In each instance patrol vehicles had stopped near installations decorated with flags and had removed North Vietnamese and South Vietnam National Liberation Front flags while on duty.⁸⁹

To preclude similar incidents, USCOB reemphasized the current instructions regarding the proper conduct of U.S. patrols in East Berlin. He also took disciplinary actions against the individuals who had violated instructions. The U.S. Mission in Berlin gave a prompt and candid response to the Soviets who appreciated receiving this information and agreed not to publicize violations of this type.⁹⁰

86. (S) Political Matters

a. The Communist Party Congress in West Berlin. In October 1965 USAREUR had learned that the West Berlin Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) planned to hold its first party congress at Spandau in West Berlin in February 1966. The meeting of the West Berlin SED--a legal political party--would probably attract delegations from many Communist Parties in the East and West. The SED apparently hoped to accomplish a major promotion of the Communist "three-state" theory by holding what in effect would be an international Communist gathering in West Berlin.

After extensive consultations and in agreement with Governing Mayor Willy Brandt, the Allies issued on 21 February a Berlin Kommandatura Order banning the meeting. The SED replied by informing the West Berlin Senat that the congress would take place between 25 and 27 February at the East

⁸⁹(1) Cable 584, USBER from Ambassador McGhee to Secy State, 1 Nov 66. (2) Cable USAB-3568, USCOB to CINCUSAREUR, 2 Nov 66. UNCLAS. (3) Cable SX-6077, CINCUSAREUR to USCOB, 5 Nov 66. (4) Cable USAB-218, USCOB to CINCUSAREUR, 6 Nov 66. All except (2) CONF. Gp-4.

⁹⁰(1) Cable USAB-219, USCOB to CINCUSAREUR. (2) Cable 5638, AMEMB Bonn to USBER. Both 7 Nov 66. (3) Cable 680, USBER to AMEMB Bonn, 18 Nov 66. All CONF. Gp-3.

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German-controlled Reichsbahn repair yards at Tempelhof--not at Spandau--and that foreign delegates would be present. The Allies, however, reiterated their position that the prohibition of the SED meeting applied to any congress in West Berlin.⁹¹

The West Berlin SED protested the ban and postponed the party congress to May.⁹²

When the SED agreed to hold an ordinary West Berlin party congress, the Allies authorized the meeting. It opened on 21 May, with approximately 500 to 600 persons--including 2-man delegations from Communist Parties in the U.S.S.R., Poland, East Germany, and France--assembled in a Spandau hall. Journalists from 50 nations covered the 2-day meeting. There were no incidents.⁹³

b. Bundestag Committee Meetings. Despite East German protests and threats, Bundestag (the Federal Republic of Germany's lower house) committees met in West Berlin from 17 to 21 January after the Allies had refused to authorize a plenary session.⁹⁴

The Allies had prepared low-key measures to counteract any Communist harassment. The preparations included the standby alert of a 9-vehicle convoy that was to travel from Helmstedt to Berlin, if ordered. The meetings took place without disturbance or incident.⁹⁵

⁹¹Cable SX-1907, CINCUSAREUR to All Std Brief Adrs, 23 Feb 66. SECRET (info used CONF. Gp-3).

⁹²Cable USAB-056, USCOB to CINCUSAREUR, 23 Feb 66. CONF. Gp-4.

⁹³Cables IO/COB-221, 222, and 224-66, USCOB to Std Berlin SITREP Adrs, 20, 21, and 23 May 66. All CONF. Gp-4.

⁹⁴USAREUR Anl Hist Sum, 1965, p. 288. TS (info used CONF. Gp-4).

⁹⁵(1) Cable 1630, Secy State to AMEMB Bonn. (2) Cable 2009, AMEMB Bonn to Secy State. Both 11 Jan 66. CONF. Gp-4. (3) Cable KFF-364, CINCBACOR to CINCUSAREUR, 15 Jan 66. SECRET.

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The Bundestag committees and F.R.G. Cabinet met again in West Berlin in April and October.⁹⁶

c. Pass Negotiations. The Berlin pass negotiations resumed on 25 January but bogged down by early February because of unacceptable demands made by the East German representative. During the following four meetings the two representatives continued their discussions, and on 3 March the East German negotiator made an unexpected and complete about-face. He thus paved the way for the new agreement, signed on 7 March, which was valid until 30 June and covered the Easter and Whitsun periods. West Berlin representatives had sought a 1-year agreement, which the East Germans were unwilling to conclude because they apparently wanted to have greater flexibility in the event of unforeseen political developments.⁹⁷

For Easter, 510,000 West Berliners used passes as compared to 588,000 in 1965. During the 14-day Whitsun period some 600,000 passes for 1-day visits were available. However, only about 467,000 persons actually visited East Berlin; this figure was approximately 60,000 below the total for the comparable 1965 period.⁹⁸

The West Berlin Senat was anxious to keep the hardship pass office open, but the East Germans refused to sign a new agreement. The hardship pass office thus closed on 30 June upon termination of the pass agreement.⁹⁹ However, negotiations continued during the following months, and on 10 October the hardship pass office reopened. Thus, after a 100-day interval, West Berliners were again able to visit East Berlin in cases of hardship.¹⁰⁰ However, the negotiations for a Christmas and

⁹⁶(1) Cable 3425, AMEMB Bonn to Secy State, 22 Apr 66. (2) Cable IO/COB-447-66, USCOB to Std Berlin SITREP Adrs, 10 Oct 66. Both CONF. Gp-4.

⁹⁷Cables SX-2102 and 2232, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR et al., 4 and 11 Mar 66. SECRET (info used CONF. Gp-3).

⁹⁸Cables IO/COB-165, 223, and 245-66, USCOB to Std Berlin SITREP Adrs, 21 Apr, 22 May, and 6 Jun 66. All CONF. Gp-4.

⁹⁹Cable SX-3795, CINCUSAREUR to All Std DISC Adrs, 14 Jun 66. SECRET (info used CONF. Gp-3).

¹⁰⁰(1) Cable 4099, AMEMB Bonn to Secy State, 5 Oct 66. (2) Cable IO/COB-445-66, USCOB to Std Berlin SITREP Adrs, 7 Oct 66. Both CONF. Gp-4.

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New Year's pass agreement came to an end on 26 October, and the East Germans did not answer a West Berlin request for another conference. The stumbling block to negotiations was West Berlin's insistence on incorporating in the next pass agreement the usual clause that the two sides differed in their political and legal viewpoints. This clause reasserted the West's nonrecognition of East German sovereignty.¹⁰¹

Over the Christmas and New Year's holidays there were no passes for West Berliners except in hardship cases.

d. Spandau Prison. In March the French, British, and U.S. Ambassadors at Bonn planned to approach the Soviet Ambassador in that city on the subject of releasing Rudolph Hess from Spandau prison because of old age and ill health. Hess, who was 72 years old, was apparently mentally deranged. In September, Baldur von Schirach and Albert Speer would complete their 20-year sentences, and upon their release Hess would be the sole prisoner in Spandau. The Soviets had previously consented to the early release of several prisoners because of age and health but had refused to commute the sentences of the three remaining Nazi war criminals.

The 90-year-old Spandau prison could hold 600 men. The annual maintenance cost was about \$125,000, excluding the salaries of the guards and other personnel. Since 1950 the Western Allies had tried--but failed--to obtain Soviet approval for moving the few prisoners to another prison or at least to a smaller building within the Spandau compound.¹⁰² During the months preceding the release of Speer and von Schirach, the Allies tried to obtain the release of Hess or his transfer to a less elaborate and expensive accommodation.¹⁰³

On 30 September Speer and von Schirach left Spandau after having completed their sentences. Some 5,000 persons gathered

¹⁰¹ Cable SX-6672, CINCUSAREUR to Std Brief Adrs, 13 Dec 66. SECRET. NOFORN. Gp-1.

¹⁰² Cable SX-2384, CINCUSAREUR to All Std Brief Adrs, 22 Mar 66. SECRET (info used CONF. NOFORN. Gp-1).

¹⁰³ (1) Cables 1311, 1541, 1654, and 1820, AMEMB Bonn to Secy State, 29 Jul, 4, 8, and 12 Aug 66. (2) Cables 19792, 23262, and 24369, Secy State to AMEMB Bonn, 2, 6, and 9 Aug 66. All CONF. Gp-4.

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
in the vicinity of the prison, but there were no significant incidents.¹⁰⁴

At noon on 1 December the U.S. guard detachment took over the responsibility for the Spandau prison from the Soviet guard unit. The only remaining prisoner was Hess.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁴ Cables IO/COB-428, 430, 431, and 432, USCOB to Std Berlin SITREP Adrs, 29 Sep and 1 Oct 66. All CONF. Gp-4.

¹⁰⁵ The Berlin Observer, 9 Dec 66, p. 3. UNCLAS.

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CHRONOLOGY (U)

<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>
<u>January</u>	
10	(U) 3d Armored Division FTX SILVER TALON begins.
15	(U) Exercise SILVER TALON ends. (C) A 10th SFG team arrives in Athens, Greece, to assist in search and rescue operations involved in the crash of a USAF aircraft.
17	(U) An accident involving four thermonuclear bombs occurs near Palomares, Spain. (C) The last augmentation unit--the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, 24th Infantry Division--begins to leave Berlin. (U) COL M. N. Stanford becomes Headquarters Commandant, USAREUR, and CO, Special Troops, vice LTC J. O. Dickerson, Acting.
20	(U) COL W. S. Dillon becomes Acting Provost Marshal, vice BG H. L. Moore, Jr., Provost Marshal. (U) The last elements of the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry leave Berlin.
24	(S) Spain prohibits overflights by planes carrying nuclear weapons as a result of the accident near Palomares.
25	(C) The 10th SFG search and rescue team returns to home station.
27	(U) COL (later BG) C. C. Cannon replaces BG H. A. Morris as Engineer/Director, Engineer and Installations Directorate, Logistics Division. (U) COL (later BG) K. W. Gustafson becomes USAREUR Provost Marshal, vice COL W. S. Dillon, Acting.

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Date

Event

January

28 (U) 3d Infantry Division FTX MARNE MAULER begins.

February

- 1 (U) USAREUR redesignates the U.S. Army General Depot, Giessen, as the U.S. Army Giessen Support Center.
- (C) Exercise DARK CLOAK, a SOTFE-directed joint unconventional warfare CPX, begins with elements of the 10th SFG participating.
- 3 (U) Exercise MARNE MAULER ends.
- 11 (C) The Department of the Army begins to withdraw personnel by diverting and curtailing individuals.
- 17 (U) Exercise WINTER EXPRESS, testing the capabilities of ACE Mobile Forces, begins near Bardufoss, Norway.
- 18 (U) USAREUR redesignates its subordinate commands as assigned units, except for the U.S. Army School, Europe, which becomes an assigned activity.
- 21 (C) Exercise DARK CLOAK ends.
- 24 (U) BG J. S. Blocker assumes command of the 3d Infantry Division, vice MG A. O. Connor.
- 26 (U) LTG T. J. Conway assumes command of Seventh Army, vice LTG W. W. Quinn.
- (U) LTG G. R. Mather assumes command of V Corps, vice LTG J. H. Polk.

March

- 1 (U) Harbors and Roads Survey Unit (Provisional) organized and assigned to USAREUR, with station at Bremerhaven.
- 7 (U) Exercise KING NEPTUNE 66 begins. LANDSOUTH participates in a CPX, and USASETAF forces participate in an FTX.
- 11 (U) Exercise KING NEPTUNE 66 ends.

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March

- 14 (U) USAREUR assigns its General Education Development (GED) Agency to USAACOM and moves it from Heidelberg to Munich. At the same time, USAREUR integrates the U.S. Armed Forces Institute, Europe, into the USAREUR Adjutant General Publications and Training Aids Center.
- 19 (C) Exercise STAR TURN, a tripartite reinforced battalion-size probe rehearsing Operation GROVESEND, begins.
- 26 (U) Exercise WINTER EXPRESS ends.
- (C) Exercise STAR TURN ends.
- 29 (U) The French Government declares its intentions to withdraw from NATO by 1 July, directs NATO military headquarters to leave its territory by 31 March 1967, and asks the United States to remove its headquarters and "several" Army and Air Force installations by 1 April 1967.

April

- 1 (U) USAREUR discontinues the U.S. Army Element, American Forces Network, France.
- 6 (C) A Soviet YAK-28 (FIREBAR) aircraft crashes in the British Sector of Berlin.
- 14 (U) Congress passes oversea teachers' pay bill, but not the appropriations bill.
- 15 (U) USASTRATCOM-EUR communications exercise NORTH PINE begins.
- 29 (C) Exercise SOUTHERN ARROW, the largest peacetime joint airborne training exercise held in Europe, begins.
- (S) Exercise GREEN HEATHER, an Anglo-American unconventional warfare exercise, begins.
- 30 (U) Exercise NORTH PINE ends.

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Date

Event

May

- 1 (U) USAREUR redesignates the USAREUR Adjutant General Publications and Training Aids Center as the USAREUR Adjutant General Support Center.
- 4 (U) USEUCOM asks USAREUR to consider a merger with Seventh Army headquarters.
- 7 (U) BG H. A. Rasmussen replaces BG J. G. Gramzow as Director, Materiel Readiness Directorate.
- 10 (U) Exercise SOUTHERN ARROW ends.
- 11 (U) USAREUR redesignates the 32d Artillery Brigade as the 32d Army Air Defense Command.
- 16 (U) BG W. E. Brinker succeeds BG O. M. Barsanti as Comptroller.
- 17 (U) Exercise GREEN HEATHER ends.

June

- 12 (C) AIR WAVE--a joint unconventional warfare communications exercise--begins.
- 18 (U) Exercise AIR WAVE ends.
- 22 (S) USAREUR conducts Exercise STOVE PIPE at the Mannheim-Rheinau Transportation Terminal.
- 24 (U) USAREUR redesignates the Quartermaster Service Center at Hanau, Germany, as Grossauheim Kaserne.
- 25 (U) USAREUR headquarters organizes a separate Engineer and Installations Division and reorganizes the Logistics Division, which exercises general staff supervision over the Engineer and Installations Division. BG C. C. Cannon is the Engineer.

July

- 1 (S) USAREUR initiates Operation FAST DRAW, the withdrawal of warheads from French nuclear delivery units stationed in Germany.

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July

- 4 (C) U.S. Consulates are the target of demonstrations, the two largest ones being at Hamburg and Munich.
- 5 (S) USAREUR completes Operation FAST DRAW.
- (U) COL W. A. Rau replaces COL F. Petruzel as Chief, U.S. Army Reserve Affairs, Europe, and Assistant Deputy Area Commander for Reserve Affairs.
- 6 (U) Chaplain (LTC) G. W. Hyatt becomes Acting Chaplain, vice COL J. O. Woods, Chaplain.
- (U) USCINCEUR forwards to the Joint Chiefs of Staff his FRELOC Final Phase I Plan.
- 7 (U) COL M. W. Niemann becomes Acting Inspector General, vice COL J. J. Pavick, Inspector General.
- (U) 7th Engineer Brigade relocates from Rhein-Main Air Base to Karlsruhe.
- 15 (S) French forces terminate their participation in Czech border surveillance.
- 20 (U) The Secretary of Defense directs the merger of USAREUR and Seventh Army headquarters by 1 December.
- (U) COL J. W. Herrington becomes Inspector General, vice COL M. W. Niemann, Acting.
- (U) COL G. E. Moranda replaces COL L. G. Hill, Jr., as Chief, Public Affairs Division.
- 22 (U) BG J. E. Kelsey assumes command of USASTRATCOM-EUR, and becomes DCS, Communications-Electronics Division, USAREUR, vice BG W. B. Bess.

August

- 1 (U) Officially sanctioned travel of dependents to France ceases.
- 2 (U) Chaplain (COL) A. J. McElwee replaces LTC G. W. Hyatt (acting) as Chaplain.

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Event

August

- 6 (U) COL P. V. Tuttle becomes Acting Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, vice MG J. H. Caughey.
- 12 (U) French Government officially authorizes U.S. dependents' schools in France to remain open until 30 June 1967.
- 18 (U) The Deputy Secretary of Defense decides to relocate USEUCOM headquarters to Stuttgart.
- 22 (U) MG J. A. Wilson becomes Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, vice COL P. V. Tuttle, Acting.
- 30 (U) Exercise SUMMER/MARMARA EXPRESS begins in Greek Thrace.

September

- 1 (U) MG B. F. Taylor replaces MG W. A. Enemark as Chief of Staff, CENTAG.

(U) The U.S. Army Reserve Affairs organizes the Satellite Department, Brussels (Belgium), of the Paris USAR School.
- 3 (U) Joint-combined exercise BAR FROST begins in Norway, with participation of USSTRICOM elements. USAREUR furnishes logistic support to U.S. participants.
- 6 (U) MG E. L. Rowny replaces MG A. K. Sibley as Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics.

(C) Exercise HAY MOUNT begins.
- 9 (U) Exercise BAR FROST ends.
- 15 (U) Department of the Army delegates to USAREUR responsibility for all dependents' schools in the European area.
- 22 (C) Exercise HAY MOUNT ends.
- 23 (S) The Secretary of Defense directs withdrawal of part of USAREUR's reserve floating marine fleet to support SEA operations.

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September

- 24 (C) The Danish FTX ABSALON 66 begins.
- 26 (U) VII Corps CPX KELLY GREEN and V Corps CPX STAND TALL begin.
- 28 (U) Exercise STAND TALL ends.
(U) Exercise SUMMER/MARMARA EXPRESS ends in Turkish Thrace.
- 30 (U) Exercise KELLY GREEN ends.
(U) Albert Speer and Baldur von Schirach complete their sentences and leave Spandau prison in West Berlin.

October

- 1 (U) U.S. Seventh Army Communications Command organized at Mannheim.
- 11 (U) Congress enacts military appropriations bill, which allows for the increase in oversea teachers' pay.
- 12 (C) Exercise ABSALON 66 ends.
(U) U.S. Army Data Processing Unit, Frankfurt, organized and assigned to USAREUR.
- 17 (S) Exercise FALLEX 66/HIGH HEELS V begins.
- 18 (U) U.S. Army Resources Coordination Group (Provisional) organized in Denmark and assigned to USAREUR.
(U) U.S. Army Projects Analysis Office (Provisional) organized and assigned to USAREUR.
(U) COL L. E. Benade becomes Adjutant General, vice BG G. P. Warner.
- 19 (U) SASCOR moves from Campbell Barracks, Heidelberg, to the AFN Building, Frankfurt.
(U) U.S. Army Mission Support Element (Provisional) organized in Belgium and assigned to USAREUR.

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Event

October

- 20 (U) U.S. Army Channel Area Support Unit (Provisional) organized in the Netherlands and assigned to USAREUR.
- 21 (C) Hq & Hq Co, 7th Engineer Brigade, moves from Karlsruhe to Frankfurt as nucleus of the Engineer Command (Provisional).
- 25 (U) U.S. Army Technical Coordination Detachment (Provisional) organized in Italy and assigned to USAREUR.

November

- 1 (U) Hq & Hq Co, U.S. Army, Europe Engineer Command (Provisional) organized at Frankfurt and assigned to USAREUR.
- (U) LTG F. T. Mildren assumes temporary command of Seventh Army.
- 5 (U) The Secretary of Defense authorizes the use of the Donges-Metz pipeline in peacetime and the recovery of U.S. rights to the Farge POL storage depot in Germany.
- (U) USASETAF begins flood relief operations in Italy.
- 7 (U) COL J. G. K. Miller, Jr., replaces BG E. M. Flanagan, Jr., as Secretary of the General Staff.
- (U) COL R. L. Dalton replaces COL J. G. K. Miller, Jr., as Assistant to the Chief of Staff.
- 9 (U) Secretary of Defense decides to relocate USACOMZEUR headquarters to Worms and SAMA to Zweibruecken, Germany.
- 15 (U) A chartered U.S. air freighter--a Pan American Airways 727 jet--crashes in a Soviet training area a few miles west of Berlin.
- 26 (U) COL R. R. Condit, Jr., replaces BG H. A. Rasmussen as Director, Materiel Readiness Directorate, Logistics Division.

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Event

December

1. (U) USAREUR and Seventh Army Headquarters merge at Heidelberg.
(U) MG F. T. Pachler designated as USAREUR and Seventh Army Deputy Commander in Chief and Chief of Staff.
(U) BG J. J. Wagstaff designated as Headquarters Commandant, and Commanding General, USAREUR and Seventh Army Troops.
(U) Seventh Army Noncommissioned Officers' Academy transferred from assignment to Seventh Army and assigned to U.S. Army School, Europe.
(U) USAREUR Aviation Group (Provisional) organized.
(U) Combat Service Support System (CS3) Assistance Group, Automatic Data Field System Command, attached to Seventh Army Support Command.
(U) Seventh Army Training Center assigned to USAREUR and Seventh Army headquarters.
(U) Seventh Army Communications Command attached to USAREUR and Seventh Army Troops.
(U) Pershing Operational Test Unit integrated into ODCSOPS, USAREUR and Seventh Army headquarters.
(U) Tactical Operations System Development Group and the Field Artillery Digital Automatic Computer/Tactical Imagery Interpretation Facility Team, Europe, attached to USAREUR and Seventh Army Troops.
- 6 (U) LTG J. H. Polk assumes position of USAREUR Deputy Commander in Chief for Seventh Army.
- 8 (U) Harbors and Roads Survey Unit (Provisional), with headquarters at Frankfurt and a field team in Hamburg, assigned to USAREUR.
- 16 (U) MG C. H. Chase replaces MG R. R. Glass as Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence.

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December

- 16 (U) USASETAF terminates flood relief operations.
- 23 (S) Secretary of Defense directs the establishment of a liquidation agency in France; the relocation of certain engineer construction and communications units to Germany and inactivation of the rest; the storage of 30 days' reserve supplies in the United Kingdom, with U.S.-based ordnance units to assist in the movement of ammunition; and the relocation of the 557th QM Company (Aerial Delivery) from France to Germany.

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GLOSSARY (U)

This glossary contains abbreviations used in this report that are not contained in AR 320-50.

<u>Term</u>	<u>Definition</u>
ABREST	Atomic Blast Resistant
ACWS	Air Control and Warning Station
AFGE	American Federation of Government Employees
AFL-CIO	American Federation of Labor - Congress of Industrial Organizations
AFNE	American Forces Network, Europe
AMF	ACE Mobile Forces
AMF-L	ACE Mobile Forces Land Component
ARCCNET	Army Command and Control Network
ARCSA	Aviation Requirements for the Combat Structure of the Army
ATP	Army Transportation Plan
ATAF	Allied Tactical Air Force
BAOR	British Army of the Rhine
C-B	Chemical-Biological
C&E	Clothing and Equipage
CCCPB	Comptroller Civilian Career Planning Board
CDC	Combat Developments Command

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<u>Term</u>	<u>Definition</u>
CH	Controlled Humidity
CINCLANTFLT	Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet
CINCUSAFE	Commander in Chief, U.S. Air Forces in Europe
CLSS	Combat Logistics Support System
COB	Command Operating Budget
COMLANFOR	Land Force Commander
CPR	Civilian Personnel Regulation
CTA	Collective Tariff Agreement
DASO	Demonstration and Shakedown Operations
DCA-EUR	Defense Communications Agency-Europe
DCSC-E	Deputy Chief of Staff, Communications-Electronics
DEPPLAN	Deployment Planning
DISC	Daily Intelligence Summary Cable
DM	<u>Deutsche Mark</u>
EDP	Emergency Defense Plan
EES	European Exchange System
EMATS	Emergency Action Transmission System
ERP	European Reinforcement Plan
ESAF	European Special Activities Facility
ET-A	European Tropospheric Scatter System, Army
EULOC	European Lines of Communication
FAS	Field Alert Status
FASV	FAS Verifications

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<u>Term</u>	<u>Definition</u>
FCC	Flight Control Center
FHMA	Family Housing Management Account
Fr	French
FRAGREP	Fragmentary Report
FRELOC	Fast Relocation of the Line of Communications
GARS	Garrison Alert Status
G.D.R.	German Democratic Republic
GSFG	Group of Soviet Forces, Germany
GSU	General Support Unit
HEADCON	Headquarters Consolidation
H.R.	House Resolution
ICB	International Competitive Bidding
IDHS	Intelligence Data Handling System
JCOC	Joint Combat Operations Center
JET	Joint Environmental Test
LANDCENT	Allied Land Forces, Central Europe
LANDSOUTH	Allied Land Forces, Southern Europe
LCU	Landing Craft Utility
MASO	Military Assistance Sales Order
MISUM	Monthly Intelligence Summary
MLE-CP	Main Lead Element Command Post
MLM	Military Liaison Mission
MOD	Minister of Defense
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<u>Term</u>	<u>Definition</u>
MOVECAP	Movement Capabilities Plan
MTDA	Modified Table of Distribution and Allowances
MTOE	Modified Table of Organization and Equipment
NAADS	New Army Authorization Document System
NAMFI	NATO Missile Firing Installation
NEA	National Education Association
NGF	Northern Group of Forces [Soviet]
NORTHAG	Northern Army Group
NSI	Nuclear Safety Inspection
OEA	Overseas Education Association
OFT	Overseas Federation of Teachers
PAL	Permissive Action Link
PLADS	Parachute Low-Altitude Delivery System
PMCT	PAL Management and Control Team
POT	Pershing Operational Test
PSI	Personnel Security Investigation
QCIR	Quarterly Current Intelligence Report
QRA	Quick Reaction Alert
RONTU	Relocation of Nontactical Units
SAMA	Supply and Maintenance Agency
SAMSA	Standard Army Management System, Supply Support Arrangements

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<u>Term</u>	<u>Definition</u>
SAS	Special Ammunition Support
SED	<u>Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands</u> (Socialist Unity [Communist] Party in West Berlin and East Germany)
SERB	Soviet External Relations Branch
SFG	Special Forces Group
SGF	Southern Group of Forces [Soviet]
SMLM	Soviet Military Liaison Mission
SOTFE	Support Operations Task Force, Europe
TAMIRAD	Tactical Midrange Air Defense
TASTA-70	The Administrative Support, Theater Army-1970
TR	Theater Reserve
U.K.	United Kingdom
USAACOM	U.S. Army Area Command
USACIO-EUR	U.S. Army Command Issuing Office, Europe
USASAE	U.S. Army Security Agency, Europe
USBER	U.S. Mission, Berlin
USDESEA	U.S. Dependents' Schools, European Area
USEAK	U.S. Element Allied <u>Kommandatura</u>
USJTF	U.S. Joint Task Force
USMLM	U.S. Military Liaison Mission
USNAVEUR	U.S. Naval Forces, Europe
U.S.S.R.	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
USTMACE	U.S. Traffic Management Agency, Central Europe
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<u>Term</u>	<u>Definition</u>
UTIB	USAREUR Technical Intelligence Bulletin
UTIC	USAREUR Technical Intelligence Center
VOPO	<u>Volkspolizei</u> (People's Police [East German])
WBK	<u>Wehrbereichskommando</u> (Military District Command [West Germany])

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